University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

June 2020

Privacy-Preserving and Functional Information Systems
Thang Hoang
University of South Florida

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons

Scholar Commons Citation
Hoang, Thang, "Privacy-Preserving and Functional Information Systems" (2020). Graduate Theses and
Dissertations.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/8220

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar
Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Privacy-Preserving and Functional Information Systems

by

Thang Hoang

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
College of Engineering
University of South Florida

Major Professor: Attila A. Yavuz, Ph.D.
Jean-François Biasse, Ph.D.
Morris Chang, Ph.D.
Jay Ligatti, Ph.D.
Xinming (Simon) Ou, Ph.D.
Mike Rosulek, Ph.D.

Date of Approval:
April 22, 2020

Keywords: privacy-enhancing technologies, secure computation, oblivious RAM
Copyright c 2020, Thang Hoang

Dedication

To my beloved family and friends, especially my little Christopher Khang.

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my PhD advisor, Dr. Attila Yavuz, who
devoted significant time and efforts to guide me through my graduate education as well as provide
best advice in life. A special thank to Dr. Jorge Guarjado for offering me internship opportunities
in his research lab and letting me freely explore exciting research areas. Jorge is not only my mentor
but also a friend, who kept giving me invaluable advice in my life and my academic endeavors.
I gratefully acknowledge Dr. Yeongjin Jang and Dr. Mike Rosulek for their training and
education in system security and theoretical cryptography. I would like thank my committee members,
Dr. Jean-François Biasse, Dr. Morris Chang, Dr. Jay Ligatti, Dr. Xinming (Simon) Ou and Dr.
Mike Rosulek, for their invaluable advice and suggestions to improve this dissertation.
I would like to thank all my colleagues at Oregon State University (OSU) and University
of South Florida (USF), Gungor Basa, Rouzbeh Behnia, Gabriel Hackebeil Daniel Lin, Ceyhun
Ozkaptan, Ozgur Ozmen, Peter Rindal, Efe Seyitoglu, Sadman Sakib, Ni Trieu, for their supports. I
am also grateful to all my friends at OSU and USF, who were always be there for me as a major
source of support and encouragement when things got gloomy.
Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratefulness to my family, especially my wife,
Tam Nguyen, for their endless love, support, encouragement and patience throughout my academic
career, all of which cannot be described by words but have to be felt by heart.

Table of Contents

List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

v

List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
Chapter 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 Dissertation Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1
2
5

Chapter 2

Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

Chapter 3 Searchable Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4 IM-DSSE: Searchable Encryption Framework for Critical Cloud Services . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.1 System and Threat Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.1.1 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.1.2 Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.2 Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.3 IM-DSSE Main Scheme. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.3.1 Setup Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.3.2 Search Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.3.3 Update Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.3.4 Cost Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.4 IM-DSSE Extended Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.4.1 IM-DSSEI : Minimized Search Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.4.2 IM-DSSEII : Achieving Cloud SaaS with Backward Privacy . . . . .
3.4.4.3 IM-DSSEI+II : Efficient Search with Backward Privacy . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.5 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.6 Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.6.1 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.6.2 Configurations and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.6.3 Overall Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.6.4 The Impact of Network Quality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.6.5 The Impact of I/O Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.6.6 Cost Breakdown. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.5 FS-DSSE: Forward-Private Searchable Encryption with Efficient Search . . . . . . . . . .
3.5.1 FS-DSSE Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.5.2 Detailed FS-DSSE Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8
8
10
12
13
15
15
16
16
18
18
19
20
21
22
22
25
26
27
34
35
35
37
39
40
41
45
47
47
i

3.5.2.1 Setup Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.5.2.2 Search Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.5.2.3 Update Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.5.4.1 Configurations and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.5.4.2 Overall Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Chapter 4 Oblivious RAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.1 Tree-ORAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.2 Path-ORAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.3 Circuit-ORAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.4 Write-Only ORAM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.5 Oblivious Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.6 Multi-Party Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.6.1 Shamir Secret Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.6.2 Additive Secret Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.7 Private Information Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4 S3 ORAM: A Multi-Server ORAM Framework with Constant Client-Bandwidth . .
4.4.1 System and Security Models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.1.1 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.1.2 Security Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.2 The Proposed S3 ORAM Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.2.1 Data Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.2.2 S3 ORAMO : S3 ORAM with Low Client Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.2.3 S3 ORAMC : S3 ORAM with Low Server Computation . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.3 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.4 Generalization of S3 ORAM on k-ary Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.4.1 k-ary S3 ORAMO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.4.2 k-ary S3 ORAMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.5 Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.5.1 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.5.2 Configuration and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.5.3 End-to-End Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.5.4 Cost Breakdown Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.5.5 The Impact of Network Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.5.6 The Impact of k-ary Tree Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.5.7 Storage Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5 MACAO: A Multi-Server ORAM Framework with Active Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5.1 System and Security Models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5.1.1 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5.1.2 Security Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5.2 The Proposed MACAO Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5.2.1 ORAM in the Malicious Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5.2.2 Our Sub-Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5.2.3 MACAO Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5.2.4 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5.2.5 Cost Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55
55
57
60
60
61
62
63
63
64
64
68
70
72
75
75
76
77
77
80
88
93
98
99
99
101
101
102
105
106
110
112
113
115
118
118
118
120
120
121
127
131
145

3.5.3
3.5.4

ii

4.5.2.6 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5.3.1 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5.3.2 Configuration and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5.3.3 Setup Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5.3.4 Overall Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5.3.5 Cost Breakdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5.3.6 Performance with Varying Privacy Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oblivious Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.6.1 Distributed Data Structure for Oblivious Searchable Encryption . . . . . . .
4.6.1.1 System and Security Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.6.1.2 The Proposed DOD-DSSE Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.6.1.3 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.6.1.4 Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.6.2 ODSE: Oblivious Dynamic Searchable Encryption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.6.2.1 System and Threat Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.6.2.2 The Proposed Semi-Honest ODSE Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.6.2.3 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.6.2.4 ODSE with Malicious Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.6.2.5 Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.6.3 OMAT and OTREE: Oblivious Data Structures for Database Services . .
4.6.3.1 OMAT: Oblivious Access on Table Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.6.3.2 OTREE: Oblivious Access on Tree Structures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.6.3.3 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.6.3.4 Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

147
148
148
149
151
152
154
156
157
157
160
162
166
174
179
181
183
192
193
201
210
213
217
223
224

Chapter 5 Hardware-Supported Oblivious Storage and Query Platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.3 Intel-SGX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4 POSUP: Practical Oblivious Search and Update Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.1 System and Threat Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.1.1 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.1.2 Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.2 POSUP Building Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.3 The Proposed POSUP Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.3.1 Oblivious Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.3.2 POSUP Oblivious Update Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.3.3 POSUP Oblivious Search Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.4 Extension to Multi-User Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.5 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.6 Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.6.1 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.6.2 Configuration and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.6.3 Micro Benchmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.6.4 Search Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.6.5 Update Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.6.6 Storage Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.5 MOSE: Multi-User Oblivious Storage Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.5.1 High-Level Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.5.2 System and Threat Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

231
231
233
235
237
239
239
241
242
244
244
247
250
252
253
255
255
256
258
261
263
264
265
266
268

4.5.3

4.6

iii

5.5.3

5.5.4
5.5.5

5.5.2.1 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.5.2.2 Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Design of MOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.5.3.1 System Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.5.3.2 Handling User Request with Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.5.3.3 Towards Scalable Oblivious Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.5.5.1 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.5.5.2 Configurations and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.5.5.3 Single Request Processing Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.5.5.4 Delay Breakdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.5.5.5 Optimized MOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.5.5.6 Multi-User Concurrent Access Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.5.5.7 Storage Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

268
270
271
271
272
275
277
281
281
282
283
285
285
288
289

Chapter 6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
6.1 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
Appendix A: Copyright Permissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . End Page

iv

List of Tables

Table 4.1

Summary of S3 ORAM schemes and some of their counterparts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Table 4.2

S3 ORAM notation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Table 4.3

Amount of data to be sent by the client and processed by the server(s). . . . . . . . . . . 105

Table 4.4

Summary of state-of-the-art ORAM schemes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

Table 4.5

Security and performance of DOD-DSSE vs. its counterparts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

Table 4.6

Total size of encrypted data structure(s) in GB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Table 4.7

ODSE symbols and notation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184

Table 4.8

Comparison of ODSE and its counterparts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

Table 4.9

Transmission cost and client storage for compared schemes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

Table 5.1

Micro-benchmark of POSUP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

Table 5.2

Delay of base-case MOSE in processing one user request. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284

v

List of Figures

Figure 3.1

IM-DSSE framework for file-storage services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Figure 3.2

IM-DSSEmain detailed algorithms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Figure 3.3

IM-DSSEmain detailed algorithms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Figure 3.4

IM-DSSEmain detailed algorithms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Figure 3.5

IM-DSSEI detailed algorithms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Figure 3.6

IM-DSSEII detailed algorithms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Figure 3.7

Latency of IM-DSSE with fast network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Figure 3.8

IM-DSSE delay with moderate network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Figure 3.9

IM-DSSE delay on SSD, and (a,b) fast and (c,d) moderate networks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Figure 3.10 Detailed costs of IM-DSSE with moderate network and SSD storage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Figure 3.11 IM-DSSE delay on mobile, RAM and (a,b) fast and (c,d) moderate networks. . . . . . 40
Figure 3.12 IM-DSSE delay on mobile, SSD and (a,b) fast and (c,d) moderate networks. . . . . . . 40
Figure 3.13 Detailed costs of IM-DSSE on mobile with moderate network and SSD storage. . . . 40
Figure 3.14 FS-DSSE setup algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Figure 3.15 FS-DSSE search protocol.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Figure 3.16 FS-DSSE update protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Figure 3.17 Latency of FS-DSSE and its counterparts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Figure 3.18 Cost breakdown of search query in FS-DSSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Figure 4.1

Tree-ORAM paradigm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
vi

Figure 4.2

Oblivious data structure for a tree. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Figure 4.3

Shamir secret sharing scheme. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Figure 4.4

Secure multi-party multiplication protocol on SSS shares. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Figure 4.5

Authenticated additive secret sharing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Figure 4.6

XOR-based PIR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Figure 4.7

SSS-based PIR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Figure 4.8

S3 ORAM setup algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Figure 4.9

General access procedure in S3 ORAM schemes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Figure 4.10 SSS-based PIR scheme. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Figure 4.11 S3 ORAMO retrieval subroutine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Figure 4.12 S3 ORAMO eviction subroutine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Figure 4.13 The triplet eviction using SSS and SMM protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Figure 4.14 S3 ORAMO triplet eviction with SSS scheme and SMM protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Figure 4.15 S3 ORAMC retrieval subroutine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Figure 4.16 S3 ORAMC eviction subroutine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Figure 4.17 S3 ORAMO eviction based on [179] using SSS and SMM protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Figure 4.18 S3 ORAMC eviction protocol based on [179]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Figure 4.19 Delay of S3 ORAM and its counterparts on a laptop with home network. . . . . . . . . . 106
Figure 4.20 Delay of S3 ORAM for varying block sizes for a 40GB DB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Figure 4.21 Detailed cost breakdown of S3 ORAM on a laptop with home network. . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Figure 4.22 The delay of S3 ORAM schemes with geographically distant servers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Figure 4.23 The impact of client network throughput.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Figure 4.24 The impact of tree degree. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
vii

Figure 4.25 Authenticated matrix multiplication with RSS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Figure 4.26 Authenticated matrix multiplication with SPDZ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Figure 4.27 Authenticated XOR-PIR on additively shared database. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Figure 4.28 Authenticated RSS-PIR on additively shared database. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Figure 4.29 Authenticated SPDZ-PIR on additively shared database.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Figure 4.30 Permutation matrix for Circuit-ORAM eviction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Figure 4.31 MACAO access structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Figure 4.32 MACAOrss retrieval. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Figure 4.33 MACAOrss eviction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Figure 4.34 MACAOspdz retrieval. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Figure 4.35 MACAOspdz eviction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Figure 4.36 End-to-end delay of MACAO schemes and their counterparts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Figure 4.37 Cost breakdown of MACAO schemes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Figure 4.38 End-to-end delay with varied privacy levels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Figure 4.39 Search/update operation on the encrypted index in DOD-DSSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Figure 4.40 Distributed encrypted index generated from the file collection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
Figure 4.41 DOD-DSSE setup algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Figure 4.42 DOD-DSSE access protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
Figure 4.43 DOD-DSSE key generation algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Figure 4.44 DOD-DSSE assign subroutine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Figure 4.45 DOD-DSSE query creation subroutine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
Figure 4.46 DOD-DSSE decryption subroutine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
Figure 4.47 DOD-DSSE client state update subroutine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
viii

Figure 4.48 End-to-end cryptographic delay with in-state network latency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Figure 4.49 End-to-end cryptographic delay with out-state network setting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Figure 4.50 ODSE research objective and high-level approach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Figure 4.51 ODSEwo
xor setup algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
Figure 4.52 ODSEwo
xor search protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
Figure 4.53 ODSEwo
xor update protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Figure 4.54 ODSEwo
ro setup algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Figure 4.55 ODSEwo
ro search protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
Figure 4.56 ODSEwo
ro update protocol.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Figure 4.57 ODSEwo
it setup algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
Figure 4.58 ODSEwo
it search protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
Figure 4.59 ODSEwo
it update protocol.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Figure 4.60 MD-ODSEwo
xor setup algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Figure 4.61 MD-ODSEwo
xor search protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Figure 4.62 MD-ODSEwo
xor update protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
Figure 4.63 MR-ODSEwo
ro setup algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
Figure 4.64 MR-ODSEwo
ro search protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
Figure 4.65 MR-ODSEwo
ro update protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
Figure 4.66 MR-ODSEwo
it setup algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
Figure 4.67 MR-ODSEwo
it search protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
Figure 4.68 MR-ODSEwo
it update protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Figure 4.69 Latency of semi-honest ODSE schemes and their counterparts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Figure 4.70 Detailed search (S) and update (U) costs of semi-honest ODSE schemes.. . . . . . . . . 206
ix

Figure 4.71 Delay of semi-honest ODSE with different query sizes.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Figure 4.72 Delay of maliciously-secure ODSE schemes with one malicious adversary. . . . . . . . . 208
Figure 4.73 Delay of maliciously-secure ODSE schemes with several malicious servers. . . . . . . . 208
Figure 4.74 OMAT and OTREE motivation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
Figure 4.75 Overview of our proposed techniques. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
Figure 4.76 OMAT structure for oblivious access on table.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
Figure 4.77 OMAT access protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
Figure 4.78 The OTREE layout for a tree data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
Figure 4.79 OTREE access protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
Figure 4.80 Average bucket load in OTREE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
Figure 4.81 Probability of stash size exceeding the threshold. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Figure 4.82 OTREE example for range queries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
Figure 4.83 Delay of OMAT and its counterparts with fast network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
Figure 4.84 Delay of OMAT and its counterparts with moderate network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Figure 4.85 Delay of OTREE and ODS-Tree. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
Figure 5.1

An overview of POSUP workflow. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

Figure 5.2

OGet function in POSUP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

Figure 5.3

Illustration of ODS-IDX and ODS-DB packaged into ORAM tree in POSUP. . . . . . 244

Figure 5.4

Setup algorithm to construct oblivious data structures in POSUP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246

Figure 5.5

POSUP oblivious update protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

Figure 5.6

POSUP search protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

Figure 5.7

File size distribution in enwiki dataset in CDF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

Figure 5.8

Detailed search delay of POSUP and its counterparts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
x

Figure 5.9

End-to-end update delay of POSUP with a 290 KB file size. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264

Figure 5.10 MOSE initialization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
Figure 5.11 Setting up EAC and EDB components in MOSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
Figure 5.12 Oblivious access workflow in MOSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
Figure 5.13 Processing user request in MOSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
Figure 5.14 User permission update in MOSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
Figure 5.15 Delay breakdown of MOSE on a single user request. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
Figure 5.16 Impact of caching on the I/O delay and memory usage of MOSE scheme. . . . . . . . . 286
Figure 5.17 Impact of CPU cores on the efficiency and scalability of MOSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
Figure 5.18 Performance of MOSE vs. TaoStore under 1 Gbps network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288

xi

Abstract

Information systems generally involve storage and analytics of large-scale data, many of
which may be highly sensitive (e.g., personal information, medical records). It is vital to ensure that
these systems not only provide essential functionalities at large scale efficiently but also achieve a high
level of security against cyber threats. However, there are significant research challenges in offering
security and privacy for such information systems while preserving their original functionalities (e.g.,
search, analytics) effectively. Hence, there is a critical need for efficient cryptographic protocols that
can address data privacy vs. utilization dilemma for real-life applications.
In this dissertation, we introduce a new series of privacy-enhancing technologies toward
enabling breach-resilient and functional information systems. We focus on privacy-preserving
data outsourcing applications featuring critical functionalities such as data query, accessibility and
analytics. Specifically, we designed new dynamic searchable encryption schemes that permit the client
to perform encrypted search and update queries on the encrypted data. We proposed new distributed
oblivious access frameworks that allow the client to access and compute over the outsourced data
efficiently without leaking the access pattern, thereby achieving a very high level of privacy in the
presence of powerful adversaries. Finally, we built several privacy-preserving data storage and query
platforms, which harness Trusted Execution Environment to enable critical functionalities (e.g.,
search, update, concurrent access), security (e.g., access control, integrity) and privacy properties
(e.g., access pattern obliviousness) in a highly efficient manner (i.e., high throughput, low delay).
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Data privacy vs. utilization is one of the most fundamental dilemmas in many applications
ranging from personal data outsourcing to large-scale breach-resilient infrastructures. Recent
cyberattacks targeting online applications (e.g., Apple iCloud, Equifax, British Airways), in which
the privacy of millions of customers was compromised, have demonstrated the importance of preserving
data secrecy on the untrusted execution environment. While standard encryption techniques (e.g.,
AES) can offer data confidentiality, they also prevent the user from performing even simple operations
(e.g., search/update) on the encrypted data, thereby diminishing the data usability. On the other
hand, although there exist functional encryption techniques such as homomorphic encryption [69]
and garbled circuit [188] that can enable data confidentiality and secure computation simultaneously,
they are mainly designed for general purposes. These techniques may incur high communication and
computation overhead, which may not be feasible for some real-world applications that have specific
resource constraints and functionality requirements.
To enable some fundamental functionalities (e.g., search/update) while preserving user privacy,
recent studies focus on designing either novel cryptographic protocols with provable security (e.g.,
searchable encryption) [35, 36, 49, 109], or encrypted queries that can be compliant with the legacy
(database) infrastructures (e.g., mySQL, mongoDB) [147]. Despite many efforts, all these techniques
have been shown to be vulnerable against many practical attacks that exploited the way how the user
access their own data on the untrusted memory (e.g., access pattern) [34, 103, 124, 137, 148, 190].
To seal such a leakage, several secure access techniques such as Oblivious RAM [75] (ORAM) and
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Private Information Retrieval [45] (PIR) were proposed. Despite their very high level of privacy and
security guarantee, all these techniques incur high communication/computation overhead, which was
shown costly to be used in many large-scale applications [20, 136].
Our main research objective is to address the security vs. functionality (e.g., private search,
update, access, analytics) dilemma of certain applications by creating new cryptographic schemes,
which can meet security requirements, while respecting the original functionalities along with
optimizations. This generally involves a three-step research process as follows. We first determine the
critical security requirements of real-world applications and then examine their unique characteristics
(e.g., architecture, performance, system requirements). Second, we seek synergies among various
cryptographic primitives to fill the needs of such applications regarding their special constraints while
guaranteeing provable security. Finally, we fully implement the proposed techniques and strictly
evaluate their performance on a myriad of real-world infrastructures.
We outline our contributions toward enabling privacy-preserving and functional information
systems in the following section.

1.1

Contributions
In this dissertation, we propose a series of privacy-enhancing techniques, which features a

high level of security and privacy while, at the same time, offering mandatory functionalities (e.g.,
search, update, analytics) for critical cyberinfrastructures. To make our techniques efficient and
more practical to be used in practice, we explore a broad range of system architecture spanning from
the standard (client-server) model to the distributed setting and Trusted Execution Environments
(TEE). We highlight our proposed schemes and their properties as follows.
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1. New Efficient Dynamic Searchable Encryption Schemes: We develop several new searchable
encryption techniques called IM-DSSE [97] (see §3.4), FS-DSSE [143] (see §3.5) with rigorous
security analyses and full-fledged implementations. One of the most notable security features is
that they are among the first to offer forward privacy, backward privacy and size obliviousness,
all of which are mandatory to prevent statistical analysis attacks. We deployed all the proposed
schemes on real cloud platforms, and the experimental results confirmed their significant
advantages over the state-of-the-art in various performance and security metrics.
2. Efficient Distributed Oblivious Access Techniques: While Oblivious RAM (ORAM) [75] can hide
the access pattern leakage in many applications (e.g., searchable encryption, data outsourcing,
secure CPU, multi-party computation, blockchains), state-of-the-art ORAM schemes either
incur a logarithmic communication overhead [169, 179] or expensive cryptographic operations
such as homomorphic encryption [54], both of which were shown costly in the context of data
outsourcing [20, 89, 136]. Toward making ORAM more practical, we have investigated ORAM in
various settings including distributed computation and TEE. We first construct S3 ORAM[89, 95],
a multi-server ORAM framework based on secret sharing (see §4.4). S3 ORAM is among the
first distributed ORAM that offers the most desirable properties for data outsourcing including
low delay, low client-server bandwidth and small storage overhead without relying on costly
cryptographic primitives such as homomorphic encryption. We further develop MACAO [87], a
multi-server ORAM framework, which not only inherits all the desired performance properties
from S3 ORAM but also offers security guarantee against malicious adversaries (see §4.5). We
fully implemented both S3 ORAM and MACAO and the experiments on real-cloud platforms
indicated that they were one order of magnitude faster than most efficient (single-server) ORAMs
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featuring logarithmic bandwidth, and at least three orders of magnitude faster than HE-based
ORAM alternatives featuring constant bandwidth.
3. Oblivious Data Structures for Searchable Encryption and Database Services: Access pattern is
one of the most fundamental leakages in searchable encryption, on which many attacks have
exploited to compromise the data and keyword privacy. We develop a series of oblivious data
structures for searchable encryption, which can conceal/mitigate the search/update pattern
leakages on the encrypted index while retaining the efficiency of search and update functionalities.
We propose DOD-DSSE, which breaks the linkability between consecutive search/update queries
by distributing the encrypted index across two non-colluding servers (see §4.6.1). This strategy
prevents statistical attacks from exploiting the public information about the keyword frequency
while achieving a high level of efficiency. We further develop ODSE framework [93, 94], which
offers fully oblivious search and update operations on the encrypted index and robustness against
the malicious adversaries with information-theoretic security (see §4.6.2). This is achieved
by exploiting some unique properties of searchable encryption along with synergizing various
efficient oblivious access primitives. We further propose several oblivious data structures called
OMAT and OTREE [88], which are specially designed to be effectively integrated with state-ofthe-art ORAM schemes to enable oblivious queries on legacy database management systems
(e.g., MongoDB, SQL) (see §4.6.3). The experimental results demonstrated the performance of
our proposed techniques, compared with the state-of-the-art when tested on commodity cloud
platforms (i.e., Amazon EC2).
4. Hardware-Supported Oblivious Storage and Query Platforms: We also explore secure hardware
techniques to build privacy-preserving and functional data storage systems. We designed
POSUP platform [91], which enables oblivious search and update functionalities with very low
4

latency for personal data outsourcing, by synergizing Intel SGX, efficient ORAM paradigms and
oblivious data structures (see §5.4). We fully implemented POSUP and intensively benchmarked
its performance on a very large dataset (i.e., full Wikipedia dataset) with commodity hardware.
The experimental results confirmed the efficiency of POSUP, where it was up to three orders of
magnitude faster than the state-of-the-art. Finally, we build MOSE [86], an oblivious storage
platform using Intel SGX to enable private concurrent access for multiple users sharing a
common database (see §5.5).

1.2

Dissertation Organization
We organize this dissertation as follows. We first present common notation being used

throughout the rest of the dissertation in §2. In §3, we present a general overview of searchable
encryption as well as our proposed IM-DSSE framework [97] (§3.4) and FS-DSSE scheme [143] (§3.5)
in detail. In §4, we discuss ORAM and present our proposed S3 ORAM framework [89] (§4.4) and
MACAO frameworks §4.5 in detail. We also present our proposed oblivious data structures techniques
in §4.6 including DOD-DSSE (§4.6.1), ODSE (§4.6.2) and OMAT (§4.6.3). In §5, we present the
overview of hardware-supported privacy-preserving information processing systems followed by our
proposed POSUP platform [91] (§5.4) and MOSE platform [86] (§5.5) in detail. Finally, §6 concludes
this dissertation and discusses our future work.
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Chapter 2: Notation

We start by defining notation being frequently used in this dissertation. We denote || and ⊕
as the concatenation and the Exclusive-OR (XOR) operation, respectively. |x| denotes the size of
x. Given a bit b, ¬b means the complement of b. bxc and dxe denote the floor and the ceiling of x,
respectively. h·ibin denotes the binary representation. [N ] means {1, . . . , N }. We denote {0, 1}∗ as a
$

set of binary strings of any finite length. x ← S denotes that x is randomly and uniformly selected
from set S. |S| denotes the cardinality of set S. S \ {x} (or S − {x}) denotes x ∈ S is removed from
$

$

$

S. (x1 , . . . , xl ) ← S means (x1 ← S, . . . , xl ← S).
Given u and v as vectors with the same length, u · v denotes the dot product of u and v.
Given an n-dimensional vector u and a matrix I of size n × m, v = u · I denotes the matrix product
of u and I resulting in an m-dimensional vector v. I[i][∗] (or I[i, ∗]) and I[∗][j] (or I[∗, j]) denote
accessing the row i and column j of matrix I, respectively. A[i, j] denotes accessing the element at
row i and column j of A. If I is a matrix then Iu denotes the row indexed by u (i.e., Iu = I[u, ∗]).
We abuse this notation to also indicate a whole column indexed by u (i.e., Iu = I[∗, u]). This abuse
of notation simplifies somewhat the presentation of our schemes. I[∗, a . . . b] (or I[∗][a . . . b]) denotes
accessing columns from a to b of matrix u[i] denotes accessing the i-th component of u. I[∗][i . . . j]
denotes accessing the columns from i to j of matrix I.
We denote an encryption scheme with Indistinguishability against Chosen Plaintext Attack
(IND-CPA) as a triplet E = (Gen, Enc, Dec), where k ← E.Gen(1λ ) generates a symmetric key k
given a security parameter 1λ ; c ← E.Enck (M ) returns the ciphertext c of M encrypted with key k;
6

M ← E.Deck (c) returns the plaintext M of c, which is previously encrypted by k. Given a counter
u, we denote c ← Enck (M, u) as IND-CPA encryption scheme, which takes as input a secret key k,
the counter u and a message M and returns a ciphertext c. We denote M ← Deck (c, u) as IND-CPA
decryption scheme, which takes as input a key k, the counter u and ciphertext c, and returns message
M.
We denote a Pseudo Random Function (PRF) is a polynomial-time computable function,
which is indistinguishable from a true random function by any PPT adversary We denote a keyed
$

Pseudo Random Function (PRF) as τ ← Gk (x), which takes as input a secret key k ← {0, 1}κ and a
string x, and returns a token/key r. We also denote τ ← KDF(x) as a key derivation function, which
takes as input an arbitrary string x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and outputs a key τ . We denote H : {0, 1}|x| → {0, 1}
as a Random Oracle (RO), which takes an input x and returns a bit.
We denote a finite field as Fp , where p is a prime. Unless otherwise stated, a · b (or ab)
denotes the scalar multiplication, and all arithmetic operations are performed over Fp .

7

Chapter 3: Searchable Encryption1

3.1

Introduction
The advent of cloud storage and computing platform provides vast benefits to the human

society and IT industry. One of the most eminent cloud services is Storage-as-a-Service (SaaS),
which offer a sophisticated infrastructure for millions of users, ranging from individuals to large-scale
businesses, to store and access their own data remotely, thereby significantly reducing the data
management and maintenance costs. Despite its effectiveness, SaaS also brings significant security
and privacy concerns. Specifically, once a user outsources their personal data to the cloud, sensitive
information (e.g., email, bank transactions) might be exploited by a malicious party (i.e., malware).
Standard encryption such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) can enable data confidentiality,
However, it also prevents the user from searching or updating information on the cloud and therefore,
completely invalidates the benefits of using SaaS services. Such a data privacy vs. utilization dilemma
poses a critical research challenge in enabling the security and privacy while, at the same time,
retaining the functionality and efficiency of the underlying cloud services.
Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) [49] permits a user to encrypt data in such a way
that they can later perform keyword searches on. These encrypted queries are performed via “search
tokens” [165] over an encrypted index, which represents the relationship between search token
(keywords) and encrypted files. A prominent application of SSE is to enable privacy-preserving
keyword search on the cloud (e.g., Amazon S3), where the data owner can outsource a collection of
1

This chapter was published in [97, 143]. Permission is included in Appendix A.
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encrypted files and perform keyword searches on it without revealing the file and query contents
[109]. Preliminary SSE schemes (e.g., [49, 163]) only provide search-only functionality on static data
(i.e., no dynamism), which strictly limits their applicability due to the lack of update capacity. Later,
several Dynamic SSE (DSSE) schemes [35, 109] were proposed that permit the user to add and
delete files after the system is set up. As a trade-off between security efficiency, there is no single
DSSE scheme that can outperform all the other alternatives in terms of all the metrics: privacy
(e.g., information leakage), performance (e.g., search, update delay), storage efficiency and query
functionality (e.g., range, boolean).
Although a number of DSSE schemes have been introduced in the literature, most of them
only provide a theoretical analysis and a prototype implementation. The lack of experimental
performance evaluations on real platforms creates a challenge in assessing the application and
performance of proposed DSSE schemes, as the impacts of hidden computation costs, multi-round
communication delay and storage blowup might be overlooked. Moreover, several studies have
shown that the most efficient (sublinear) DSSE schemes [35, 82] leak significant information and
are vulnerable to statistical inference analysis [34, 148, 190]. For instance, Zhang et al. [190] has
demonstrated a file-injection attack strategy, in which the semi-honest adversary can recover all
keywords being searched or updated in the context of applying DSSE for personal email. It has been
identified that the forward-privacy is an imperative security feature for modern DSSE constructions to
mitigate the impact of the attack. Several forward-secure DSSE schemes with an optimal asymptotic
complexity have been proposed, they incur either high delay due to public-key operations [26], or
high storage blow-up at both client and server side [165, 189].
Therefore, it is vital to develop new DSSE schemes that can achieve a high level of security
with a well-quantified information leakage, while maintaining a performance and functionality balance
9

between the search and update operations. More importantly, it is critical that the performance
of proposed DSSE schemes should be experimentally evaluated in a realistic cloud environment
with various parameter settings, rather than relying on asymptotic results. The investigation of
alternative data structures and their optimized implementations on commodity hardware seem to be
the key factors towards achieving these objectives.

3.2

Related Work
SE has been proposed in both symmetric [97, 109, 163] (known as SSE) and asymmetric

[15, 16, 24] (commonly known as PEKS) settings. In this dissertation, we mainly focus on SSE
techniques. SSE was first introduced by Song et al. [163]. Curtmola et al. [49] proposed a
sublinear SSE scheme and introduced the security notion for SSE called adaptive security against
chosen-keyword attacks (CKA2) (see Definition 1). Refinements of [49] have been proposed, which
offer extended functionalities [33, 171]. However, the static nature of those schemes limited their
applicability to applications that require dynamic file collections. Kamara et al. were among the
first to develop a DSSE scheme in [109] that could handle dynamic file collections via an encrypted
index. However, it leaks significant information for updates and it is not parallelizable. Kamara et al.
[108] proposed a DSSE scheme, which leaks less information than that of [109] and is parallelizable.
Recently, a series of new DSSE schemes [26, 35, 82, 107, 138, 165] have been proposed, which offer
various trade-offs between security, functionality and efficiency properties such as small leakage [165],
scalable searches with various query and data types [36, 65, 107, 170, 175–177], or high efficiency
[138]. Inspired by the work from [35], Kamara et al. in [107] proposed a new sublinear DSSE scheme,
which supports more complex queries such as disjunctive and boolean queries.
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Zhang et al. in [190] later showed that new DSSE constructions should offer the forwardprivacy property to mitigate the impact of practical attacks. Several forward-private DSSE schemes
achieving high efficiency in terms of asymptotic complexity and actual performance have been
proposed. Specifically, Bost et al. in [26] proposed Sophos, which offers forward-privacy using an
asymmetric primitive (i.e., trapdoor permutation). Rizomiliotis et al. in [153] leveraged ORAM
techniques [169] (see §4) to enable forward-privacy. Recently, several forward-private DSSE schemes
only relying on symmetric primitives have been proposed [58, 115, 118, 164], some of which offer
parallelism [58, 115, 118],and improved I/O access with computation efficiency using a caching
strategy [115, 118, 164]. For example, Lai et al. [118] modeled the relationship between keywords
and files in DSSE as bipartite graphs. The authors also proposed a novel data structure called
cascaded triangles, which offers parallelism and efficient update (add/delete). Kim et al. [115]
leveraged two hash tables to integrate forward index and inverted index together in the form of
encrypted index, which offers efficient update with direct deletion. Several forward-private DSSE
schemes, which offer extended query functionalities such as boolean query [107], similarity search
[177] were also proposed. Bost et al. [27] proposed some (single-keyword) DSSE schemes that achieve
both forward-privacy and backward-privacy with optimal asymptotic complexity using asymmetric
primitives.
Due to the deterministic keyword-file relationship, most traditional DSSE schemes (including
our framework) leak search and access patterns (to be defined in Definition 2), which are vulnerable
to statistical inference attacks [34, 103, 124, 148, 190]). Several DSSE schemes have been proposed
to deal with such leakages [25]) but they are neither efficient nor provably secure. ORAM [169] or
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [45, 73] can hide search and access patterns in DSSE. However,
its cost is still high to be applied to DSSE in practice [136].
11

3.3

Preliminaries
The security notion for DSSE is Dynamic adaptive security against Chosen-Keyword Attacks

(CKA2) security [108, 109, 165, 189]), which captures information leakage via leakage functions
characterizing the information leakage due to search and update operations (see [108, 165, 189] for
the details).
Definition 1 (IND-CKA2 Security [49, 109]). Let A be a stateful adversary and S be a stateful
simulator. Consider the following probabilistic experiments:

• RealA (κ): The challenger executes K ← Gen(1κ ). A produces (δ, f) and receives (γ, C) ←
EncK (δ, f) from the challenger. A makes polynomially bounded number of adaptive queries

Query ∈ (w, fid , fid0 ) to the challenger. If Query = w is a keyword search query then A receives
a search token τw ← SearchToken(K, w) from the challenger. If Query = fid is a file addition
query then A receives an addition token (τf , c) ← AddToken(K, fid ) from the challenger. If
Query = fid0 is a file deletion query then A receives a deletion token τf0 ← DeleteToken(K, fid0 )
from the challenger. Eventually, A returns a bit b that is the output of the experiment.
• IdealA,S (κ): A produces (δ, f). Given L1 (δ, f), S generates and sends (γ, C) to A. A makes
a polynomial number of adaptive queries Query ∈ (w, fid , fid0 ) to S. For each query, S is
given L2 (δ, f, w, t). If Query = w then S returns a simulated search token τw . If Query = fid or
Query = fid0 , S returns a simulated addition token τf or deletion token τf0 ,respectively. Eventually,
A returns a bit b that is the output of the experiment.
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A DSSE is said to be (L1 , L2 , L3 )-secure against adaptive chosen-keyword attacks (CKA2-security)
if for all PPT adversaries A, there exists a PPT simulator S such that

|Pr[RealA (κ) = 1] − Pr[IdealA,S (κ) = 1]| ≤ neg(κ)

All existing DSSE schemes (e.g. [35, 36, 82, 138, 165, 189] with Dynamic CKA2 security leak
data structure-access pattern [168] defined as follows:
→ = {op(b) , u(b) , data(b) }q
Definition 2 (Access Pattern). Access pattern is a data request sequence −
σ
b
i
i
i
i=1
of length q over an encrypted memory region on server Sb during search and update operations,
(b)

(b)

(b)

(b)

(b)

(b)

where opi ∈ {read(ui , datai ), write(ui , datai )}, ui
(b)

or written and datai

(b)

is the data located at ui

is the address identifier on Sb to be read

to be read or written on Sb .

Access pattern leaks search patterns and update patterns, which can be defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Search and Update Pattern). Search pattern indicates if the same keyword has been
previously searched. Given a query on w at time t, the search pattern is a binary vector of length t
with 1 at location i if the search i ≤ t was for w, 0 otherwise. Update pattern indicates information
being leaked during an update operation with different levels, in that level 1 (as defined in [189])
leaks least information, which is similar to search pattern.

3.4

IM-DSSE: Searchable Encryption Framework for Critical Cloud Services

Towards filling the gaps between theory and practice in DSSE research community, we
introduce IM-DSSE, a fully-implemented Incidence Matrix-based DSSE framework which favors
desirable properties for realistic privacy-critical cloud systems including high security against practical
attacks and low end-to-end delay. In this framework, we provide the full-fledged implementation of
13

our DSSE schemes, which are specially designed to meet various application requirements and cloud
data storage-as-a-service infrastructures in practice.
IM-DSSE offers ideal features for privacy-critical cloud systems as follows.

• Highly secure against file-injection attacks: IM-DSSE offers forward privacy (see [165] or §3.4.5
for definition) which is an imperative security feature to mitigate the impact of practical fileinjection attacks [26, 190]. Only a limited number of DSSE schemes offer this property (i.e.,
[26, 58, 115, 118, 153, 164, 165, 177]), some of which incur high client storage with costly update
(e.g., [165]) or high delay, due to oblivious access techniques (e.g., [153]) and public-key operations
(e.g., [26]).

Additionally, IM-DSSE offers size-obliviousness property, where it hides all size

information involved with the encrypted index and update query including (i) update query size
(i.e., number of unique keywords in the updated file); (ii) and the number of keyword-file pairs in
the database. One of the IM-DSSE variants achieves backward privacy defined in [165]. We notice
that Bost et al. in [27] have recently proposed a new DSSE scheme that can achieve all these
security properties with padding. This scheme leverages asymmetric primitives (e.g., puncturable
encryption [79]), which might incur high computation cost. Our scheme relies on symmetric
primitives but with the cost of an extra communication overhead.
• Updates with improved features: (i) IM-DSSE allows to directly update keywords of an existing
file without invoking the file delete-then-add operation sequence. The update in IM-DSSE also
leaks minimal information, where it does not leak timing information (i.e., all updates take the
same amount of time) and how many keywords are being added/deleted in the updated file. (ii)
The encrypted index of our schemes does not grow with update operations and, therefore, it does
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not require re-encryption due to frequent updates. This is more efficient than some alternatives
(e.g.,[165]) in which the encrypted index can grow linearly with the number of deletions.
• Fully parallelizable: IM-DSSE also supports parallelization (as in [35, 58, 115, 118]) for both update
and search operations and, therefore, it takes full advantage of modern computing architecture to
minimize the delay of cryptographic operations. Experiments on Amazon cloud indicates that
the search latency of our framework is highly practical and mostly dominated by the client-server
communication (see §3.4.6).
• Detailed experimental evaluation and open-source framework: We deployed IM-DSSE in a realistic
cloud environment (i.e., Amazon EC2) to assess the practicality of our framework. We experimented with different database sizes and investigated the impacts of network condition and
storage unit on the overall performance. We also evaluated the performance of IM-DSSE on a
resource-limited mobile client. We gave a comprehensive cost breakdown analysis to highlight
the main factors contributing to the overall delay in all these settings. We have released the
implementation of our framework to public to provide opportunities for broad adaptation and
testing [85] (see §3.4.6).

Figure 3.1 illustrates the overview of our IM-DSSE framework for file-storage applications.

3.4.1 System and Threat Models
3.4.1.1

System Model
Our system model comprises one server and one client, which can be mobile resource-

constrained (e.g., cell phone) as illustrated in Figure 3.1. Our model can be extended into multiple
clients that share the same keys.
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CLOUD
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To search for keyword 𝑤𝑖 :

CLIENT

1. Generate token

𝑡𝑖

ENCRYPTED INDEX
𝐜1
𝑡1

(𝑓1 , … , 𝑓𝑛′ )

To update file 𝑓𝑗 :

CLIENT

3. Decrypt

1. Encrypt file

… 𝐜𝑚

2. Look-up associated 𝐜𝑖

… 𝑡𝑚

ENCRYPTED FILES

𝐜𝑖 = (𝑐1 , … , 𝑐𝑛′ )

1. Generate token

… 𝐜𝑖

… 𝑡𝑖

(𝑐1 , … , 𝑐𝑛 )
𝑡𝑗
𝑐𝑗

2. Update 𝑡𝑗

ENCRYPTED INDEX
𝑡1

… 𝑡𝑗

… 𝑡𝑚

2. Update 𝑐𝑗

ENCRYPTED FILES

(𝑐1 , … 𝑐𝑗 , … , 𝑐𝑛 )

Figure 3.1: IM-DSSE framework for file-storage services.
3.4.1.2

Threat Model
In our threat model, the client is trusted and the server is honest-but-curious, meaning that

it follows the protocol faithfully but attempts to extract sensitive information during the client’s
search/update operations. The server can know the encrypted files, the encrypted index and record
the transcripts of the protocol. Our objective is to allow the client to perform search and update
operations in a secure manner, in which files can be securely retrieved/updated while leaking least
information to the server. Specifically, once the server is compromised, the client should only leak
the query content and no file contents or specific keywords are ever compromised. Since search and
update tokens are deterministic, our IM-DSSE framework leaks search, and file-access patterns as in
all other DSSE schemes. We present the formal security model in §3.4.5.

3.4.2 Data Structures
Our encrypted index is an incidence matrix I, in which I[i, j].v ∈ {0, 1} stores the (encrypted)
relationship between keyword indexing at row i and file indexing at column j, and I[i, j].st ∈ {0, 1}
stores a bit indicating the state of I[i, j].v. Particularly, I[i, j].st is set to 1 or 0 if I[i, j].v is last
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K ← IM-DSSEmain .Gen(1κ ): Given security parameter κ, generate secret key K
$

1: k1 ← E.Gen(1κ ) and (k2 , k3 ) ← {0, 1}κ
2: return K, where K ← {k1 , k2 , k3 }
f ← IM-DSSEmain .DecK (c): Decrypt encrypted file c with key κ
1: f ← Deck1 c0 , y||c where c ← Tf [y].ct, (c0 , y) ← c
2: return f
(γ, C) ← IM-DSSEmain .EncK (δ, f): Given index δ and plaintext files f, generate corresponding encrypted index γ
and encrypted files C
1: Tw [i].ct ← 1, Tf [j].ct ← 1, for 0 ≤ i ≤ m, 0 ≤ j ≤ n
2: I[∗, ∗].st ← 0 and δ[∗, ∗] ← 0
3: Extract (w1 , . . . , wm0 ) from f = {fid1 , . . . , fidn0 }
4: for i = 1, . . . , m0 do
5:
swi ← Gk2 (wi ), xi ← Tw (swi )
6:
for j = 1, . . . , n0 do
7:
if wi appears in fidj then
8:
sidj ← Gk2 (idj ) and yj ← Tf (sidj )
9:
δ[xi , yj ] ← 1
10: for i = 1, . . . , m do
11:
ri ← Gk3 (i||ci ), where ci ← Tw [i].ct
12:
for j = 1, . . . , n do
13:
I[i, j] ← δ[i, j] ⊕ H(ri ||j||cj ), where cj ← Tf [j].ct
14: for j = 1, . . . , n0 do
15:
cj ← (c0j , yj ), where c0j ← Enck1 fidj , yj ||uyj
16: return (γ, C), where γ ← (I, Tf ) and C ← {c1 , . . . , cn0 }

Figure 3.2: IM-DSSEmain detailed algorithms.
accessed by update or search, respectively. For simplicity, we write I[i, j] to denote I[i, j].v, and be
explicit about the state bit as I[i, j].st.
The encrypted index I is augmented by two static hash tables Tw and Tf that associate a
keyword and file to a unique row and a column, respectively. Specifically, Tf is a file static hash table
whose key-value pair is (sidj , hyj , cj i), where sidj ← Gk2 (idj ) for file with identifier idj , column index
yj ∈ {1, . . . , n} is equivalent to the index of sidj in Tf and cj is a counter value. We denote access
operations by yj ← Tf (sidj ) and cj ← Tf [yj ].ct. Tw is a keyword static hash table whose key-value
pair is {swi , hxi , ci i}, where token swi ← Gk2 (wi ) for keyword wi , row index xi ∈ {1, . . . , m} is
equivalent to the index of swi in Tw and ci is a counter value. We denote access operations by
xi ← Tw (swi ) and ci ← Tw [xi ].ct. All counter values are incremental and initially set to 1. So, the
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client state information is in the form of Tw and Tf , both of which offer (on average) O(1) access
time.

3.4.3 IM-DSSE Main Scheme
We present the detailed algorithmic construction for the main scheme (denoted IM-DSSEmain )
in IM-DSSE framework in Figure 3.2, Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4, which consists of nine algorithms
with high-level ideas as follows.

3.4.3.1

Setup Algorithm
The client first executes IM-DSSEmain .Gen Algorithm to generate secret keys (K). Based on the

generated keys K, the client executes IM-DSSEmain .Enc Algorithm to create encrypted data structures
to be outsourced to the cloud. In IM-DSSEmain .Enc Algorithm, it first extracts m0 unique keywords
(w1 , . . . , wm0 ) from n0 files f = {fid1 , . . . , fidn0 } with unique IDs (id1 , . . . , idn0 ) (step step 3). It then
constructs an (unencrypted) incidence matrix δ (steps step 4–step 9) by setting each cell value δ[i, j]
to {0, 1}, where i, j are the row and column indexes of keyword and file derived from their hash
table indexes, respectively (steps step 5, step 13). Next, it encrypts each cell δ[i, j] with a unique
hkey-counteri pair, where the key (ri ) is uniquely derived for each row (i) from K (step step 11),
and the counter (uj ) is distinct for each column (j) (step step 13). Finally, it encrypts each file in
f resulting in encrypted files C (steps step 14–step 15). Once C and the encrypted matrix (I) are
constructed, the client sends them to the cloud server along with the file hash table (Tf ).
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τw ← IM-DSSEmain .SearchToken(K, w): Generate search token τw from keyword w and key K
1: sw ← Gk2 (w), i ← Tw (sw )
2: c ← Tw [i].ct, ri ← Gk3 (i||c)
3: if c = 1 then
4:
τw ← (i, ri )
5: else
6:
ri ← Gk3 (i||c − 1) and τw ← (i, ri , ri )
7: Tw [i].ct ← c + 1
8: return τw
(Iw , C w ) ← IM-DSSEmain .Search(τw , γ): Given search token τw and encrypted index γ, return sets of file identifiers
Iw and encrypted files C w ⊆ C matching with τw
1: for j = 1, . . . , n do
2:
cj ← Tf [j].ct
3:
if (τw = (i, ri ) or I[i, j].st = 1) then
4:
I0 [i, j] ← I[i, j] ⊕ H(ri ||j||cj )
5:
I[i, j].st ← 0
6:
else
7:
I0 [i, j] ← I[i, j] ⊕ H(ri ||j||cj )
8:
I[i, j] ← I0 [i, j] ⊕ H(ri ||j||cj )
9: l ← 0
10: for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n} satisfying I0 [i, j] = 1 do
11:
l ← l + 1 and yl ← j
12: Iw ← {y1 , . . . , yl }
13: γ ← (I, Tf ), C w ← {(cy1 , y1 ), . . . , (cyl , yl )}
14: return (Iw , C w )

Figure 3.3: IM-DSSEmain detailed algorithms.
3.4.3.2

Search Protocol
To search for keyword w, the client executes IM-DSSEmain .SearchToken Algorithm to generate

a search token τw to be sent to the server. The token contains the row index (i) of w and row keys
(ri , r̄i ) derived from K, i, and the row counter (u) (steps step 3–step 6). r̄i and ri are the old and
new keys that are used to decrypt the row being searched for the first and latter times, respectively.
Upon receiving τw , the server executes IM-DSSEmain .Search Algorithm to decrypt the row and retrieve
the search result. Specifically, if the cell I[i, j] is previously updated (indicated via the state bit
I[i, j].st), or being searched for the first time (step step 3), it uses the new key (ri ) to decrypt the
cell (step step 4) and set the state to be 0 (step step 5). Otherwise, it uses the old key (r̄i ) to
decrypt the cell (step step 7) and re-encrypts it with the new key (ri ) (step step 8). Finally, the
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server determines column indexes j such that I[i, j] = 1, and returns the corresponding j-labeled
ciphertexts to the client (steps step 9–step 13). The client executes IM-DSSEmain .Dec Algorithm on
each ciphertext to decrypt the files and obtain the search result.

3.4.3.3

Update Protocol
The client executes IM-DSSEmain .AddToken Algorithm to generate an addition token (τf ). It

gets the column index (j) of the file to be added from the file hash table (Tf ) (step step 1), and
then, derives fresh row keys from the keyword hash table (Tw ) to be used for encrypting the column
(steps step 2–step 3). It then extracts unique keywords (w1 , . . . wt ) from the file, and constructs
an (unencrypted) column Ī[∗, j] with values being set to {0, 1} (steps step 4–step 6). Finally, it
encrypts Ī[∗, j] with row keys (steps step 7–step 8) and the file with K (step step 9). The client
sends τf containing the ciphertext and the encrypted column to the server. Upon receiving τf , the
server executes IM-DSSEmain .Add Algorithm to update the column j and its state in I (step step 1).
It increases the column counter (step step 2), and adds the ciphertext to the set of encrypted files
(step step 3).
Similar to the file addition protocol, the client executes IM-DSSEmain .DeleteToken Algorithm
to generate the deletion token, and the server executes IM-DSSEmain .Delete Algorithm to update the
column and delete the file from the set of encrypted files.
Some existing schemes (e.g., [138]) allow file addition/deletion, but do not permit updating
keywords in an existing file directly. This can be easily achieved in our scheme as follows. Assume
the client wants to update file fid by adding (or removing) some keywords, they will prepare a new
column I0 [i, j] ← bi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, where bi = 1 if wi is added and bi = 0 otherwise and j ← Tf (sid )
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(τf , c) ← IM-DSSEmain .AddToken(K, fid ): Given key K and file fid , generate addition token τf and ciphertext c of
fid
1: sid ← Gk2 (id), j ← Tf (sid ), Tf [j].ct ← Tf [j].ct + 1 and cj ← Tf [j].ct
2: for i = 1, . . . , m do
3:
ri ← Gk3 (i||ci ), where ci ← Tw [i].ct
4: Extract (w1 , . . . , wt ) from fid and set I[∗, j] ← 0
5: for i = 1, . . . , t do
6:
swi ← Gk2 (wi ), xi ← Tw (swi ), I[xi , j] ← 1
7: for i = 1, . . . , m do
8:
I0 [i, j] ← I[i, j] ⊕ H(ri ||j||cj )
9: c ← (c0 , j), where c0 ← Enck1 fid , j||cj
10: return (τf , c) where τf ← (I0 , j)
(γ 0 , C 0 ) ← IM-DSSEmain .Add(γ, C, c, τf ): Add addition token τf and ciphertext c to encrypted index γ and ciphertext set C, resp.
1: Set I[i, j] ← I0 [i, j] and I[i, j].st ← 1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m
2: Tf [j].ct ← Tf [j].ct + 1
3: return (γ 0 , C 0 ), where γ 0 ← (I, Tf ) and C 0 ← C ∪ {(c, j)}
τf0 ← IM-DSSEmain .DeleteToken(K, f ): Given key K and deleted file fid , generate deletion token τf0
1: Execute steps step 1–step 3 of IM-DSSEmain .AddToken Algorithm to produce (j, cj , hr1 , . . . , rm i) and increase
Tf [j].ct to 1
2: for i = 1, . . . , m do
3:
I0 [i, j] ← H(ri ||j||cj )
4: return τf0 , where τf0 ← (I0 , j)
(γ 0 , C 0 ) ← IM-DSSEmain .Delete(γ, C, τf0 ): Update deletion token τf0 to encrypted index γ 0 and delete a file from
ciphertext set C 0
1: Set I[i, j] ← I0 [i, j] and I[i, j].st ← 1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m
2: Tf [j].ct ← Tf [j].ct + 1
3: return (γ 0 , C 0 ), where γ 0 ← (I, Tf ), C 0 ← C \ {(c, j)}

Figure 3.4: IM-DSSEmain detailed algorithms.
with sid ← Gk2 (id) as in IM-DSSEmain .AddToken algorithm (steps step 4-step 6). The rest of the
algorithm remains the same.

3.4.3.4

Cost Analysis
For keyword search, IM-DSSEmain incurs n invocations of hash function H and n XOR

operations. Although IM-DSSEmain has a linear search complexity, which is asymptotically less
efficient than other DSSE schemes (e.g., [26, 35]), we show in our experiments that, this impact is
insignificant in practice for personal cloud usage with moderate database size where all optimizations
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are taken into account. Since IM-DSSEmain is fully parallelizable, the search and update computation
times can be reduced to n/p and m/p, respectively, where p is the number of processors. Therefore,
cryptographic operations in IM-DSSEmain only contribute a small portion to the overall end-to-end
search delay, which is mostly dominated by the network communication latency between client and
server. Notice that all sub-linear DSSE schemes [35, 165] are less secure and sometimes incur more
costly updates than IM-DSSEmain . For file update, IM-DSSEmain incurs m invocations of H and m
XOR operations along with m bits of transmission.
IM-DSSEmain costs




2m · n + n · (κ + |c|) bits of storage at the server for encrypted index I

and file hash table Tf . At the client side, IM-DSSEmain requires (n + m)(κ + |c|) + 3κ bits for two
hash tables Tw , Tf and secret key K.

3.4.4 IM-DSSE Extended Schemes
We present extended schemes derived from IM-DSSEmain presented above that IM-DSSE framework also supports.

3.4.4.1

IM-DSSEI : Minimized Search Latency

In IM-DSSEmain , we encrypt each cell of I with a unique key-counter pair, which requires
n invocations of H during keyword search. This might not be ideal for some applications that
require extremely prompt response. Hence, we introduce an extended scheme called IM-DSSEI , which
aims at achieving a very low search latency with the cost of increasing update delay. Specifically,
instead of encrypting the index bit-by-bit as in IM-DSSEmain scheme, IM-DSSEI leverages b-bit block
cipher encryption to encrypt b successive cells with the same key-counter pair. This is achieved by
interpreting columns of I as D = d nb e blocks, each being IND-CPA encrypted using AES-CTR mode
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(τf , c) ← IM-DSSEI .AddToken(K, fid ): Generate addition token τf and ciphertext c of fid
1: sid ← Gk2 (id), j ← Tf (sid ), l ← b j−1
b c, cl ← u[l]
2: a ← (l · b) + 1, a0 ← b · (l + 1)
3: Extract (w1 , . . . , wt ) from fid
4: for i = 1, . . . , t do
5:
swi ← Gk2 (wi ), xi ← Tw (swi )
6: Get from server (I[∗, a . . . a0 ]) and I[∗, l].st
7: for i = 1, . . . , m do
ci ← Tw [i].ct
8:
9:
if (ci > 1 and I[i, l].st = 0) then
10:
ci ← ci − 1
11:
ri ← Gk3 (i||ci )†
12:
I0 [i, a . . . , a0 ] ← Decri I[i, a . . . a0 ], l||cl
13: I0 [i, j] ← 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and I0 [xi , j] ← 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ t
14: u[l] ← u[l] + 1, cl ← u[l]
15: for i = 1, . . . , m do
16:
if (ci > 1 and I[i, l].st = 0) then
17:
ri ← Gk3 (i||ci + 1)
I[i, a . . . a0 ] ← Encri I0 [i, a . . . a0 ], l||cl
18:
19: Tf [j].ct ← Tf [j].ct + 1 and u0j ← Tf [j].ct
20: c ← (c0 , j) where c0 ← Enck1 fid , j||u0j
21: return (τf , c) where τf ← (I, j)
(γ 0 , C 0 ) ← IM-DSSEI .Add(γ, C, c, τf ): Add addition token τf and ciphertext C to encrypted index γ and
ciphertext set C, resp.
0
1: l ← b j−1
b c, a ← (l · b) + 1, a ← b(l + 1)
0
0
2: I[i, j ] ← I[i, j ], for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and a ≤ j 0 ≤ a0
3: u[l] ← u[l] + 1 and I[∗, l].st ← 1
4: return (γ 0 , C 0 ), where γ 0 ← (I, Tf ) and C 0 ← C ∪ {c}
† G should generate a suitable key for E (e.g., 128-bit key for AES-CTR)

Figure 3.5: IM-DSSEI detailed algorithms.
with block cipher size b. The counter will be stored via a block counter array (denoted as u) instead
of Tf [·].c as in the main scheme. The update state is maintained for each block rather than each
cell of I[i, j]. Hence, I is decomposed into two matrices with different sizes: I.v ∈ {0, 1}m×n and
I.st ∈ {0, 1}m×D .
IM-DSSEI requires some algorithmic modifications from the main scheme. Figure 3.5 presents
IM-DSSEI .AddToken Algorithm and IM-DSSEI .Add Algorithm for file addition procedure in IM-DSSEI

(modifications for file deletion follow the same principle). Specifically, we substitute encryption and
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decryption using random oracle H(ri ||j||uj ) with block cipher encryption Encri ·, l||u0l and Decri ·, l||u0l ,
respectively, where ul is a block counter (see steps step 12, step 20). Since I is encrypted by blocks,
to update a column during the file update, the client needs to retrieve a whole block and its state
from the server first (step step 6). The client then decrypts the block (steps step 7–step 12), updates
a column within it (step step 13), re-encrypts the entire block (steps step 15–step 18), and finally
sends the encrypted block to the server for replacement. So, the reduction of search cost increases
the cost of communication overhead for the update as a trade-off.
The modifications for IM-DSSEI .Gen, IM-DSSEI .Enc, IM-DSSEI .SearchToken and IM-DSSEI .Search
algorithms are straightforward. Only the underlying encryption is changed from random oracle to
block cipher (e.g., AES-CTR) as exemplified in IM-DSSEI .AddToken Algorithm. Hence, we will not
present those algorithms in detail.
For keyword search, IM-DSSEI requires n/b invocations of E, which is theoretically b times
faster than the main scheme. Given the CTR mode, the search time can be reduced to n/(b·p), where
p is the number of processors. For file update, IM-DSSEI requires transmission of (2b + 1) · m bits
along with decryption and encryption operations at the client side, compared with m non-interactive
transmission and encryption-only in the main scheme. Thus, the keyword search speed in IM-DSSEI
is increased by a factor of b (e.g., b = 128) with the cost of transmitting (2b + 1) · m bits in the file
update.
IM-DSSEI reduces the server storage to

same as in IM-DSSEmain .



n·|c|+m·n·(b+1)
b



bits. The client storage remains the
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(Iw , C w ) ← Search(K, w): Given keyword w and key K, return sets of file identifiers Iw and encrypted
files C w ⊆ C matching with w
1: swi ← Gk2 (w), i ← Tw (swi ), ri ← Gk3 (i), l ← 0
2: Fetch the i-th row data I[i, ∗] from server
3: for j = 1, . . . , n do
4:
cj ← Tf [j].ct
5:
I0 [i, j] ← I[i, j] ⊕ H(ri ||j||cj )
6: for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n} satisfying I0 [i, j] = 1 do
7:
l ← l + 1 and yl ← j
8: Iw ← {y1 , . . . , yl }
9: Send Iw to server and receive C w = {(cy1 , y1 ), . . . , (cyl , yl )}
10: fi ← DecK (cyi ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ l
11: return (Iw , fw ), where fw ← {f1 , . . . , fl }

Figure 3.6: IM-DSSEII detailed algorithms.
3.4.4.2

IM-DSSEII : Achieving Cloud SaaS with Backward Privacy

All DSSE schemes introduced so far require the server to perform some computation (i.e.,
encryption/decryption) during keyword search, which might not be fully compatible with typical
storage-only clouds (e.g., Dropbox, Google Drive, Amazon S3). Hence, we propose an extended
scheme derived from IM-DSSEmain called IM-DSSEII , where all computations are performed at the client
side while the server does nothing rather than serving as a storage unit. This simple trick makes
IM-DSSEII not only compatible with with storage-only clouds, but also more importantly, achieve the

backward-privacy property. This is because the server now cannot decrypt any part of encrypted
index to keep track of historical update operations. Moreover, IM-DSSEII also reduces the storage at
both client and server sides by eliminating the state matrix and keyword counters that are needed
in IM-DSSEmain and IM-DSSEI to perform correct decryption and achieve forward-privacy during the
search and update, respectively.
We present the keyword search procedure of IM-DSSEII in Figure 3.6, which combines
SearchToken and Search algorithms in DSSE. To search for keyword w, the client sends to the

server the w’s row index (i) and receives the corresponding row I[i, ∗] (step step 2). The client
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decrypts I[i, ∗], extracts column indexes j such that I[i, j] = 1. Since the client computes everything,
it is not required to derive new row keys for forward-privacy and therefore, state matrix I[∗, ∗].st as
well as file hash table Tf at the server and keyword counters Tw .ct at the client are not needed in
IM-DSSEII (see steps step 3–step 5 for example). The client then fetches and decrypts encrypted files

indexed at j to obtain the search result (step step 9).
IM-DSSEII .Gen is identical to IM-DSSEmain .Gen Algorithm. IM-DSSEII .Enc, IM-DSSEII .Add,
IM-DSSEII .AddToken, IM-DSSEII .Delete, IM-DSSEII .DeleteToken can be easily derived from their version

in the main scheme (IM-DSSEmain ) by (1) substituting row key generation ri ← Gk3 (i, ci ) with
ri ← Gk3 (i), (2) omitting all keyword counters ci , block states I[∗, ∗].st, (3) and removing Tf from
the server storage. Due to repetition, we will not present them in detail.
The computation cost of IM-DSSEII is identical to IM-DSSEmain (i.e., n and m invocations of
H for search and update resp.). IM-DSSEII requires two-round communication with n bits being
transmitted during keyword search.
IM-DSSEII reduces the client and server storage costs to n(κ + |c|) + m · κ + 3κ and m · n bits,

respectively.

3.4.4.3

IM-DSSEI+II : Efficient Search with Backward Privacy

Our IM-DSSE framework also supports IM-DSSEI+II , an extended DSSE scheme which is the
combination of IM-DSSEI and IM-DSSEII schemes. In IM-DSSEI+II , the incidence matrix I is encrypted
with b-bit block cipher encryption, and the decryption is performed by the client during search. Since
IM-DSSEI+II inherits all properties of IM-DSSEI and IM-DSSEII schemes, IM-DSSEI+II is highly desirable

for cloud SaaS infrastructure that requires a very low search latency and backward-privacy with the
costs of more delayed update and an extra communication round during search.
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3.4.5 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security and update privacy of all the DSSE schemes provided
in our IM-DSSE framework. Most known efficient SSE schemes (e.g., [35, 138, 165]) reveal the search
and file-access patterns defined as follows.

• Given search query w at time t, the search pattern P(δ, Query, t) is a binary vector of length t
with a 1 at location i if the search time i ≤ t was for w, and 0 otherwise. The search pattern
indicates whether the same keyword has been searched in the past or not.
• Given search query w at time t, the file-access pattern ∆(δ, f, w, t) is identifiers Iw of files f
containing w.

We consider leakage functions in the line of [108] that captures dynamic file addition/deletion
in its security model, but we leak much less information compared to [108].
Definition 4 (Leakage Function). We define leakage functions (L1 , L2 , L3 ) as follows:
1. (m, n, id, h|fid1 |, . . . , |fidn |i) ← L1 (δ, f): Given the index δ and the set of files f (including their
identifiers), L1 outputs the maximum number of keywords m, the maximum number of files n,
the identifiers id = {id1 , . . . , idn } of f and the size of file |fidj | for 1 ≤ j ≤ n (which also implies
the size of its corresponding ciphertext |cidj |).
2. (P(δ, Query, t), ∆(δ, f, w, t)) ← L2 (δ, f, w, t): Given the index δ, the set of files f and a keyword
w for the search operation at time t, it outputs the search pattern P and file-access pattern ∆.
3. |fid |← L3 (δ, f, id, t, op): Given the index δ, the set of files f, a file identifier id, and the update
type op ∈ {hAdd, |fid |i, Delete} at time t, it outputs the size of updated file fid (which also
implies the size of its corresponding ciphertext |cid |).
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Remark 1. In Definition 1, we adopt the dynamic CKA2-security notion in [108] that captures the
file addition and deletion by simulating corresponding tokens τf and τf0 , resp.

The security of IM-DSSE can be stated as follows.
Theorem 1. If E.Enc is IND-CPA secure, G is PRF and H is a RO then IM-DSSE is (L1 , L2 , L3 )-secure
in ROM by Definition 1 (CKA-2 security with update capacity).

Proof. We prove the IND-CKA2 for IM-DSSEmain proposed in §3.4.3. The proof for extended schemes
in §3.4.4 can be easily derived from this proof (see Remark 2 below for argument) and therefore, we
will not repeat it.
To begin with, we construct a simulator S that interacts with an adversary A in an execution
of an IdealA,S (κ) experiment as described in Definition 1. In this experiment, S maintains lists LR,
LK and LH to keep track of query results, states and history information, respectively. Initially,
all lists are set to empty. LR is a list of key-value pairs and is used to keep track of RO(·) queries.
We denote value ← LR(key) and ⊥ ← LR(key) if key does not exist in LR. LK is to keep track
of random values generated during the simulation and it is similar to LR. LH is to keep track of
search and update queries, S’s replies to those queries and their leakage output from (L1 , L2 ). S
executes the simulation as follows.

1. Handle RO(·) Queries: b ← RO (x) takes an input x and returns a bit b as output. Given x,
$

if ⊥ = LR(x) set b ← {0, 1}, insert (x, b) into LR and return b as the output. Else, return
b ← LR(x) as the output.
2. Simulate (γ, C): Given (m, n, hid1 , . . . , idn0 i, h|c1 |, . . . , |cn0 |i) ← L1 (δ, f), S simulates (γ, C) as
follows.
28

$

(a) (sidj , k) ← {0, 1}κ , yj ← Tf (sidj ), insert (idj , sidj , yj ) into LH and cyj ← Enck{0}

|cidj |

for

1 ≤ j ≤ n0 .
(b) For j = 1, . . . , n and i = 1, . . . , m
i. Tw [i].ct ← 1 and Tf [j].ct ← 1.
$

ii. zi,j ← {0, 1}κ , I[i, j] ← RO (zi,j ) and I[i, j].st ← 0.
0

(c) Output (γ, C), where γ ← (I, Tf ) and C ← {hci , yi i}ni=1
C has the correct size and distribution, since L1 leaks h|cid1 |, . . . , |cidn0 |i and E.Enc(·) is a
IND-CPA secure scheme, respectively. I and Tf have the correct size since L1 leaks (m, n).
Each I[i, j] for 1 ≤ j ≤ n and 1 ≤ i ≤ m has random uniform distribution, since RO(·) is
invoked with random value zi,j . Tf has the correct distribution, since each sidj has random
uniform distribution, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n0 . Hence, A does not abort due to A’s simulation of (γ, C).
The probability that A queries RO(·) on any zi,j before S provides I to A is negligible (i.e.,
1
2κ ).

Hence, S also does not abort.

3. Simulate τw : Simulator S receives a search query for an arbitrary keyword w on time t. S is
given (P(δ, Query, t), ∆(δ, f, w, t)) ← L2 (δ, f, w, t). S adds these to LH. S then simulates τw
and updates lists (LR, LK) as follows.
$

(a) If w is in LH, then fetch sw . Else, sw ← {0, 1}κ , i ← Tw (swi ), ci ← Tw [i].ct, insert
(w, L1 (δ, f), sw ) into LH.
$

(b) If ⊥ = LK(i||ci ), then ri ← {0, 1}κ and insert (ri , i, ci ) into LK. Else, ri ← LK(i||ci ).
(c) If ci > 1, then ri ← LK(i||ci − 1), τw ← (i, ri , ri ). Else, τw ← (i, ri ).
(d) Tw [i].ct ← ci + 1.
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(e) Given L2 (δ, f, w, t), S knows identifiers Iw = {y1 , . . . , yl }. Set I0 [i, y] ← 1 for each y ∈ Iw
and the rest of the elements as I0 [i, j] ← 0 for each j ∈ {{1, . . . , n} \ Iw }.
(f) If ((τw = (i, ri )∨I[i, j].st) = 1), then V[i, j] ← I[i, j]0 ⊕I[i, j] and insert tuple (ri ||j||cj , V[i, j])
into LR, where cj ← Tf [j].ct for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
(g) I[i, j].st ← 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
(h) I[i, j] ← I0 [i, j] ⊕ RO (ri ||j||cj ), where cj ← Tf [j].ct for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
(i) Output τw and insert (w, τw ) into LH.
Given any ∆(δ, f, w, t), S simulates the output of RO(·) such that τw always produces the
correct search result for Iw ← Searchτw , γ. S needs to simulate the output of RO(·) for two
?

conditions: (i) The first search of w (i.e., τw = (i, ri )), since S did not know δ during the
simulation of (γ, C). (ii) If any file fid containing w has been updated after the last search on w
?

(i.e., I[i, j].st = 1), since S does not know the update content. S sets the output of RO(·) for
those cases by inserting tuple (ri ||j||cj , V[i, j]) into LR. In other cases, S just invokes RO(·)
with (ri ||j||cj ), which consistently returns the previously inserted bit from LR.
During the first search on w, each RO(·) outputs V[i, j] = RO (ri ||j|cj ) that has the correct
distribution, since I[i, ∗] of γ has random uniform distribution (see II-Correctness and Indistinguishability argument). Let J = {j1 , . . . , jl } be the set of indexes of files containing w, which
are updated after the last search on w. If w is searched again after being updated, then each
RO(·)’s output V[i, j] = RO (ri ||j|cj ) has the correct distribution, since τf ← (I0 , j) for indexes
j ∈ J has random uniform distribution. Given that S’s τw always produces correct Iw for given
∆(δ, f, w, t), and relevant values and RO(·) outputs have the correct distribution, A does not
abort during the simulation due to S’s search token. The probability that A queries RO(·) on
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any (ri ||j|cj ) before querying S on τw is negligible (i.e.,

1
2κ )

and, therefore, S does not abort

due to A’s search query.
4. Simulate (τf ,τf0 ): S receives an update request op ∈ {hAdd, |c|i, Delete} for an arbitrary file
having id at time t. Given |cid |← L3 (δ, f, id, t, op), S simulates update tokens (τf , τf0 ) as follows.
$

(a) If id is in LH, then fetch (id, sid , j). Else set sid ← {0, 1}κ , j ← Tf (sid ) and insert (id, sid , j)
into LH.
(b) Tf [j].ct ← Tf [j].ct + 1, cj ← Tf [j].ct.
$

(c) If ⊥ = LK(i||ci ), then ri ← {0, 1}κ and insert (ri , i, ci ) into LK, where ci ← Tw [i].ct for
1 ≤ i ≤ m.
$

(d) I0 [i, j] ← RO (zi ), where zi ← {0, 1}2κ for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
(e) Set I[i, j] ← I0 [i, j] and I[i, j].st ← 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
(f) If op = hAdd, |c|i, then simulate cj ← Enck{0}|c| add cj into C, set τf ← (I0 , j) and output
τf . Else, set τf0 ← (I0 , j), remove cj from C and output τf0 .
Given access pattern (τf , τf0 ) for a file fid , A checks the correctness of update by searching all
keywords w = {wi1 , . . . , wil } in fid . Since S is given access pattern ∆(δ, f, w, t) for a search
query (which captures the last update before the search), the search operation always produces
a correct result after an update as analyzed above. Hence, S’s update tokens are correct and
consistent.
It remains to show that (τf , τf0 ) have the correct probability distribution. In the real algorithm,
the counter cj is increased for each update. If fid is updated after the keyword w at row i
is searched, a new ri is generated for w as simulated (ri remains the same for consecutive
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updates but cj increases). Hence, the real algorithm invokes H(.) with a different (ri ||j||cj ) for
1 ≤ i ≤ m. S simulates this step by invoking RO(·) with zi and I0 [i, j] ← RO (zi ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
(τf , τf0 ) have random uniform distribution since I0 has random uniform distribution and update
operations are correct and consistent as shown above. cj also has the correct distribution since
E.Enc(·) is an IND-CPA encryption. Hence, A does not abort during the simulation due to S’s
update tokens. The probability that A queries RO(·) on any zi prior querying S on (τf , τf0 ) is
negligible (i.e.,

1
)
22·κ

and, therefore, S does not abort due to A’s update query.

5. Final Indistinguishability Argument: (swi , sidj , ri ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ n are indistinguishable from real tokens and keys since they are generated by PRFs that are indistinguishable
from random functions. E.Enc(·) is a IND-CPA scheme, the answers returned by S to A for
RO(·) queries are consistent and appropriately distributed, and all query replies of S to A
during the simulation are correct and indistinguishable as discussed above. Hence, for all PPT
adversaries, the outputs of RealA (κ) and IdealA,S (κ) experiment are:

|Pr[RealA (κ) = 1] − Pr[IdealA,S (κ) = 1]|≤ neg(κ),
where neg(·) is a negligible function.

We argue the security of extended schemes as follows.
Remark 2. IM-DSSEI , IM-DSSEII and IM-DSSEI+II are secure by Definition 1, and their proofs can be
easily derived from the security analysis of IM-DSSEmain with the intuition as follows.
IM-DSSEI only differs from IM-DSSEmain in terms of b-bit encryption, compared with 1-bit

encryption. This modification does not impact the IND-CKA2 security of IM-DSSEI over IM-DSSEmain .
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Given that we use ROs and an IND-CPA encryption scheme (e.g., AES with CTR mode), the security
of IM-DSSEI is not affected in our model, and in particular, there is no additional leakage. The price
that is paid for this performance improvement is that the scheme becomes interactive. Since the block
data exchanged between client and server are encrypted with an IND-CPA encryption scheme, there
is no additional leakage due to this operation.
IM-DSSEII only differs from IM-DSSEmain in terms of where the decryption during keyword

search takes place. Performing decryption at the client (instead of at the server) does not impact the
IND-CKA2 security of IM-DSSEII over IM-DSSEmain . Given that we, respectively, use ROs and PRF
for H and G as in IM-DSSEmain , the security of IM-DSSEII remains the same.
IM-DSSEI+II is merely the combination of IM-DSSEI and IM-DSSEII , where block cipher encryp-

tion and client decryption during search are both implemented. As analyzed, each of these strategies
does not impact the security and therefore, IM-DSSEI+II still preserve the IND-CKA2 security.

The leakage definition and formal security model imply various levels of privacy for different
DSSE schemes. We summarize some important privacy notions based on the various leakage
characteristics discussed in [165] as follows.

• Size pattern: The number of actual keyword-file pairs.
• Forward privacy: A search on a keyword w does not leak the IDs of files being updated in the
future and having w.
• Backward privacy: A search on a keyword w does not leak all historical update operations (e.g.,
addition /deletion) on the identifiers of files having this keyword.
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Since keyword-file relationships are represented by an encrypted incidence matrix, IM-DSSE framework
hides the size pattern (i.e., number of ‘1’ in I), so that it is size-oblivious.
Corollary 1. IM-DSSE framework offers forward-privacy.

Proof. In IM-DSSE framework, the update involves reconstructing a new column/block of encrypted
index I. The column/block is always encrypted with row keys that have never been revealed to the
server. This is achieved in IM-DSSEmain and IM-DSSEI schemes by increasing the row counter after
each keyword search operation so that fresh row keys will be used for subsequent update operations.
In IM-DSSEII scheme, since all cryptographic operations are performed at the client side where no
keys are revealed to the server, it is unable for the server to infer any information in the update, given
that the encryption scheme is IND-CPA secure. These properties enable our IM-DSSE framework to
achieve forward privacy.
Corollary 2. IM-DSSEII and IM-DSSEI+II achieve backward-privacy.

Proof. In most DSSE schemes, the client sends a key that allows the server to decrypt a small part
of the encrypted index during keyword search. The server can use this key to backtrack historical
update operations on this part and therefore, compromise the backward-privacy. In IM-DSSEII and
IM-DSSEI+II schemes, instead of sending the key to the server, the client requests this part and decrypts

it locally. This prevents the server from learning information about historical update operations on
the encrypted index and therefore, allows both schemes to achieve backward-privacy.

3.4.6 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we study the performance of our IM-DSSE framework in real-life networking
and system settings. We present a detailed cost breakdown analysis to fully assess the criteria that
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constitute the performance overhead of our constructions. Given that such analysis is generally
missing in the literature, this is the main focus of our performance evaluation. Finally, we give a
brief asymptotic comparison of our framework with several DSSE schemes in the literature.

3.4.6.1

Implementation
We implemented our framework using C/C++. For cryptographic primitives, we used

libtomcrypt library [53]. We modified low level routines to call AES hardware acceleration instructions

(via Intel AES-NI library [80]) if they are supported by the underlying hardware platform. We used AES128 Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) for hash function. Our random oracles were
all implemented via 128-bit AES CMAC. For hash tables, we employed Google’s C++ sparse hash map
library [4] with the hash function being implemented by the CMAC-based random oracles truncated
to 80 bits. We implemented the IND-CPA encryption E using AES with CTR mode. For network
communication, we used ZeroMQ library [3]. IM-DSSE framework contains the full implementation of
all schemes including IM-DSSEmain , IM-DSSEI , IM-DSSEII and IM-DSSEI+II , which can be freely accessed
via our following Github repository [85]: https://github.com/thanghoang/IM-DSSE/.
Our implementation supports the encrypted index stored on either memory or local disk.
Therefore, our schemes can be directly deployed in either storage-as-a-service (e.g., Amazon S3) or
infrastructure-as-a-service clouds (e.g., Amazon EC2). For this experimental evaluation, we selected
block cipher size b = 128 for IM-DSSEI and IM-DSSEI+II schemes.

3.4.6.2

Configurations and Methodology
We used subsets of the Enron email dataset [2], ranging from 50,000 to 250,000 files with

240,000–940,000 unique keywords to evaluate the performance of our schemes with different encrypted
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Figure 3.7: Latency of IM-DSSE with fast network.
index sizes. These selected sizes surpass the experiments in [109] by three orders of magnitude and
are comparable to the experiments in [165].
We conducted the experiment with two settings: (i) We used HP Z230 Desktop as the client
and built the server using Amazon EC2 with m4.4xlarge instance type. The desktop was equipped
with Intel Xeon CPU E3-1231v3 @ 3.40GHz, 16 GB RAM, 256 GB SSD and CentOS 7.2 was
installed. The server was installed with Ubuntu 14.04 and equipped with 16vCPUs @2.4 GHz Intel
Xeon E5-2676v3, 64 GB RAM and 500 GB SSD hard drive. (ii) We selected LG G4 mobile phone to
be the client machine running Android OS, v5.1.1 (Lollipop) and was equipped with Qualcomm
Snapdragon 808 64-bit Hexa-core CPU @1.8 GHz, 3GB RAM and 32 GB internal storage. Notice
that AES-NI library cannot be used to accelerate cryptographic operations on this mobile device due
to its incompatible CPU, which affects the performance of our schemes in the mobile environment as
will be shown in the following section.
We disabled the slow-start TCP algorithm and maximized initial congestion window parameters in Linux (i.e., 65535 bytes) (see [57] for more insights) to reduce the network impact during the
initial phase in case the scheme requires low amount of data to be transmitted.
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Figure 3.8: IM-DSSE delay with moderate network.
3.4.6.3

Overall Results.
Figure 3.7 presents the overall performance in terms of end-to-end cryptographic delay of all

the schemes in IM-DSSE framework. In this experiment, we located client and server in the same
geographical region, resulting in a network latency of 11.2 ms and a throughput of 264 Mbps. We
refer to this configuration as a fast network setting. Notice that we only measured the delay due to
accessing the encrypted index I, and omitted the time to access encrypted files (i.e., set C) as it
is identical for all searchable encryption and non-searchable encryption schemes. For instance, in
keyword search, we measured the delay of IM-DSSEmain scheme and IM-DSSEI scheme by the time the
client sends the request and the server finishes decrypting an entire row of the encrypted index and
gets cells whose value is 1. The IM-DSSEmain scheme and its extended versions took less than 100
ms to perform a keyword search, while it took less than 2 seconds to update a file. The cost per
keyword search depends linearly on the maximum number of files in the database (i.e., O(n)) and
yet it is highly practical even for very large numbers of keyword-file pairs (i.e., more than 1011 pairs).
Indeed, we confirm that the search operation in IM-DSSE is very fast and most of the overhead is due
to network communication delay as it will be later analyzed in this section. Note that the costs for
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Figure 3.9: IM-DSSE delay on SSD, and (a,b) fast and (c,d) moderate networks.
adding and deleting files (updates) over the encrypted index are highly similar since their procedure
is almost identical.
The keyword search operation delay of IM-DSSEmain is higher than that of extended schemes
and the difference increases as the size of the encrypted index increases due to two reasons: First,
the encrypted index I in IM-DSSEmain scheme is bit-by-bit encrypted compared with 128-bit block
encryption in IM-DSSEI . Hence, the server needs to derive more AES keys than in IM-DSSEI to decrypt
a whole row. Thus, the gap between IM-DSSEmain and IM-DSSEI represents the server computation
cost required for this key derivation and encryption. Second, the processes in IM-DSSEmain scheme are
performed subsequently, in which the server needs to receive some information sent from the client
first before being able to derive keys to decrypt a row. Such processes in IM-DSSEI and IM-DSSEII
can be parallelized, where the client generates the AES-CTR keys while receiving a row of data
transmitted from the server. We can see that the delay is similar between IM-DSSEI and IM-DSSEII and
IM-DSSEI+II . This indicates that using 128-bit encryption significantly reduces the server computation

cost to a point, where it becomes negligible as being later shown.
Considering the file update operation, our IM-DSSEmain and IM-DSSEII schemes leverage 1-bit
encryption and, therefore, it does not require to transfer a 128-bit block to the client first prior
to updating the column as in IM-DSSEI and IM-DSSEI+II schemes. Hence, they are faster and less
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Figure 3.10: Detailed costs of IM-DSSE with moderate network and SSD storage.
affected by the network latency than IM-DSSEI and IM-DSSEI+II . So, the gap between such schemes
reflects the data download delays, which will be significantly higher on slower networks as shown in
the next experiment. Update in IM-DSSEI+II is considerably faster than in IM-DSSEI because it allows
for parallelization, in which the client can pre-compute AES-CTR keys while receiving data from
the server. In IM-DSSEI , such keys cannot be pre-computed as they need some information from the
server beforehand (i.e., state data I[∗, j].st).

3.4.6.4

The Impact of Network Quality.
The previous experiments were conducted on a high-speed network, which might not be

widely available in practice. Hence, we additionally investigated how our schemes perform when the
network speed is degraded. We setup the server to be geographically located distant from the client
machine, resulting in the network latency and throughput to be 67.5 ms and 46 Mbps, respectively.
Figure 3.8 shows the end-to-end cryptographic delay of our schemes in this moderate network setting.
Due to the high network latency, search operation of each scheme is slower than that of fast network
by 230ms. The impact of the network latency is clearly shown in the update operation as reflected
in Figure 3.8b. The delays of IM-DSSEI , IM-DSSEI+II are significantly higher than those of IM-DSSEmain
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Figure 3.13: Detailed costs of IM-DSSE on mobile with moderate network and SSD storage.
and IM-DSSEII . As explained previously, this gap actually reflects the download delay incurred by
such schemes.

3.4.6.5

The Impact of I/O Access
Another important performance factor for DSSE is the encrypted index storage access delay.

Hence, we investigated the impact of the encrypted index storage location on the performance of
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our schemes. Clearly, the ideal case is to store all server-side data on RAM to minimize the delay
introduced by storage media access as shown in previous experiments. However, deploying a cloud
server with a very large amount of RAM capacity can be very costly. Thus, in addition to the
RAM-stored results shown previously, we stored the encrypted index on the secondary storage unit
(i.e., SSD drive), and then measured how overall delays of our scheme were impacted by this setting.
Figure 3.9 presents the results with two aforementioned network quality environments (i.e., fast and
moderate speeds). In IM-DSSEmain and IM-DSSEI schemes, the disk I/O access is incurred by loading
a part of the encrypted index including value I.v and state I.st . It is clear that the disk I/O access
time incurred an insignificant latency to the overall delay in terms of keyword search operation
as shown in Figure 3.9a and Figure 3.9d, since our schemes achieve perfect locality as defined by
Cash et al. [37]. However, in the file update operation, the delay in IM-DSSE framework was 1–4
seconds more, compared with RAM-based storage. That is because we stored all cells in each row of
the encrypted matrix I in contiguous memory blocks. Therefore, keyword search invokes accessing
subsequent memory blocks while update operation results in accessing scattered blocks which incurs
much higher disk I/O access time. Due to the incidence matrix data structure and this storage
strategy, our search operation was not affected as much by disk I/O access time as other non-local
DSSE schemes (e.g., [35, 36, 108]), which require accessing random memory blocks for security.

3.4.6.6

Cost Breakdown.
We dissected the overall cost of our schemes previously presented in Figure 3.7, Figure 3.8

and Figure 3.9 to investigate which factors contribute a significant amount to the total delay of each
scheme. For analysis, we selected the cost of our schemes when performing on the largest encrypted
index size being experimented (i.e., 2.36 × 1011 ) with moderate network speed, where the encrypted
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index is stored on an SSD drive. Figure 3.10 presents the major factors that contribute to the total
delay of our schemes during keyword search and file update operations.
Considering the search operation, it is clear that data transmission occupied the largest
amount of delay among all schemes. In our IM-DSSEmain and IM-DSSEI schemes, most of the computations were performed by the server wherein cryptographic operations were accelerated by AES-NI
so that they only took a small portion of the total, especially in IM-DSSEI scheme. Meanwhile, the
client only performed simple computations such as search token generation so that its cost was
negligible. In IM-DSSEII and IM-DSSEI+II schemes, encrypted data were decrypted at the client side,
while the server did nothing but transmission. Therefore, the client computation cost took a small
portion of the total delay and the server’s cost was negligible. However, as indicated in §3.4.4, the
client computation and data transmission in IM-DSSEII and IM-DSSEI+II are fully parallelizable where
their partially parallel costs are indicated by their overlapping area in Figure 3.10a. Hence, we
can infer that client computation was actually dominated by data transmission and, therefore, the
computation cost did not affect the total delay of the schemes. As explained above, we stored the
encrypted matrix on disk with row-friendly strategy so that the disk I/O access time due to keyword
search was insignificant, which contributed less than 3% to the total delay.
In contrast, it is clear that disk I/O access time occupied a considerable proportion of the
overall delay of the update operation, especially in the IM-DSSEmain and IM-DSSEII schemes due to
non-contiguous memory access. Data transmission was the second major factor contributing to the
total delay. As the server did not perform any expensive computations, its cost was negligible in all
schemes. The client performed cryptographic operations which were accelerated by AES-NI library
so that it only contributed less than 7% to the overall cost. Additionally, the client computation
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was mostly parallelized with the data transmission and the server’s operations in IM-DSSEII and
IM-DSSEI+II schemes so that it can be considered not to significantly impact the total delay.

We evaluated our schemes’ performance when deployed on a mobile device with limited
computational resources. Similar to the desktop experiments, we tested on fast and moderate
network by geographically locating the server close and distant from the mobile, respectively. The
phone was connected to a local WiFi which, in turn, allowed the establishment of the connection to
the server via a wireless network resulting in the latency and throughput of fast network case to
be 18.8 ms, 136 Mbps while those of moderate case were 76.3 ms and 44 Mbps, resp. Figure 3.11
and Figure 3.12 present the benchmark results with aforementioned network settings when the
data in the server were stored on RAM and SSD, respectively. In the mobile environment, the
IM-DSSEII scheme performed considerably slower than others in terms of keyword search. That is

because, in this scheme, a number of cryptographic operations (i.e., O(n)) were performed by the
mobile device. Moreover, these operations were not accelerated by AES-NI library as in our Desktop
machine because the mobile CPU did not have special crypto-accelerated instructions. Considering
the keyword search performance of IM-DSSEII in the moderate network setting (i.e., Figure 3.11c
and Figure 3.12c), we can see that its delay significantly increased when the size of encrypted
index exceeded 1011 keyword-file pairs. This is because starting from this size of the encrypted
index, the client computation began to dominate the data transmission cost. The update delays
of our schemes, especially the IM-DSSEmain and IM-DSSEII schemes, were substantial in the mobile
environment because the mobile platform had to perform intensive cryptographic operations.
Figure 3.13 shows the decomposition of the total end-to-end delay of our schemes in the
out-of-state network setting when the server data were stored on an SSD drive. For the search
operation, the detailed costs of IM-DSSEmain and IM-DSSEI schemes are the same as in the desktop
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setting since computations were mostly performed by the server while the client only performed some
lightweight computation to generate the token. In IM-DSSEII , the client computation contributed
almost 100% to the total delay due to O(n) number of AES-CTR decryptions, compared with
O(n)/128 in IM-DSSEI+II which was all dominated by the data transmission delay. The limitation of
computational capability of the mobile device is reflected clearly in Figure 3.13b, wherein the client
computation cost accounted for a considerable amount of the overall delay of most schemes except
for the IM-DSSEI+II scheme.
We reported the delays of our framework without taking optimization into account. Meanwhile, the performance of our framework can be further optimized by applying several caching
strategies to minimize the computation, I/O access and communication overhead at both client and
server sides. Specifically, for each search operation, one can observe that our framework requires
to decrypt and re-encrypt an entire row in the incidence matrix. This increases significantly the
computation overhead whereas it is not necessary to protect the row confidentiality once its content
is already revealed. Therefore, given a keyword to be searched at the first time, the server can
decrypt the row, and cache all positions that indicate the files containing the keyword in a compact
index such as encrypted dictionary. When the keyword is repeatedly searched, the server can simply
look up this index to obtain the search result. This caching strategy reduces the server computation
overhead with the cost of maintaining an extra data structure. Both client and server can also
cache the content of keywords being searched/update frequently on local persistent memory to
reduce the network communication and I/O access thereby, reducing the overall delay. We note that
the efficiency of this caching is application-specific since it depends on the characteristics of the
outsourced database and the user query. By open-sourcing the implementation of our framework, we
leave its optimization to practitioners when deployed on specific use-cases in practice.
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3.5

FS-DSSE: Forward-Private Searchable Encryption with Efficient Search
We propose a new DSSE scheme that offers important features for practical deployment

including forward-privacy, sublinear search time with parallelization support, and low client storage.
This is achieved by harnessing a secure update strategy on a special encrypted index structure
along with a novel caching strategy using a dictionary data structure to partially store the result of
previous search queries. We refer our scheme as Forward-Private and Sublinear DSSE (FS-DSSE)
scheme, with the following desirable properties:

• High-speed search with full parallelization: The proposed scheme offers the lowest search delay
among its counterparts. From the asymptotic point of view, our search complexity is (i) equivalent
to the most efficient yet forward-insecure DSSE scheme [35], and (ii) lower than some state-ofthe-art forward-private DSSE schemes. Our proposed scheme is also fully parallellizable, and
therefore, can take advantage of multi-threading techniques offered by the cloud. The experimental
evaluation showed that, our search delay was comparable to the most efficient yet forward-insecure
DSSE scheme, while it was one to three orders of magnitude faster than its forward-private
counterparts [26] (see §3.5.4).
• Low client storage overhead: The proposed scheme features O(1) client storage overhead, in which
the client only needs to store a few symmetric keys. This property allows the proposed scheme to
be deployed on mobile devices where the client has a limited memory capacity.
• High security: Our scheme not only achieves forward-privacy as the important security feature,
but also can hide the size information of some operations on the encrypted index similar to [189].
Specifically, the proposed scheme does not leak the number of actual keyword-file pairs in update
operation, and the encrypted index size as defined in [165]. Note that such information is leaked
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in most state-of-the-arts DSSE schemes (except [189]), which might be exploited in statistical
attacks.
• Full-fledged implementation and evaluation on real infrastructure: We fully implemented the
proposed scheme and extensively evaluated its performance on a real computing infrastructure.
The experimental result demonstrated that the proposed scheme is highly efficient, which showed
the potentials to be deployed on real-world breach-resilient infrastructure. We release the
implementation of our scheme for public testing and wide adaptation (see §3.5.4).

Our main observation is that the search query in standard DSSE reveals a part of the
encrypted index to the server while retrieving the corresponding encrypted files. Therefore, once a
keyword is searched again, it is not necessary to repeat the computation on the encrypted index to
extract corresponding files that were previously revealed. Instead, one can leverage a more compact
and simple data structure (e.g., dictionary) to store file IDs revealed in the first search so that if the
same query is repeated, the server will simply get the results stored in this data structure. This
strategy will amortize the computation cost incurred in the first search operation and therefore, will
make DSSE schemes more efficient. Note that the price to pay for gaining this search efficiency is
(in worst case) doubling the server storage overhead.
The second objective is to find a DSSE scheme that efficiently adopts the aforementioned
strategy. We observe that, the DSSE scheme in [189] offers a high level of security including
forward-privacy with the cost of linear search complexity. This computation cost can be significantly
reduced by using our proposed caching strategy mentioned above. Therefore, we take the DSSE
scheme in [189] as the base case to construct FS-DSSE with the caching strategy. We start by giving
some brief overview about the data structures used in our scheme, some of which are borrowed from
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[189]. We refer the reader to [189] for detailed description. Note that our caching strategy can be
applied to any forward-private DSSE scheme (e.g. Sophos [26]) to reduce the search cost.

3.5.1 FS-DSSE Data Structures
FS-DSSE leverages Incidence matrix I as the search index and (ii) hash table Tw to keep
track of the position of keywords in I similar to IM-DSSE (see §3.4.2). For simplicity, we assume files
are indexed from 1 to n and therefore, it is not required to create a hash table for them. Additionally,
since FS-DSSE leverages a caching strategy at the server to reduce the computation cost of repeated
search operations, we employ a dictionary data structure D to store the search result of the queries
when the keyword is first searched. D can be considered as an array of size m, where D[i] stores the
list of file IDs which is revealed when searching the keyword indexing at row i in I. D is encrypted
with IND-CPA encryption and is updated if there are file operations performed on I in between the
search queries. We present the update policy in the following section to keep D consistent.

3.5.2 Detailed FS-DSSE Algorithms
In this section, we present the detailed procedures in FS-DSSE as follows:

3.5.2.1

Setup Algorithm
First, given a list of plaintext files f, the client creates the encrypted files C and encrypted

index and sends them to the server by calling IM-DSSEmain .Gen procedure. This procedure (i) generates
three keys, {k1 , k2 , k3 } that collectively constitutes the key K, used to encrypt the files, the incidence
matrix, and the counters in the hash table, respectively, (ii) extracts keywords from the input files,
each being assigned to a row index via the hash table Tw , and (iii) sets the corresponding value for
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(I, C, σ, K) ← FS-DSSE.Setup(1κ , f): Create encrypted index
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:

$

k1 ← E.Gen(1κ ) and (k2 , k3 ) ← {0, 1}κ
Set K ← {k1 , k2 , k3 }
Extract keywords (w1 , . . . , wm0 ) from f = {fid1 , . . . , fidn0 }
Set counter ui = 1, state vi = 1 for each wi in hash table Tw
Set I[i, j] ← 1 where i is the keyword index in Tw and 1 ≤ j ≤ n if fj contains keyword i
Generate row keys ri ← PRF(k2 ||i||ui ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m
Encrypt each row of I with key ri for 1 ≤ i ≤ m
Encrypt counters in hash table Tw with k3
Encrypt all files f with k1 as C = {cj : cj ← Enck1 fj }
return (I, C, σ, K), where σ ← Tw (Send (I, C, σ) to server)

Figure 3.14: FS-DSSE setup algorithm.
each I[i, j]. Note that a counter for each keyword is also stored in Tw , which will be used to derive
a key to achieve the forward-privacy during update. Finally, the client generates the encrypted
incidence matrix I, encrypts counters in hash table Tw and encrypts all files f, and sends them to
the server, while keeping the key K secret.

3.5.2.2

Search Protocol
To search a keyword w, the client first requests the encrypted counter of w stored in Tw .

Then, they send a search token containing the row index i and the row key ri derived from the
counter, to the server. If the keyword is being searched for the first time, then the server decrypts
the whole row I[i, ∗] with ri , adds all column indexes j, where I[i, j] = 1, to the dictionary D[i], and
encrypts D[i]2 . The server returns the corresponding encrypted files matching with such indexes to
the client.
If a previously-searched keyword is searched again, the server retrieves indexes of corresponding encrypted files by simply decrypting D[i]. It is important to note that D[i] might need to be
updated, given that there are some file update operations on I that happened after the latest search
2

Server encrypts D with a self-generated key just to preserve the data privacy against outside attackers.
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(R, σ 0 ) ← FS-DSSE.SearchK (w, I, σ)
Client:
1: Let i be index of w in Tw
2: Download the counter ui of keyword wi in Tw
3: Decrypt ui with k3 and generate key ri ← PRF(k2 ||i||ui )
4: Send (i, vi0 , ri ) to server
Server: On receive (i, vi0 , ri ):
5: if i is first-time searched then
6:
Let I0 [i, ∗] be the decryption of I[i, ∗] using key ri
7:
D[i] ← {j : I0 [i, j] = 1}
8:
Encrypt D[i]
9: else
10:
Decrypt D[i]
11:
Let J = {j : I[i, j].st = 1}
12:
for each j in J do
13:
Let I0 [i, j] be the decryption of I[i, j] using key ri
14:
Add j to D[i] if I0 [i, j] = 1, or delete j if otherwise
15: Send R = {cj : j ∈ D[i]} to client
16: Re-encrypt D[i], set I[i, ∗].st = 0 and Tw [i].v ← 0
17: return (R, σ 0 ), where σ 0 ← Tw with i-th entry being updated
Client: On receive R:
18: fj ← Deck1 cj for each cj ∈ R

Figure 3.15: FS-DSSE search protocol.
on wi . This is achieved by checking the state bit I[∗, ∗].st. Specifically, if I[i, j].st = 1, then the
server decrypts I[i, j] and adds the entry j to D[i] if I[i, j] = 1 (or deletes j if I[i, j] = 0).
The use of data structure D enables FS-DSSE to have an amortized sublinear search complexity. Specifically, the computation cost of the first query is O(n) while that of repeated queries is
O(r), where r is the result size of the first query. The amortized cost is O(r + dw ), where dw is the
number of updates, after n search repetitions.

3.5.2.3

Update Protocol
Given an updated file fj , the client extracts the updated keywords and creates an unencrypted

column I[∗, j], which represents the relationship between fj with all the keywords in DB. The client
then generates m row keys ri according to corresponding counters stored in Tw at the server. To
achieve the forward-privacy, the client must encrypt I[∗, j] with fresh keys, which are unknown to
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(I0 , C 0 , σ 0 ) ← FS-DSSE.UpdateK (fj , I, σ, C)
Client:
1: Set I[∗, j] ← 0 and c ← N U LL
2: Download all counters ui and states vi (1 ≤ i ≤ m) in Tw
3: Download state column I[∗, j].st
4: Let V = {i : vi = 0}
5: Extract keywords (w1 , . . . , wt ) from fj
6: Decrypt counters ui with k3 , and set ui ← ui + 1 for each i ∈ V
7: Generate keys ri ← PRF(k2 ||i||ui )
8: Set I[xi , j] ← 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ t, where xi is index of wi in Tw
9: Encrypt fj as cj ← Enck1 fj
10: Encrypt each row I[i, j] with row keys ri , for 1 ≤ i ≤ m
→
11: Let −
u ← (u1 , . . . , un ), where each ui is encrypted with k3
→
12: Send (I[∗, j], cj , j, −
u ) to server
→
Server: On receive (I[∗, j], cj , j, −
u ):
13: Tw [i].u ← ui and set Tw [i].v ← 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m
14: Set I[∗, j] ← I[∗, j] and I[∗, j].st ← 1
15: return (I0 , C 0 , σ 0 ), where I0 = I with column j updated, C 0 = C updated with cj , σ 0 = Tw with counters and
states updated

Figure 3.16: FS-DSSE update protocol.
the server. This can be done by generating the row key with the incremental counter, given that
the key generated with the current counter has been previously revealed to the server during the
previous searches. Finally, the client sends the encrypted column and the encrypted files to the
server, where the encrypted index and encrypted database are updated accordingly.

3.5.3 Security Analysis
Let L be a leakage function which captures information leakage in FS-DSSE including the
maximum number of keywords and files, file IDs, the size of each file and access patterns. FS-DSSE
achieves the following security.
Theorem 2. FS-DSSE is (L)-IND-CKA2 secure by Definition 1.

Proof (Sketch). The security of a DSSE is defined with the dynamic IND-CKA2 notion, which
intuitively means that the search and update tokens sent from the client must not reveal any
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Figure 3.17: Latency of FS-DSSE and its counterparts.
information about the keywords being searched or updated. This notion pertains to leakage functions,
which captures precisely what information is leaked from the ciphertext and the tokens.
Lemma 1. FS-DSSE is forward-private, in the sense that when the client conducts an update, this
operation does not leak any information based on previous search operations [165].

Proof (Sketch). The forward-privacy implies that the content of updated files should not be linked
with any previous search operations. FS-DSSE harnesses the update strategy in [189], in which the
update operation uses all fresh row keys which were never revealed to the server. It is achieved by
increasing the keyword counter maintained in the hash table Tw .

3.5.4 Experimental Evaluation
We first describe our implementation details, experimental setup and evaluation metrics
with state-of-the-art schemes. We then present the performance of the proposed scheme along with
in-depth comparison. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/ozgurozmen/FS-DSSE
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3.5.4.1

Configurations and Methodology
Our implementation uses the following libraries: tomcrypt for cryptographic primitives; Intel

AES-NI for AES-CTR encryption acceleration; google-sparsehash for hash table; zeroMQ for network
communication.
We used a Desktop with Intel Xeon E3-1231v3 @ 3.40 GHz and 16GB RAM at the client
side. We leveraged our on-campus computing platform equipped with 32 CPUs @ 2.70GHz, and
512GB RAM as the server.
We used the full Enron email dataset, including 517401 files and 1728833 distinct keywords
according to the standard tokenization method. The total number of keyword-file pairs is around
108 .
We compare FS-DSSE with some state-of-the art DSSE schemes including the scheme in
[189] (called as 2D-DSSE), Sophos [26] and Πdyn
2lev [35]. For Sophos and 2D-DSSE, we used their
public open-source since their implementation setting is same with ours (C/C++), but we only
simulated Πdyn
2lev due to its lack of open-source C/C++ implementation.
We evaluated all the schemes according to search and update delay, in terms of amortized
costs. To compare the search time, we searched from least-common keywords (e.g., only appears in
a few, e.g., 1-50, of the files) to most-common keywords (e.g., appears in all, e.g., 99-100% of the
files) with 10% intervals. We applied the same strategy to compare the update times. We present
the cost breakdown of search and update operations for our scheme.
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3.5.4.2

Overall Results
We present the end-to-end delays for search and update operations of FS-DSSE and its

counterparts in Figure 3.17a and Figure 3.17b, respectively. Note that we excluded Sophos in the
Figure 3.17a since it is beyond y-axis limit. FS-DSSE achieves the fastest search time among the
counterparts in most cases, where it is even 1.4× faster than the most efficient yet forward-insecure
scheme Πdyn
2lev .
Since search complexity of 2D-DSSE is linear with the maximum number of files in database,
its search time was constant in any size of search query results. Due to the sublinear property,
FS-DSSE is faster than 2D-DSSE, for the most of the keywords, where it is up to 35× faster when
searching least-common keywords. 2D-DSSE is only 8ms faster than FS-DSSE when searching the
most-common keywords. The search time of Sophos could not fit into this graph due to its heavy
public key operations. Specifically, we measured that end-to-end delay to be around 20 seconds even
when searching for least-common keywords.
FS-DSSE has a constant update time similar to 2D-DSSE for all files with different number of
keywords associated to, since they are both linear with the number of keywords in the database. The
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latency difference between them is that in FS-DSSE, we store Tw at the server instead of the client as
in 2D-DSSE to achieve O(1) client storage, which incurs an extra round of communication overhead.
dyn
On the other hand, update time of Πdyn
2lev is the fastest. It is due to the fact that Π2lev scheme has a

smaller encrypted index size and therefore, random access is performed on a smaller memory region.
Moreover, the random access cost dominates the total update cost in our scheme. The update cost
of Sophos increases linearly with the number of keywords associated with the updated file. The cost
is lower than FS-DSSE when file is associated with 8.18% of the total number of keywords and it is
higher for the rest. Since the update cost of Sophos is dominated with the public key operations
performed at the client-side, when the file is associated with 100% of keywords, it is 11.39× slower
than FS-DSSE.
We also studied the detailed cost of search operation in FS-DSSE to observe the factors that
had the most impact on the total delay. It is depicted in Figure 3.18 that total delay is mostly
dominated by the server computation with the increasing number of files associated with the keyword.
Even though server performs symmetric key encryption/decryption in parallel using 32 cores, it still
dominates the total time since our network speed is extremely fast and the size of the dictionary D,
that stores the indexes, highly increases. Since generating search token does not incur any expensive
operations, the client computation cost is negligible.
Update cost of our scheme is constant as the number of keywords associated with the
updated file increases (see Figure 3.17b). Our measurements showed that update cost of our scheme
is dominated by the I/O access due to non-contiguous memory access. The second major dominating
cost of update operation is the client computation. It requires the re-encryption of the encrypted
index column with new keys to achieve forward-privacy. Since the network speed is fast in this
experiment, the communication cost is lower than other factors.
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Chapter 4: Oblivious RAM3

4.1

Introduction
ORAM, originally introduced by Goldreich [74], is a cryptographic protocol that allows

a client to perform read/write operations over their personal data stored on an untrusted server
without leaking any information regarding the requests’ address (i.e., access pattern). It has
been shown in various application domains that sensitive information can be derived from the
access pattern leakage, including data outsourcing [104, 111], secure enclaves [46, 178, 187] and
searchable encryption [21, 34, 103, 117, 148, 156, 190]. Recent attempts have used ORAM to seal
the access pattern leakages in many systems such as data outsourcing [20, 42, 48, 91], trusted
execution environments [7, 8, 98, 149, 159], secure hardware [62, 63, 123, 127, 139, 151], multi-party
computation [6, 56, 59, 76, 114, 180, 181] and block-chain [38, 84, 120].
Despite the strong security and privacy properties it offers, ORAM is known to incur high
communication/computational cost. Specifically, there exists a logarithmic communication lower
bound in any passive ORAM construction [29, 75, 119], where the server only acts as a storage entity
(i.e., no computation-capable). This overhead, however, has been shown costly for certain applications
in the traditional client-server setting [20, 136]. To reduce the client bandwidth overhead, active
ORAM schemes were introduced, in which the server can perform some sorts of secure computation
[5, 52, 54, 77, 126, 130, 150, 166]. Several active ORAM constructions have successfully achieved a
low (constant) client bandwidth overhead by using either Homomorphic Encryption (HE) [44] or
3
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distributed computation model [166]. Although the HE performance has considerably been improved
recently with efficient implementations, the use of HE in ORAM access still incur remarkable
computation overhead at both the client and server sides. This results in a high access latency, which
may negatively impact the user experience and degrade the quality of the cloud services. Moreover,
most active ORAM schemes only consider em passive security in the sense that the adversary is
assumed to follow the protocol faithfully [44, 130]. The cost to enable active security in the active
ORAM schemes is high, especially in the single-server setting [54], which may not be suitable for
real-life applications.
In many practical scenarios, it may not be possible to guarantee a reliable and high bandwidth
network connection between the client and server. This is particularly true in the case of home
networks and mobile devices with wireless network connectivity (e.g., Wi-Fi, LTE). Given that
ORAM with O(log N ) client bandwidth overhead (e.g., Path-ORAM [169]) may not be suitable for
such contexts, there is a significant need to design a new ORAM scheme that can achieve O(1) client
bandwidth overhead. It is also important that the proposed ORAM is suitable for resource-limited
clients and only incurs a low delay to provide a desirable quality of service. Moreover, in practice, it
is likely that a malicious adversary can be present (e.g., malware), who can deviate from the ORAM
protocol to compromise the data integrity and the access pattern privacy. Therefore, our objective is
to create efficient ORAM frameworks that can simultaneously achieve (i) a low client-communication
overhead (i.e., O(1) bandwidth overhead), (ii) low computational overhead at both the client- and
server-side, (iii) low storage, (iv) ability to securely compute on the accessed data and (iv) security
against active adversaries.
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4.2

Related Work
The first ORAM proposed by Goldreich et al. [74] was in the context of software protection

and followed by refinements [75]. Since then, several ORAM schemes have been proposed [75, 145];
however, many of these can achieve the logarithmic bandwidth overhead that was proven as the
ORAM lower bound under O(1) blocks of client storage [75]. The recent ORAM schemes mainly
have been considered in the client-server model to hide the data access pattern over a remote server
[145]). In 2011, Shi et al. proposed a breakthrough in ORAM constructions by using a tree paradigm
[161]. This tree paradigm led to efficient ORAM scheme proposals (e.g., [39, 71, 150, 169, 179]) that
can achieve the Goldreich-Ostrovsky logarithmic communication bound in [75]. The most simple and
efficient ORAM based on tree-ORAM paradigm is Path-ORAM [169], where the client only needs
to perform read and write operations over a data path, whereas the server only needs to provide
storage functionality (e.g., data sending and receiving only).
Tree-ORAM and Path-ORAM have been adapted to enable access pattern obliviousness
in many applications such as secure processors [127], oblivious data structures [113, 154, 182],
multi-party computation [179, 181] and oblivious storage [8, 43, 125, 135, 158, 186]. Several ORAM
schemes were specifically designed for oblivious file systems [12, 22, 39, 128, 129]. Since all these
systems rely on the Tree-ORAM paradigm, they incur the logarithmic communication overhead,
which was shown costly for certain client-server applications [20, 136]. Recently, Larsen and Nielsen
in [119] have re-confirmed the existence of the logarithmic bandwidth overhead in passive ORAM
schemes (i.e., the server is storage-only).
To reduce the communication overhead, the concept of active ORAM has been proposed,
where the server can perform some computation. Ring-ORAM [150] reduced the communication
cost of Path-ORAM by 2.5 times given that the server performs XOR computations. Path-PIR [130]
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used PIR [174] with Additively HE (AHE) [144]) on top of the Tree-ORAM [161]. [52] used PIR
scheme [174] on top of ObliviStore [167], which is based on Partition-ORAM [168]. The TWORAM
scheme [67] constructed a garbled circuit [188] over the tree ORAM structure, which allows the
client and server to perform the secure computation to access the block. Although many active
ORAM schemes have been presented [10, 52, 54, 61, 67, 130, 132, 150]), most of them either cannot
surpass the logarithmic bound [130, 150] or were shown insecure (i.e., [5, 132]. To the best of our
knowledge, only active ORAM schemes that harness HE techniques [50, 70] can achieve the O(1)
client bandwidth overhead under reasonably large block sizes (e.g., O(log5 N ) where N is the number
of data blocks) [10, 54, 61]. Despite their communication efficiency, it has been shown in [89, 132]
that performing HE computation during the ORAM access incurred significantly more latency than
streaming O(log N ) data blocks as in passive ORAM schemes.
To improve the computation efficiency, ORAM has been explored in the distributed setting
[5, 77, 89, 126, 166]. The first multi-server ORAM was proposed by Stefanov et al. [166], where
the (single-server) Partition-ORAM [168] paradigm was transformed into the multi-server setting to
achieve O(1) client bandwidth overhead and low computation at the servers. The main limitation of

√
this scheme is that it incurs high client storage overhead (i.e., O( N )) due to the Partition-ORAM
paradigm. Lu et al. [126] and Kushilevitz et al. [116] adapted the hierarchical ORAM construction in
[75] to the multi-server setting to reduce the communication overhead. CHf-ORAM [131] attempted
to use four non-colluding servers to achieve O(1) bandwidth blowup under O(1) blocks of client
storage. However, CHf-ORAM [131] (as well as its predecessor [132]) was broken by Abraham et al.
[5], which also showed an asymptotically tight sub-logarithmic communication bound for composing
ORAM with PIR. Abraham et al. also proposed a two-server ORAM scheme [5], which exploits
the XOR-PIR protocol [45] for the oblivious retrieval. Gordon et al. proposed a two-server ORAM
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scheme [77], which removes the need of updating the position map component in the tree-ORAM
paradigm, thereby saving the factor of O(log N ) communication rounds incurred by accessing the
position map recursively at the server. Very recently, Chan et al. proposed a perfectly secure 3-server
ORAM scheme [40] based on the Hierarchical ORAM paradigm in [75]. Gordon et al. proposed a
simple and efficient two-server tree-based ORAM [77], which achieves O(log N ) bandwidth overhead
with O(1) communication round. In this scheme, the position map is static meaning that the
path assigned for each data block is deterministic and unchanged, which can be computed by a
pseudo-random function.
Another line of distributed ORAM research focuses on the context of multi-party computation
in the RAM model [56, 59, 114, 181]. In these works, the access patterns are hidden from all parties
so that such ORAM schemes are integrated with some secure computation protocol (e.g., Yao’s
garbled circuit [188]) and, therefore, their cost is higher than classical client-server ORAM model.
The aim is to perform secure computation in the RAM model where both instructions and functions
are hidden from participants and thus ORAM is simply used as a building block. Due to the stronger
privacy model, all these distributed ORAM schemes are less efficient than the distributed ORAM in
the standard client-server setting.
Finally, in contrast to the generic ORAM (where both read and write patterns are hidden
and indistinguishable), there exist some special ORAM schemes that conceal only either read or
write patterns (but not both) [23, 155, 173]. Most of these constructions are more efficient than
generic ORAMs since they target only on the specific operation type (read or write).
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Figure 4.1: Tree-ORAM paradigm.
4.3

Preliminaries

→
Definition 5 (ORAM Security [161]). Let −
o = (hop1 , idx1 , data1 i, . . . , hopq , idxq , dataq i) be a sequence
of data access requests on encrypted database, where opi ∈ {read, write}, idxi is logical address to be
→
read/written and datai being the data at idxi to be read/written (for i ∈ {1, . . . , q}). Let AP(−
o)
→
be an access pattern observed by the server S given a data request sequence −
o . An ORAM scheme
→
→
is secure if for any two data request sequences −
o i and −
o j of the same length, their access patterns
→
→
AP(−
o i ) and AP(−
o j ) are computationally indistinguishable by anyone but the client.

4.3.1 Tree-ORAM
Most efficient ORAMs [52, 54, 150, 169] to-date follow the tree paradigm [161]. In this
paradigm, there are two main components: A full binary tree data structure stored at the server
side and a position map (denoted as pm) stored at the client side (Figure 4.1). The data blocks are
organized into the tree, where each block is assigned to a path pid selected uniformly at random,
and the position map is used to keep track of the location of each block in the tree. A tree with N
leaves can store up to N data blocks. Each node in the tree is called a “bucket”, which has Z slots
to contain data blocks. Each block b has a unique identifier id and all blocks are of the same size |b|
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(e.g., 4 KB). In the tree, since there are more slots than the number of blocks it can contain, all
empty slots are filled with dummy data.
There are two main sub-protocols in the tree ORAM paradigm: retrieval and eviction. To
access a block, the client first reads the block by executing the retrieval protocol on the path of the
block stored in the position map. The client updates the block and assigns it to a new path selected
uniformly at random. Finally, the client executes the eviction protocol on a random/deterministic
path, which writes the block back to the top levels of the tree and obliviously pushes blocks down
from top to bottom levels. ORAM schemes following the tree paradigm [54, 150, 169] all follow
the aforementioned basic routine, and provides different trade-offs between communication and
computation overhead.
The size of pm is O(N log N ). To reduce the client storage to O(1), it is possible to store pm
remotely on the server using the recursive ORAM [161], which increases the number of communication
rounds to O(log N ) for each access operation.

4.3.2 Path-ORAM
Stefanov et al. proposed Path-ORAM [169], the most efficient and simple ORAM scheme,
which follows the tree paradigm by Shi et al. [161]. Apart from the position map and the binary
tree, Path-ORAM requires an extra component called stash (S) tp temporarily store some data
blocks at the client. To access a block with Path-ORAM, the client retrieves its path from pm and
then performs a read operation (read) on its path, in which all real blocks in the path are fetched
into S. The client updates the retrieved block with a new random path in pm and then performs
an eviction operation (Evict) to push the blocks in S back to the read path such that each block
resides somewhere in an intersection node between the read path and its assigned path toward the
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leaf. In Path-ORAM, the stash size |S| was proven to be upper-bounded by the security parameter
λ as |S|= O(λ) blocks, which characterizes the overflow probability and statistical security.

4.3.3 Circuit-ORAM
Circuit-ORAM [179] further reduces the (circuit) complexity of Path-ORAM when implemented in the context of secure hardware (e.g., Intel SGX) or multi-party computation by minimizing
the number of blocks that are involved during the read and eviction operations. In this design, each
bucket has a meta-data component to store the information about real blocks and their path ID
that it contain.The retrieval and eviction of Circuit-ORAM work as follows.
To perform retrieval, similar to the original Tree-ORAM [161], the client reads all data in the
path, but keeps only the block of interest in the stash and removes it from the path. The removal
process can be implemented efficiently by flipping only one bit in the bucket meta-data.
To perform eviction, the client prepares a list of blocks to be pushed down in the eviction
path by scanning the meta-data of buckets in the path. The client picks one block in the stash (if
any) that can be pushed to the deepest level of the tree and then traverses from the root to the leaf
node. In each level, the client drops the on-hold block and picks at most one block to be put into a
deeper level. For each data access, the client invokes two eviction procedures, with the eviction path
being selected randomly or deterministically, as in [71].
Circuit-ORAM has a smaller bucket size Z than Path-ORAM (i.e., 2 vs. 4) and, therefore, it
incurs less server storage overhead. However, Circuit-ORAM incurs approximately 1.25× more I/O
accesses than Path-ORAM since each access operation requires two eviction operations. Similar to
Path-ORAM, the stash size |S| in Circuit-ORAM was proven to be upper-bounded by the security
parameter, i.e., |S|= O(λ) blocks.
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Figure 4.2: Oblivious data structure for a tree.
4.3.4 Write-Only ORAM
In contrast to the generic ORAM, where both read and write operations are hidden, Blass et
al. [23] proposed a Write-Only ORAM scheme, which only hides the write pattern in the context of
hidden volume encryption. Intuitively, 2n memory slots are used to store n blocks, each assigned
to a distinct slot and a position map is maintained to keep track of the location of every block.
Given a block to be written, the client reads O(λ) slots chosen uniformly at random and writes the
block to a dummy slot among O(λ) slots. Data in all slots are IND-CPA encrypted to hide which
slot is updated. By selecting λ sufficiently large (e.g., λ = 80), one can achieve a negligible failure
probability, which might occur when all λ slots are non-dummy. It is also possible to select a small
λ. In this case, the client maintains a stash S of size O(log N ), where N is the total number of data
blocks, to temporarily store blocks that cannot be rewritten when all read slots are full.

4.3.5 Oblivious Data Structures
Oblivious Data Structure (ODS) proposed by Wang et al. [182] leverages “pointer techniques”
to reduce the storage cost of position map components in non-recursive ORAM schemes to O(1), if
the data to be accessed have some specific structures (e.g., linked-list, grid, tree, etc.). For instance,
given a binary search-sorted array as illustrated in Figure 4.2, the ORAM block is augmented with
k + 1 additional slots that hold the position of the block along with the positions and identifiers of its
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children as b := (id, data, pos, childmap), where id is the block identifier, data is the block data, pos
is its position in ORAM structure, and childmap is a miniature position map with entries (idi , posi )
for k children. To ensure that the childmap is up to date, a child block must be accessed through
at most one parent at any given time. If a block does not have a parent (e.g., the root of a tree),
its position will be stored in the client. A parent block should never be written back to the server
without updating positions of its children blocks.

4.3.6 Multi-Party Computation
Secret sharing scheme allows a secret value to be shared and computed securely among
multiple untrusted parties. We briefly introduce several efficient secret sharing schemes as follows.

4.3.6.1

Shamir Secret Sharing
We recall (t, `)-threshold Shamir Secret Sharing (SSS) scheme [160], which comprises two

algorithms SSS = (Create, Recover) as presented in Figure 4.3. To share a secret α ∈ Fp among `
parties, a dealer generates a random polynomial f , where f (0) = α and evaluates f (xi ) for party
Pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ `, where xi ∈ F∗p is a deterministic non-zero element of Fp that uniquely identifies
party Pi and it is considered public information (SSS.Create algorithm). f (xi ) is referred to as the
share of party Pi , and it is denoted by JαKi . To reconstruct the secret α, the shares of at least t + 1
parties have to be combined via Lagrange interpolation (SSS.Recover algorithm).

We extend the notion of secret share for a value into the share for a vector in a natural way
as follows: Given a vector v = (v1 , . . . , vn ), JvKi = (Jv1 Ki , . . . , Jvn Ki ) indicates the share of v for party

Pi , which is a vector whose elements are the shares of the elements in v. Similarly, given a matrix I,
JIK denotes the share of I, which is also a matrix with each cell JI[i, j]K being the share of the cell
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SSS.Create(α, t):
$

1: (a1 , . . . , at ) ← Fp
2: for i = 1, . . . , ` P
do
3:
JαKi ← α + tj=1 aj · xji # xi ∈ F∗p :

public identifier of party Pi

4: return (JαK1 , . . . , JαK` )

SSS.Recover(A, t):
1: Randomly pick t + 1 ≤ ` shares {JαKx1 , . . . , JαK
 xt+1 } in A
2: g(x) ← LagrangeInterpolation {(xi , JαKxi )}t+1
i=1
3: α ← g(0)
4: return α

Figure 4.3: Shamir secret sharing scheme.
I[i, j]. In some cases, to ease readability, we drop the subscript i, when the party is understood from
the context.
Shamir [160] showed that SSS is information-theoretic secure and t-private in the sense that
no set of t or less shares reveals any information about the secret. More precisely, ∀m, m0 ∈ Fp ,
∀I ⊆ {1, . . . , `} such that |I|≤ t and for any set A = {a1 , . . . , a|I| } where ai ∈ Fp , the probability
distributions of {si∈I : (s1 , . . . , s` ) ← SSS.Create(m, t)} and {s0i∈I : (s01 , . . . , s0` ) ← SSS.Create(m0 , t)}
are identical and uniform:
Pr({si∈I } = A) = Pr({s0i∈I } = A).
Ben-Or et al. [19] showed that SSS can be used to obtain t-private protocols. Lemma 2 summarizes
the homomorphic properties of SSS and it was first described in [19].
(t)

Lemma 2 (SSS Homomorphic Properties [19]). Let JαKi

be the Shamir share of value α ∈ Fp with

privacy level t for Pi . SSS offers additively and multiplicatively homomorphic properties:
• Addition of two shares
(t)

(t)

(t)

Jα1 Ki + Jα2 Ki = Jα1 + α2 Ki .

(4.1)
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• Multiplication w.r.t a scalar c ∈ Fp
(t)

(t)

c · JαKi = Jc · αKi .

(4.2)

• Partial share multiplication
(t)

(t)

(2t)

Jα1 Ki · Jα2 Ki = Jα1 · α2 Ki

.

(4.3)

The two-share partial multiplication (Equation 4.3) in Lemma 2 results in a share of α1 · α2 ,
which is t-private and represented by a 2t-degree polynomial. It was first observed in [19] that
the resulting polynomial is not uniformly distributed. In order to achieve the uniform distribution
and computation consistency over Jα1 · α2 K, it is required to reduce the degree of the polynomial

representation of Jα1 · α2 K from 2t to t and re-share the polynomial. This multiplication operation

with degree reduction can be achieved via the secure following multiplication protocol.

Gennaro et al. [68] presented a Secure Multi-pary Multiplication (SMM) protocol for two
Shamir secret-shared values among multiple parties. Given α1 , α2 ∈ Fp shared by (t, `)-threshold
(t)

(t)

SSS as Jα1 Ki and Jα2 Ki for 1 ≤ i ≤ ` respectively, 2t + 1 parties Pi among ` parties would like to
compute the multiplication of α1 , α2 without revealing the value of α1 and α2 . The protocol requires
a Vandermonde matrix V{xi } of size (2t + 1) × (2t + 1) having the following structure.
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(t)

(t)

• Input: Pi owns Jα1 Ki , Jα2 Ki

(t)

and wants to compute Jα1 · α2 Ki

(t)
JβKi ,

where β = α1 · α2
• Output: Each Pi obtains
1: for each Pi ∈ {P1 , . . . , P2t+1 } do
(2t)
(t)
(t)
2:
JβKi ← Jα1 Ki · Jα2 Ki
(t) `
(2t)
3:
(JβKj )j=1 ← SSS.Create(JβKi , t)
4:

(t)

Distribute JβKj

to all Pj ∈ {P1 , . . . , P2t+1 } \ Pi

5: for each Pi ∈ {P1 , . . . , P2t+1 } do
2t+1
P −1
(t)
(t)
6:
JβKi ←
V [1, j] · JβKj
j=1

Figure 4.4: Secure multi-party multiplication protocol on SSS shares.
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where xi ∈ Fp are unique identifiers of participating party Pi . We refer to V−1 as the inverse of
(t)

(t)

(2t)

Vandermonde matrix. Each party Pi locally multiplies Jα1 Ki and Jα2 Ki yielding Jα1 · α2 Ki
(2t)

creates shares of Jα1 · α2 Ki

, and

by a new random polynomial of degree t for 2t + 1 parties and distributes

them to other 2t parties. Finally, each party locally performs the dot product between the received
−1
shares and V{x
[1, ∗] to obtain a new share of α1 · α2 , which is now represented by a polynomial of
i}
(t)

degree t as Jα1 · α2 Ki . Figure 4.4 presents this multiplication protocol.

Lemma 3 (SMM Protocol Privacy [68]). The SMM protocol in [68] (denoted as ? operator) offers
homomorphic property for full multiplication between two SSS-shares, whose result is t-private as:

(t)

(t)

(t)

Jα1 · α2 Ki = Jα1 Ki ? Jα2 Ki

(4.5)
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(hsi0 , . . . , hsi`−1 ) ← AuthCreate(α, s, `):
1: (JsK0 , . . . , JsK`−1 ) ← ASSS.Create(s, `)
2: (JαsK0 , . . . , JαsK`−1 ← ASSS.Create(αs, `)
3: return (hsi0 , . . . , hsi`−1 ), where hsii ← (JsKi , JαsKi )
s ← AuthRecover(α, (hsi0 , . . . , hsi`−1 )):
1: s ← ASSS.Recover(JsK0 , . . . , JsK`−1 )
2: σ ← ASSS.Recover(JαsK0 , . . . , JαsK`−1 )
3: if αs 6= σ then return ⊥
4: return s

Figure 4.5: Authenticated additive secret sharing.
4.3.6.2

Additive Secret Sharing
Additive secret sharing scheme (ASSS) comprises two algorithms ASSS = (Create, Recover)

as follows.

• (s0 , . . . , s`−1 ) ← ASSS.Create(s, `): Given a secret s ∈ Fp and a number of parties ` as input, it
outputs random values si as the shares for ` parties such that s =
share of a value s for party Pi as JsKi , i.e., JsKi = si .

P

i si .

We denote the additive

• s ← ASSS.Recover(s0 , . . . , s`−1 ): Given ` shares as input, it returns the secret as s ←

P

i si .

Additive secret sharing is t-private in the sense that no set of t or fewer shares reveals any
information about the secret. More formally, ∀s, s0 ∈ Fp , ∀L ⊆ {0, . . . , ` − 1} such that |L|≤ t and
for any S = {s0 , . . . , s|L|−1 } where si ∈ Fp , the probability distributions of {si∈L : (s0 , . . . , s`−1 ) ←
ASSS.Create(s, `)} and {s0i∈L : (s00 , . . . , s0`−1 ) ← ASSS.Create(s0 , `)} are identical and uniform.
Additive secret sharing offers additive homomorphic properties as follows. Given additive
shares Js1 K and Js2 K and c ∈ Fp , each party can locally compute the additive share of addition and
scalar multiplication as Js1 + s2 K ← Js1 K + Js2 K and JcsK ← cJsK.
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Replicated Secret Sharing (RSS) scheme enables homomorphic multiplication over additive shares with information-theoretic security [105]. In the three-party setting, each party
Si ∈ {S0 , S1 , S2 } stores two additive shares of a secret s ∈ Fp , JsKi and JsKi+1 4 .

To com-

pute JuvK from JuK and JvK, RSS proceeds as follows. First, each party Si (locally) computes
xi ← JuKi JvKi + JuKi JvKi+1 + JuKi+1 JvKi and represents xi with the addition of random values as
(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

xi = r0 + r1 + r2 . Each Si retains (ri , ri+1 ) and sends (ri−1 , ri ) and (ri , ri+1 ) to other parties
Si−1 and Si+1 , respectively. Finally, each Si obtains the shares of multiplication result by (locally)
(0)

computing JuvKi ← ri

(1)

+ ri

(2)

+ ri

(0)

(1)

(2)

and JuvKi+1 ← ri+1 + ri+1 + ri+1 .

We recall the authenticated secret sharing in [51], in which each secret s is attached with an

information-theoretic Message Authenticated Code (MAC) computed as αs, where α is a global MAC
key owned by the dealer. We denote the authenticated share of a secret s as h·i, which contains the
additive share of s and the additive share of αs as hsi = (JsK, JαsK), where JαsK is created in the same
manner as JsK. Figure 4.5 presents the algorithms to create authenticated shares and recover the

secret. We present a homomorphic multiplication protocol with malicious security, which follows the
pre-computation model [51, 112] using Beaver multiplication triples [14] of the form (a, b, c), where
c = ab. In this setting, each untrusted party Si owns a share of the MAC key as JαKi . In the offline

phase, all untrusted parties harness homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge protocols [51, 112]
to compute the authenticated share of the Beaver triple and its MAC in such a way that no party
learns about (a, b, c) and α. To this end, each Si obtains (haii , hbii , hcii ), where haii = (JaKi , JαaKi )
and so forth. In the online phase, given hui = (JuK, JαuK) and hvi = (JvK, JαvK) and all parties

want to compute huvi, each Si first (locally) computes JKi ← JuKi − JaKi , and JρKi ← JvKi − JbKi .

All parties come together to open  and ρ by each Si broadcasting JKi and JρKi . Finally, each Si
4

We note that the subscript index in this case is modulo 3.
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(ρ1 , . . . , ρ` ) ← PIRxor .CreateQuery(j): Create select query for a database size n
1: Initialize binary string e ← 0n and set e[j] ← 1
2: for i = 1, . . . , ` − 1 do
3:
ρi ← {0, 1}n
4: ρ` ← ρ1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ ρ`−1 ⊕ e
5: return (ρ1 , . . . , ρ` )
ri
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:

← PIRxor .Retrieve(ρi , B): Retrieve an item in B
Parse B as (b1 , . . . bn )
Initialize ri ← {0}m
for j = 1, . . . , n do
if ρi [j] = 1 then
r i ← r i ⊕ bj
return ri

b ← PIRxor .Reconstruct(R): Reconstruct the item
1: b ← r1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ r` , where ri ∈ R for 1 ≤ i ≤ `
2: return b

Figure 4.6: XOR-based PIR.
(locally) computes the authenticated share of the multiplication as huvii = (JuvKi , JαuvKi ), where
JuvKi ← JcKi + JbKi + ρJaKi + ρ and JαuvKi ← JαcKi + JσbKi + ρJσbKi + ρJαKi . At the end of the
protocol, all parties can verify the integrity of opened values as follows. Let xj be an opened value
and Jαxj Ki is the share of its MAC to Si . Let bj be a random value that all parties agree on. Each
Si locally computes x ←

P

together to open ω as ω ←

j bj xj ,

P

JyKi ←

i JωKi .

P

j bj Jαxj Ki

and JωKi ← JyKi − xJαKi . All parties come

If ω = 0, all the opened values pass the integrity check.

4.3.7 Private Information Retrieval
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) enables retrieval of a data item from an (unencrypted)
public database without revealing which item being fetched. A multi-server PIR [17, 73] is defined
as follows.
Definition 6 (Multi-Server PIR [17, 45, 73]). Let DB = (b1 , . . . , bn ) be a database consisting
of n items being stored in ` servers. A multi-server PIR protocol consists of three algorithms:
PIR = (CreateQuery, Retrieve, Reconstruct). Given an item bi in DB to be retrieved, the client creates
70

(JeK1 , . . . , JeK` ) ← PIRsss .CreateQuery(j): Create select queries
1: Let e := (e1 , . . . , en ), where ej ← 1, ei ← 0 for 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n
2: for i = 1, . . . , n do
3:
(Jei K1 , . . . , Jei K` ) ← SSS.Create(ei , t)
4: for l = 1, . . . , ` do
5:
JeKl ← (Je1 Kl , . . . , Jen Kl )
6: return (JeK1 , . . . , JeK` )
JbKi ← PIRsss .Retrieve(JeKi , B): Retrieve the item
1: JbKi ← JeKi · B
2: return JbKi
b ← PIRsss .Reconstruct(B, t): Recover the retrieved item from the set of answers B
1: b ← SSS.Recover(B, t)
2: return b

Figure 4.7: SSS-based PIR.
queries (e1 , . . . , e` ) ← PIR.CreateQuery(i) and distributes ej to server Sj . Each server responds with
an answer aj ← PIR.Retrieve(ej , DB). Upon receiving ` answers, the client computes the value of
item bi by invoking the reconstruction algorithm b ← PIR.Reconstruct(a1 , . . . , a` ).
The security of the protocol is defined in terms of correctness and privacy. A multi-server PIR
protocol is correct if the client computes the correct value of b from any ` answers via PIR.Reconstruct
algorithm with probability 1. The concept of t-privacy for protocols is applied naturally to the PIR
setting and follows directly from the t-privacy of SSS and the fact that among the servers they only
have access to t shares of the query vector [73].
We recall two efficient multi-server PIR protocols as follows.

• XOR-Based PIR [45]: It relies on XOR trick to perform the private retrieval, in which the
database B contains n items bi , each being interpreted as a m-bit string (Figure 4.6).
• SSS-Based PIR [17, 73]: It relies on SSS to improve the robustness of multi-server PIR, in which
the database B contains n items bi , each being interpreted as an element of Fp (Figure 4.7).
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Table 4.1: Summary of S3 ORAM schemes and some of their counterparts.
Scheme
Path-ORAM [169]
Ring-ORAM [150]
Onion-ORAM [54]

Bandwidth Overhead†
Client-server Server-server
O(log N )
O(log N )
O(1)
-

Block
Size∗
Ω(1)
Ω(1)
Ω(log5 N )

Server
Computation
XOR
Additively HE [50]
Permutation and IND-CPA encryption
Permutation and cuckoo hashing

O(1)
O(log N )

O(log N )
-

Ω(1)
Ω(1)

S3 ORAMO

O(1)

O(log N )

Ω(log2 N )

S3 ORAMC

O(1)

O(log N )

Ω(log N )

Dist. OblivStore [166]
2-Server ORAM [126]

Secure addition and
multiplication of SSS values

Client
Block Storage‡
O(log N )
O(log N )
O(1)
√
O( N )
O(1)
O(1)

# servers
1
1
1
2
2
3

O(log N )

† Bandwidth overhead denotes the number of blocks being transmitted between the client and the server(s) or between the servers. Due to the eviction,
the server-server bandwidth overhead of S3 ORAMO is O(λ log N ), where λ is the statistical security parameter. Since the eviction is performed every
λ/2 access requests, the amortized server-server bandwidth overhead of S3 ORAMO is O(log N ).
∗ This indicates the minimal block size needed to absorb the transmission cost of the retrieval query and the eviction data, thereby meeting the expected
client-bandwidth overhead. In this table, we consider all the ORAM schemes in the non-recursive form, where the position map is stored at the client.
‡ Client block storage is defined as the number of data blocks being temporarily stored at the client. This is equivalent to the stash component used in
[150, 169], which, therefore, does not include the cost of storing the position map of size O(N log N ). Notice that all the ORAM schemes in this table,
except the one in [126], require the position map component.

4.4

S3 ORAM: A Multi-Server ORAM Framework with Constant Client-Bandwidth
We present S3 ORAM, a new multi-server ORAM framework, which features O1 client

bandwidth blowup, low storage and efficient computation at both client- and server-side. Our
proposed framework consists of two multi-server active ORAM schemes including S3 ORAMO and
S3 ORAMC , in which the former minimizes the client storage requirement while the latter optimizes
the computation and storage overhead at the server-side. We first present our main idea and then
outline the desirable properties of our proposed framework as follows.
Most efficient ORAM schemes to-date follow the tree paradigm by Shi et al. [161]. In
this paradigm, there are two main procedures for each ORAM access: retrieval and eviction. Our
intuition is to harness the homomorphic properties of Shamir secret sharing along with a secure
multi-party multiplication protocol to perform these procedures in an oblivious manner. To achieve
O(1) client-bandwidth overhead, it is imperative to ensure that each procedure only incurs a small
constant number of data blocks to be transmitted between the client and the server(s). In the
standard (single-server) ORAM setting, we observe that both Onion-ORAM [54] and Circuit-ORAM
[179] schemes require low client storage and offer elegant retrieval and eviction strategies that can
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be further implemented with SSS homomorphic computation to achieve O(1) client-bandwidth
overhead. Therefore, the main idea of S3 ORAMO and S3 ORAMC schemes in our S3 ORAM framework
is to harness SSS and SMM protocol to perform the retrieval and eviction operations in the line
of Onion-ORAM and Circuit-ORAM, respectively, but in a significantly more computation- and
client bandwidth-efficient manner. By doing this, S3 ORAMO (resp. S3 ORAMC ) inherits all desirable
properties of Onion-ORAM (resp. Circuit-ORAM) regarding the low client storage cost, while
achieving O(1) client-bandwidth overhead without the costly homomorphic operations but instead
requiring only a lightweight computation and suitability for small block sizes. Table 4.1 outlines a
high-level comparison of S3 ORAM and its counterparts.
Our S3 ORAM framework offers the following properties.

• Low client-server communication: All schemes in S3 ORAM framework offer O(1) client bandwidth
blowup, compared with O(log N ) of Path-ORAM [169] and Ring-ORAM [150] (with a fixed
number of servers). S3 ORAM schemes feature a smaller block size (i.e., Ω(log2 N ) in S3 ORAMO ,
Ω(log N ) in S3 ORAMC ), than state-of-the-art O(1) bandwidth blowup ORAM schemes that
require Fully or Partially HE operations (e.g., Ω(log5 N ) in Onion-ORAM [54], Ω(log6 N ) in
Bucket-ORAM [61]).
• Low client and server computation: S3 ORAM schemes require the servers to perform only
lightweight modular additions and multiplications, which are much more efficient than partial HE
operations (e.g., [50]). In particular, we show in §4.4.5 that, the server computation of S3 ORAM
schemes is three orders of magnitude faster than that of Onion-ORAM.
The client in S3 ORAM schemes only performs lightweight computations for retrieval and eviction
operations. Thus, it is more efficient than Onion-ORAM, which requires a number of HE
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operations. For example, S3 ORAM requires only a few milliseconds compared to minutes of
Onion-ORAM to generate an encrypted access query. Moreover, since data blocks in S3 ORAM
schemes are single-layered “encrypted”, the “decryption” process is less costly so that it is faster
than other ORAMs (e.g., [54, 166]), whose blocks are multi-layered encrypted.
• Low end-to-end delay: Due to low bandwidth and computation overhead, S3 ORAM schemes
are approximately three orders of magnitude faster than Onion-ORAM, while it is one order
of magnitude faster than Path-ORAM in networks with moderate client bandwidth. We notice
that for S3 ORAM to provide all its advantages, it is assumed that good network throughput is
available between the servers. In our detailed analysis in §4.4.5.5, we show that if the inter-server
bandwidth is limited and the client has access to a high-speed Internet connection, state-of-the-art
(single-server) ORAM schemes (i.e., Path-ORAM, Ring-ORAM) are more efficient than S3 ORAM
(see §4.4.5.5 for a detailed analysis).
• Low client storage: S3 ORAMO scheme features O(1) blocks of client storage, compared with O(λ)
√
blocks in Path-ORAM/Ring-ORAM, and O( N ) blocks in [168]. S3 ORAMC scheme achieves the
same block of client storage with Path-ORAM/Ring-ORAM (i.e., O(λ))
• High security: All S3 ORAM schemes achieve information-theoretic statistical security. The
statistical bit comes from the tree-paradigm by Shi et al. [161]. The information-theoretic
property comes from SSS and its multi-party multiplication protocol.
• Full-fledged implementation and experiments: We fully implemented S3 ORAMC and S3 ORAMO
schemes in our S3 ORAM framework and evaluated their performance in an actual cloud environment (i.e., Amazon EC2). The detailed experiments showed that both S3 ORAM schemes
are efficient in practice and they can be deployed on mobile devices with a limited computation

74

capacity and low network connection. We have released the source code of S3 ORAM framework
for public use and testing.

S3 ORAM harnesses the distributed setting to achieve constant client bandwidth overhead
with efficient computation and the server-side simultaneously. It should be clear, however, that
the use of standard secret sharing techniques and, in particular, Shamir secret sharing, renders our
protocol vulnerable to collusion attacks (as it is standard in this setting). It should be observed that
this vulnerability does not exist in the standard single-server ORAM model. Therefore, as it is also
standard in this model, we note that S3 ORAM cannot offer any security guarantee if the number of
colluding servers exceeds the privacy threshold. Another limitation of S3 ORAM is that it only offers
security in the semi-honest setting (see [54] for the exemplified active attack).

4.4.1 System and Security Models
4.4.1.1

System Model
Following the literature in distributed secure computation (e.g., [19, 73]), we assume a

synchronous network, which consists of a client and ` ≥ 2t + 1 semi-honest servers S = {S1 , . . . , S` }.
It is also assumed that the channels between all the players are pairwise-secure, i.e., no player can
tamper with, read, or modify the contents of the communication channel of other players. We assume
that all parties behave in an “honest-but-curious” manner in which parties always send messages
as expected but try to learn as much as possible from the shared information received or observed.
Notice that we do not allow parties to provide malicious inputs, i.e., parties are not allowed to
behave in a Byzantine manner.
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A protocol is t-private [19] (see [73] for similar definitions in the context of distributed PIR)
if any set of at most t parties cannot compute after the protocol execution more than they could
compute individually from their set of private inputs and outputs. Alternatively, the parties have not
“learned” anything. Our protocols in general, offer information-theoretic guarantees unless something
is said explicitly to the contrary. This implies that our solutions are secure against computationally
unbounded adversaries. As it is standard, we require that all computations by the servers and client
be polynomial time and efficient. Finally notice that not only is the interaction between the servers
and client performed in such a way that information-theoretic security is guaranteed but also the
database being accessed is shared among the servers in a way that no coalition of up to t servers can
find anything about the database contents (also in an information-theoretic manner).

4.4.1.2

Security Model
We now define the security of multi-server ORAM in the semi-honest setting proposed in [5]

as a straightforward extension of the definition in [5] to the multi-server setting.
Definition 7 (Multi-Server Active ORAM). Let x = ((op1 , id1 , data1 ), . . . , (opq , idq , dataq )) be a data
request sequence of length q, where opj ∈ {Read, Write}, idj is the identifier to be read/written and
dataj is the data identified by idj to be read/written. Let ORAMj (x) represent the ORAM client’s
sequence of interactions with the server Si given a data request sequence x.
A multi-server ORAM is correct if for any sequence x, {ORAM1 (x), . . . , ORAM` (x)} returns data
consistent with x except with a negligible probability.
A multi-server ORAM is t-secure if ∀I ⊆ {1, . . . , `} such that |I|≤ t, for any two data access sequences
x, y with |x|= |y|, their corresponding transcripts {ORAMi∈I (x)} and {ORAMi∈I (y)} observed by
a coalition of up to t servers {Si∈I } are (perfectly/statistically/computationally) indistinguishable.
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Table 4.2: S3 ORAM notation.
Symbol
T
Z
T[i], T[i][j]
|b|, b, c
N, m
H
pm
(pid, pIdx) ← pm[id]
I ← P(pid)

Description
S3 ORAMtree structure.
Bucket size.
i-th bucket of S3 ORAMtree T and j-th slot in the i-th bucket of T.
Block size, block and block chunk, respectively.
Number of blocks and number of chunks in a block.
Height of the S3 ORAMtree.
Position map.
Precise location (i.e., path ID and path index) of the block id.
Set of indexes of buckets residing in the path pid.

4.4.2 The Proposed S3 ORAM Framework
S3 ORAM follows the typical procedure of tree-based ORAMs [161]. Specifically, given a
block to be accessed, the client first retrieves it from the outsourced ORAM structure via a secure
retrieval operation. The retrieved block is then assigned to a random path, and written back to
the root bucket. Finally, an eviction operation is performed in order to percolate data blocks to
lower levels in the ORAM structure. The intuition behind S3 ORAM access protocol is as follows: (1)
We integrate SSS with a multi-server PIR protocol to perform a private retrieval operation with
some homomorphic properties; (2) We leverage these homomorphic properties of SSS and a SMM
protocol to perform block permutation and to preserve t-privacy level of ORAM structure in the
eviction phase, without relying on costly partial HE operations. Notice that the idea of using PIR
to implement the ORAM retrieval phase was first suggested in [130], and later in some subsequent
works such as [5, 52, 54, 77]. In Table 4.2, we outline the notation used in the S3 ORAM schemes
and throughout the rest of the dissertation.

4.4.2.1

Data Structure
S3 ORAM schemes follow the tree paradigm proposed by Shi et al. [161] (see §4.3.1), in which

the outsourced database is split into size-equal blocks and then organized to a balanced binary tree

77

S3 ORAM.Setup(DB):
1: Split DB into blocks (b1 , . . . , bN ) with corresponding IDs (id1 , . . . , idN )
2: T[i][j] ← {0}|b| for 1 ≤ i < 2H+1 and 1 ≤ j ≤ Z
3: for i = 1, . . . , N do
$
4:
zi ← {1, . . . , 2H }
5:
Put bi into an empty slot indexed y of the leaf bucket in path zi
6:
pm[idi ] ← (zi , H · Z + y)
7: for i = 1, . . . , 2H+1 − 1 do
8:
for j = 1, . . . , Z do
(1)
(m)
(k)
9:
(ci,j , . . . , ci,j ) ← T[i, j], where ci,j ∈ Fp
10:
11:

(k)

(k)

(k)

(Jci,j K1 , . . . , Jci,j K` ) ← SSS.Create(ci,j , t) for 1 ≤ k ≤ m

JT[i, j]Kl ←

(1)
(m)
(Jci,j Kl , . . . , Jci,j Kl )

for 1 ≤ l ≤ `

12: return (JTK1 , . . . , JTK` ) # Send JTKi to Si for 1 ≤ i ≤ `

Figure 4.8: S3 ORAM setup algorithm.
(T) with a height of H. Each node in T is called a bucket with Z slots so that it can store up to Z
data blocks. Thus, T can store up to N < Z · 2H data blocks.
At the client-side, the client maintains a position map component (pm) to keep track of the
assigned path (pid) for each data block in the tree. Additionally, the client stores the location of
each data block in its assigned path. Hence, pm is of structure pm := (id, hpid, pIdxi), where id is
the block ID, 1 ≤ pid ≤ 2H is the assigned path of the block, and 1 ≤ pIdx ≤ Z · (H + 1) is the
location of the block in its path. The client also maintains a so-called stash component (denoted as
S) to temporarily store accessed block(s) from the tree.
In the S3 ORAM framework, the tree structure is SSS-shared among ` servers. Figure 4.8
presents the Setup algorithm to construct data structures in S3 ORAM schemes given a database
input DB. First, the client organizes DB into N data blocks, and then initializes every slot in each
bucket of the tree (T) with a 0’s string of length |b| (lines 1-2). The client arranges all blocks into
T, wherein each block (bi ) is independently assigned to a random leaf bucket of T. Notice that |b|
can be larger than dlog2 pe and therefore, it might not be suitable for arithmetic computation over
Fp . To address this, the client splits the data in each slot of T into equal-sized chunks cj ∈ Fp (line
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S3 ORAM.Access(op, id, b∗ ):
1: b ← S3 ORAM.Retrieve(id)
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:

$

pm[id].pid ← {1, . . . , kH+1 }
if op = write then
b ← b∗
S←S∪b
Execute S3 ORAM.Evict()
return b

Figure 4.9: General access procedure in S3 ORAM schemes.
9)5 . Finally, the client creates shares of T via SSS.Create algorithm for each chunk in each slot in T
(line 10). The S3 ORAM distributed data structure consists of ` shares of T as {JTK1 , . . . , JTK` }.

Figure 4.9 presents the general access operation of S3 ORAMschemes following the tree-ORAM

paradigm. Basically, there are two main subroutines in the S3 ORAM.Access algorithm: Retrieve (line
1) and Evict (line 6). The former is to obliviously retrieve the block of interest from the ORAM-tree
stored on the cloud, while the latter is to obliviously write the retrieved block back to the ORAM-tree.
Once the block is retrieved, it is assigned to a new random path (line 2), updated if needed (line 3),
and then stored in the stash (line 5) to be pushed back later via the Evict protocol.
In our S3 ORAM framework, we select the eviction path deterministically, which follows the
reverse lexicographical order proposed in [71]. Specifically, given a binary tree of height H, where
edges in each level are indexed by either 0 (left) or 1 (right), the collection of edges of the eviction
path at the EvictCtr-th eviction operation is calculated by the following formula.

v = DigitReverse2 (EvictCtr

mod 2H ),

(4.6)

where DigitReverse2 denotes the order-reversal of the binary string representation of the decimal
integer input.
5

We assume implicitly that we choose an appropriate prime p such that every string cj when interpreted as an element
of Fp is less than p.
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In the following, we present the main scheme in our S3 ORAMframework called S3 ORAMO ,
which features the low client storage overhead. We describe another S3 ORAM scheme called
S3 ORAMC , which offers efficient computation and low server storage overhead with the cost of client
storage afterward.

4.4.2.2

S3 ORAMO : S3 ORAM with Low Client Storage
We introduce S3 ORAMO , an S3 ORAM scheme that does not require the client to maintain

the stash component, thereby saving a factor of O(λ) client storage overhead. To achieve this,
S3 ORAMO follows the Triplet Eviction strategy in [54]. To enable O(1) client-bandwidth blowup,
S3 ORAMO harnesses homomorphic properties of SSS, which allows the client to “instruct” the servers
to perform efficient retrieval and eviction operations in a secure manner without having to download
and upload O(log N ) data blocks.
In the following, we describe in detail the retrieval and eviction protocol of S3 ORAMO scheme.
To achieve O(1) client bandwidth blowup, the retrieval protocol in S3 ORAMO scheme requires
an efficient PIR protocol to privately retrieve the block of interest. We first describe the PIR protocol
based on SSS as follows.
Our objective is to privately retrieve a block of interest residing in the queried path on the
S3 ORAMO tree. Recall that in the single-server HE-based ORAM schemes (e.g., [10, 54]), the PIR
query is encrypted with additive/fully HE. In S3 ORAMO , the tree is SSS-shared among ` servers,
which features highly efficient additive and multiplicative homomorphic properties. We observe that
the multi-server PIR scheme in [17, 73] relies on SSS to create PIR queries and, therefore, it can
serve as a suitable private retrieval tool to be used for S3 ORAMO scheme. We describe SSS-based
PIR scheme in Figure 4.10, and further outline it as follows:
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PIR.CreateQuery(j):
1: Let e := (e1 , . . . , en ), where ej ← 1, ei ← 0 for 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n
2: for i = 1, . . . , n do
(t)
(t)
3:
(Jei K1 , . . . , Jei K` ) ← SSS.Create(ei , t)
(t)

(t)

(t)

4: JeKi := (Je1 Ki , . . . , Jen Ki ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ `
(t)
(t)
5: return (JeK1 , . . . , JeK` )
(t)

(t)

PIR.Retrieve(JeKi , JDBKi ):
(2t)

(t)

(t)

6: JbKi ← JeKi · JDBKi
(2t)
7: return JbKi
(2t)

PIR.Reconstruct(JbK1

(2t)

, . . . , JbK`

):

(2t)
(2t)
SSS.Recover(JbK1 , . . . , JbK` , 2t)

8: b ←
9: return b

Figure 4.10: SSS-based PIR scheme.
S3 ORAMO .read(id):
Client:
1: (s, j) ← pm[id]
(t)
(t)
2: (JeK1 , . . . , JeK` ) ← PIR.CreateQuery(j)
(t)
3: Send (s, JeKi ) to server Si , for 1 ≤ i ≤ `

(t)

Server: each Si ∈ {S1 , . . . , S` } receiving (s, JeKi ) do
4: I ← P(s)
5: for j = 1, . . . , m do
(t)
(t)
6:
Let Jcj Ki contain j-th chunk of Z slots in JT[i0 ]Ki , ∀i0 ∈ I
(2t)
(t)
(t)
7:
Jcj Ki ← PIR.Retrieve(JeKi , Jcj Ki )
(2t)
(2t)
8: Send (Jc1 Ki , . . . , Jcm Ki ) to client
(2t)
(2t) `
}i=1 , . . . , {Jcm Ki }`i=1 )
(2t)
(2t)
PIR.Reconstruct(Jcj K1 , . . . , Jcj K` ) for 1 ≤

Client: On receive ({Jc1 Ki

9: cj ←
10: b ← (c1 , . . . , cm )
11: return b

j≤m

Figure 4.11: S3 ORAMO retrieval subroutine.
Assume that each server Si stores a share of the database DB containing n blocks denoted
as JDBKi , which can be interpreted as a vector with each i-th component being the share of the i-th

item in DB. Let j be the index of the block in DB to be privately retrieved. The client executes
the PIR.CreateQuery algorithm, which creates an n-dimensional unit vector with all zero coordinates
except the j-th coordinate being set to 1 (line 1) and then, secret-shares it with SSS (lines 2–3). The
client then distributes these shares to the corresponding servers, each answering with the result of
the dot product between the received share vector and its share of DB by executing the PIR.Retrieve
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S3 ORAMO .Evict():
1: (c1 , . . . , cm ) ← b, where b is the block that has just been retrieved
2: (Jcj K1 , . . . , Jcj K` ) ← SSS.Create(cj , t) for 1 ≤ j ≤ m
3: Write (Jc1 Ki , . . . , Jcm Ki ) to slot JT[1, nr + 1]Ki in server Si for 1 ≤ i ≤ `
4: nr ← nr + 1 mod A # nr is initialized with 0
5: if nr = 0 then
6:
v ← DigitReverse2 (EvictCtr mod 2H )
7:
Execute S3 ORAMO .EvictAlongPath(v) protocol
8:
EvictCtr ← EvictCtr + 1 mod 2H # EvictCtr is initialized with 0

Figure 4.12: S3 ORAMO eviction subroutine.
algorithm (line 6). Finally, the client executes the PIR.Reconstruct algorithm, which invokes the
SSS.Recover algorithm over ` answers to recover the desired block (line 8). Since DB in this context
is SSS-secret shared instead of plaintext as in [17, 73], our PIR.Reconstruct algorithm requires at
least 2t + 1 shares (instead of t + 1) to recover the item correctly.
We present the retrieval protocol in S3 ORAMO in Figure 4.11, which employs three algorithms
of the above SSS-based PIR scheme. Given the block to be read, the client first determines its
location in the S3 ORAMO tree via the position map pm (line 1) and then, privately retrieves it
using the SSS-based PIR protocol. In this case, the server interprets all slots in the retrieval path
as the database input DB in the PIR.Retrieve algorithm. Hence, the size of DB and the length of
the query vector is n = Z · (H + 1). Since there are m separate chunks in each slot, the servers
execute the PIR.Retrieve algorithm m times with the same PIR query but over different DBj , where
each DBj contains the j-th chunk of all slots in the retrieval path (lines 5–7). Finally, the client
obtains the desired block by recovering all chunks upon receiving their corresponding shares using
the PIR.Reconstruct algorithm (line 9).
To eliminate the need of maintaining the stash component at the client-side, S3 ORAMO
follows the Triplet Eviction strategy proposed in [54]. The S3 ORAMO .Evict algorithm in Figure 4.12
presents the eviction procedure in S3 ORAMO scheme. Specifically, after the block is privately
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retrieved via the S3 ORAMO .read protocol, the client creates new SSS-shares for it (lines 1–2), and
then writes the share to an empty slot in the root bucket of the corresponding server (lines 3). After
A ≤ Z successive retrievals, the client selects a deterministic eviction path following the reverse
lexicographical order (line 5), and executes the S3 ORAMO .EvictAlongPath protocol, to obliviously
percolate the blocks from upper levels (e.g., root bucket) to deeper levels (e.g., leaf buckets).
According to the Triplet Eviction policy, for each level in the eviction path, all blocks from
the source bucket (T[i]) will be obliviously moved to all its children (i.e., T[2i], T[2i + 1]). We
follow the same terminology used in [54] to denote the buckets involved in each Triplet Eviction
operation: If the child of the source bucket resides in the eviction path, it is called the destination
bucket while the other child is called the sibling bucket (see Figure 4.13 for clarification). In our
S3 ORAMO scheme, the move is performed by computing the matrix product, in which the client
creates permutation matrices and requests the servers to jointly perform the matrix product between
such matrices and vectors containing data along the eviction path in the S3 ORAMO tree. We present
the algorithmic description of this strategy in the S3 ORAMO .EvictAlongPath protocol in Figure 4.14
with details as follows.
Let JuK be a 2Z-dimensional share vector formed by concatenating all data in the source

bucket and the destination bucket. The client creates a permutation matrix I ∈ {0, 1}2Z×Z (line 2)
such that the matrix product between JuK and I will result in a Z-dimensional vector JvK, in which
data at position i in JuK is moved to position j in JvK. That is, I is a matrix, where I[i, j] ← 1 if the

block at position i in JuK is expected to move to position j in JvK (line 7). As a result, I[i + Z, i] ← 1
if the block currently at position i in JvK remains (line 12). To hide the location information of

real blocks after permutation, the client “encrypts” every single element of I with SSS resulting
in a share matrix JIK ∈ F2Z×Z
(line 13). Note that the matrix product between these two shares
p

83

(t)
0
{JIh K1 }H
h=1 , JIH K1

(t)
0
{JIh K2 }H
h=1 , JIH K2

Server 1

Triplet Eviction
(2)

Server 2

Triplet Eviction
(3)

(t)
0
{JIh K3 }H
h=1 , JIH K3

(2)

(1) Send permutation matrices

Server 3

Client

Triplet Eviction
(3)

(2)

(3)

Source bucket
Destination bucket
Sibling bucket
Eviction path

(2) SMM Protocol

(2): Blocks in source bucket are pushed down via matrix product
(3): Blocks in source bucket are copied to (non-leaf) sibling bucket

Figure 4.13: The triplet eviction using SSS and SMM protocol.
results in a share vector with each element being represented by a degree-2t polynomial. To maintain
the consistency and privacy of the S3 ORAMO tree structure, servers will jointly perform the SMM
protocol to reduce the degree of the polynomial of each component in JvK from 2t to t (line 22 and
line 26).

We can apply the same trick as above to obliviously move real blocks in source buckets to
their sibling buckets. However, since the non-leaf sibling buckets are guaranteed to be empty due to
previous evictions passing on them (see Lemma 4), this process can be further optimized as discussed
in [54] as follows. For each non-leaf sibling bucket in the eviction path, the client simply requests
servers to copy all the data in the source bucket to the sibling bucket (line 19) and then, updates
locally the path location of blocks in the position map (pm) accordingly (line 9–10). For the leaf
sibling bucket, since it is not guaranteed to be empty at any time, we use the matrix permutation
to move blocks from the source bucket to it as described above. This optimization can halve the
client-server and server-server bandwidth cost as well as the server computation. Generally, we can
see that our eviction approach requires only one client-server communication and guarantees that all
data after eviction are consistently “encrypted” by degree-t polynomials. Figure 4.13 visualizes this
new SSS-based Triplet Eviction strategy.
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S3 ORAMO .EvictAlongPath(v):
Let (u1 , . . . , uH ) be the (ordered) indexes of source buckets along the eviction path v
Client:
1: for h = 1, . . . , H do
2:
Let Ih be a 2Z × Z matrix, set Ih [∗, ∗] ← 0
3:
for each real block with id in the source bucket T[uh ] do
4:
if id can legally reside in the destination bucket of T[uh ] then
5:
(pid, pIdx) ← pm[id]
6:
Let y (1 ≤ y ≤ Z) be the index of an empty slot in the destination bucket of T[uh ]
7:
Ih [x][Z + y] ← 1, where x ← pIdx mod Z
8:
pm[id0 ].pIdx ← Z · h + y # Update the new location of the block in the path
9:
else# id can legally reside in the sibling bucket of T[uh ]
10:
pm[id].pIdx ← pm[id].pIdx + Z
11:
for each real block with id0 in the destination bucket of T[uh ] do
12:
Ih [x + Z][x] ← 1, where x ← pm[id0 ].pIdx mod Z
(t)
(t)
13:
JIh [x, y]K1 , . . . , JIh [x, y]K` ← SSS.Create(Ih [x, y], t) for 1 ≤ x ≤ 2Z, 1 ≤ y ≤ Z

14: Repeat lines 2–13 (excluded lines 9-10) to create JI0 H K, the share of permutation matrix for source to sibling
bucket at the leaf level (h = H)
(t)
(t)
(t)
15: Send (JI0H Ki , JI1 Ki , . . . , JIH Ki ) to Si , for 1 ≤ i ≤ `
(t)

(t)

(t)

Server: each Si ∈ {S1 , . . . , S` } receiving (JI0H Ki , JI1 Ki , . . . , JIH Ki ) do
18: for h = 1, . . . , H do
(t)
19:
Copy all data from source bucket JT[uh ]Ki to its non-leaf sibling bucket
20:
for j = 1, . . . , m do
(t)
(t)
21:
Let Jch,j Ki be a vector containing j-th chunks of JT[uh ]Ki and its destination bucket
(t)
(t)
(t)
22:
Jĉh,j Ki ← Jch,j Ki ? JIh Ki
(t)
(t)
23:
Update j-th chunks of the destination bucket of JT[uh ]Ki with Jĉh,j Ki
24: for j = 1, . . . , m do
(t)
(t)
25:
Let Jc0H,j Ki be a vector containing j-th chunks of source bucket JT[uH ]Ki and its (leaf ) sibling bucket
(t)
(t)
(t)
26:
Jĉ0H,j Ki ← Jc0H,j Ki ? JI0H Ki
(t)
(t)
27:
Update j-th chunks of the sibling bucket of JT[uH ]Ki with Jĉ0H,j Ki

Figure 4.14: S3 ORAMO triplet eviction with SSS scheme and SMM protocol.
We analyze the cost of S3 ORAMO pertaining to the block size (|b|), number of blocks (N ),
and statistical security parameter (λ). We consider other system parameters (e.g., prime field Fp ,
number of servers `) to be fixed.
In the S3 ORAMO retrieval phase, each PIR query being sent to ` servers is of size (Z ·
(H + 1) · dlog2 pe) bits. The client exchanges one block of size |b| with each server. The Triplet
Eviction is performed after every A subsequent retrievals. In this operation, the client sends H + 1
permutation matrices to ` servers. Each matrix is of size 2Z 2 · dlog2 pe bits. The servers exchange
the shares of H + 1 buckets with each other, each being of size Z · |b| bits. Therefore, given
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H = O(log N ), Z = A = O(λ) and `, p are constants, the amortized client-server communication
complexity is O(|b|+λ · log N ). The amortized server-server communication overhead is O(|b|· log N ).
The client bandwidth blowup is defined as the ratio between the cost of client-server
communication by using ORAM to access the block vs. the base case where the block is insecurely
accessed without ORAM. Our analyzed communication complexity of S3 ORAMO above indicates that
the size of the PIR query and the permutation matrices is independent of the block size parameter |b|.
Therefore, the O(1) client bandwidth blowup can be achieved in S3 ORAMO by selecting a suitable
value of |b|. That is, by selecting |b|= Ω(λ · log N )6 , S3 ORAM achieves O(1) client bandwidth
blowup.
In the retrieval phase, the servers compute the dot product between the Z ·(H +1)-dimensional
PIR query vector and the block vector containing Z · (H + 1) blocks of size |b|. In the Triplet
Eviction phase, the servers compute H + 1 times the matrix product between a vector containing
2Z blocks of size |b| and a permutation matrix of size 2Z × Z. The matrix product incurs re-sharing
and computing the degree reduction in the SMM protocol on Z · (H + 1) blocks each being of size
|b|. In total, the amortized server computation complexity is O(|b|·λ · log N ).
The client executes the SSS.Create algorithm Z · (H + 1) times and 2Z 2 · (H + 1) times
to create the PIR query and H + 1 permutation matrices, respectively. The client executes the
SSS.Recover and SSS.Create algorithms to reconstruct and re-share a block of size |b|, respectively.
Thus, the amortized client computation complexity is O(|b|+ log N ).
S3 ORAMO layout is a full binary tree of height H, which has a total of Z · (2H+1 − 1) slots
and can store up to N ≤ A · 2H−1 real blocks. Given A = Z = Θ(λ) for statistical security (see
6

In the ORAM community, λ = O(log N ) is commonly used. With this assumption, the block size in S3 ORAMO is
Ω(log2 N )
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Lemma 4), the server storage blowup cost is O(1). Notice that the share of the value has the same
size as the value (i.e., no ciphertext expansion as in Onion-ORAM), the server storage of S3 ORAM
is constant and does not increase after a sequence of access operations.
Similar to Onion-ORAM, S3 ORAMO does not require the stash component since the retrieved
block is immediately written back to the root bucket. Hence, the client block storage in S3 ORAMO
is O(1). The client locally stores the position map whose cost is O(N · (log N + log log N )).
For theoretical interest, S3 ORAMO can achieve (in total) O(1) client storage by storing the
position map in smaller ORAMs using the recursion technique in [168] and the bucket metadata
structure in [54]. Specifically, for each bucket in the S3 ORAMO tree, we create a metadata that stores
the current index (pIdx) and the assigned path (pid) of blocks residing in it. For each S3 ORAM access,
the metadata of buckets along the retrieval/eviction path will be read first to get the path and the
location of blocks of interest. This information will be used to create the PIR query and permutation
O
3
matrices. Next, we construct a series of S3 ORAMO structures S3 ORAMO
0 , . . . , S ORAMlogr N , where
O
3
S3 ORAMO
0 stores database blocks and each block j in S ORAMi+1 stores the path information (pid)

of the blocks (j − 1)r, . . . , jr in S3 ORAMO
i and r ≥ 2 is the compression ratio. We refer the reader
to [54, 168] for the detailed descriptions.
For simplicity, we assume that r = 2 and let H = log N be the height of S3 ORAMO
0 . In
S3 ORAMO
i (i ≥ 1), the size of meta-data is λ(H − i), the block size is 2(H − i + 1), and the path
length is H − i. There are log N recursive levels so that the total bandwidth overhead for each
recursive S3 ORAMO retrieval is λ

PH−1
i=0

i2 +

PH

i=1 2(H

− i + 1) = O(λ log3 N ). Due to amortization,

the asymptotic cost of eviction is similar to the retrieval as analyzed above. Therefore, to achieve
3
O(1) client bandwidth blowup, the block size of S3 ORAMO
0 needs to be Ω(λ · log N ). So, using the
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recursion technique to get rid of the client position map increases the regular block size a factor of
O(log2 N ) and O(log N ) communication rounds.
The regular block size in recursive S3 ORAMO is a factor of log2 N times larger than other
(recursive) tree-based ORAM schemes featuring O(log N ) bandwidth (e.g., Path ORAM, RingORAM, Tree-ORAM) and (at least) log N times smaller than (recursive) tree-based ORAM with
O(1) bandwidth (e.g., Onion-ORAM [54], Bucket-ORAM [61], OVS [10]) due to the following reasons.
As analyzed above, to keep the original asymptotic communication overhead intact when applying the
recursion technique, the regular block size must be large enough to absorb the cost of transmitting
the blocks and the meta-data components from O(log N ) small (recursive) ORAM structures. In
ORAM schemes with O(log N ) bandwidth, since the size of small blocks in their recursive structures
is O(log N ), the regular block size is Ω(log2 N ) to absorb the cost of downloading O(log2 N ) small
blocks (there is no meta-data component in these schemes). On the other hand, the regular block
size of O(1)-bandwidth ORAM schemes does not increase when applying the recursion, since it is
already larger than the total amount needed to absorb the cost of downloading the blocks and the
meta-data of small ORAM structures (e.g., Ω(log5 N )-Ω(log6 N ) block size vs. Ω(log3 N ) needed).
Given that the recursion technique significantly increases the regular block size, it is recommended to maintain the position map locally assuming that its size is small enough. This choice
allows the implementor to gain the full performance advantages that S3 ORAM offers in practice.

4.4.2.3

S3 ORAMC : S3 ORAM with Low Server Computation
In this section, we present S3 ORAMC , a S3 ORAM scheme that achieves lower computational

complexity than S3 ORAMO due to its smaller bucket size parameter Z (e.g., O(1) vs. O(λ)). The
price to pay for such achievement is that it requires maintaining the stash at the client-side to
88

temporarily store blocks that cannot be pushed back to the tree due to the small bucket size. The
intuition of S3 ORAMC is to implement the access protocol of Circuit-ORAM proposed by Wang et
al. [179] using the homomorphic properties of SSS as follows.
S3 ORAMC has the same retrieval procedure like S3 ORAMO scheme, where we leverage
SSS-based PIR Scheme to privately retrieve the block in the retrieval path of the S3 ORAMC tree
(Figure 4.15).
S3 ORAMC .read(id)
1: b ← S3 ORAMO .read(id)
2: return b

Figure 4.15: S3 ORAMC retrieval subroutine.

S3 ORAMC implements the eviction principle in Circuit-ORAM scheme with additive and
multiplicative homomorphic properties of SSS. Similar to S3 ORAMO scheme, S3 ORAMC selects a
deterministic eviction path following the reverse lexicographical order (Equation 4.6) proposed in [71]
(Figure 4.16), which was proven to achieve the negligible overflow probability with a lower bucket
size parameter compared with the random path (e.g., 2 vs. 3). We note that the detail descriptions
of PrepareDeepest(v) and PrepareTarget(v) subroutines in Figure 4.16 can be found in [179].
Intuitively, the client first scans the position map to prepare the target array that indicates
which blocks to be pushed down to which levels in the eviction path. Afterward, the client goes
through each level of the eviction path, picks the desired block and drops it to the target level.
S3 ORAMC .Evict():
1:
2:
3:
4:

v ← DigitReverse2 (EvictCtr mod 2H )
Execute S3 ORAMC .EvictAlongPath(v) protocol
EvictCtr ← EvictCtr + 1 mod 2H
Repeat lines 1-3

Figure 4.16: S3 ORAMC eviction subroutine.
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Figure 4.17: S3 ORAMO eviction based on [179] using SSS and SMM protocol.
Notice that at any time, the client holds and drops at most one block. This policy is guaranteed by
computing a target array that indicates whether to pick/drop the block in each level by scanning the
position map. We refer the reader to [179] for the detailed description and explanation.
Figure 4.17 visualizes the high-level idea of the eviction in S3 ORAMC , which implements
the push-down strategy in [179] using SSS and SMM protocol. Figure 4.18 describes the detailed
algorithm with the high-level idea as follows. For each level (h) in the eviction path, the client
creates a permutation matrix (Ih ) of size (Z + 1) × (Z + 1). We use the last column of the matrix
(Ih [∗][Z + 1]) to indicate the block to be picked, while the other columns Ih [∗][j] ( 1 ≤ j ≤ Z) is to
indicate the block to be moved to or hold at j-th slot of the h-leveled bucket. The data vector Jch K,

which will be computed the matrix product with Ih , is of size Z + 1 containing the holding block

(Jch [1]K) and the data from Z slots of the h-leveled bucket (Jvh [2]K . . . , Jvh [Z + 1]K). So, the client
sets Ih [x][Z + 1] ← 1 to pick the block at slot x (line 15), and Ih [1][x] ← 1 to drop the holding block

to the x-th slot of the h-leveled bucket (line 10). If the currently holding block is moved to the next
level (i.e., no pickup/drop-off at this level), the client sets Ih [1][Z + 1] ← 1 (line 13). Similar to
S3 ORAMO scheme, the client sets Ih [x + 1][x] ← 1 to keep blocks indexed x in the h-leveled bucket
in position (lines 17-20). Finally, the client creates the SSS-shares for such permutation matrices
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S3 ORAMC .EvictAlongPath(v):
Let (u1 , . . . , uH+1 ) be the (ordered) bucket indexes along the eviction path v from the root to the leaf level
Client:
1: (deepest, deepestIdx) ← PrepareDeepest(v); target ← PrepareTarget(v)
2: hold ← ⊥, dest ← ⊥, (c1 , . . . , cm ) ← 0|b|
3: if target[0] 6= ⊥ then # target[0] and deepestIdx[0] denote the stash component
4:
hold ← deepestIdx[0], dest ← target[0]
5:
(c1 , . . . , cm ) ← S[hold], S[hold] ← {}
6: for h = 1, . . . , H + 1 do
7:
Let Ih be a (Z + 1) × (Z + 1) matrix, set Ih [∗, ∗] ← 0.
8:
if hold 6= ⊥ then
9:
if i = dest then # Drop the holding block to this level
10:
Ih [1][x] ← 1 where x is the index of an empty slot in the bucket T[uh ]
11:
hold ← ⊥, dest ← ⊥
12:
else# Move the holding block to the next level
13:
Ih [1][Z + 1] ← 1
14:
if target[i] 6= ⊥ then # Pick a block at this level
15:
Ih [x][Z + 1] ← 1 where x ← deepestIdx[h]
16:
hold ← x, dest ← target[i]
17:
for each real block id in T[uh ] do # Hold the position of other real blocks at this level
18:
x ← pm[id].pIdx mod Z
19:
if x 6= deepestIdx[h] then
20:
Ih [x + 1][x] ← 1
(t)
(t)
21: JIh [∗, ∗]K1 , . . . , JIh [∗, ∗]K` ← SSS.Create(Ih [∗, ∗], t) for 1 ≤ h ≤ H + 1
(t)
(t)
22: (Jcj K1, . . . , Jcj K` ) ← SSS.Create(cj , t) for 1 ≤ j ≤ m
(t)

(t)

(t)

(t)

23: Send hJc1 Ki , . . . , Jcm Ki i, hJI1 Ki , . . . , JIH+1 Ki i to Si , for 1 ≤ i ≤ `

Server: each S ∈ {S1 , . . . , S` } receiving (hJc1 K, . . . , Jcm Ki, hJI1 K, . . . , JIH+1 Ki) do
18: JxKj ← JcKj for 1 ≤ i ≤ m
19: for h = 1, . . . , H + 1 do
20:
for j = 1, . . . , m do
21:
Let Jch,j K be a Z-dimensional vector containing j-th chunks of bucket JT[uh ]K
22:
Jĉh,j K := (Jxj K, Jch,j K) # Concatenate Jxj K with Jch,j K resulting in a (Z + 1)-dimensional vector
23:
Jĉ0h,j K ← Jĉh,j K ? JIh K
24:
(Jc0 h,j K, Jxj K) := Jĉ0h,j K # Assign the last component of vector Jĉ0 Kh,j to Jxj K
25:
Update j-th chunks of bucket JT[uh ]K with Jc0 h,j K

Figure 4.18: S3 ORAMC eviction protocol based on [179].
(line 21) and for the block being picked-up in the stash (if any) (line 22), and distributes the shares
to the corresponding servers (line 23). Similar to S3 ORAMO , for each level in the eviction path,
the servers jointly perform the matrix product between the share of data vector and the share of
permutation matrix via local addition and the secure multiplication protocol (line 23), and update
the bucket with the newly computed vector (line 25).
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Similar to S3 ORAMO , we analyze the cost of S3 ORAMC regarding the block size (|b|), number
of blocks (N ), and statistical security parameter (λ), while other system parameters (e.g., prime
field Fp , number of servers `) are treated as constants. S3 ORAMO has the same tree layout, an
identical retrieval phase and a similar eviction procedure with the S3 ORAMO scheme. S3 ORAMC
only differs from S3 ORAMO in terms of the bucket size parameter (Z) and the eviction frequency,
which happens after every retrieval instead of A as in S3 ORAMO . S3 ORAMC also incurs at most
three blocks (one for retrieval and two for eviction) to be transmitted in each ORAM access. Given
Z = O(1) in S3 ORAMC , we summarize the asymptotic cost of S3 ORAMO as follows.
The client-server communication complexity is O(|b|+ log N ). The server-server communication overhead is O(|b|· log N ). To achieve O(1) client-server bandwidth blowup, the minimal block
size is Ω(log N ), which is a factor of λ times smaller than that of S3 ORAMO .
The server computation is O(|b|· log N ). The client computation complexity is O(|b|+ log N ).
S3 ORAMC layout is a full binary tree of height H, which has a total of Z · (2H+1 − 1) slots
and can store up to N ≤ 2H real blocks. Since Z = O(1), the server storage blowup in S3 ORAMC
is O(1) similar to S3 ORAMO asymptotically, but its constant overhead factor is smaller (i.e., 2
vs. 8). The client requires to maintain the stash, which costs O(λ) to achieve negligible overflow
probability. The position map costs O(N (log N + log log N )). Therefore, the total client storage is
O(λ + N (log N + log log N )). It is possible to achieve O(1) client storage by storing the stash (via
SSS shares) on the servers and using the recursion technique to keep the position map in smaller
ORAMs. However, this will significantly increase the computation and communication overhead for
oblivious access to the stash and the position map, respectively.
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4.4.3 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of two S3 ORAM schemes. First, S3 ORAMO follows
the Triplet Eviction strategy originally proposed in Onion-ORAM [54]. Therefore, it achieves the
same failure probability with Onion-ORAM. We refer the reader to [54] for the detail of the proof.
Lemma 4 (S3 ORAMO Bucket Overflow Probability). If Z ≥ A and N ≤ A · 2H−1 , the probability that
a bucket overflows after a Triplet Eviction operation is bounded by e−

(2Z−A)2
6A

, where Z = A = Θ(λ).

Proof. We refer the reader to [54].

It is easy to see that Lemma 4 implies the following fact.
Corollary 3 (Non-Leaf Destination Bucket Load). All non-leaf destination buckets are always empty
after the Triplet Eviction takes place, except with a negligible probability.

We present the main security of S3 ORAMO as follows.
Theorem 3 (S3 ORAMO Security). S3 ORAMO is correct and information-theoretically (statistically)
t-secure by Definition 7.

Proof. S3 ORAMO is correct iff (i) the S3 ORAMO .read(·) protocol returns the correct value of the
retrieved block and (ii) the S3 ORAMO .Evict(·) function is consistent.
For each data request x, let b be the block to be retrieved and j be the location of b in its
path (i.e., j := pm[id].pIdx where id is the identifier of b). The share of the PIR query for server Si is
(t)

(t)

(t)

of form: JeKi = (JeK1 , . . . , JeKn ), where n = Z · (H + 1) and ei = 0 for 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n, ej = 1. Let
Jcu K = (Jcu1 K, . . . , Jcun K) be the vector consisting of the share of u-th chunks taken from Z slots in

every bucket residing in the retrieval path. For 1 ≤ u ≤ m, the answer of each server Si is of form:
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(t)

(t)

JeKi · Jcu Ki =
=

n 
X
k=1

n
X
k=1

Jek K(t) · Jcu,k K(t)



Jek · cu,k K(2t)

= Jcu,j K(2t)

by Equation 4.3
by Equation 4.1

By SSS scheme, at least 2t + 1 shares are required to recover the secret hidden by a random 2t-degree
polynomial. Our system model presented in §4.4.1 follows this and, therefore, the client always
(2t)

(2t)

computes the correct value of chunk ct by ct ← SSS.Recover(Jct K1 , . . . , Jct K`

, 2t). Since all chunks

of b are correctly computed, b is properly retrieved with the probability 1.

Corollary 3 shows that the root bucket is empty after the triplet eviction. The client writes
the retrieved block to an empty slot in the root bucket sequentially (line 3, Figure 4.12). Since
Z ≥ A, the root always has enough empty slots to contain all the blocks to be written before the
triplet eviction happens, thereby avoiding the overwritten and inconsistency issues. After A accesses,
the client executes the triplet eviction algorithm (Figure 4.14) to move blocks from upper levels (e.g.,
root) to deeper levels (e.g., leaf). Corollary 3 also shows that non-leaf sibling buckets are empty due
to previous triplet evictions and, therefore, they can contain all data moved from their source bucket
without creating any inconsistency issue. Real blocks from source buckets are moved to destination
buckets via matrix products. These computations are correct due to homomorphic properties of
two-share addition and multiplication offered by SSS and the SMM protocol, respectively, which
were proven correct in [68].
We now prove the security of S3 ORAMO as follows.
Given a request sequence x of length q, where xj = (opj , idj , dataj ) as in Definition 7, let
O
3
S3 ORAMO
i (x) be the S ORAM client’s sequence of interactions with the server Si including a
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sequence of retrievals (Figure 4.11), write-to-root (line 3, Figure 4.12) and triplet eviction operations
(Figure 4.14). We have that the write-to-root operation is deterministic, which is performed right
after the retrieval. In this operation, the previously retrieved block is written to a publicly known
slot in the root bucket as shown above. The triplet eviction is also deterministic, which is performed
after every A successive accesses regardless of any data being requested. Since all these operations
(i.e., retrieval, write-to-root, triplet eviction) are independent of each other, they can be considered
as separate sequences observed by Si in S3 ORAMO
i (x) as follows



−
→
(x )
(x )


R i (x) = (Ri 1 , . . . , Ri q )




−
→
(x̃ )
(x̃ )
S3 ORAMO
(x)
=
W i (x̃) = (Wi 1 , . . . , Wi q ) ,
i





→
(x̄
)

(x̄ )
−
E i (x̄) = (Ei 1 , . . . , Ei q/A )

(4.7)

−
→
−
→
−
→
where R i (x̃), W i (x̃) and E (x̄) denote the retrieval, write-to-bucket and triplet eviction sequences,
given a data access sequence x, respectively.
Assume that there is a coalition of up t servers {Si∈I } sharing their own transcripts with each
other. Let I ⊆ {1, . . . , `} such that |I|≤ t. The view of {Si∈I } can be derived from Equation 4.7 as


−
→
(x )
(x )


{
R i∈I (x)} = ({Ri∈I1 }, . . . , {Ri∈Iq })




−
→
(x̃ )
(x̃ )
{S3 ORAMO
(x)}
=
{W i∈I (x̃)} = ({Wi∈I1 }, . . . , {Wi∈Iq }),
i∈I





→

(1)
(q/A)
{−
E i∈I (x̄)} = ({Ei∈I }, . . . , {Ei∈I })
We show that for any two access sequences x and x0 of the same length (i.e., |x|= |x0 |), the pairs
−
→
−
→
−
→
−
→
−
→
−
→
h{ R i∈I (x)}, {W i∈I (x̃)}, { E i∈I (x)}i and h{ R i∈I (x0 )}, {W i∈I (x̃0 )}, { E i∈I (x̄0 )}i are identically distributed.
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(x )

For each access request xj ∈ x, {Si∈I } observes a transcript {Ri∈Ij } consisting of a retrieval
path Pxj (access pattern), which is identical for all servers (line 4, Figure 4.11) and all data generated
by the SSS-based PIR scheme (lines 5-7).
The access pattern of S3 ORAMO is identical to all other secure tree-based ORAM schemes.
Specifically, each block in S3 ORAMO is assigned to a leaf bucket selected randomly and independently
from each other. Once a block is accessed, it is assigned to a new bucket leaf selected randomly and
independently. Such random assignment along with the selected bucket size parameter (Z) may
result in the bucket(s) in the S3 ORAMO tree being overflowed with a negligible probability thereby,
impacts the security (see Lemma 4). Therefore, access patterns generated by any data request
sequences of the same length are statistically indistinguishable. We next analyze the probability
distribution of data observed at the server side in each S3 ORAMO retrieval as follows. For each
retrieval, the client sends to the servers PIR queries generated by PIR.CreateQuery algorithm. Such
queries are SSS shares and, therefore, is t-private. The inner product is also t-private due to Lemma 2
with addition and partial multiplicative homomorphic properties by Equation 4.3 and Equation 4.1,
respectively. So, any data generated in S3 ORAMO retrievals are identically distributed in the presence
of t colluding servers.
By these properties, for any data request sequence x, the corresponding transcripts (including
access patterns) generated in the S3 ORAMO retrieval phase are information-theoretically (statistically)
indistinguishable from random access sequence in the presence of up to t colluding servers.
Data are written to slots in the root bucket according to the sequential order and, therefore,
the write pattern is deterministic and public. Such written data are SSS-shared with new random
polynomials so that they are t-private. Therefore, the write-to-root transcripts are identically
distributed.
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(j)

(j 0 )

The access patterns of {Ei∈I } and {Ei∈I } are public because the triplet eviction is deterministic, which follows reverse lexicographical order like Onion-ORAM (e.g., [54]), We show that data
generated in such triplet evictions are identically distributed as follows. For each triplet eviction, the
client sends (H + 1) permutation matrices, which are SSS-shares and, therefore, they are all t-private
and uniformly distributed. Data in sibling buckets are t-private and uniformly distributed because
they are merely copied from source buckets deterministically (line 19, Figure 4.14). The matrix
product (line 22, Figure 4.14) is also t-private due to the security of SMM protocol by Lemma 3 .
Therefore, given two request sequences x, y with |x|= |y|, the corresponding deterministic triplet
eviction sequences observed by {Si∈I } are
−
→
(x̄
)
(x̄ )
{ E i∈I (x̄)} = ({Ei∈I1 }, . . . , {Ei∈Iq/A })
−
→
(ȳ
)
(ȳ )
{ E i∈I (ȳ)} = ({Ei∈I1 }, . . . , {Ei∈Iq/A })
(j̄ )

(x̄ 0 )

j
where (x̄j , ȳj ) ∈ {0, . . . , H} for 1 ≤ j ≤ q/A. Since data yielded in {Ei∈I
} and {Ei∈Ij } are

−
→
identically distributed for all (j, j 0 ) ∈ {x̄1 , . . . , x̄q/A } ∪ {ȳ1 , . . . , ȳq/A } as shown above, { E i∈I (x̄)}
−
→
and { E i∈I (ȳ)} are identically distributed.
Given any data request sequence, S3 ORAMO generates (i) access patterns statistically
indistinguishable from a random request sequence of the same length, and (ii) identically (uniform)
distributed data in the presence of up to t colluding servers. This indicates that S3 ORAMO scheme
achieves information-theoretic statistical t-security according to Definition 7.

S3 ORAMC follows the Circuit-ORAM eviction strategy [5] so that it inherits the same failure
probability as Circuit-ORAM as follows.
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Lemma 5 (S3 ORAMC Stash Overflow Probability). Let the bucket size Z ≥ 2. Let st(S3 ORAMC [s]) be
a random variable denoting the stash size of S3 ORAMC scheme after an access sequence s. Then, for
any access sequence s, Pr[st(S3 ORAMC [s]) ≥ R] ≤ 14 · e−R .
Proof. We refer the reader to [179].

The security of S3 ORAMC is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (S3 ORAMC Security). S3 ORAMC is correct and information-theoretically (statistically)
t-secure by Definition 7.

Proof. The correctness and security proof of S3 ORAMC can be easily derived from that of S3 ORAMO
scheme so that we will not present it in detail due to the significant overlap with the proof of
Theorem 3. Intuitively, S3 ORAMC leverages the same principles as S3 ORAMO , i.e., SSS-based PIR
scheme and permutation matrix, to implement the retrieval and eviction phases, which were proven
correct and consistent due to homomorphic properties of SSS and SMM protocol. We also proved
that all the data generated by these operations are t-private. The access pattern in S3 ORAMC is
statistically indistinguishable due to its negligible stash overflow probability by Lemma 5. All these
properties indicate that S3 ORAMC scheme achieves information-theoretic statistical t-security by
Definition 7.

4.4.4 Generalization of S3 ORAM on k-ary Tree
It is possible to execute ORAM over a general k-ary tree layout to achieve a sub-logarithmic
asymptotic overhead (i.e., O(logk N ), where k is a free parameter). Our proposed S3 ORAM schemes
can also be easily extended to work over a general k-ary ORAM layout. However, we later show
that increasing the value of k does not bring much benefit to the actual performance of tree-based
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ORAM schemes. We present S3 ORAMschemes on the general k-ary tree layout, and then provide
the analytical analysis to show that their cost achieves the best at k ∈ {2, 3} as follows.

4.4.4.1

k-ary S3 ORAMO
We can leverage the concepts of SSS homomorphic computation and the permutation matrix

presented in §4.4.2.2 to implement the eviction strategy in [5], which is the generalization of the
Triplet Eviction used in S3 ORAMO . Generally speaking, this strategy requires to organize each
bucket in the S3 ORAMO k-ary tree layout into k slides, each being of size as a function of the security
parameter (i.e., O(λ)). In other words, Z = O(k · λ). Each bucket at the leaf level is connected
with a so-called auxiliary bucket of size O(λ). The eviction path for k-ary tree is determined by
modifying Equation 4.6 to output the order-reversal of base-k digits instead of the binary string.
Once the eviction path is determined, we travel from the root to the leaf and obliviously move
all blocks from the (non-leaf) source bucket to a deterministic slide of all of its children. At the
leaf level, we obliviously move all blocks from the leaf bucket to its corresponding auxiliary bucket.
All these oblivious moves can be implemented using the SSS matrix product principle described in
§4.4.2.2. Notice that in this context, the retrieval phase in S3 ORAMO scheme remains unchanged.

4.4.4.2

k-ary S3 ORAMC
S3 ORAMC scheme in §4.4.2.3 supports the k-ary tree layout naturally without modifying the

retrieval and the eviction subroutines. We only need to change Equation 4.6 as similar to the k-ary
S3 ORAMO scheme as discussed above to get the eviction path in the k-ary tree layout. It also only
requires to adjust the bucket size parameter (Z) to be a function of the tree degree to achieve a
negligible stash overflow probability. In other words, Z = O(k) for the statistical security.
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We now treat k as a parameter in the asymptotic cost. In this context, the bucket size
parameter (Z) is O(κ · λ) instead of O(λ). The k-ary S3 ORAMO layout is a tree of height O(logk N ).
The eviction in each level move all blocks from the source bucket of size O(κ · λ) to a slide (sized
O(λ)) of its k children buckets. Thus, the (amortized) client-server and server-server bandwidth
is O(|b|+λ · k · logk N ) and O(|b|·λ · k · logk N ), respectively. The (amortized) server and client
computation is O(|b|·λ · k · logk N ) and O(|b|+k · logk N ), respectively.
Similarly, we can easily derive the cost of k-ary S3 ORAMC scheme, where the bucket size
now becomes Z = O(k). So, the client-server- and server-server-bandwidth of k-ary S3 ORAMC
are O(|b|+k · logk N ) and O(|b|·k · logk N ), respectively. The server- and client-computation are
O(|b|·k · logk N ) and O(|b|+k · logk N ), respectively.
So, given that |b|, λ, N are unchanged in this context, the computation/bandwidth overhead
of k-ary S3 ORAM schemes can be written as a function of k as

f (k) = α + β · k · logk N = α + β ·

k
· ln N,
ln k

(4.8)

where α ∈ {0, |b|}, β ∈ {1, |b|, λ, λ · |b|}. Since k ≥ 2 and k ∈ N, it is easy to see that f (k) is minimal
at k = 3.
For k = 2, our S3 ORAMO using the Triplet Eviction outperforms a constant factor of two
compared with using the generalization strategy in [5]. This is because in this case, each source
bucket only has one sibling bucket. Due to Equation 4.6, once a bucket is being treated as the
sibling bucket, it will be later considered as the destination bucket before being treated as the sibling
bucket again. Meanwhile, once the (non-leaf) bucket is treated the destination bucket, it is always
guaranteed to be empty after the eviction (see Corollary 3). In other words, the bucket is always
100

empty before being considered as the sibling bucket and, therefore, given a fixed size of O(λ), it
always has enough slots to keep the expected load below its capacity. The eviction in [5] does not
exploit this special role-switching when k = 2, but focuses on the general case for any k > 2, where
one bucket must serve as the sibling bucket k − 1 times before being empty. As a result, each bucket
must have k slides each being of size O(λ), and the eviction only touches one slide of the bucket to
achieve the sub-logarithmic overhead. Therefore, when k = 2, its (eviction and retrieval) overhead is
doubled compared with that of the Triplet Eviction. Moreover, given the fact that the generalization
eviction with k = 3 only gains 6% improvement over k = 2, while its k = 2 case is two times less
efficient than the Triplet Eviction as shown above, we conclude that the S3 ORAMO achieves the best
performance with k = 2 and the Triplet Eviction strategy.
For S3 ORAMC scheme, it achieves the best performance at k = 3 according to Equation 4.8.
This is because it supports k-ary layout naturally without modifying eviction and retrieval subroutine
but only adjusting the bucket size parameter. We further demonstrate empirical results to support
such analytical analyses in §4.4.5.6.

4.4.5 Experimental Evaluation
4.4.5.1

Implementation
We fully implemented two S3 ORAM schemes in C++ consisting of roughly 5,000 lines

of code. We used two external libraries in our implementation: (1) The Shoup’s NTL library
v9.10.07 for the pseudo-random number generation and arithmetic operations due to its low-level
optimization for modular multiplication and cross product functions; (ii) the ZeroMQ library8 for
the network communication. Our implementation supports parallelization via multi-threading to
7
8

Available at http://www.shoup.net/ntl/download.html
Available at http://zeromq.org
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take full advantage of multi-core CPUs at the server side. We also implemented k-ary tree layout
generalization for both S3 ORAM schemes. The implementation of our S3 ORAM framework is publicly
available at https://github.com/thanghoang/S3ORAM.
We first describe the configuration and methodology to conduct our experiments as follows.

4.4.5.2

Configuration and Methodology
We used a 2015 Macbook Pro laptop as the client, which was equipped with an Intel Core i5-

5287U CPU @ 2.90GHz and 16 GB RAM. On the server-side, we used Amazon EC2 with c4.4xlarge
type to deploy three server instances. Each server was running Ubuntu 16.04 and equipped with 16
vCPUs Intel Xeon E5-2666 v3 @2.9 GHz, 30 GB RAM and 1TB SSD.
We located three servers to be geographically close to each other (same region) as well as
to our client machine, which results in the network latency between them being approximately 15
ms. The servers were connected to each other via a dedicated network whose throughput for both
download and upload is approximately 1 Gbps. The client used Wi-Fi connecting to the Internet
via a home data plan, which offers the latency of 20 ms and the download/upload throughput of
55/6 Mbps to the servers.
We evaluated the performance of all ORAM schemes with a randomly generated database of
size from 0.5 GB to 40 GB and block sizes from 4 KB to 1024 KB.
We selected Path-ORAM [169] and Onion-ORAM [54] as the main counterparts of S3 ORAM
framework since the former is the most optimal O(log N )-bandwidth ORAM (without server computation) while the latter achieves O(1) bandwidth blowup (with server computation). We also chose
Ring-ORAM [150] as it is an efficient O(log N )-bandwidth ORAM scheme with server computation.
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We consider all ORAM schemes (including our S3 ORAM framework) under their non-recursive form,
where the position map is stored locally at the client. This is because storing the position map
at the server will incur O(log N ) number of communication rounds of accessing O(log N ) smaller
S3 ORAM, which may result in high overhead. In practice, it is likely that the position map is
small enough to be stored locally at the client. Moreover, since S3 ORAM is only secure in the
semi-honest setting, we only compared its performance with the semi-honest version of Path-ORAM,
Ring-ORAM and Onion-ORAM. We did not consider alternatives that (i) failed to achieve O(1)
client communication blowup but incurred more delay (e.g., [52, 130]), (ii) were shown to be insecure
(e.g., [131, 132]), or (iii) incurred more cost than the selected ORAM counterparts above regarding
to our configuration and experimental settings (e.g., [10]). We also did not explicitly compare the
performance of S3 ORAM against the multi-server ORAM scheme in [166] because of the major
√
difference in terms of client block storage between the two schemes (O(1) vs. O( N )). Given a very
large outsourced database, the storage required by [166] might not be suitable for resource-limited
√
devices such as a mobile phone. Moreover, if O( N ) block storage is acceptable, then the lower
bound in [5] might imply a better ORAM strategy than our S3 ORAM schemes, in which leveraging
only PIR technique suffices to achieve O(1) client bandwidth blowup.
We present the parameter choice and methodology to measure the performance of S3 ORAM
schemes and their counterparts as follows.

• S3 ORAM: For the S3 ORAMO scheme, we selected the bucket size Z = 74 and A = Z/2 = 37
and to achieve the negligible overflow probability of 2−80 by Lemma 4. We measured the cost
for each S3 ORAMO access as the retrieval delay plus the write-to-root delay plus the amortized
delay of the eviction operation. For the S3 ORAMC scheme, we selected the bucket size Z = 2
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suggested in [179] for the negligible stash overflow probability by Lemma 5. We also investigated
the performance of S3 ORAM framework with k-ary structure, where k > 2. In this case, we fixed
the database size and varied the tree height (H) and the bucket size (Z) parameters. (see §4.4.5.6
for the detailed configuration).
• Path-ORAM: We selected the bucket size Z = 4 to achieve the negligible stash overflow probability
of 2−80 . We measured the delay of Path-ORAM as the time to download and upload 4 · log2 N
blocks plus the delay of IND-CPA decryption and re-encryption of these blocks at the client. We
used libtomcrypt9 to implement AES-CTR as the IND-CPA encryption.
• Ring-ORAM: We selected Ring-ORAM parameters (i.e., Z = 16, S = 25 and A = 20) as stated
in [150] for a negligible stash overflow probability of 2−80 . We measured the delay of Ring-ORAM
as the total time of (i) one block transmission, (ii) XOR and IND-CPA encryption/decryption
operations at the client, (iii) XOR operations at the server and (iv) the amortized cost of eviction
and early shuffles based on the formula (H + 1)(2Z + S)/A · (1 + PoissCDF(S, A)) given in [150].
• Onion-ORAM: We selected the size of RSA modulus to be 1024 bits for AHE according to
[9]. We selected the bucket size and the eviction frequency of Onion-ORAM as Z = 74 and
A = Z/2 = 37 for the negligible bucket overflow probability of 2−80 . We measured the overall
delay of Onion-ORAM as the time to (1) perform homomorphic computations at the client and
server and (2) transfer O(1) blocks and PIR queries, plus the amortized cost of eviction operation.
Since Onion-ORAM is extremely computationally costly, measuring its delay even on a medium
database takes an insurmountable amount of time. Therefore, we only measured its delay on a
small database (i.e., 1 MB) first, and then extrapolate the delay for larger database sizes.
9

Available at https://github.com/libtom/libtomcrypt
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Table 4.3: Amount of data to be sent by the client and processed by the server(s).
# Blocks
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

4.4.5.3

Retrieval Phase
Query Size (KB)
# Computed Blocks
S3 ORAMO S3 ORAMC S3 ORAMO S3 ORAMC
4.05
0.17
518
20
6.36
0.23
814
28
8.09
0.28
1,036
34
9.82
0.33
1,258
40
12.14
0.39
1,554
48
13.88
0.44
1,776
54
15.61
0.48
1,998
60

Eviction Phase
Permutation Matrix Size (KB) # Computed Blocks
S3 ORAMO
S3 ORAMC
S3 ORAMO S3 ORAMC
598.93
1.55
76,664
198
941.19
2.11
120,472
270
1,197.88
2.53
153,328
324
1,454.56
2.95
186,184
378
1,796.81
3.52
229,992
450
2,053.50
3.94
262,848
504
2,310.19
4.36
295,704
558

End-to-End Delay
We first present the analytical communication and computation overhead of S3 ORAM schemes

with databases containing a various number of data blocks in Table 4.3. We can see that the size
of the retrieval query and permutation matrices by the client as well as the amount of the data to
be computed by the server are much lower than S3 ORAMO for each access. This is mainly because
S3 ORAMC has a much smaller bucket size than S3 ORAMO (i.e., 2 vs. 74). However, the eviction in
S3 ORAMO is only performed after every 37 accesses compared with one in S3 ORAMC scheme. In
fact, this accumulative strategy allows S3 ORAMO to be less impacted by the network congestion
control (i.e., TCP slow-start) and the client-server/ server-server communication latency than
S3 ORAMC . Moreover, S3 ORAMO incurs only one block to be uploaded per access compared with
two in S3 ORAMO scheme. All these factors result in the amortized end-to-end delay of S3 ORAMO
scheme being comparable with the actual delay of S3 ORAMC as shown in Figure 4.19, even though its
analytical overhead looks worse than that of S3 ORAMC . We also show in Figure 4.19 the simulated
delay of S3 ORAM counterparts with different database sizes (from 0.5 to 40 GB) and block sizes
(128 KB and 256 KB). Both S3 ORAM schemes took only 1.3-1.4 (resp. 2.1-2.7) seconds to access
a 128 KB (resp. 256 KB) block in the database of size up to 40 GB. This resulted in S3 ORAM
schemes being approximately 9.3 and 6.4 times faster than Path-ORAM and Ring-ORAM, where
they took 7-14 (resp. 14-26) seconds for each 128 KB (resp. 256 KB) block access. Compared with
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Figure 4.19: Delay of S3 ORAM and its counterparts on a laptop with home network.
Onion-ORAM, our S3 ORAM schemes were three orders of magnitude faster. This is mainly due to
the fact that S3 ORAM schemes only rely on simple arithmetic operations (e.g., modular addition/
multiplication), while Onion-ORAM leverages Partially/Fully HE (see §4.4.5.4). One might also
observe from Figure 4.19 that choosing a larger block size has a small impact on the delay of S3 ORAM
schemes. This is clearly illustrated in Figure 4.20, where we present the impact of block size on
the end-to-end delay of S3 ORAM schemes compared with their counterparts. Given any block size
ranging from 4 KB to 1024 KB, S3 ORAM schemes always maintain a constant factor of 9.3 and
6.4 times faster than Ring-ORAM and Path-ORAM, respectively. This presents an advantage to
S3 ORAM schemes over their counterparts for applications requiring large block sizes such as image
or video storage services.

4.4.5.4

Cost Breakdown Analysis
In this section, we dissect the overall delay of S3 ORAM to explore the factors that contribute

the most to the total delay. Figure 4.21 shows the detailed cost factors of two S3 ORAM schemes
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Figure 4.20: Delay of S3 ORAM for varying block sizes for a 40GB DB.
according to 0.5-40 GB DB with 128 KB blocks. There are five factors that affect the overall delay
of S3 ORAM schemes as follows.
1. Client computation: In both S3 ORAM schemes, the client computed the SSS shares of the
retrieval query and the permutation matrices, recovered the requested block and re-shared the
block with SSS. All these incurred only some modular addition and multiplication operations.
These computations are extremely lightweight so that the client computation contributed only
a minimal amount to the total delay (i.e., < 1%), which is hard to observe in both Figure 4.21a
and Figure 4.21b.
2. Server computation: In both S3 ORAM schemes, the servers computed the ORAM tree data with
the retrieval query via the dot product and with permutation matrices via the matrix product,
which also incurred a series of modular addition and multiplication operations. However, unlike
the client computation, the cost of these operations at the server-side depends on the block
size. As a result, the server computation contributed a higher amount to the total delay (i.e.,
7-11%) than the client computation. Compared between two S3 ORAM schemes, we can see
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Figure 4.21: Detailed cost breakdown of S3 ORAM on a laptop with home network.
that S3 ORAMO had a higher server computation delay than S3 ORAMC scheme. This is because
the block size of S3 ORAMO is much larger than S3 ORAMC (i.e., 74 vs. 2), which significantly
impacts the SSS-based PIR computation in the retrieval phase.
3. Client-server communication: In both S3 ORAM schemes, this operation contributed the most
to the total delay (over 90%). For each S3 ORAM access, the client downloaded one block from
the servers and uploaded 1-2 blocks along with one retrieval query and some permutation
matrices. We can observe from Figure 4.21 that the time to upload the retrieval query and
permutation matrices (yellow-patterned green bars) was much faster than the time to download
and upload a 128 KB data block (unpatterned green bars). This clearly reflects the theoretical
insight of S3 ORAM schemes, where the client communication overhead is constant and mostly
dominated by the data block with the poly-logarithmic size. We can also observe that S3 ORAMO
(Figure 4.21b) took a longer time to transmit the retrieval query and permutation matrices
than S3 ORAMC (Figure 4.21a). This is because the bucket size parameter in S3 ORAMO scheme
is much larger than in S3 ORAMC as explained above, which impacts the size of the retrieval
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vector and the eviction matrices. On the other hand, the block transmission time in S3 ORAMC
was doubly slower than in S3 ORAMC . This is because the eviction in S3 ORAMC requires to
transmit two blocks for each access, compared with only one in S3 ORAMO .
4. I/O access: Due to the cache miss issue and the infrastructure of the selected Amazon EC2
instances (i.e., c4.4xlarge), the disk I/O access caused a considerable delay especially in
S3 ORAMO scheme. Specifically, we stored the S3 ORAM tree in a network storage unit called
“Elastic Block Storage” (EBS), which was connected to Amazon EC2 computing unit with
a maximum throughput of 160 MB/s. This resulted in the I/O access being limited by this
throughput, and therefore, causing a high delay. To reduce the I/O access overhead, one solution
is to store the S3 ORAM tree structure on a local storage unit with high throughput (e.g., NVMe).
Another solution is to apply a caching strategy, where h-top levels of the S3 ORAM tree are
stored directly on RAM. As explained above, S3 ORAMO has a larger bucket size than S3 ORAMC
so that its reported I/O delay was higher than S3 ORAMC .
5. Server-server communication: This overhead was caused by the SMM protocol when the servers
performed the matrix product operation in the eviction phase. In S3 ORAMO scheme, the
reported communication delay between the servers was very low, and significantly faster than in
S3 ORAMC scheme. This is because of the amortization in S3 ORAMO scheme, where the eviction
was performed after every A = 37 subsequent retrievals. This context allowed the network
latency (i.e., 15 ms) to be amortized and minimized the impact of the TCP slow start scheme.
In S3 ORAMC , the eviction must be performed right after each retrieval so that its reported
delay was significantly impacted by those factors.
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4.4.5.5

The Impact of Network Quality
We first investigated the impact of inter-server network quality on the performance of

S3 ORAM schemes. In this setting, we set up three Amazon EC2 servers to be geographically distant
to each other (in the form of a triangle between California, Ohio and Central Canada regions). The
average network round-trip latency and throughput between the servers were 78 ms and 295 Mbps,
respectively. The round-trip latency between the client and the farthest server was 80 ms, while the
client throughput to all servers remained unchanged (i.e., 55/6 Mbps of download/upload speed).
Figure 4.22 presents the delay of S3 ORAM in this setting compared with the previous one. We
can see that S3 ORAM schemes performed 0.3–2 s (2× at most) slower than in the original setting,
where all servers were in the same region and close to the client. This slowdown is mostly due to (i)
the higher latency and lower throughput of the inter-server network link and (ii) the latency when
the client communicates with the farthest server. However, as shown in Figure 4.22, S3 ORAM still
outperformed the performance of Path-ORAM and Ring-ORAM in the original setting (i.e., server
was placed close to the client). This is because the server-server communication only contributed a
small fraction in the total delay, especially in S3 ORAMO scheme (due to the amortization) as already
analyzed in §4.4.5.4. On the other hand, S3 ORAM incurred only one communication round between
the client and the servers so that the impact of the client’s high round-trip latency was minimal.
Moreover, the client throughput remained unchanged and therefore, it did not impact much on the
delay of S3 ORAM schemes in this context. We observed that S3 ORAMC was more impacted by the
inter-server high network round-trip latency than S3 ORAMO . This is because S3 ORAMC performed
eviction right after each access, where the servers communicated with each other in O(log N ) rounds.
Meanwhile, these rounds were performed once every A = 37 accesses in S3 ORAMO and therefore,
their total latency was amortized.
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Figure 4.22: The delay of S3 ORAM schemes with geographically distant servers.
Given that the low network quality at both client and inter-server sides did not impact much
on the delay of S3 ORAM schemes, we now show that if the client can have a high-speed network
setting, our S3 ORAM framework might no longer be an ideal choice. We conducted an experiment to
demonstrate that ORAM schemes featuring O(log N ) bandwidth overhead are better than S3 ORAM
after a certain threshold of network bandwidth. Figure 4.23 presents simulated performance of
S3 ORAM schemes and their counterparts with different client network bandwidth settings regarding
40 GB database containing 128 KB blocks. With 1 Gbps inter-server network throughput (servers
were at the same region), Path-ORAM and Ring-ORAM surpassed S3 ORAM schemes for a client
network throughput of approximately 720 Mbps and 380 Mbps, respectively (Figure 4.23a). Given
servers were set up geographically distant to each other, the corresponding numbers were 80-300
Mbps and 50-100 Mbps (Figure 4.23b). This is because Path-ORAM and Ring-ORAM feature
O(log N ) bandwidth overhead so that they receive a more benefit from the high network speed. On
the other hand, S3 ORAM schemes feature O(1) bandwidth overhead and therefore, get less benefit.
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Figure 4.23: The impact of client network throughput.
4.4.5.6

The Impact of k-ary Tree Layout
We performed an empirical analysis to confirm our finding in §4.4.4 that increasing the degree

of the ORAM tree receives very little benefit if not worse than the default setting (i.e., binary tree).
Figure 4.24 presents the actual end-to-end delay of S3 ORAM schemes with varied tree degrees
under the fixed 1TB DB with 128 KB blocks configuration. We can see that the actual delay of k-ary
S3 ORAM schemes likely matched with the expected overhead (the dash-dotted line). As discussed,
the performance of S3 ORAMO following the generalized eviction in [5] achieved the best at k = 3

Expected overhead by Equation 4.8
S3 ORAMO with generalized eviction in [5]
S3 ORAMO
S3 ORAMC

Delay (second)

4

3

2

1

0

2

4

6

8

10

k

Figure 4.24: The impact of tree degree.
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(the solid purple line). Remark that for the special case where k = 2, such generalized eviction did
not take into account the bucket load characteristic after each eviction for optimization. Meanwhile,
this characteristic was fully exploited in the Triplet Eviction strategy, which allowed reducing the
end-to-end delay by half (the solid purple point with the dashed purple line). In summary, considering
a little gain that k = 3 can offer and the optimization that can be done with k = 2, we can see that
S3 ORAMO scheme achieved the best performance at the default setting (i.e., binary tree layout with
the Triplet Eviction). In S3 ORAMC scheme, the actual performance followed closely to the analytical
result, which achieved the best performance at around k ∈ {3, 4, 5}. However, the gain was not so
considerable compared with k = 2 (i.e., < 6.5%). At k > 5, the delay of S3 ORAMC scheme started
to increase and became worst than k = 2.

4.4.5.7

Storage Overhead
At the client-side, S3 ORAMO does not require the stash component similar to Onion-ORAM.

On the other hand, S3 ORAMC requires the stash of size O(λ · |b|) similar to Path-ORAM and RingORAM. Therefore, given a database containing 512 KB blocks, S3 ORAMC scheme needs around
32-33 MB of the client storage for the stash, while S3 ORAMO requires nothing. The storage cost for
the position map component in both (non-recursive) S3 ORAM schemes is slightly higher than their
non-recursive counterparts. For instance, with a 16 TB database of 512-KB blocks (D = 33, 554, 432),
S3 ORAM schemes cost 119 MB while the others (e.g., Onion-ORAM, Ring-ORAM, Path-ORAM)
cost 100 MB. This is because we store not only the path information but also the specific location of
each block in its assigned path.
At the server side, each server storage overhead in S3 ORAMO scheme increases by a factor of
eight (i.e., (8D−A)·|b| bits) by Lemma 4. The server storage overhead for S3 ORAMC scheme increases
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by a factor of two (i.e., 2D · |b|), which is equal to Circuit-ORAM. Recall that all S3 ORAM schemes
need at least three servers. The server storage for Path-ORAM and Ring-ORAM is 4D · |b| bits and
6D · |b| bits, respectively. The server storage for Onion-ORAM is similar to S3 ORAMO for one server
but will increase after a sequence of access operation due to the ciphertext expansion of Additively
HE.
We analytically compare S3 ORAM schemes with state-of-the-art multi-server ORAM schemes
for data outsourcing. The most notable ORAM relevant to our framework is Multi-Cloud Oblivious
Storage (MCOS) [166] as it also features O(1) client communication overhead at the cost of O(log N )
server-server bandwidth overhead like S3 ORAM. MCOS is better than S3 ORAM in the several
aspects as follows. First, it does not require a minimal block size to achieve the constant client
communication overhead, while S3 ORAM requires Ω(log2 N ) - Ω(log3 N ) block size. Second, it
needs two servers to operate while S3 ORAMrequires at least three servers. The main downside
√
of MCOS over S3 ORAMis that it requires the client to store O( N ) data blocks compared with
O(1) − O(log N ). For instance, with 256 TB database with 232 blocks, the client storage is 15 GB
(vs. {0, 8} MB in S3 ORAM). Another distributed ORAM relevant to S3 ORAM is the two-server
ORAM scheme by Lu and Ostrovsky et al. [126]. Due to the hierarchical ORAM paradigm [75], the
main advantage of this scheme is that the client does not need to maintain the position map and
the stash components as in partition-based and tree-based ORAM schemes including S3 ORAM and
MCOS. However, it incurs O(log N ) client communication overhead as opposed to S3 ORAM and
MCOS. As a result, it can operate on any block size and all the servers do not need to communicate
with each other.
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4.5

MACAO: A Multi-Server ORAM Framework with Active Security
While S3 ORAM enables desirable performance properties for the client such as low communi-

cation overhead and low delay, it only offers security against semi-honest adversary. In practice, it
is likely the active adversary may be present, who may deviate from the protocol to compromise
the user privacy and data integrity. To address this issue, we design MACAO, a comprehensive
MAliciously-secure and Client-efficient Active ORAM framework. MACAO harnesses suitable secret
sharing techniques, efficient eviction strategy along with information-theoretic Message Authentication Code (MAC), which (i) offers integrity check, (ii) prevents malicious behaviors and (iii)
achieves a comparable efficiency to state-of-the-art ORAM schemes simultaneously. Our MACAO
framework comprises two main multi-server ORAM schemes: MACAOrss and MACAOspdz . We design
MACAOrss based on replicated secret sharing [105], which requires three servers and there is no
collusion among the servers (privacy level t = 1). On the other hand, MACAOspdz is built on SPDZ
secret sharing [51] following the preprocessing model, which can operate in the `-server setting
(` ≥ 2) with the optimal level of privacy (i.e., t = ` − 1). We construct a series of authenticated PIR
protocols based on RSS and SPDZ and prove that they are secure against the malicious adversary.
Additionally, we propose several optimization tricks to reduce the bandwidth overhead at the cost of
reducing information-theoretic to computational security. Table 4.4 outlines some key characteristics
of MACAO compared with state-of-the-art ORAM schemes.
In summary, our main contributions are as follows.

• Multi-server active ORAM with security against active adversaries: MACAO offers data confidentiality and integrity, access pattern obliviousness in the presence of malicious adversaries.
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Table 4.4: Summary of state-of-the-art ORAM schemes.
Scheme
Ring-ORAM [150]
CKN+18 [40]
GKW18 [77]
S3 ORAM[89]
Path-ORAM [169]
Circuit-ORAM [179]
SS13 [166]
LO13 [126]
Onion-ORAM [54]
MACAO (MACAOrss )
MACAO (MACAOspdz )

Bandwidth Overhead†
Client-server Server-server
O(log N )
O(log N )
O(log N )
O(1)
O(log N )
O(log N )
O(log N )
O(1)
O(log N )
O(log N )
O(1)
O(1)

O(log N )

Block
Size∗
Ω(1)
Ω(log2 N )
Ω(1)
Ω(log2 N )
Ω(1)
Ω(1)
Ω(log2 N )
Ω(1)
Ω(log6 N )

Client
Block Storage‡
O(log N )
O(1)
O(log N )
O(1)
O(log N )
O(log
√ N)
O( N )
O(1)
O(1)

Ω(log N )

O(log N )

# servers§

Security

1
3
2
2t + 1
1
1
2
2
1
3
t+1

Semi-Honest
Semi-Honest
Semi-Honest
Semi-Honest
Malicious
Malicious
Malicious
Malicious
Malicious

Comp. over
Enc. Data
7
7
7
3
7
7
7
7
3

Malicious

3

† Bandwidth

overhead denotes the number of blocks being transmitted between the client and the server(s) or between the servers.
indicates the minimal block size needed to absorb the transmission cost of the retrieval query and the eviction instructions, thereby
achieving the desirable client-bandwidth overhead.
‡ Client block storage is defined as the number of data blocks being temporarily stored at the client. This is equivalent to the stash component
used in [150, 169], which, therefore, does not include the cost of storing the position map of size O(N log N ). Notice that all the ORAM
schemes in this table, except [77, 126], require such a position map component. However, we can apply recursive technique in [161] to store
the position map on the server at the cost of increasing a small number of communication rounds [161, 166].
§ S3 ORAM and MACAO
spdz offer the property that allows a certain number of colluding servers in the system (privacy level t ≥ 1) by
increasing the number of servers. Other multi-server ORAM schemes do not offer this scalability (t = 1) efficiently, and require a fixed
number of servers.
∗ This

MACAO enables the client to detect, with high probability, if the malicious server(s) has tampered
with the inputs/outputs of the protocol.
• Oblivious distributed file system applications and secure computation: Our MACAO framework
relies on secret sharing as the core building block, which offers additive and multiplicative
homomorphic properties. Therefore, after a block is accessed, it can be computed further directly
on the server(s). This property permits MACAO to serve as a core building block towards designing
a full-fledged Oblivious Distributed File System (ODFS) with secure computation capacity.
• Full-fledged implementation and performance evaluation: We fully implemented MACAO framework and compared its performance with state-of-the-art ORAM schemes on real-cloud platforms
(i.e., Amazon EC2). Our experimental results confirmed the efficiency of MACAO, in which it is
up to seven times faster than single-server ORAMs. We provide detail cost analysis of MACAO
schemes in §4.5.3.5.
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In addition, it is important to point out that in the context of a multi-server active ORAM
scheme with malicious security, we also achieve the following important properties, previously only
attained in passive schemes in the semi-honest setting.

• Low client storage and communication overhead: MACAO offers O(1) client-bandwidth overhead,
compared with O(log N ) of the most efficient passive ORAM schemes (e.g., [150, 169]). Moreover,
MACAO features a smaller block size than other active ORAM schemes that also achieve the
constant client-bandwidth blowup (e.g., S3 ORAM [89], Onion-ORAM [54], Bucket-ORAM [61]).
Observe that while asymptotically comparable to [54, 61], in practice MACAO schemes are more
efficient since they feature a smaller block size.
• Low computational overhead at both client and server sides: In MACAO, the client and server(s)
only perform bit-wise and arithmetic operations (e.g., addition, multiplication) during the online
access. This is more efficient than other ORAM schemes requiring heavy computation due
to partially/fully HE [54]. MACAO offers up to three orders of magnitude improvement over
Onion-ORAM [54] thanks to the fact that all HE operations in MACAO are pre-computed in the
offline phase between the servers and independent of the client and on-line (read or eviction)
access phase. Therefore, the online access latency of MACAOspdz is not impacted by the delay
of HE. On the other hand, MACAOrss does not require any pre-computation or HE operations.
Due to the efficient computation at both client and server sides and the low client-bandwidth
overhead, MACAO achieves low end-to-end delay to access a large block in a large database in
real-world settings.

As a final remark, observe that we focus on oblivious access in the single-client setting, where
the client is fully trusted. This is in contrast to some of the distributed ORAM research targeting

117

the fully distributed model, where there is no trusted party (i.e., client) at all [56, 59, 114, 181]. The
problem of multi-client access to ORAM as in [125, 128, 129, 158, 186] is also outside of the scope of
this study.

4.5.1 System and Security Models
4.5.1.1

System Model
Our system model consists of a client and ` servers (S0 , . . . , S`−1 ). We assume that the

channels between all the players are pairwise-secure. That is, no player can tamper with, read, or
modify the contents of the communication channel of other players. We define a multi-server ORAM
scheme as follows.
Definition 8 (Multi-Server ORAM). A Multi-server ORAM scheme is a tuple of two PPT algorithms
ORAM = (Setup, Access) as follows.
−
→
• T ← Setup(DB, 1λ ): Given database DB and security parameter λ as input, it outputs a
−
→
distributed data structure T .
• data0 ← Access(op, id, data): Given an operation type op ∈ {read, write}, an ID id of the block to
be accessed, a data data, it outputs a block content data0 to the client.

4.5.1.2

Security Model
The client is the only trusted party. The servers are untrusted and can behave maliciously, in

which they can tamper with the inputs and/or outputs of the ORAM protocol. Our security model
captures the privacy and verifiability of the honest client in the presence of a malicious adversary
corrupting a number of servers in the system. The privacy property ensures that the adversary
118

cannot infer the client access pattern or database content. The verifiability ensures that the client
is assured to gain access to the trustworthy data from the server with integrity guarantee, and
they can detect and abort the protocol if one of the servers cheats. Following the simulation-based
security model in multi-party computation [32] and single-server ORAM [54], we define the security
of multi-server ORAM in the malicious setting by augmenting the S3 ORAM security model [89] to
account for malicious adversaries as follows.
Definition 9 (Simulation-Based Multi-Server ORAM Security with Verifiability). We first define the
ideal and real worlds as follows.
Let Foram be an ideal functionality, which maintains the latest version of the database on
behalf of the client, and answers the client’s requests as follows.

• Setup: An environment Z provides a database DB to the client. The client sends DB to the ideal
functionality Foram . Foram notifies the simulator Soram the completion of the setup operation and
the DB size, but not the DB content. Soram returns ok or abort to Foram . Foram then returns ok
or ⊥ to the client accordingly.
• Access: For each access, the environment Z specifies an operation op ∈ {read(id, ⊥), write(id, data)}
as the client’s input, where id is the ID of the block to be accessed and data is the block data to
be updated. The client sends op to Foram . Foram notifies the simulator Soram (without revealing
the operation op to Soram ). If Soram returns ok to Foram , Foram sends data0 ← DB[id] to the client,
and updates DB[id] ← data accordingly if op = write. The client then returns the block data
data0 to the environment Z. If Soram returns abort to Foram , Foram returns ⊥ to the client.
In the real world, an environment Z gives the client a database DB. The client executes Setup
protocol with servers (S0 , . . . , S`−1 ) on DB. For each access, Z specifies an input op ∈ {read(id, ⊥
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), write(id, data)} to the client. The client executes Access protocol with servers (S0 , . . . , S`−1 ). The
environment Z gets the view of the adversary A after every operation. The client outputs to the
environment Z the data of block with ID id being accessed or abort (indicating abort).
We say that a protocol ΠF securely realizes the ideal functionality Foram in the presence of a
malicious adversary corrupting t servers iff for any PPT real-world adversary that corrupts up to t
servers, there exists a simulator Soram , such that for all non-uniform, polynomial-time environment
Z, there exists a negligible function negl such that

|Pr[R e a l ΠF ,A,Z (λ) = 1] − Pr[I d e a l Foram ,Soram ,Z (λ) = 1]|≤ negl(λ).

4.5.2 The Proposed MACAO Framework
In this section, we describe our ORAM framework in detail. We first present how stateof-the-art active ORAM schemes are vulnerable against the active adversary. We then develop
sub-protocols that are used to build our framework.

4.5.2.1

ORAM in the Malicious Setting
In passive ORAM schemes (e.g., [161, 169, 179]), the server only acts as a storage-only service,

which processes data sending and receiving requests by the client. Therefore, any malicious behavior
can be easily detected by creating a MAC for each ORAM block being requested [169]. Malicious
security is more difficult to achieve in the active ORAM setting, where the client delegates the
computation to the server for reduced bandwidth overhead. Next, we review the attack introduced in
[54] to illustrate the vulnerability of state-of-the-art active ORAM schemes in the malicious setting.
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Most efficient active ORAMs (e.g., [52, 89, 150]) follow the tree-ORAM paradigm and harness
PIR techniques to implement the retrieval phase efficiently. As outlined in §4.3.7, to privately retrieve
the block indexed i, the client creates a PIR query, which is a unit vector v where all elements are
set to zero, except the one at index i being set to 1. Such a query is either encrypted with HE or
secret-shared. According to the PIR, the server computes a homomorphic inner product between v
and the vector containing ORAM blocks on the retrieval path. So, if the adversary modifies ORAM
blocks that will be likely multiplied with the ciphertext/share of the zero components in the retrieval
vector, the final inner product will still be correct. In this case, the client is unable to tell whether
the adversary has modified the ORAM structure, but the malicious server has learned if the vector
component was zero or not, thus violating the privacy of the query. In the tree paradigm, the upper
levels of the tree will likely contain blocks that have been recently accessed. By modifying data
blocks in upper levels, the malicious server can learn whether the same blocks have been accessed
again with high probability. To prevent this, Devadas et al. [54] suggested the client to download a
large portion of data blocks, and apply the same homomorphic computation (like what server did)
on them (as what should be done at the server), to verify if computation at the server is consistent
with the one computed locally. This technique, however, incurs high bandwidth and computation
overhead at the client.

4.5.2.2

Our Sub-Protocols
In this section, we design some sub-protocols for our MACAO framework. These sub-protocols

offer security against the attacks targeting the inner product between the client queries and the
ORAM data as presented above. We present the security proof of sub-protocols in the Appendix.
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Inputs: Client has input α and Si has inputs (hUii , hVii , hUii+1 , hVii+1 ), where hUii = (JUKi , JαUKi ) and so
forth. Each Si has JrKi , Jr̂Ki as the shares of two random values r, r̂ ∈ Fp .
1. Every Si locally computes Xi ← JUKi × JVKi + JUKi × JVKi+1 + JUKi+1 × JVKi and Yi ← JUKi × JαVKi +
JUKi × JαVKi+1 + JUKi+1 × JαVKi .
(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

2. Every Si represents Xi and Yi as the sum of random matrices as Xi = R0 + R1 + R2 , where Rj
(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

Fm×k
and Yi = T0 + T1 + T2 , where Tj
p
(i)
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3. Every Si computes hQii = (JQKi , JαQKi ) and hQii+1 = (JQKi+1 , JαQKi+1 ), where JQKi ← Ri + Ri + Ri ,
(0)
(1)
(2)
(0)
(1)
(2)
(0)
(1)
(2)
JQKi+1 ← Ri+1 + Ri+1 + Ri+1 , JαQKi ← Ti + Ti + Ti , JαQKi+1 ← Ti+1 + Ti+1 + Ti+1 and Q = U × V.
P
P
Output: Each Si sends JrKi , Jr̂Ki to all other servers to compute r, r̂ as r ← i JrKi , r̂ ← i Jr̂K
All servers set
Pi .P
t
t
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r̂
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k . If (JxKi , JyKi ) received from Si and Si−1 are inconsistent or αx 6= y, where x ←
i JxKi and
y ← i JyKi , the client sends ⊥ to all servers and aborts. Otherwise, the client sends ok and every Si accepts
hQii , hQii+1 as its correct authenticated shares of U × V.

Figure 4.25: Authenticated matrix multiplication with RSS.
We construct matrix multiplication protocols using RSS and SPDZ schemes described in
§4.3.6.2.
We first extend RSS to be secure against a malicious adversary in the three-server setting.
The key idea is to create an information-theoretic MAC for each secret as proposed in [51]. Let u, v
be two secrets to be multiplied. The dealer (i.e., the client in our model) creates the authenticated
shares of u and v, i.e., hui = (JuK, JαK) and hvi = (JvK, JαvK), and distributes them appropriately to

servers accordingly. More specifically, every Si receives (huii , huii+1 , hvii , hvii+1 ). All servers jointly
execute the RSS multiplication protocol to compute JuvK over JuK, JvK, and JαuvK over JαuK, JvK (or

JαvK, JuK), resulting in huvi = (JuvK, JαuvK). To this end, every Si sends huvii , huvii+1 to the client.

The client executes x ← AuthRecover(α, (huvi0 , . . . , huvi`−1 )) and aborts if x =⊥.

We now develop an authenticated matrix multiplication protocol based on the extended
RSS. Given two matrices U ∈ Fm×n
and V ∈ Fn×p
, U × V incurs O(mnp) number of pair-wise
p
p
multiplications. Simply using RSS for each multiplication requires O(mnp) shares being sent from one
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Initialize: The servers invoke the pre-computation to generate sufficient number of authenticated shares of matrix
multiplication triples (hAi, hBi, hCi).
Inputs: The client has input α and every Si has inputs (JαKi , hUii , hVii ). Each Si has JrKi , Jr̂Ki as the shares of
random values r, r̂ ∈ Fp .
1. Every Si locally computes JEKi ← JUKi − JAKi , and JPKi ← JVKi − JBKi and broadcast JEKi , JPKi .
P
P
2. All servers open E and P by every server locally computing E ← i JEKi , P ← i JPKi .
3. Every Si locally computes hQii = (JQKi , JαQKi ), where JQKi ← JCKi + E × JBKi + JAKi × P + E × P and
JαQKi ← JαCKi + E × JσBKi + JσAKi × P + JαKi E × P, P = U × V.
P
P
Output: Each Si sends JrKi , Jr̂Ki to all other servers to compute r, r̂ as r ← i JrKi , r̂ ← i Jr̂Ki . All servers
set
rt ← rt and r̂t ← r̂t for t = 1, . . . ,P
mp.P Every Si locally computes and sends to the client JxKi ←
P P
k]Ki ), where
j
k (rt E[j, k] + r̂t P[j, k]) and JyKi ←
j
k (rt JαE[j, k]Ki + r̂t JαP[j,
P
P JαEKi = JαUKi − JαAKi ,
JαPKi = JαVKi − JαBKi and t = jp + k. The client computes x ← i JxKi , y ← i JyKi . If αx 6= y, the client
sends ⊥ to all servers and aborts. Otherwise, the client sends ok and every Si accepts hQii as its correct
authenticated share of U × V.

Figure 4.26: Authenticated matrix multiplication with SPDZ.
server to the other servers. Instead of doing so, we can perform the local matrix multiplication over
the shares and then only re-share the computation result. This strategy saves a factor of n number
of shares to be transferred among three servers. Let hUi = (JUK, JαUK) and hVi = (JVK, JαVK) be
the authenticated share of U and V, respectively. Figure 4.25 presents our matrix multiplication
protocol with RSS scheme in the three-server setting with malicious security.
In our framework, we only employ RSS for the specific three-server setting, where no server
can collude with each other (level 1 of privacy). Although a higher privacy level can be achieved
with the general (` − t)-threshold RSS, where ` = 2t + 1 is the number of servers and t is the privacy
level, it requires



`
t

shares for each secret,



`−1
t

of which are stored in each server. This significantly

increases the server storage, I/O access, communication and computation overhead, and therefore
it is not desirable. In the following, we construct another matrix multiplication protocol, which is
more suitable for applications that need a high privacy level.
Inspired by [133], we develop an efficient authenticated matrix multiplication protocol with
SPDZ sharing. As discussed previously, the computation of U × V, where U ∈ Fm×n
, V ∈ Fn×p
p
p
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incurs O(mnp) numbers of multiplication. Simply using the original SPDZ multiplication protocol
[51] for the matrix multiplication will increase the communication overhead among the servers
significantly10 . To save a factor of n the bandwidth overhead, instead of using the standard Beaver
triples of the form (a, b, ab), we generate matrix multiplication triples (A, B, C), where C = A × B.
Now we assume that each server Si stores an authenticated share of the triple as (hAii , hBii , hCii ).
Figure 4.26 describes the matrix multiplication protocol by SPDZ. Note that in our setting, the
client owns the global MAC key α so they they can check the integrity of computation at the end of
the protocol. In other words, servers do not need to multiply their share of the MAC key with the
random linear combination of opened values.
We construct several PIR protocols in the shared setting with malicious security that will be
used in our ORAM framework. In contrast to standard the PIR, where the database is public, the
database in our setting is shared with authenticated secret sharing in Figure 4.5 and each server
in the system stores one or multiple shares of the database. In this setting, each database item
is split into m chunks as bi = (bi,1 , . . . , bi,m ), where bij ∈ Fp . So a database with N items can be


interpreted as a m × N matrix B = (bi ) ∈ Fm×N
.
Let
hBi
=
(JBK,
JαBK)
=
(Jb
K),
(Jαb
K)
be
i
i
p
the authenticated share of B. Our PIR protocols are as follows.

We extend the original XOR-PIR protocol [45] to privately retrieve a block in the shared
setting with malicious security. We consider the three-server case; however it can be extended
to the general `-server setting. In this setting, the client creates three authenticated shares for
database B as (hBi0 , . . . , hBi2 ) ← AuthCreate(α, B, 3). Each Si stores two out of three authenticated
shares as (hBii , hBii+1 ). Our main idea is to harness the XOR-PIR protocol in [45] to retrieve each
10

The authors in [18] observed that the offline phase can be optimized for functions. The approach is however, different.
We are not aware of other published results that optimized the offline phase for matrix multiplication.
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Parameters: N denotes the number of shared items in the shared database.
Inputs: The client has inputs (idx, α) and each server Si has inputs (hBii , hBii+1 ).
1. Let (q0 , . . . , qN −1 ) be the indicator for the retrieved block, i.e., qidx = 1 and qi = 0 for 0 ≤ i 6= idx < N . For
each authenticated shared database hBii , stored on Si and Si−1 :
(1)

(1)

(a) The client generates a random binary string of length N, R(i) = (r0 , . . . , rN −1 ). The client generates
(2)
(i+1)
(i+1)
(i)
(i+1)
(i)
R(i+1) = (r0 , . . . , rN −1 ) by flipping the idx-th bit of R(i) , i.e., ridx = r̄idx and rj
= rj for all j 6= idx.
The client sends R(i) to Si and R(i+1) to Si+1 .
P
P
P
(i)
(i)
(b) Si computes and responds with xi = j (Jbj Ki · rj ) and yi = j Jαbj Ki · rj , where
represents the
bit-wise
XOR
and
·
represents
the
bit-wise
AND.
Similarly,
S
i+1 computes and responds with xi+1 =
P
P
(i+1)
(i+1)
) and yi = j Jαbj Ki · rj
.
j (Jbj Ki · rj
(c) The client computes x0i = xi ⊕ xi+1 and yi0 = yi ⊕ yi+1 .

2. The client interprets x0i and yi0 as the i-th authenticated share of the retrieved block b, i.e., hbii = (JbKi , JαbKi ) =
(x0i , yi0 ). The client executes b ← AuthRecover(α, (hbi0 , . . . , hbi2 )).
Output: The client outputs b.

Figure 4.27: Authenticated XOR-PIR on additively shared database.
Parameters: N denotes the number of shared items in the shared database.
Inputs: The client has inputs (idx, α) and each server Si has inputs (hBii , hBii+1 , ).
1. The client creates an indicator Q = (q0 , . . . , qN −1 ) for the block to be retrieved, i.e., qidx = 1 and qj = 0
for 0 ≤ j 6= idx < N . The client creates shares of Q by executing Create algorithm on each qi , resulting in
JQK0 , . . . , JQK`−1 . The client sends JQKi to Si for 0 ≤ i ≤ 2.
2. Every Si executes step 1 of the matrix multiplication protocol based on RSS scheme in Figure 4.25. Specifically,
every Si locally computes and responds with xi = JQKi × JBKi + JQKi × JBKi+1 + JQKi+1 × JBKi and yi =
JQKi × JαBKi + JQKi × JαBKi+1 + JQKi+1 × JαBKi .
P
P
3. The client computes b ← i xi and t ←
yi .
Output: If αb = t, the client outputs b as the correct block. Otherwise, the client outputs ⊥.

Figure 4.28: Authenticated RSS-PIR on additively shared database.
authenticated share of the database block, and then verify the integrity of the block from the shares.
Figure 4.27 presents our protocol in details.
We construct a PIR protocol with malicious security based on the RSS matrix multiplication
protocol presented in §4.3.6.2. Similar to XOR-PIR, we consider the 3-server setting, where each
server Si stores two authenticated shares (hBii , hBii+1 ) of database B. Figure 4.28 presents the
protocol in detail.

125

Parameters: N denotes the number of shared items in the shared database.
Inputs: The client has inputs (idx, α) and each server Si has input hBii .
1. The client creates an indicator Q = (q0 , . . . , qN −1 ) for the block to be retrieved, i.e., qidx = 1 and qj = 0 for
0 ≤ j 6= idx < N . The client creates the authenticated shares of Q by executing AuthCreate algorithm on each
qi , resulting in hQi0 , . . . , hQi`−1 . The client sends hQii to Si
2. The client and all servers jointly execute the SPDZ-based matrix multiplication protocol in Figure 4.26 to
compute hQ × Bi. If the client does not abort, every Si sends the output hQ × Bii to the client.
3. The client executes b ← AuthRecover(α, hQ × Bi0 , . . . , hQ × Bi`−1 ).
Output: The client outputs b as the retrieved block.

Figure 4.29: Authenticated SPDZ-PIR on additively shared database.
We construct a maliciously-secure PIR protocol based on the SPDZ matrix multiplication
(Figure 4.29). This protocol works in the general `-server setting, in which every Si stores a single
authenticated share of the database as hBii .
As outlined in §4.3.3, the core idea of the eviction in [179] is to maximize the number of data
blocks that can be pushed down in a single block scan on the eviction path via strategic pick and
drop operations. To make these operations oblivious, the client needs to download and upload the
entire bucket for each level scan, thereby suffering from the logarithmic communication overhead.
Similar to S3 ORAM, MACAO framework harnesses the permutation matrix concept to implement
the Circuit-ORAM eviction strategy in a more communication-efficient manner. Figure 4.30 presents
our algorithm with the highlights as follows. For each level h on the eviction path v, we create a
(Z + 1) × (Z + 1) matrix Ih initialized with zeros. We consider the data to be computed with Ih as
(Z+1)×m

a matrix Uh ∈ Fp

containing Z blocks from the bucket at level h and the block supposed to
(Z+1)×m

be held by the client11 . The main objective is to perform Vh> = U>
h × Ih , where Vh ∈ Fp

contains the new data for the bucket at level h and the new block to be picked for deeper levels.
Therefore, to drop the holding block to an empty slot indexed x in the bucket at level h, the client
sets Ih [Z, x] ← 1 (line 12). To pick a block at slot x0 , the client sets Ih [x0 , Z] ← 1 (line 17). To skip
11

Remark that each database block is split into m chunks ci ∈ Fp .
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(b, (I0 , . . . , IH )) ← CreatePermMat(v):
1: hold ← ⊥, dest ← ⊥, b ← {0}|b|
2: (deepest, deepestIdx) ← PrepareDeepest(v)
3: target ← PrepareTarget(v)
4: if target[0] 6= ⊥ then
5:
hold ← deepestIdx[0]; dest ← target[0]
6:
b ← S[hold], S[hold] ← {}
7: for h = 0 to H do
8:
Ih [i, j] ← 0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ Z, 0 ≤ j ≤ Z
9:
if hold 6= ⊥ then
10:
if h = dest then # Drop the on-hold block to this level
11:
hold ← ⊥, dest ← ⊥,
12:
Ih [Z][x] ← 1 where xh is an empty slot index at level h
13:
else# Move the on-hold block to the next level
14:
Ih [Z][Z] ← 1
15:
if target[h] 6= ⊥ then # Pick a block at this level
16:
Ih [x0 ][Z] ← 1 where x0 ← deepestIdx[h]
17:
hold ← x0 , dest ← target[h]
18:
for each real block id at level h do # Preserve existing blocks
19:
if pm[id].pIdx mod Z 6= deepestIdx[h] then
20:
Ih [x̂][x̂] ← 1 where x̂ ← pm[id].pIdx mod Z
21: return (b, (I0 , . . . , IH ))

Figure 4.30: Permutation matrix for Circuit-ORAM eviction.
this level (no drop or pick), the client sets Ih [Z, Z] ← 1, which moves the holding block to the next
level (line 14). To preserve an existing block at this level, the client sets Ih [x̂, x̂] ← 1 where x̂ is the
slot index of the block in the bucket (lines 18-20).

4.5.2.3

MACAO Schemes
In this section, we construct two ORAM schemes in our framework called MACAOrss and

MACAOspdz by putting sub-protocols in the previous section altogether. Our constructions follow the
general tree-ORAM access structure [161] outlined in §4.3.1, which contains two main subroutines
including retrieval and eviction. At the high level idea, our ORAM schemes use multi-server
authenticated PIR protocols to implement the retrieval. For the eviction, our ORAM schemes
harness the concept of permutation matrix and the homomorphic matrix multiplication protocols.
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data0 ← Access(op, id, data):
1: (pid, pIdx) ← pm[id]
2: data0 ← Retrieve(pid, pIdx)
3: if data0 =⊥ then
4:
return abort
5: if op = write then
6:
b ← data
$
7: pm[id].pid ← {0, . . . , 2H − 1}
8: Evict()
9: return data0

Figure 4.31: MACAO access structure.
We first give the storage layout at the client- and server-side, and then present our ORAM schemes
in detail.
Our constructions follow the tree-ORAM paradigm outlined in §4.3.1. In MACAOrss scheme,
there are three servers and each server Si ∈ {S0 , S1 , S2 } stores two authenticated shares of the tree
as (hTii , hTii+1 ). In MACAOspdz scheme, there are ` ≥ 2 servers, where each Si ∈ {S0 , . . . , S`−1 }
stores an authenticated share hTii and an additive share of the global MAC key, JαKi .

The client maintains the position map of the form pm := (id; pid, pIdx), where id is the block

ID, 0 ≤ pid < 2H is the path ID and 0 ≤ pIdx < ZH is the index of the block in its assigned path.
Notice that pm can be stored remotely at the servers by recursive ORAM [169] and meta-data
construction as discussed in S3 ORAM in §4.4 (see §4.5.2.6). For ease of presentation, we assume that
pm is locally stored. Since we follow Circuit-ORAM eviction, the client needs to maintain the stash
component (S) to temporarily store blocks that cannot be evicted back to the tree. This stash can
also be stored at the server-side for reduced storage overhead as will be discussed in the next section.
Finally, the client stores the global MAC key α.
Figure 4.31 presents the general access structure of MACAO schemes. In the following, we
present in detail the retrieval and eviction phases of each scheme.
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b ← MACAOrss .Retrieve(pid, pIdx):
1. return b, where b ← The client executes either XOR-PIR protocol in Figure 4.27 or RSSS-PIR protocol in
Figure 4.28 with 3 servers, in which the client has input (pIdx, α) and each Si has inputs as the path pid of
hTii , hTii+1 .

Figure 4.32: MACAOrss retrieval.
MACAOrss .Evict():
Parameters: EvictCtr denotes the number of eviction operations initialized at 0, H denotes the height of ORAM
tree, ` = 3 denotes the number of servers in the system.
Inputs: The client has input α and every Si has inputs (hTii , hTii+1 ).
Client:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

v ← DigitReverse2 (EvictCtr mod 2H ), EvictCtr ← EvictCtr + 1
(b, (I0 , . . . , IH )) ← CreatePermMat(v)
(hbi0 , . . . , hbi`−1 ) ← AuthCreate(α, b, `)
(JIh K0 , . . . , JIh K`−1 ) ← Create(Ih , `) for 0 ≤ h ≤ H
Send (hbii , (JI0 Ki , . . . , JIH Ki )) to Si and Si−1 for 0 ≤ i < `

Server: For each level h of the eviction path v starting from the root:
6. Every Si forms authenticated shared matrices hBh ii , hBh ii+1 by concatenating the bucket P(v, h) of hTii , hTii+1
with hbii , hbii+1 , respectively.
7. All parties execute RSS-based matrix multiplication protocol in Figure 4.25, where the client inputs α and
every Si inputs (JIh Ki , hBh ii , JIh Ki+1 , hBh ii+1 ). Let hBh × Ih ii , hBh × Ih ii+1 be the output of Si .
8. Every Si interprets the last row of hBh × Ih ii , hBh × Ih ii+1 as the on-hold blocks hbii , hbii+1 respectively, for
the next level h + 1, and updates the bucket P(v, h) of hTii , hTii+1 with the other rows.

Figure 4.33: MACAOrss eviction.
Our MACAOrss scheme operates on the specific three-server setting. MACAOrss employs
either XOR-PIR or RSS-PIR protocol for oblivious retrieval, and RSS matrix multiplication for
eviction as follows.
Figure 4.32 presents the retrieval phase of MACAOrss scheme. Since we perform the PIR
on the retrieval path, all the buckets on the path are interpreted as the database input of the
PIR protocols. As a result, the length of the PIR query is Z(H + 1) and the database input is
interpreted as a matrix of size Z(H + 1) × m. Notice that we can use XOR-PIR and RSS-PIR
protocols interchangeably in this phase. The difference is that XOR-PIR incurs less computation
than RSS-PIR (XOR vs. arithmetic operations) with the smaller size of the client queries (binary
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string vs. finite field vector). As a trade-off, it doubles the number of data to be downloaded, and
the computed blocks on the servers are in the form of XOR shares. This XOR-share format does not
allow for further (homomorphic) arithmetic computations after being accessed once.
Figure 4.33 presents the eviction protocol of MACAOrss scheme in detail. We follow the
deterministic eviction strategy proposed in [71], where the eviction path is selected according to the
reverse-lexicographical order of the number of evictions being performed so far (line 1). Intuitively,
the client creates the permutation matrices for Circuit-ORAM eviction plans (line 2). The client
creates authenticated shares for the block fetched from the stash and the permutation matrices (lines
3, 4), and then distributes the shares to corresponding servers. Notice that it is not necessary to create
authenticated shares of permutation matrices because RSS scheme only needs one authenticated
share to do the authenticated homomorphic multiplication. Once receiving all shares from the client,
all servers execute the RSS-based authenticated matrix multiplication protocol in Figure 4.25 for
each level h of the eviction path. The servers form the authenticated shared matrices to be multiplied
with the shared permutation matrices by concatenating the buckets at level h of the authenticated
shared ORAM trees with the authenticated shared blocks sent by the client. The servers interpret
the last row of the resulting matrices as the authenticated shared blocks holding by the client for
the next level (h + 1), and update the h-leveled buckets of the shared ORAM tree with the other
rows of the resulting matrices.
Our MACAOspdz scheme operates on the general `-server setting with the pre-computation
model.
As presented in Figure 4.34, MACAOspdz employs the SPDZ-PIR protocol, instead of RSS-PIR
or XOR-PIR in MACAOrss , to implement the private retrieval phase.
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b ← MACAOrss .Retrieve(pid, pIdx):
1. return b, where b ← The client executes SPDZ-PIR in Figure 4.29 with ` servers, in which the client has
input (pIdx, α) and each Si has inputs as the path pid of hTii .

Figure 4.34: MACAOspdz retrieval.
MACAOspdz .Evict():
Parameters: Same as Figure 4.33, except ` ≥ 2.
Inputs: The client has input α and every Si has inputs (JαKi , hTii ).
Client: (b, (I0 , . . . , IH )) ← Execute lines 1–3 in Figure 4.33.
1. (hIh i0 , . . . , hIh i`−1 ) ← AuthCreate(Ih , `) for 0 ≤ h ≤ H
2. Send (hbii , (hI0 ii , . . . , hIH ii )) to Si for 0 ≤ i < `
Server: For each level h of the eviction path v starting from the root:
3. Every Si forms authenticated shared matrices hBh ii by concatenating the bucket P(v, h) of hTii with hbii ,
respectively.
4. All parties execute the SPDZ-based matrix multiplication protocol in Figure 4.26, where the client inputs α
and every Si has inputs (JαKi , hIh ii , hBh ii ). Let hBh × Ih ii be the output of Si .
5. Every S interprets the last row of hBh × Ih ii as the on-hold block (hbii for the next level h + 1, and updates
the buckets P(v, h) of hTii with the other rows.

Figure 4.35: MACAOspdz eviction.
Figure 4.35 depicts the eviction phase of MACAOspdz , which is similar to that of MACAOrss ,
except that it employs matrix multiplication protocol by SPDZ to implement the oblivious pick and
drop operations. In this case, the client creates and sends to the servers the authenticated shares of
the permutation matrices, instead of only the additive shares as in MACAOrss .

4.5.2.4

Security Analysis
We now present the security of MACAO schemes. The MACAO eviction follows the push-down

principle proposed in Circuit-ORAM [179] so that it has the same overflow probability as follows.
Lemma 6 (Stash Overflow Probability). Let the bucket size Z ≥ 2. Let st(MACAO[s]) be a random
variable denoting the stash size of a MACAO scheme after an access sequence s. Then, for any access
sequence s, Pr[st(MACAO[s]) ≥ R] ≤ 14 · e−R .
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Proof. (see [179])

We define the security model for the matrix multiplication with verifiability as follows.
Definition 10 (Matrix Multiplication with Verifiability). We first define the ideal world and real world
as follows.
Let Fmult be an ideal functionality, which performs the matrix multiplication for each client
request as follows. In each time step, the environment Z specifies two matrices X and Y as the
client’s input. The client sends X and Y to Fmult . Fmult notifies the simulator Smult (without
revealing X and Y to Smult ). If Smult returns ok to Fmult , Fmult computes and sends Z = X × Y to
the client. The client then returns Z to the environment Z. If Smult returns abort to Fmult , Fmult
returns ⊥ to the client.
In the real world, Z specifies an input (X, Y) to the client. The client executes the matrix
multiplication protocol Π with servers (S0 , . . . , S`−1 ). The environment Z gets the view of the
adversary A after every operation. The client outputs to the environment Z the output of the
protocol Π or abort.
We say that a protocol ΠF securely realizes the ideal functionality Fmult in the presence of a
malicious adversary corrupting t servers iff for any PPT real-world adversary that corrupts up to t
servers, there exists a simulator Smult , such that for all non-uniform, polynomial-time environment
Z, there exists a negligible function negl such that

|Pr[R e a l ΠF ,A,Z (λ) = 1] − Pr[I d e a l Fmult ,Smult ,Z (λ) = 1]|≤ negl(λ).
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Lemma 7. In the 3-server setting, the matrix multiplication protocol via RSS in Figure 4.25 is secure
against a malicious adversary corrupting an arbitrary server.

Proof. We prove by constructing a simulator such that the environment Z cannot distinguish between
the real protocol and the ideal functionality. We define the simulator Smult in the ideal world and a
sequence of hybrid games as follows.
The simulator follows the honest procedure on behalf of the client to multiply two dummy
matrices X ∈ Fn×m
and Y ∈ Fm×p
. During the multiplication, if the client (executed by the
p
p
simulator) aborts then the simulator sends abort to Fmult and stops. Otherwise, the simulator returns
ok to Fmult (causing it to output the result to the client).
We define a sequence of hybrid games to show that the following real world and the simulation
in the ideal world are statistically indistinguishable:

|Pr[R e a l ΠF ,A,Z (λ) = 1] − Pr[I d e a l Fmult ,Smult ,Z (λ) = 1]|≤ negl(λ).

We define Game 0 as the real game R e a l ΠF ,A,Z (λ) with an environment Z and three
servers in the presence of an adversary A presented in Definition 10. In this case, the real matrix
multiplication protocol ΠF is the one presented in Figure 4.25. Without loss of generality, we assume
server S0 is corrupted.
We define Game 1 as follows. In this game, the client locally computes Z = X×Y. Whenever
the client executes the protocol ΠF with three servers, if abort does not occur, the client uses their
locally computed Z for further processing. The difference between Game 0 and Game 1 happens if at
some point, where the client obtains an incorrect computation from the servers, but unable to detect
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because the adversary generates a valid MAC of the computation (thus the abort does not occur).
We claim that Game 0 and Game 1 are statistically indistinguishable. The intuition is to show that
if the adversarial server ever cheats by modifying the protocol input during the computation, it will
be caught with high probability (thereby forcing the adversary to follow the protocol faithfully).
Let hXii = (JXKi , JαXKi ) and hXii = (JYKi , JαYKi ) be the authenticated shares of X and

Y for every server Si , 0 ≤ i ≤ 2. Due to additive secret sharing, we have that X =
Y=

P

i JYKi ,

αX =

be expressed as

P

i JαXKi

and αY =

P

i JαYKi .

P

i JXKi ,

By replicated secret sharing, Z = X × Y can

Z =(JXK0 + JXK1 + JXK2 ) × (JYK0 + JYK1 + JYK2 )

=(JXK0 × JYK0 + JXK0 × JYK1 + JXK1 × JYK0 )S0 +

(JXK1 × JYK1 + JXK1 × JYK2 + JXK2 × JYK1 )S1 +
(JXK2 × JYK2 + JXK0 × JYK2 + JXK2 × JYK0 )S2
(0)

(0)

(0)

(1)

(1)

(1)

(4.9)

(2)

(2)

(2)

(R0 + R1 + R2 )S0 + (R0 + R1 + R2 )S1 + (R0 + R1 + R2 )S2


(R(0) + R(1) + R(2) ) + (R(0) + R(1) + R(2) ) + (R(0) + R(1) + R(2) )
0
0 S0
1
1
1 S1
2
2
2 S2
 0
=

 (0)
(0)
(1)
(2)
(0)
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
(R1 + R1 + R1 )S0 + (R2 + R2 + R2 )S1 + (R0 + R0 + R0 )S2

(4.10)

(4.11)

S0 can cheat at three stages: (i) before the re-sharing phase where S0 modifies their own shares
(JXK0 , JYK0 , JXK1 , JYK1 ) (Equation 4.9); (ii) during the re-sharing phase where S0 sends inconsistent
shares to other servers (Equation 4.10); (iii) after the re-sharing phase where S0 deviates the linear
combination (Equation 4.11). It can be seen that (ii) and (iii) may result in the servers storing
inconsistent copies with each other, which can be detected at the output phase of the protocol.
Specifically, every server Si performs the random linear combination of all components Jzj Ki in the
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resulting matrix JZKi as JxKi ←

P

j rj Jzj Ki .

Due to RSS, JxKi will be computed by two servers on

their own shares. This means if JZKi is inconsistent from two servers, the client will receive two
different xi and, therefore, can tell whether one of the servers has cheated.

Finally, we show that if the adversary adds any error to his local computation before the
re-sharing phase (i.e., stage (i)), they will also get caught. Let T be an error introduced by S0
during its local computation. By Equation 4.9, the computation will now become (X × Y + T).
Hence, to make the client not abort, S0 should modify its shares of the MACs in such a way that all
servers will compute the valid share of the MAC of the form α(X × Y + T) at the end. Remark
that the MAC of the multiplication X × Y is α(X × Y), which can be computed by multiplying αX
with Y via replicated secret sharing as

αX × Y =(JαXK0 + JαXK1 + JαXK2 ) × (JYK0 + JYK1 + JYK2 )

=(JαXK0 × JYK0 + JαXK0 × JYK1 + JαXK1 × JYK0 )S0 +
(JαXK1 × JYK1 + JαXK1 × JYK2 + JαXK2 × JYK1 )S1 +

(4.12)

(JαXK2 × JYK2 + JαXK2 × JYK0 + JαXK0 × JYK2 )S2 .

Let T0 be an error introduced by S0 during the local computation in Equation 4.12. As
shown above, the resulting MAC computation will be of the form (αX × Y + T0 ). Thus,

α(X × Y) + T0 = α(X × Y + T) ⇐⇒ T0 = αT.

(4.13)

Since α is the global MAC key known only be the client, the probability that S0 can generate a valid
(T, T0 ) pair is

1
|Fp | .

That means the adversary cannot deviate from the protocol, otherwise, they will

cause the client to abort the protocol with high probability.
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We define Game 1’ as follows. In this game, the client executes ΠF with three servers
using dummy matrices, instead of the one chosen by the environment Z. We introduce the ideal
functionality Fmult , which the client queries to answer the environment requests. During executing
ΠF , if the client does not abort, the output of F is forwarded to Z. We claim that Game 1 and
Game 2 are statistically indistinguishable, in which the view of the adversary can be simulated
given the view of the honest servers. At the beginning of the ΠF protocol, the client distributes
the authenticated share of the multiplication matrices to each server. Due to the perfect secrecy of
additive secret sharing, all these shares are uniformly distributed. After the local computation, each
server re-shares the computed result with additive secret sharing and distributes the shares to other
servers (i.e., step 1 in Figure 4.25). Such shares are also uniformly distributed due to the security of
additive secret sharing. All these properties permit to simulate the view of the adversary given the
view of the honest servers.
We define Game 0’ similar to Game 0 except that the client uses dummy matrices to interact
with the servers, instead of the ones provided by the environment Z. The client queries the ideal
functionality Fpir on the actual input provided by Z and forwards the output to Z. We claim
that Game 1’ and Game 0’ are indistinguishable using the same argument as between Game 1 and
Game 0. We can see that Game 0’ is the ideal game I d e a l Fmult ,Smult ,Z with simulator Smult and the
environment Z.
Putting all the games together, we have that Game 0 ≡ Game 1 ≡ Game 1’ = Game 0’ and
this completes the proof.
Corollary 4. In the `-server setting, the matrix multiplication protocol by SP DZ in Figure 4.26 is
secure against a malicious adversary corrupting (`-1) servers.
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Proof. This proof can be derived from the proof of Lemma 7 and the one in [51] so that we will not
present it in detail due to repetition. Intuitively, the proof works by defining the simulator and the
hybrid games similar to the ones in the proof of Lemma 7 with a slight tweak as follows. It was
proven in [51] that the probability that the adversary can cheat during the SPDZ multiplication over
two shared values is 1/|Fp |. Thus, we can follow the proof in [51] and present it for the vectorized
values (i.e., matrix) to construct Game 1. Similarly, it has been also proven in [51] that the view of
the ideal process and the real process is statistically indistinguishable by the SPDZ multiplication
over single values. We can follow [51] to construct Game 1’ for vectorized values.
Lemma 8. In the 3-server setting, the XOR-PIR protocol on an authenticated shared database in
Figure 4.27 is secure against a malicious adversary corrupting an arbitrary server.

Proof. We prove this by constructing a simulator such that the environment Z cannot distinguish
between the real protocol and the ideal functionality. We define the simulator Spir in the ideal world
and a sequence of hybrid games as follows.
To simulate the setup protocol, the simulator follows the honest setup procedure with a
dummy database B0 containing N dummy data items, on behalf of the client. For the retrieval
simulation, the simulator follows the honest retrieval procedure, on behalf of the client, to read a
block with dummy ID. During the access operation, if the client (executed by Spir ) aborts then the
simulator sends abort to Fpir and stops. Otherwise, the simulator returns ok to Fpir .
We define a sequence of hybrid games to show that the following real world and the simulation
in the ideal world are statistically indistinguishable:

|Pr[R e a l ΠF ,A,Z (λ) = 1] − Pr[I d e a l Fpir ,Spir ,Z (λ) = 1]|≤ negl(λ).
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We define Game 0 as the real game R e a l ΠF ,A,Z (λ) with an environment Z and three
servers in the presence of an adversary A. presented in Definition 10. In this case, the real PIR
protocol ΠF is the one presented in Figure 4.27. Without loss of generality, we assume server S0 is
corrupted.
We define Game 1 as follows. In this game, the client maintains a copy of the database
locally. Whenever the client privately retrieves a data item block from the servers, if abort does
not occur, the client uses its version stored locally for further processing. The difference between
Game 0 and Game 1 happens if at some point, the client retrieves an incorrect item from the servers,
but unable to detect since the adversarial server generates a valid MAC for it (thus the abort does
not occur). We claim that Game 0 and Game 1 are statistically indistinguishable. Similar to other
proofs, the intuition is to show that if the adversarial server ever cheats during the PIR computation,
it will be caught with high probability as follows.
Every server Si ∈ {S0 , S1 , S2 } stores two authenticated shares of the database B as hBii =
(JBKi , JαBKi ) = ((Jbj Ki ), (Jαbj Ki )) and hBii+1 = (JBKi+1 , JαBKi+1 ) = ((Jbj Ki+1 ), (Jαbj Ki+1 )). According to the XOR-PIR protocol, every Si aggregates (i.e., XOR) all authenticated shares of the
blocks that correspond with the value ‘1’ in the client queries. Let e0 and e1 be the queries that the
client sends to S0 , which are the binary strings of length `, where ` is the number of database blocks.
Let ê0 (resp. ê1 ) be the error introduced by S0 during the bitwise operations between JBK0 (resp.
JBK1 ) and e0 (resp. e1 ). So, the reply that the client obtains from S0 is of the form
(0)

JbK0 ⊕ e0 =
(0)
JbK1

⊕ e1 =

M

∀j : e0 [j]=1

M

∀j : e1 [j]=1

Jbj K0

(4.14)

Jbj K1
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(1)

(1)

(0)

(1)

Since S1 , S2 are honest, the client obtains honest answers JbK0 , JbK1 , JbK2 , JbK2

from

them. Due to XOR-PIR, the client reconstructs the following shares from the server:

(0)

(1)

(0)

(1)

(0)

(1)

JbK0 ⊕ e0 = JbK0 ⊕ JbK0 = JbK0 + t0
JbK1 ⊕ e1 = JbK1 ⊕ JbK1 = JbK1 + t1

(4.15)

JbK2 = JbK2 ⊕ JbK2 = JbK2

By additive secret sharing, the client recovers a block of the form b0 = JbK0 + JbK1 + JbK2 +

t0 + t1 = b + t where t = t0 + t1 ∈ Fp . Equation 4.15 implies that if the adversary introduces any bit
of error during the XOR computation, the client will recover incorrect shares of the original block b
thereby, obtaining an arbitrary block b0 different from b. In order to make the client not abort, the

adversary must inject the errors during the bitwise computation between hαBi0 with e0 and hαBi1
with e1 , in such a way that allows the client to reconstruct a valid MAC for b0 , i.e., αb0 = αb + αt.
Since α is unknown, the probability that the adversary can cheat to make the client reconstruct a
valid MAC for b0 is

1
|Fp | .

That means the adversary must follow the protocol faithfully, otherwise

they will cause the client to abort with high probability.
We define Game 1’ as follows. The client executes the Setup with a dummy database B0 (as
similar to Spir ) instead of the one provided by Z. For each request, the client executes a dummy
retrieval with three servers instead of the one chosen by Z. In this game, we use the ideal functionality
Fpir , which store the database provided by Z in the setup phase, to answer the environment requests.
For each retrieval, if the client does not abort, it forwards the output of Fpir to Z.
We say that Game 1 and Game 1’ are indistinguishable. Notice that if the client does not
abort in these games, then the data item is retrieved correctly and the corrupted server follows the
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protocol faithfully as the honest servers. In our PIR protocol, the database is stored in the form of
authenticated shares at the server, which are uniformly distributed due to the perfect privacy of
additive secret sharing. The PIR queries are shared by XOR secret sharing, which are also uniformly
distributed due to the perfect secrecy of XOR. Due to PIR, the computation is performed over the
entire database at each server. All these security properties indicate that the view of the adversary
can be simulated given the view of the honest servers that execute the XOR-PIR protocol with the
client.
We define Game 0’ similar to Game 0 except that the client uses a dummy database and a
dummy retrieval index to interact with the servers, instead of the ones provided by the environment
Z. The client queries the ideal functionality Fpir on the actual input provided by Z and forwards the
output to Z. We claim that Game 1’ and Game 0’ are indistinguishable using the same argument as
between Game 1 and Game 0. Game 0’ is the ideal game I d e a l Fpir ,Spir ,Z with simulator Spir and
the environment Z. Putting all the games together, we have that Game 0 ≡ Game 1 ≡ Game 1’ ≡
Game 0’ and this completes the proof.

We now prove the security of multi-server PIR protocols. We first present the security model
of multi-server PIR based on simulation as follows.
Definition 11 (Multi-Server PIR with Verifiability). We first define the ideal world and real world as
follows. Let Fpir be an ideal functionality, which maintains a version of the database on behalf of
the client and answers the client’s requests as follows.
An environment Z provides a database B to the client. The client sends B to Fpir . Fpir
stores B and notifies the simulator Spir the completion of the setup, but not the content of B. The
simulator Spir returns ok or abort to Fpir . Fpir then returns ok or ⊥ to the client accordingly. In
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each retrieval step, the environment Z specifies an index idx as the client’s input. The client sends
idx to Fpir . Fpir notifies the simulator Spir (without revealing idx to Spir ). If Spir returns ok to Fpir ,
Fpir sends b ← B[idx] to the client. The client then returns b to the environment Z. If Spir returns
abort to Fpir , Fpir returns ⊥ to the client.
In the real world, Z gives the client a database B. The client executes the Setup with `
servers (S0 , . . . , S`−1 ). At each time step, Z specifies an input idx to the client. The client executes
the PIR protocol Π with (S0 , . . . , S`−1 ). The environment Z gets the view of the adversary A after
every operation. The client outputs to the environment Z the output of Π or abort.
We say that a protocol ΠF securely realizes the ideal functionality Fpir in the presence of a
malicious adversary corrupting t servers iff for any PPT real-world adversary that corrupts up to t
servers, there exists a simulator Spir such that for all non-uniform, polynomial-time environment Z,
there exists a negligible function negl such that

|Pr[R e a l ΠF ,A,Z (λ) = 1] − Pr[I d e a l Fpir ,Spir ,Z (λ) = 1]|≤ negl(λ).

Corollary 5. In the 3-server setting, the RSS-PIR protocol on an authenticated shared database in
Figure 4.28 is secure against a malicious adversary corrupting an arbitrary server.

Proof. This can be derived from the proof of Lemma 8 so we will not repeat due to repetition.
Intuitively, we construct the Simulator Spir and the hybrid games similar to the ones in the proof of
Lemma 8, with a small change as follows. This protocol interprets the PIR database as a matrix to
execute the matrix multiplication protocol via replicated secret sharing. We have shown in the proof
of Lemma 7 that the probability that the adversary can inject a malicious input to the stage (i) of
the matrix multiplication without being caught is

1
|Fp | .

We can use this argument to construct Game
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1. In Game 1’, we can argue that the view of the ideal process and the real process is statistically
indistinguishable because the retrieval queries in this PIR are in the form of additive secret sharing,
and therefore, are uniformly distributed.
Corollary 6. In the `-server setting, the SPDZ-PIR protocol on an authenticated shared database
setting in Figure 4.29 is secure against a malicious server corrupting up to (` − 1) servers.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Corollary 5, this proof can be derived from the proof of Lemma 8 by
replacing the XOR operations with the matrix multiplication protocol by SPDZ secret sharing.

Now we state the security of our MACAO schemes as follows.
Theorem 5 (MACAO Security). MACAO framework is statistically (information-theoretically) secure
by Definition 9.

Proof. We define a simulator in the ideal world and a sequence of hybrid games as follows.
To simulate the setup protocol, the simulator follows the honest setup procedure with a
$

database DB0 containing N blocks bi for each bi ← {0, 1}|b| , on behalf of the client. For the access
simulation, the simulator follows the honest access protocol, on behalf of the client, to read a dummy
block with dummy ID. During the access operation, if the client protocol (executed by the simulator)
aborts then the simulator sends abort to Foram and stops. Otherwise, the simulator returns ok to
Foram .
We define a sequence of hybrid games to show that the following real world and the simulation
in the ideal world are statistically indistinguishable:

|Pr[R e a l ΠF ,A,Z (λ) = 1] − Pr[I d e a l Foram ,Soram ,Z (λ) = 1]|≤ negl(λ).
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We define Game 0 as the real game R e a l ΠF ,A,Z (λ) with an environment Z and ` servers
in the presence of an adversary A as presented in Definition 8. In this game, the real ORAM access
protocol ΠF is the one presented in Figure 4.31, where the retrieval and evictions subroutines are
presented in Figure 4.32, Figure 4.33, Figure 4.34, Figure 4.35.
We define Game 1 as follows. In this game, the client maintains a copy of the data blocks bi
in plaintext locally. Whenever the client accesses a block bi from the servers, If abort does not occur,
the client uses its plaintext stored locally for further processing. The difference between Game 0 and
Game 1 happens if, at some point, the client retrieves a modified block from the servers, but unable
to detect since the adversarial server generates a valid MAC for it (thus the abort does not occur).
We claim that Game 0 and Game 1 are statistically indistinguishable as follows. First,
MACAO schemes harness multi-server PIR protocols based on XOR/RSS/SPDZ scheme to perform
the retrieval phase. We have shown that all these protocols are secure against the malicious adversary
by Lemma 8, Corollary 5 and Corollary 6, where the probability that the adversary can tamper with
the block and forge a valid MAC is

1
|Fp | .

Second, MACAO schemes use the authenticated matrix

multiplication protocols by RSS or SPDZ to perform the eviction. By Lemma 7 and Corollary 4, all
these protocols are secure against the malicious adversary, where the probability that the adversary
can deviate from the protocol without being caught is

1
|Fp | .

We define Game 1’ as follows. In this game, the client executes the Setup with a dummy
database DB0 similar to the simulation, instead of the one provided by the environment Z. For each
access operation, the client executes a dummy access with ` servers instead of the one chosen by Z.
We also introduce the ideal functionality Foram storing the database provided by the environment Z
in the setup phase, which the client queries to answer the environment requests. At each time of
access, if the client does not abort, it forwards the output of Foram to Z.
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We claim that Game 1 and Game 1’ are statistically indistinguishable as follows. In both
games, if the client does not abort then the data block is retrieved correctly. That means the
corrupted server follows the protocol faithfully as the honest servers. We show that the view of
the adversary in these games can be simulated given the view of the honest servers that execute
Access protocol of MACAO with the client as follows. In MACAO, the client database is stored in the
ORAM tree at the server in the form of authenticated shares, which achieves a perfect security due
to the perfect privacy of additive secret sharing. MACAO schemes harness the tree-ORAM paradigm,
where the client privately assigns each block to a path selected uniformly at random. Once a block
is retrieved, the client locally assigns it to a new random path, and therefore, it is unknown to the
server. Thus, given any data request sequence, the server observes a sequence of random retrieval
paths. The eviction path in MACAO is deterministic following the reverse lexicographical order and
therefore, it is publicly known by anyone. MACAO schemes employ the push-down strategy in [179],
which achieves a negligible failure probability with fixed system parameters (e.g., bucket size, stash
size) by Lemma 6. Therefore, given any two data request sequences of the same length, the servers
observe two access patterns that are statistically indistinguishable from each other (the statistical
bit comes from the negligible failure probability of push-down strategy). Moreover, any computation
performed by the servers is secure due to the security multi-server PIR protocols by Corollary 5,
Lemma 8, Corollary 6 and multiplicative homomorphic properties of SPDZ and RSS schemes. These
security properties show that the view of the adversarial server can be simulated given the view of
the honest servers in MACAO.
We define Game 0’ similar to Game 0 except that the client uses a dummy database and
dummy access operations to interact with the servers, instead of the ones provided by the environment
Z. The client queries the ideal functionality F on the input of Z and forwards its output to the
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environment Z. We claim that Game 1’ and Game 0’ are indistinguishable using the same argument
as between Game 1 and Game 0. It is easy to see that Game 0’ is the ideal game I d e a l F ,S,Z with
simulator S and the environment Z.
Putting all the games together, we have that Game 0 ≡ Game 1 ≡ Game 1’ ≡ Game 0’ and
this completes the proof.

4.5.2.5

Cost Analysis
We analyze the asymptotic cost of our proposed MACAO schemes. We treat some parameters

as constant including the finite field (p), the bucket size Z and the number of servers ` (i.e., ` = 3 in
MACAOrss and ` ≥ 2 in MACAOspdz ). Following the tree ORAM literature (e.g., [161, 169, 179]), we
consider the statistical security parameter as a function of database size, i.e., λ = O(log N ). Let
L = Z(H + 1) = O(log N ) be the length of the path in the MACAO structure, and C = |b|/|Fp | be
the number of chunks per data block.
In the MACAOrss retrieval, the client sends six L-bit binary strings and receives six 2|b|-bit
replies if using XOR-PIR. If using RSS-PIR, the client sends six (L|Fp |)-bit queries, and receives
three 2|b|-bit replies. In the MACAOrss eviction, the client sends to each server two authenticated
shares of a data block and (H + 1) permutation matrices of size (Z + 1) × (Z + 1), where each element
is log2 p bits. Since L = O(log N ) and p is fixed, the client communication cost per MACAOrss access
is O(|b|+ log N ). MACAOspdz has a similar asymptotic bandwidth cost as MACAOrss because they
only differ in the fixed number of authenticated shares per server (2 vs. 1), and the number of servers
` (yet ` is fixed).
In MACAOrss , servers communicate with each other only in the eviction phase, where two
authenticated shares of the entire eviction path is transmitted from one server to the others.
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Hence, the server-server communication is 4L(` − 1)|b|= O(|b|log N ). In MACAOspdz , servers need
to communicate with each other not only in the eviction but also in the retrieval phase. For
each retrieval/eviction operation, every server sends the authenticated shares of the entire path
and the client queries/matrices to all the others. Thus, its total server-server communication is
2L(|Fp |+|b|+(Z + 1)2 + |b|) = O(|b|log N ).
In MACAOrss retrieval, the client generates 4L random bits and performs XOR on L-bit data
and |b|-bit data four times if using XOR-PIR. If using RSS-PIR, the client generates (` − 1)L|Fp |
random bits. In both cases, the client additionally performs 2C additions (for block and MAC
recovery) and C multiplications (for MAC comparison) over Fp field. For each MACAOrss eviction,
the client generates L(` − 1)(Z + 1)2 log2 p random bits, performs 2L(Z + 1)2 (` − 1) additions and
L(Z + 1)2 multiplications over Fp . The cost of MACAOspdz is similar to that of MACAOrss using
RSS-PIR, but with ` ≥ 2.
In MACAOrss retrieval, each server performs XOR operations on 2|b|-bit strings approximately
L times if using XOR-PIR. If using RSS-PIR, each server performs 6LC modular multiplications,
4LC additions over Fp . Each MACAOrss eviction incurs 6LC multiplications and 16LC additions
over Fp with 4LC log2 p random bits being generated.
In both MACAOrss and MACAOspdz , the position map is of size N (log2 N +log2 log2 N ). We follow the eviction in [179], which requires the client to maintain a stash of size O(|b|λ) for negligible overflow probability. In total, the asymptotic client storage overhead is O(N (log N + log log N ) + |b|log N ).
An ORAM tree with N leaves can store 2N data blocks. Each node in the tree can store
Z blocks. In MACAOrss and MACAOspdz schemes, each server stores one and two authenticated
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shares of the ORAM tree, respectively. Therefore, the storage overhead per server in MACAOrss and
MACAOspdz is 4Z|b|N and 2Z|b|N bits = O(N ), respectively.

4.5.2.6

Extensions
In this section, we describe some tricks that can be applied to our MACAO schemes.
We first propose a trick to reduce the bandwidth overhead as follows. Since our ORAM

framework relies on XOR secret sharing and additive secret sharing as the main building blocks, the
retrieval queries and eviction data can be created and distributed in a more communication-efficient
manner. The client can generate the authenticated shares of retrieval queries, data blocks and
permutation matrices using a Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) instead of a truly random function.
To reduce the communication overhead, the client can create random seeds for such pseudo-random
generator using a truly random function, and securely send the seeds to (` − 1) servers so that
they can generate their own shares themselves. Since the client only needs to send the shares to
one server, this strategy can significantly reduce the client bandwidth overhead. The price to pay
for this is the reduction of the security level from information-theoretic to computational due to
the pseudo-random generation function. In MACAOrss scheme, we can further apply this trick to
reduce the server-server communication overhead in the eviction phase. After performing the local
computation (e.g., line 1 in Figure 4.25), every server can generate and send the seeds to other
servers to let them calculate their re-shared values. In this case, every server only needs to send a
shared matrix (instead of four) to one other server.
We propose another trick to reduce the client storage overhead as follows. In our framework,
the client maintains two major components including a position map of size O(N (log N + log log N )
and a stash S of size O(|b|log N ). While the position map can be stored remotely on the server-side
147

using the recursion and meta-data techniques [54, 161], we present two solutions to remove S at
the client as follows. The first solution is to store S remotely at the server-side in the form of
authenticated shares (JSK, JαSK), and leverage homomorphic matrix multiplication protocols to

obliviously pick and drop the block from/into S. We treat S as an additional level of the ORAM
tree appended to the root as suggested in [179]. Thus, when executing the PIR protocol in the
retrieval phase, we need to include the stash level, and therefore, the retrieval query length (and the
number of data blocks in the path) will be (Z(H + 1) + λ) = O(log N ). In the eviction phase, to
obliviously put a block b into S[x], the client creates a unit vector v = (v0 , . . . , vλ−1 ) where vx = 1
and vy = 0 for all 0 ≤ y 6= x < λ. The client creates and sends authenticated shares hbi and hvi,
and every server performs hSi ← hbi × hvi> + hSi. To obliviously pick a block at S[x0 ], the client
creates a unit vector v0 = (v0 , . . . , vλ−1 ), where ex0 = 1 and ey = 0 for all 0 ≤ y 6= x < λ. The
client creates and sends authenticated shares of v0 and the servers perform hbi ← hv0 i × hSi> and
hSi ← hSi − hv0 i × hSi> .
The other method is to implement the triplet eviction principle proposed in [54] using
homomorphic properties of additive shares as similar to [89]. Since this approach requires the
bucket size to be of size O(log N ) for negligible overflow, the computation and communication in
the retrieval phase will be increased by a factor of O(log N ).

4.5.3 Experimental Evaluation
4.5.3.1

Implementation
We fully implemented both MACAO schemes in §4.5.2.3 all the extensions in §4.5.2.6. In

MACAOspdz , we implemented only the online phase of the SPDZ-based matrix multiplication protocol
since we assume that authenticated shares of Beaver-like matrix triples were pre-computed sufficiently
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in the offline phase. The implementation was written in C++ consisting of more than 25K lines of
code for the MACAO controllers at the client- and server-side. We used three main external libraries:
(i) Shoup’s NTL library v9.10.0 [162] for the server computation; (ii) ZeroMQ library [99] for the
network communication; (iii) pthread for server computation parallelization. Our implementation
made use of SIMD instructions to optimize the performance of bit-wise operations and vectorized
computations on Intel x64 architecture. For the reduced bandwidth trick, we used tomcrypt library
[53] to implement seeded pseudo-random number generators using sober128 stream cipher. Each
server stored a 128-bit secret seed shared with the client. In MACAOrss scheme, each server stored
two extra 128-bit secret seeds shared with the other two servers, which are used to re-share the local
computation during the RSS-based matrix multiplication in the eviction phase.
Our implementation can be found at https://github.com/thanghoang/MACAO.

4.5.3.2

Configuration and Methodology
For the server-side, we employed three c5.4xlarge Amazon EC2 instances each equipped

with 3.00 GHz 16-core Intel Xeon 8124M CPU, 16 GB RAM and 8 TB networked Elastic Block
Storage (EBS)-based SSD. For the client, we used a Macbook Pro with 2.6 GHz 6-core Intel Core i7
8850H CPU and 32 GB RAM.
We used a random database of size ranging from 1 GB to 1 TB. We selected two standard
data block sizes including 4 KB and 256 KB as these are commonly used in small-scale and large-scale
file systems, respectively.
We used a standard home Internet setting for client-server communication. Specifically, the
laptop client was connected to the Internet via WiFi with 54.5 Mbps download, 5.72 Mbps upload
throughput and 20ms round-trip latency to Amazon EC2 servers. The server instances were set up
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Figure 4.36: End-to-end delay of MACAO schemes and their counterparts.
geographically close to each other, which resulted in the inter-server throughput of 1 Gbps with 3ms
round-trip latency.
We selected S3 ORAM and Path-ORAM as the main counterparts for MACAO since S3 ORAM
is the most efficient multi-server ORAM scheme (but with no malicious security), while the others are
state-of-the-art single-server ORAM schemes. Although Onion-ORAM offers similar properties to
MACAO (e.g., constant bandwidth, malicious security), we did not explicitly compare our framework
with it because the delay of Onion-ORAM was shown significantly higher than S3 ORAM and
Path-ORAM. The main performance evaluation metric is the end-to-end delay, which captures
the processing time at client- and server-side (e.g., I/O, computation) as well as the network
communication among parties. We configured the system parameters for all schemes as follows so
that they achieve the same failure probability of 2−80 .

• MACAO: We selected the bucket size Z = 2, stash size |S|= 80 and performed two deterministic
evictions per access as suggested in [179]. We selected a 59-bit prime field for the computational
advantage of 64-bit architecture and the optimization of NTL library. In this experiment, we
150

demonstrated the performance of MACAOrss with the RSS-PIR protocol only. It is because this
protocol allows to further enable secure computation on the accessed block, and its delay is higher
than XOR-PIR (so the comparison with counterparts will be more conservative).
• S3 ORAM: We used the open-sourced implementation in [90]. We selected Z = 74 and eviction
frequency A = 37. Similar to MACAO, we selected a 59-bit prime field.
• Path-ORAM: We implemented a prototype of Path-ORAM. We selected Z = 4 and |S|= 80
[169]. We used Intel AES-NI library to accelerate cryptographic operations. We used AES with
counter mode (CTR) for encryption and decryption. We created the MAC tag for each node in
the Path-ORAM tree using AES-128 CMAC.
• Ring-ORAM: We selected standard parameters as suggested in [150] (i.e., Z = 16 and A = 20).
• Circuit-ORAM: We selected Z = 2, |S|= 80 and performed two evictions per access as in [179].
Similar to Path-ORAM, we used AES-128 CMAC for authentication and AES-CTR for encryption
with Intel AES-NI.

4.5.3.3

Setup Delay
We first discuss the time to set up necessary MACAO components (e.g., authenticated shares

of the ORAM trees, position maps) on the client machine. The delay grew linearly to the database
size. Specifically, it took around 370 s to 357,601 s to construct MACAOrss components for 1 GB
to 1 TB database with 4 KB block size. For MACAOspdz components, it took 244 s to 241,553 s,
which was round 1.5 times faster than MACAOrss since MACAOspdz only needs 2 servers (vs. 3
in MACAOrss ). With 255 KB block size, the setup delay was 142 s to 135,927 s for MACAOspdz
components, and 209 s to 215,482 s for MACAOrss components. We note that we did not measure
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the preprocessing cost to generate multiplication triples for MACAOspdz scheme as it is out-of-scope
of this dissertation. We refer curious readers to [112] for its detailed benchmarks.

4.5.3.4

Overall Result
We present in Figure 4.36 the end-to-end delay of MACAO schemes compared with selected

counterparts with 4 KB and 255 KB block sizes and database sizes from 1 GB to 1 TB. In the
home network setting, all MACAO schemes outperformed Path-ORAM and Circuit-ORAM in all
testing cases, especially when the block size was large (i.e., 256 KB). Specifically, Path-ORAM and
Circuit-ORAM took 369 ms to 650 ms and 625 ms to 1.2 s to access a 4 KB block, respectively,
whereas MACAO schemes took 198 ms to 336 ms. All MACAO schemes (except MACAOrss ) were
also faster than Ring-ORAM for 4 KB block access. For 256 KB block access, the performance gap
between MACAO and single-server ORAM schemes significantly increased since MACAO featured the
constant client-bandwidth blowup. In particular, Path-ORAM, Circuit-ORAM and Ring-ORAM
took 16 s to 32 s, 17 s to 34 s and 12 s to 24 s, respectively, for each 256 KB-block access, whereas
MACAO schemes only took 3.3 s to 5.5 s. This resulted in MACAO being up to 7× faster than
single-server ORAM schemes.
On the other hand, the performance of MACAO schemes was comparable to S3 ORAM, where
S3 ORAM took 312 ms to 451 ms per 4 KB-block access, and 1.78 s to 3.11 s per 256 KB-block access,
respectively. MACAOspdz scheme was faster than S3 ORAM for 4 KB-block access since it operated on
two servers (vs. 3 in S3 ORAM) with small amount of data, and the retrieval phase of MACAO incurred
less number of blocks to be computed than S3 ORAM(O(log N ) vs. O(log2 N )). We notice that
MACAOspdz operates on the preprocessing model, where their online access operation performance
depends on the availability of authenticated matrix multiplication shares computed in the offline
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Figure 4.37: Cost breakdown of MACAO schemes.
phase. For 256 KB-block access, S3 ORAM was approximately 1.5 times faster than MACAO schemes.
This is mainly because MACAO schemes perform the computation on the information-theoretic MAC
components, whose size is equal to the block size. Notice that S3 ORAM does not have the MAC and
it does not offer integrity and security against the malicious adversary.
One might also observe from Figure 4.36 that the bandwidth reduction trick significantly
prf
lowered the end-to-end delays of MACAO schemes (denoted as MACAOprf
rss and MACAOspdz schemes).

This trick allowed us to reduce the performance gap between the MACAO schemes using RSS and
SPDZ when the amount of data to be transmitted was large as in the 256 KB-block access. The
price to pay for such efficiency is the reduction from information-theoretic to computational security.
To aid more understanding, we provide the detailed cost of MACAO schemes in the following section.
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Figure 4.38: End-to-end delay with varied privacy levels.
4.5.3.5

Cost Breakdown
We decomposed the delay of MACAO schemes to investigate cost factors that impact the

performance. As shown in Figure 4.37, there were four main sources of delay including client
processing, server processing, client-server communication and server-server communication.
MACAO schemes incurred very low computation at the client-side thereby, making them the
ideal choice for resource-limited clients such as mobile devices. The client main task was to generate
shares of the retrieval query and permutation matrices for eviction by invoking pseudo/true-random
number generator. The client recovered the accessed block and verified its integrity by performing
some modular additions and multiplications. All these operations are very lightweight, all of which
cost less than 4 ms and 40 ms for 4 KB and 256 KB block size on 1 TB database, respectively.
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We disabled default caching mechanisms [146] to minimize the impact of random access
sequence on the I/O latency. The disk access contributed a small amount to the delay of MACAO
schemes due to the following reasons. The MACAO structure was stored on a network-based storage
unit called EBS with 2.1 Gbps throughput. Meanwhile, the amount of data to be loaded per retrieval
was small, which was only 4|b|(H + 1) KB, where |b|∈ {4, 256} and H ∈ {11, . . . , 27} for up to 1 TB
of outsourced data. In MACAO schemes, the disk I/O access only impacted the retrieval, but not
eviction. This is because MACAO schemes follow the deterministic eviction, where the data along
the eviction path can be pre-loaded into the memory before the push-down operation. Hence, the
data can be read directly from the cache if needed, given that they were processed in the previous
operations but have not been written to the disk yet.
This contributed a large portion to the total delay, mostly due to the matrix multiplication
in the eviction phase. The server computation in MACAOrss was higher than in MACAOspdz since it
incurred more number of additions than MACAOspdz for each homomorphic multiplication.
MACAO schemes feature a constant client-bandwidth blowup similar to S3 ORAM. Therefore,
only the query size and the eviction matrix size increased when the database size increased while
the number of data blocks to be transmitted remained the same. Therefore, although it was one
of the most significant factors contributing to the total delay, the client-server communication cost
of MACAO schemes was likely to remain the same when increasing the database size as shown in
Figure 4.37, where most of the time was spent to download/upload a constant number authenticated
shares of the data blocks. MACAOspdz incurred less client-server communication delay than MACAOrss
because it only needs two servers, instead of three. Figure 4.37 also shows that the bandwidth
reduction trick significantly reduced the client communication delay (the green bar with red filled
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pattern). This trick allows the client to send the authenticated share to only one server, thereby
making the client-communication overhead of MACAOrss and MACAOspdz schemes almost the same.
Server-Server communication is the second smallest portion of the total delay. We can also
see that the bandwidth reduction trick also helped to reduce the server-server communication in
MACAOrss scheme (the yellow bar with red pattern in Figure 4.37). The MACAOrss scheme had
higher inter-server communication delay than MACAOspdz since three servers communicated with
each other, compared with only two in MACAOspdz .
MACAO schemes harness the eviction strategy in [179] so that they incur a constant server
storage blowup. In MACAOrss , every server stores two authenticated shares of the ORAM tree so
that storage overhead per server is 8|DB| (i.e., 4 times blowup from [179]). On the other hand,
every server in MACAOspdz stores one authenticated shared ORAM tree, and therefore, the server
storage overhead is 4|DB| (2 times blowup from [179]). Regarding the client storage, MACAOrss
schemes add an extra of O(N log log N ) bits to the storage overhead of [179], which is analytically
|N |log2 N + log2 (log2 N ) + 80|b| in total. Empirically, with 1 TB DB and 256 KB block size, the
client storage overhead of MACAOrss , MACAOspdz is 33.23 MB. With 1 TB DB and 4 KB block size,
it is 1.33 GB.

4.5.3.6

Performance with Varying Privacy Levels
We conducted an experiment to evaluate the performance of MACAOspdz and MACAOprf
spdz

schemes under higher privacy levels by increasing the number of servers. Due to RSS, we did not
evaluate MACAOrss and MACAOprf
rss since they incur significant server storage for high privacy levels.
Figure 4.38 outlines the delay of MACAOspdz and MACAOprf
spdz scheme under 1 TB database with
4 KB and 256 KB block sizes. When increasing the number of servers, MACAOprf
spdz incurred much
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less delay than MACAOspdz , especially in the 256 KB block size setting, since the client only sent
data to one server while the other servers generated authenticated shares on their own.

4.6

Oblivious Data Structures
Although ORAM can seal the access pattern leakage in any application, applying it straight-

forwardly may incur high communication, computation and monetary cost. On the other hand,
there are unique characteristics in certain applications that we can exploit to design more efficient
oblivious access alternatives. In this section, we propose several oblivious data structures, which
permit oblivious access protocols (e.g., ORAM, PIR) to be deployed more efficiently in the context
of searchable encryption and database services.

4.6.1 Distributed Data Structure for Oblivious Searchable Encryption
We propose a new oblivious access scheme over the encrypted index in DSSE that we call
Distributed Oblivious Data structure (DOD-DSSE). Our intuition is to leverage two non-colluding
servers and exploit the properties of an incidence matrix to seal information leakages in DSSE, while
incurring only a small-constant overhead. DOD-DSSE achieves the following desirable properties:

• High security: DOD-DSSE seals leakages from search and update operations on the encrypted
index and, therefore, it offers much higher security than traditional DSSE schemes. Specifically,
DOD-DSSE breaks the linkability between access operations on the encrypted index I, hides search
(i) and update (ii) patterns. This allows DOD-DSSE to prevent a server from learning whether or
not the same query is continuously repeated as well as the relationship between keywords and
files. Therefore, DOD-DSSE is secure against statistical attacks to which all traditional DSSE
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schemes are vulnerable due to leakages from the access patterns on the encrypted index. Table 4.5
summaries the security of DOD-DSSE, compared with traditional DSSEs.
• High efficiency: DOD-DSSE offers much lower bandwidth overhead and delay than applying
ORAM-based techniques (e.g., ODS [182]) to the encrypted data structure I. Our experimental
results indicate that DOD-DSSE is much faster than using ODS with Path ORAM protocol on
dictionary12 and incidence matrix13 data structures, respectively, in terms of end-to-end delay
(Table 4.5). DOD-DSSE only takes around one second to perform an access operation on a very
large data structure (see §4.6.1.4 for a detailed comparison).
• Formal security analysis and full-fledged implementation: We fully analyze the security and information leakages of DOD-DSSE (§4.6.1.3). We provide a detailed implementation of DOD-DSSE
on two virtual Amazon EC2 servers and strictly evaluated the performance of DOD-DSSE on real
network settings (§4.6.1.4). We also released the implementation of DOD-DSSE for public use14 .

These properties make DOD-DSSE an ideal alternative for privacy-critical cloud applications.
We briefly describe the main idea of DOD-DSSE as follows:
Existing DSSE schemes rely on a deterministic association between the (address) token of a
query and its corresponding encrypted result in the DSSE data structure. In other words, each query
x is represented by a deterministic address token-data tuple (ux , Iux ) in the encrypted data structure
I. Despite permitting consistent and fast search/update operations, these deterministic relations leak
12

Dictionary is a hkey, valuei structure such that given a keyword key, its corresponding value is a list of file IDs in
which key appears. This data structure offers sublinear search time, but leaks information due to its size depending
on the file IDs associated with key.
13
Incidence matrix is a data structure which represents the relationship between keywords (indexing rows) and files
(indexing columns) via its cell value. For example, if matrix entry I[i, j] is set to 1, it means the keyword indexing
the ith row appears in the file indexing the jth column. Similarly, the I[i, j] entry is set to 0 if the keyword indexing
the ith row does not appear in the file indexing column j.
14
Available at https://github.com/thanghoang/DOD-DSSE/
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the access pattern on the encrypted index defined in Definition 2. The research challenge is to devise
cryptographic methods that can create a random uniform address token-data tuple (ux , Iux ) for each
query x in an oblivious way with just a small number of communication rounds and processing time.
DOD-DSSE achieves this by using a “fetch–reencrypt–swap” strategy between two servers as follows:
First, the client creates two encrypted data structures, each including address-data tuples
(ux , Iux ) of all possible search and update queries, and then sends them to two non-colluding servers
(S0 , S1 ), respectively. To perform a search or update operation, the client sends a search query
and an update query to each server. One query is for the real operation while the other three
are randomly selected (fake) queries (Figure 4.39, step (1)). Each server sends back to the client
the corresponding address-data tuples that have been queried. After that, the client decrypts the
received data to obtain the result (step (2)), and then re-encrypts them (step (3)). The client creates
new address-data tuple for each performed query by assigning re-encrypted data to a random address
(step (4)). Finally, the client swaps such address-data tuples and writes them back to the other
server (step (5)). That means the new address-data tuple of the query being read from server S0
will be written to server S1 and vice versa. This strategy makes each server observe a randomized
data structure-access pattern with only one-time repetition of a unlinkable query that has been
performed on the other server, provided that the two servers do not collude. §4.6.1.2 presents detailed
constructions of DOD-DSSE.
There are two limitations in our design. First, we assume that the two servers storing the
encrypted data structures are non-colluding; Second, DOD-DSSE leaks to each server Sb (b = 0, 1) a
one-time repetition of a query that was previously performed on the other server. This query cannot
be linked to any other queries performed on Sb and it never repeats on Sb again.
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Table 4.5: Security and performance of DOD-DSSE vs. its counterparts.
Security
Data structure-access pattern
Update
1-time repetition of Full query
leakage
an unlinkable query linkability§

Scheme

Performance
Query
result size

Statistical
attacks

7
7∗
3

7
3
3

End-to-end crypto
delay†

Setting
# Server

Traditional DSSE
[109],[138],[35],[189]
ODICT
OMAT

7
3
3

7
3
3

7
7∗
3

< 0.2 s
192.2 s∗
767.5 s

1
1
1

DOD-DSSE
7‡
3
3
3
3
1.1 s
2
We simulated the cost of ODS [182] with Path-ORAM protocol [169] on dictionary (ODICT) and incidence matrix (OMAT) data
structures.
†
The delays of schemes were measured in our experiment with an average network latency of 31 ms and throughput of 30 Mbps.
‡
This leakage does not lead to any statistical attacks.
∗
Due to the sublinear operation time of dictionary data structure, ODS cannot fully hide the length of search/update result without
fully padding which is very costly. To evaluate the performance of ODICT over the real network, we only simulated ODICT with
average padding.
§
Full query linkability allows the adversary to perform, for example, frequency analysis [124], resulting in statistical attacks.

We note that the performance and security benefits of DOD-DSSE well-justifies these limitations. Furthermore, (i) two practical non-colluding servers can be found in real world as competitive
cloud providers such as Amazon, Microsoft and Google are very unlikely to collude against their
client. (ii) Indeed, we show that with minimal information leakage (i.e., one-time repetition of an
unknown and unlinkable query on the other server), DOD-DSSE seals all search/update patterns,
prevents statistical attacks which are main objectives of a secure DSSE. At the same time, it achieves
extremely efficient performance compared to using ORAM-based techniques. Therefore, DOD-DSSE
offers an ideal security-performance trade-off for DSSE.

4.6.1.1

System and Security Models
Our system model comprises a client and two servers S = (S0 , S1 ), each storing an instance

of an encrypted data structure created from the same file collection.
Assumption 1. Servers communicate with the client via private channels. (i) (S0 , S1 ) are honest-butcurious, meaning that they show interest in learning information but follow the protocol faithfully;
they do not inject malicious inputs to the system. (ii) S0 and S1 do not collude.
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write to row u35 , column v23
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Îvj : re-encrypted data in column vj

*This strategy provides the unlinkability between queries as the same keyword/file generates diﬀerent queries to each server. Multiple repetitions of the same
operation cannot be observed if S0 and S1 are non-colluding. Hence, it prevents leakage from search & update patterns and invalidates statistical attacks.

Figure 4.39: Search/update operation on the encrypted index in DOD-DSSE.
→, −
→
In DOD-DSSE, data request sequences (−
σ
0 σ1 ) of length q by Definition 2 are independently
observed by servers (S0 , S1 ), respectively. We assume that the encrypted data structure can store
up to N distinct data items, each corresponding with either a search or an update query. Each
item is represented by a unique address-data tuple (u, data) in the data structure. The security
(b)

of DOD-DSSE scheme relies on the fact that any access operations opi

→ observed by server
∈−
σ
b

Sb , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ q are guaranteed to be unlinkable. This achievement enables us to protect the
data structure-access pattern in each server as defined in Definition 2. We define the unlinkability
property of access operations on the encrypted data structure in DSSE as follows:
(b)

(b)

(b)

(b)

Definition 12. Let (ui , datai ), (uj , dataj ) be address-data tuples requested by access operations
(b)
(b)
→ observed by server S , respectively. op(b) is called unlinkable to op(b) if the
(opi , opj ) ∈ −
σ
b
b
i
j
(b)

(b)

(b)

(b)

probability that h(ui , datai ), (uj , dataj )i represent the same item being accessed is

1
N,

where N

is the number of distinct items stored in Sb .
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Note that this is the upper bound of linkability probability that one can infer from two
arbitrary tuples. The unlinkability in Definition 12 implies the DOD-DSSE security definition, which
is comparable to that of ORAM as follows:
Definition 13. DOD-DSSE on the server Sb leaks no information beyond ORAM (Definition 5) with
the exception of one-time repetition of an unknown and unlinkable query on the other server S¬b , to
which Sb does not have access.

We will give a detailed security analysis in §4.6.1.3 after presenting the construction of
DOD-DSSE in the following section.

4.6.1.2

The Proposed DOD-DSSE Scheme
We first describe the encrypted data structure used in DOD-DSSE, followed by several newly

proposed algorithms.
We first assume that f and w denote a file and a keyword, respectively. m and n denote
the maximum number of files and keywords in the dataset, respectively. f = (fid1 , . . . , fidm ) denotes
the collection of files. An encrypted data structure enables encrypted search and update operations
for a keyword w or a file fid . We adopt a keyword-file incidence matrix to be the DSSE data
structure I due to its security and performance advantages, compared with other typical types such
as multi-linked list [109], dictionary [138], and tree [108]. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that
keywords are assigned to row indices while file IDs are assigned to column indices. We assume our
file collection f consists of m0 ≤ N unique keywords and n0 ≤ N file IDs, where N is the maximum
number of unique keywords and files that our I can support. We construct the encrypted index I(0)
for server S0 and I(1) for S1 as follows:
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First, we assign each item x, where x is a keyword or file ID, to a unique random address
(b) $

in I(b) as ux ← Lb for each b ∈ {0, 1}, where Lb is the set of unassigned row or column indices in
I(b) . For security reasons which will be analyzed in §4.6.1.3, |L|= 2N . In other words, I is a square
matrix of size 2N × 2N to cover N keywords and files.
We represent the relationship between a keyword and a file by a cell value in I(b) . I(b) [i, j] = 1
means the keyword w assigned to row i appears in the file assigned to column j in server Sb and
(b)

I(k) [i, j] = 0 otherwise. We can consider the data Iux of item x as a row or column data which is a
binary string of length 2N representing the relationship between x and its object in server Sb . A
search or update query of x will correspond with retrieving a whole row or column respectively.
Finally, we encrypt every cell in I(b) using bit-by-bit IND-CPA encryption scheme with a
(b)

(b)

(b)

counter and a key as I(b) [i, j] ← Encτi I(b) [i, j], cj , where cj
(b)

(b)

index j and a value aj in server Sb and τi

is a counter derived from column

is a row key derived from the row index i and a secret
(b)

key generated for server Sb . We store the information of aj in global counter arrays c(b) of length
(b)

2N which can be retrieved as aj ← c(b) [j], for each b ∈ {0, 1}. We describe detailed constructions
of I(0) , I(1) in Figure 4.41. Figure 4.40 depicts the structure and content of I(0) and I(1) .
We create data structures Tw , Tf stored on the client-side for keywords and files, respectively
which are defined as:
(1)
T : (H(x), hu(0)
x , ux , bx i).
(0)

(1)

(Tw , Tf ) are used to keep track of the assigned addresses (ux , ux ) of each item x on servers (S0 , S1 ),
respectively, as well as the server ID (i.e., bx ∈ {0, 1}) where it was last accessed. We define functions
for T as follows:
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Figure 4.40: Distributed encrypted index generated from the file collection.
(0)

(1)

• T.insert(key, value): insert hash of x (i.e., H(x)) as key and x’s information hux , ux , bx i as value
(0)

(1)

into T . It can accept null as key, in which the value (i.e, hunull , unull , bnull i) will be inserted into
empty slots in T .
• jx ← T.get(H(x)): find the index jx of x in T using its hash value H(x).
(b)

• jx ← T.lookup(ux , b): find the index jx of x in T using its address ux on the server Sb .
(0)

(1)

Information about x can be retrieved via its index jx in T as (H(x), hux , ux , bx i) ← T [jx ].
We can see that I is a 2N × 2N matrix storing the relationship between N unique keywords
and N files. There are at least N empty rows and N empty columns in I. We also include in Tw , Tf
sets of such “dummy” addresses in I(0) , I(1) , denoted as Tw .L0 , Tw .L1 , for keywords and Tf .L0 , Tf .L1
for files respectively. This is to achieve the consistency of DOD-DSSE data structure and security
(see §4.6.1.3).
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(K, Tw , Tf , I(0) , I(1) ) ← DOD-DSSE.Init(κ, f):
1: Initialization: Set Tw , Tf to be empty
(b)
I0 [i, j] ← 0 and c(b) [j] ← 1, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 2N , 1 ≤ j ≤ 2N and for each b ∈ {0, 1}
Tx .Lb ← {1, 2, . . . , 2N } for each x ∈ {w, f } and b ∈ {0, 1}
2: K ← DOD-DSSE.Gen(1κ )
3: Extract unique keywords w = (w1 , . . . , wm0 ) from files f = (fid1 , . . . , fidn0 )
(0)

4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:

# Create unecnrypted data structure I0
for server S0 , I0
for each wi ∈ {w1 , . . . , wm0 } do
(0)
(1)
(ui , ui , Tw ) ← DOD-DSSE.Assign(H(wi ), Tw )
for each idj ∈ {id1 , . . . , idn0 } do
(0)
(1)
(vj , vj , Tf ) ← DOD-DSSE.Assign(H(idj ), Tf )
if wi appears in fidj then
(0) (0)
(1) (1)
(0)
(1)
I0 [ui , vj ] ← 1, I0 [ui , vj ] ← 1

(1)

for server S1

# Reserve row and column indices for new keywords and files being added in the future
10: Call DOD-DSSE.Assign(null, Tx ) multiple times until all values in all N slots in Tx are filled, for each
x ∈ {w, f }
(0)

(1)

# Encrypt every row of data structures I0
and I0
11: for each server Sb ∈ {S0 , S1 } do
(b)
12:
I(b) [i, ∗] ← DOD-DSSE.Enc(I0 [i, ∗], i, b, K) for each row i ∈ {1, . . . , 2N }
13: return (K, Tw , Tf , I(0) , I(1) )

Figure 4.41: DOD-DSSE setup algorithm.
We present detailed implementations of DOD-DSSE in three main algorithms with four
subroutines. We provide in Figure 4.46 the decryption procedure for a row/column data of I. The
encryption procedure DOD-DSSE.Enc() is not explicitly defined and it works similarly by substituting
Dec for Enc in lines 4 and 8 of Figure 4.46.
The main operation of DOD-DSSE is presented in Figure 4.42. First, the client generates for
each server one search and one update queries including two row indices (one is dummy) and two
column indices (one is dummy) as in Figure 4.45 (step 1). The client reads data in such addresses
from the servers and decrypts only data in non-dummy addresses (steps 2 – 7). After that, the client
can perform an actual search or update operation over the decrypted data (steps 8–11). Finally, the
decrypted data are re-encrypted with new counters and written back to addresses in the server from
where they were read as well as the dummy addresses in the other server (steps 17–21). Notice that
such data need to be updated before re-encryption to preserve keyword-file relations (steps 15–16),
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id ← DOD-DSSE.Access(op, x, S, K, Tw , Tf ):
# Generate search and update queries
(b)
(b)
1: ({uj , utj }j∈{w,f },b∈{0,1} , β) ← DOD-DSSE.CreateQueries(H(x))
2: for each j ∈ {w, f } do
# Retrieve from each server 2 columns or 2 rows depending on index j
3:
for each server Sb ∈ {S0 , S1 } do
(b)
(b)
4:
Iuj ← Read(uj ) from Sb
(b)

(b)

Iutj ← Read(utj ) from Sb

5:
6:

# Decrypt retrieved row and column
(b)
(β)
(β)
I0 uj ← DOD-DSSE.Dec(Iuj , uj , β, K)

7:

I0 utj ← DOD-DSSE.Dec(Iutj , utj

(¬b)

(¬β)

(¬β)

, ¬β, K)

8: if op = search then
(β)
(β)
Extract column index from I0 uw as id ← (y1 , . . . , yl ), where I0 uw [yk ] = 1 for each yk ∈ {1, . . . , 2N }\Tf .Lβ ,
9:
1≤k≤l
10: else
(β)
11:
Update list of keywords in I0 uf and key in Tf , Tw corresponding with the file being updated
12: for each j ∈ {w, f } do
# Update new address of non-dummy column and row data in the other server
(¬)
(β)
13:
Tj ← DOD-DSSE.UpdateT(Tj , uj , β, uj ¯)
(¬β)
(β)
14:
Tj ← DOD-DSSE.UpdateT(Tj , utj , ¬β, utj )
(β)

16:

(¬β)

Update cell values in I0 uj and I0 utj to preserve keyword-file relations with changes at steps 13, 14

15:

(¬β)
(I0 uj ,

Create
in both servers

(¬β)
I0 uj )

(β)

(¬β)

based on I0 uj , (I0 utj ) respectively to preserve keyword-file relation consistency

# Increase all counter values in global counter arrays
17: c(b) [i] ← c(b) [i] + 1 for each b ∈ {0, 1} and i ∈ {1, . . . , 2N }
18: for each j ∈ {w, f } do
19:
for each server Sb ∈ {S0 , S1 } do
# Re-encrypt retrieved data with newly updated counters
(b)
(b)
(b)
(b)
(b)
(b)
20:
Îuj ← DOD-DSSE.Enc(I0 uj , uj , b, K), Îutj ← DOD-DSSE.Enc(I0 utj , utj , b, K)
21:

# Write re-encrypted data back to corresponding server Sb
(b) (b)
(b) (b)
Write(uj , Îuj ), upData(utj , Îutj ) to Sb

22: return id

Figure 4.42: DOD-DSSE access protocol.
and their new addresses in the other server are updated in hash tables (steps 12–16) so that they
can be retrieved correctly in subsequent operations.

4.6.1.3

Security Analysis
→, −
→
Let (−
σ
0 σ1 ) be a query sequence of length q sent to servers (S0 , S1 ) respectively. By

→), AP (−
→
Definition 2, the access patterns hAP0 (−
σ
0
1 σ1 )i observed by (S0 , S1 ), respectively, are:
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K ← DOD-DSSE.Gen(1κ ):

# Generate keys to encrypt two data structures
1: k0 ← E.Gen(1κ ), k1 ← E.Gen(1κ )
2: return K ← (k0 , k1 )

Figure 4.43: DOD-DSSE key generation algorithm.
(0)

(1)

(ux , ux , T ) ← DOD-DSSE.Assign(x, T )

# Pick a random address from dummy set in each server
1: for each b ∈ {0, 1} do
(b) $

ux ← T.Lb
(b)
T.Lb ← T.Lb \ {ux }

2:
3:

# Randomly assign server ID for x
$

4: bx ← {0, 1}

# Store
 assigned info
 of x in hash table
(0)
(1)
5: T.insert x, hux , ux , bx i
(0)

(1)

6: return (ux , ux , T )

Figure 4.44: DOD-DSSE assign subroutine.

(0)

(0)

AP0 = {access(x1 ), . . . , access(xi ), . . . , access(x0q )}
AP1 =

(b)

(b)

(4.16)

(1)
(1)
{access(x1 ), . . . , access(xi ), . . . , access(x(1)
q )},

(b)

(b)

(b)

access(xi ) = ({read(uj,ti , Iuj,ti )}, {write(uj,ti , Îuj,ti )}) , for j ∈ {w, f }, 1 ≤ t ≤ 2 , b ∈ {0, 1}
and 1 ≤ i ≤ q performing read-then-write operations on the server Sb , given a DOD-DSSE.Access
(b)

(b)

operation opi (Figure 4.42) at step i. Each address-data tuple (uj,ti , Iuj,ti ) comprises a random row
or column address and an IND-CPA encryption output, respectively.
Remark 3. Due to the properties of the square incidence matrix data structure, rows and columns
intersect each other and have the same length. For each actual operation, DOD-DSSE performs a
search query and an update query to each server Sb . This prevents Sb from determining (i) if the
actual intention of the client is to search or to update, and (ii) which data-address tuple corresponds
with search or update query. These properties prevent Sb from separately forming search and update
patterns defined in Definition 3.
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(U, ) ← CreateQueries(x):
#¯ Get hash table entry for x and its info
1: jx ← Tx .get(x)
2: β ← Tx [jx ].bx
()
(β)
3: ux¯ ← Tx [jx ].ux
(β)

# Select a random non-dummy row/column index ux̄ .
# If x is w then x̄ is f and vice-versa
() $
4: ux̄¯ ← {1, . . . , 2N } \ Tx̄ .Lβ

5: for each j ∈ {w, f } do

# Select a random non-dummy index from server S¬β
6:

(¬β) $

uj

← {1, . . . , 2N } \ Tj .L¬β

# Randomly select dummy row & column indices in S0, S1

7:
8:

for each b ∈ {0, 1} do
(b) $

utj

← Tj .Lb
(b)

(b)

9: return (U, β), where U = {uj , utj }j∈{w,f },b∈{0,1}

Figure 4.45: DOD-DSSE query creation subroutine.
I0u ← DOD-DSSE.Dec(Iu , u, b, K):
1: if u is a row index then
(b)
2:
τu ← KDF(kb ||u)
3:
for j = 1 . . . , 2N do
(b)
4:
I0u [j] ← Decτu Iu [j], j||c(b) [j]
5: else
# if u is a column index
6:
for i = 1 . . . , 2N do
(b)
7:
τi ← KDF(kb ||i)
(b)
8:
I0u [i] ← Decτi Iu [i], u||c(b) [u]
9: return I0

Figure 4.46: DOD-DSSE decryption subroutine.
Remark 4. Data items associated with search and update queries are located in two independent address
spaces (i.e., row index vs. column index) and, therefore, their access operations are independent from
each other. For the sake of brevity, we only analyze the security of search queries. The same analysis
can be applied to update queries. From now on, whenever we say data Iux of the query x at address
ux , we mean the row data corresponding with the search query along with its row index.

According to the unlinkability definition (Definition 12) and DOD-DSSE access scheme in
Figure 4.42, we define in Definition 14 the unlinkability property of a data item which is read from
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T ← DOD-DSSE.UpdateT(T, qIdx , b, nIdx ):
# Get hash table entry for qIdx in Sb
1: jx ← T.lookup(qIdx, b)
# Update hash table with new entry nIdx and server b
(¬b)
2: oIdx ← T [j].ux
(¬b)
3: T [jx ].ux
← nIdx
4: T [jx ].bx ← ¬b
# Remove nIdx from dummy set T.L¬b and add oIdx to it

5: T.L¬b ← T.L¬b ∪ {oIdx} \ {nIdx}
6: return T

Figure 4.47: DOD-DSSE client state update subroutine.
server S¬b , and its new representation is then written to Sb under Sb ’s view. We then show in
Lemma 9 that any access patterns observed by servers (S0 , S1 ) in our scheme are unlinkable to each
other by Definition 14 under Lemma 9. Finally, we prove that DOD-DSSE achieves our main security
notion (Definition 13) in Theorem 6.
(b)

(b)

Definition 14. Let (ux , Iux ) represent an item x in a set I (b) of N distinct data items on server
(b)

(b)

(b)

(b)

(b)

(b)

Sb such that ux 6= ux0 and Iux 6= Iux0 for each x0 , x ∈ I (b) and x 6= x0 . (utx00 , Îutx00 ) ∈ APb (as in
(Equation 4.16)) is a new representation of an arbitrary data item x00 ∈ D, which has just been
(b)

(b)

accessed on server S¬b . In DOD-DSSE, (utx00 , Îutx00 ) is unlinkable to I (b) if and only if the probability
(b)

(b)

(b)

(b)

that (utx00 , Îutx00 ) represents the same item with any tuples (ux , Iux ) for each x ∈ I (b) is

1
N.

Lemma 9. Under 1, any access patterns observed by Sb and S¬b as in (Equation 4.16) are unlinkable
with each other by Definition 12.

Proof. For each DOD-DSSE operation xi (Figure 4.42), server Sb observes that two address-data
tuples are accessed per search query simultaneously. One of them is to read while the other is to
write data being read from S¬b . The data from all accessed addresses are IND-CPA re-encrypted
with new counters before being written back (Figure 4.42, steps 17, 20) so that it is computationally
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indistinguishable for Sb to determine which address is being read or written. To begin with, we show
(b)

(¬b)

that access(xi ) is unlinkable to access(xi

) as follows:
(b)

We first analyze the address-data tuple denoted as (u(b) , Iu ), which is read and observed by
(b)

Sb . Iu is decrypted into I0 (b)
u and then is IND-CPA re-encrypted with a new counter before being
written to S¬b (steps 17, 20). I0 is assigned by the client to a new random index selected from a
$

set of dummy addresses in S¬b as u(¬b) ← Tw .L¬b , which is independent from u(b) . Under 1, Sb
does not have a view on S¬b and vice versa. So, Sb does not know if I0 is assigned to which u(¬b)
(b)

in S¬b and under which new encryption form Î. Therefore, (u(b) , Iu ) can represent the same item
(¬b)

with any address-data tuples (u(¬b) , Iu

) in S¬b with the same probability of

1
N,

where N is the

(b)

number of items in S¬b . By Definition 14, (u(b) , Iu ) is unlinkable to any items in S¬b from Sb ’s view.
(b)

Considering the S¬b ’s view, S¬b also does not know which address-data tuple (u(b) , Iu ) was read
from Sb under 1. Meanwhile, Î is a IND-CPA encryption so that it looks random-uniform to all other
data in S¬b . Moreover, the address associating with Î is selected randomly from the set of dummy
addresses L¬b with |L¬b |= N . It is oblivious for S¬b to link Î to any item which will be queried
subsequently. Notice that to achieve this obliviousness, it is mandatory to always keep |L¬b | = N .
Once the new IND-CPA encryption form Î of an item is written to new address u(¬b) in S¬b , its old
address in S¬b will be set to dummy and included to L¬b by the client (Figure 4.47, steps 2, 5).
(b)

We next consider search address-data tuple denoted as (ut(b) , Îut ) which is written to Sb
under Sb ’s view. This tuple is the new representation of an arbitrary item which has just been
queried from S¬b . As DOD-DSSE access operations on servers Sb and S¬b are symmetric, meaning
that Sb can act as S¬b in the aforementioned analysis and vice versa. Therefore, the same analysis is
applied to this case.
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(b)

(¬b)

Finally, we show that if each pair (access(xi ), access(xi

)) is pairwise unlinkable to each

(b)

(¬b)

other, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ q, then access(xi ) is also unlinkable to others access(xj
(b)

(¬b)

Without loss of generality, we assume that j < i. As (access(xj ), access(xj
(b)

) for all 1 ≤ j 6= i ≤ q.

)) is pairwise unlinkable,

(¬b)

meaning that given access(xj ) observed by Sb , the corresponding access(xj

) generated in S¬b is
(b)

oblivious from Sb ’s view. It is computationally infeasible for Sb to link access(xi ) with any access
(¬b)

patterns access(xj

(b)

) generated in S¬b by just observing access(xj ). The same principle applies to

S¬b as operations on two servers are symmetric. Hence, the Lemma 9 holds.
Corollary 7. For any access pattern observed by Sb (or S¬b ), the same query will result in the same
address being accessed on Sb (or S¬b ), at most twice.

Proof. Assume that at step i the real query x is performed and its corresponding data item is read
(b)

from address ux in server Sb . According to DOD-DSSE scheme, data of x will be written to an
(¬b)

arbitrary address ux

in S¬b (Figure 4.42, step 21). Given that the same query x is performed
(¬b)

again at step j > i, its data will be read from S¬b so that S¬b can observe the address ux

accessed

at step i is now accessed again. By this access pattern, S¬b can infer the same query is performed
at step i and j on it. However from Sb ’s view, it is oblivious for Sb to determine if the data being
((b))

written to an arbitrary address utx

at step j is associated with the query x at step i due to

Lemma 9. Now assume that at step k, where k > j > i, the query x is performed again. It will
be read from Sb and then written to S¬b . Similar to that of Sb at step j, S¬b observes an access
operation which is unlinkable to access operations generated at step j and i by Lemma 9. It can be
easily seen that the same query only generates the same address access at most two times. Therefore,
the corollary holds.
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Theorem 6. Given a server Sb , DOD-DSSE achieves security by Definition 13, meaning that DOD-DSSE
leaks no information beyond ORAM security definition with the exception of one-time repetition of
an unlinkable query on the other S¬b , to which Sb does not have access.

Proof. Given an access pattern APb of length q as in (Equation 4.16) observed by server Sb , denote
Yq as the set of all possible combinations y of N data items, where |y|= q. We have N q possible
(b)

(b)

strings as |Yq |= N q . Let ui,1 , ui,2 be read and write addresses for search query observed by Sb ,
(b)

respectively, given a data access request access(xi ). From Sb ’s view, data item of the real query xi
(b)

(b)

(denoted as I0xi ) can be accessed from ui,1 , or ui,2 (i.e., I0xi is actually accessed from S¬b and then
written to Sb ). By Lemma 9, we have:

(b)

Pr(access(xi )) =

2
X
1h
j=1

+ Pr(pos(I0xi )

=

2

(b)
(b)
ui,j ) Pr(ui,j

(b)

(b)

Pr(pos(I0xi ) = ui,j ) Pr(ui,j ∈ Tw .Lb )


2
i X
1 1
1
1 1 1
+
= .
6 Tw .Lb ) =
∈
2 N2 N2
N
j=1

Notice that given a real query xi , Figure 4.42 generates two random row indices on each
server Sb : one is from the set of dummy addresses and the other is from from the set of non-empty
addresses. Such addresses are removed from their current set and included in the other set. This is
to maintain the size of each set so that given another real query xj 6= xi , its generated addresses
are randomly chosen from size-consistent sets, making it independent of each other. Hence, from
(b)

Sb ’s observation, access patterns generated by access(xi ) are computational indistinguishable from
(b)

those generated by access(xj ), given that xj 6= xi .
For xj = xi , with q ≥ j > i ≥ 1, we have two cases:
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(b)

(b)

1. If pos(I0xi ) = ui,1 then pos(I0xj ) = uj,2 , meaning I0xi is read from Sb , while I0xj is read from S¬b .
(b)

By Lemma 9, data in uj,2 is unlinkable to any data items in Sb . Therefore, access(xj ) generates
(b)

an access pattern which is statistically independent from access( xi ) in server Sb .
(b)

(b)

2. If pos(I0xi ) = ui,2 then pos(I0xj ) = uj,1 , meaning Ixi is read from S¬b and I0xj is read from Sb .
(b)

(b)

Sb observes that the same address is accessed again (i.e., uj,1 = ui,2 ). By Lemma 9, data
(b)

from ui,2 is written to S¬b which is unlinkable to any data items in S¬b ; the probability that
Sb can determine if I0xj is re-written back to it in subsequent access operations is

1
N.

That

means given another query xk such that xk = xj = xi , with k > j > i, the access pattern
(b)

(b)

generated by access(xk ) is statistically independent from access(xj ) as in case (i). Therefore,
the information DOD-DSSE leaks in this case is that the same query can generate the same
address access at most twice, as shown in Corollary 7.
To sum up, we have Pr(APb ) =

Qq

(b)
j=1 Pr(access(xj ))

=


1 (q−r)
,
N

where r is the number of one-time

repetitions of data access requests as in case (ii). There are N (t−r) possible strings y ∈ Yq that can
generate the same APb so that it is computationally indistinguishable for Sb to determine which
string in N (t−r) candidates generates the APb . In the worst case, where there are r = q/2 repetitions
in the data request sequence of length q, then Pr(APb ) =


1 q/2
.
N

In traditional DSSE, each search or update query on a keyword or a file produces the same
address being accessed for consistency purposes. This deterministic relation between queries and
address tokens permits an adversary to perform statistical attacks, such as query frequency analysis,
to uncover the relations among keyword/file being accessed [34, 103, 124, 190].
In DOD-DSSE, queries observed in each server are unlinkable by Definition 12 to each other,
meaning that they can be independently generated by any possible keywords/files, from the server’s
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view. DOD-DSSE achieves the security by Definition 13 in that, the only information that server
Sb can infer from its observed access pattern is one-time repetition of an arbitrary query, which is
previously performed on the other server S¬b . Note that servers do not have a view of each other’s
accesses or queries (i.e., non-colluding servers). This leakage is negligible for any practical setting,
and does not permit to establish any statistical relationship, since one-time repetitions are unlinkable.
These security guarantees imply that DOD-DSSE can not only prevent statistical analysis (e.g., [124])
but also any other potential threats that may exploit the linkability among arbitrary queries.

4.6.1.4

Experimental Evaluation
We evaluated the performance of our scheme on real network settings with different network

latencies. By latency, we mean the round-trip time taken by a packet to go from the host (i.e.,
client) to the destination (i.e., server) and back. In addition, we made several comparisons. First, we
compared our scheme’s cryptographic end-to-end delay (i.e., the time to completely process a search
or update operation) with a traditional DSSE scheme which does not hide the access pattern (e.g.,
[189]). We then compared to a simulated scheme which applies ORAM on a DSSE dictionary data
structure and matrix data structure15 . We notice that in order to be comparable with ORAM, which
can achieve oblivious operations (i.e., whether the operation is search or update), our DOD-DSSE
scheme is designed to always perform both search and update queries regardless of the type of actual
operation which is required. Therefore, search and update operations require the same amount of
time. This is in contrast with traditional DSSE schemes in which search and update operations
incur different delays. This will be shown in the following experiments.
15

We did not implement the full scheme, we estimated the performance by simulation in a real network setting and
assuming a 4 KB block-size ORAM as presented in [169, 182].
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Figure 4.48: End-to-end cryptographic delay with in-state network latency.
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Figure 4.49: End-to-end cryptographic delay with out-state network setting.
We used a HP Z230 Desktop as the client and two virtual servers provided by Amazon EC2.
The client machine was installed with CentOS 7.2 and equipped with Intel Xeon CPU E3-1231v3 @
3.40GHz, 16 GB RAM and 256 GB SSD. We deployed servers running Ubuntu 14.04 with m4.4xlarge
instance type which offers 16 vCPUs @ 2.4 GHz, Intel Xeon E5-2676v3, 64 GB RAM and 200 GB
SSD for each server.
We adopted Google sparse hash table16 to implement the data structures Tf , Tw stored at
the client side. We implemented IND-CPA encryption and decryption schemes using AES-CTR
mode as it supports parallelism and key pre-computation. We used AES-128 CMAC to implement
16

https://github.com/sparsehash/sparsehash
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the hash function H. For cryptographic primitives, we utilized libtomcrypt17 with Intel AES-NI
hardware accelerated library18 to optimize the performance of cryptographic operations. We used
ZeroMQ library19 to implement network communication between client and server(s).
We performed our experiments on the Enron email dataset20 . We selected subsets of the
Enron corpus to construct the DSSE data structure with various combinations of keyword-file pairs,
ranging from 108 to 9 × 1010 . This is to evaluate the performance of DOD-DSSE and its counterparts
with different dataset sizes starting from small to very large similar to [35].
We first measured the pre-processing time to build the encrypted data structures in
DOD-DSSE with different sizes. With the largest data structure being experimented, which consists
of 9 × 1011 keyword-file pairs (i.e., 300,000 files and 300,000 keywords), it takes the client roughly
20 hours to construct two encrypted incidence matrices. For 108 keyword-file pairs, the time is 30
seconds. Notice that this initialization phase is only run one time in the offline phase so that its
cost is not an important factor. Our focus is to evaluate the performance of DOD-DSSE and its
counterparts in the online phase, where we perform search and update operations on the constructed
data structure(s).
Next, we showed the performance of DOD-DSSE scheme in the online phase. We created
two Amazon EC2 servers in the same geographical region (i.e., in-state), resulting in an average
network latency of 11 ms and throughput of 100 Mbps. It takes approximately 800 ms to perform a
search (or update) operation on the distributed data structure consisting of 9 × 1011 keyword-file
pairs, as demonstrated in Figure 4.48.
17

http://www.libtom.org/LibTomCrypt/
https://software.intel.com/articles/download-the-intel-aesni-sample-library
19
http://zeromq.org/
20
https://www.cs.cmu.edu/∼./enron/
18
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Table 4.6: Total size of encrypted data structure(s) in GB.
# keyword-file pairs
DOD-DSSE† DSSE [189] ODICT OMAT
108
0.1
0.02
1.37
0.05
2.5 × 109
2.4
0.6
37.38
1.16
1010
10
2.4
149.54
4.66
2.25 × 1010
22.4
5.6
336.46
10.48
4 × 1010
40
10
598.15
18.63
6.25 × 1010
62.4
15.6
934.60
29.10
9 × 1010
90
22.4 1345.83
41.91
†
DOD-DSSE stores two encrypted data structures in two non-colluding
servers so that the storage cost for each server will be a half of presented
numbers.

We compared the actual cost of DOD-DSSE with that of our counterparts. We selected the
scheme in [189] to be our main traditional DSSE counterpart as, to the best of our knowledge, it is
the most secure DSSE scheme in the literature. We used Path ORAM [169] protocol for ODS as it
offers optimal bandwidth overhead. We simulated the cost of using ODS on a dictionary (denoted
as ODICT) and a square incidence matrix (denoted as OMAT) data structures because the former
provides sublinear operating time while the latter achieves the best security. We applied an average
padding strategy to mitigate the information leakage from ODICT due to the optimal search/update
time property.
We analyzed the asymptotic communication complexity of the aforementioned schemes.
Traditional DSSE achieves optimal bandwidth overhead of O(r), where r is the number of data
corresponding with the search/update query [189]. In ODS approaches, keyword-files pairs are
packaged into 4KB blocks, and the total number of blocks is denoted as B. Given a search/update
operation, the number of blocks being transmitted by OMAT and ODICT is s · c · O(log B) and
s0 · c · O(log B), respectively, where c = 4 is the bucket size in Path ORAM [169] and s, s0 are the
numbers of communication rounds to retrieve sufficient results for the query [182]. In DOD-DSSE,
the bandwidth complexity is 4 · O(N ), where N is the maximum number of unique keywords/files
that DOD-DSSE can support.
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After that, we benchmarked the actual performance of DOD-DSSE and its counterparts
in practice based on the previous asymptotic communication analysis. Figure 4.48 demonstrates
the actual end-to-end cryptographic delay (i.e., encryption, transmission delays) of schemes using
in-state Amazon EC2 server(s) with various data structure sizes. We can see that DOD-DSSE incurs
a small-constant communication overhead due to extra queries (i.e., 4x times slower than traditional
DSSE). However, it is approximately 50x and 210x times faster than ODICT and OMAT which
specifically take 42 and 167 seconds to perform an operation on the large data structure, respectively.
This indicated that even though the asymptotic complexity of ODS approaches looks very efficient,
hidden constants such as c, s, s0 actually contribute a lot to the communication overhead, as shown
in Figure 4.48.
We inspected the cost of DOD-DSSE to investigate the impacts of network communication
and cryptographic operations on the end-to-end delay. We observed that the majority of the delay
is due to network transmission, in which the ratio between it and cryptographic operations is
roughly 8:1. To investigate more the impact of network latency and throughput on DOD-DSSE and
its counterparts, we setup two EC2 servers geographically located outside of our state, resulting
in a network latency and throughput of 31 ms and 30 Mbps, respectively. As it can be seen
in Figure 4.49(b), this geographically distributed out-state environment makes DOD-DSSE and
traditional DSSE perform approximately 200 ms and 100 ms slower than in-state setting, respectively.
Due to the characteristics of ODS requiring a number of communication rounds to perform a search
or update operation, slower network latency and throughput significantly impact the performance of
ODICT and OMAT. We can see that DOD-DSSE is now 170x and 690x times faster than ODICT
and OMAT, respectively by this setting. Comparing with the in-state configuration, ODICT and
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OMAT are both 4.5x times slower than their in-state version. This implies 12.78 minutes and 3.2
minutes to accomplish an operation, respectively (Figure 4.49(a)).
Finally, we analyzed the storage cost of DOD-DSSE. With the largest dataset being experimented in this study (i.e., 9 × 1011 keyword-file pairs), DOD-DSSE requires approximately 35 MB
to store at the client side all necessary information for its operation such as symmetric keys, Tf , Tw
and global counter arrays. This can be easily fulfilled even by resource-limited devices such as a
smartphone or a tablet. Table 4.6 shows the total size of the encrypted data structure(s) stored at
the server side required by DOD-DSSE and its counterparts with different dataset sizes. DOD-DSSE
requires 8x and 2x times as much storage space as that of traditional DSSE and OMAT, respectively,
and yet, is much more compact than ODICT using dictionary21 . Considering the advantages of
DOD-DSSE in terms of efficiency, storage cost and achieved security aspects over traditional DSSE
and ORAM-based methods, our scheme is likely to be an ideal security-performance trade-off DSSE
scheme for privacy-critical cloud computing.

4.6.2 ODSE: Oblivious Dynamic Searchable Encryption
In DSSE, it is highly desirable to seal access pattern leakages when accessing the encrypted
index (I) and encrypted files (f). Since the size of individual files in F can be arbitrarily large and
each search/update query might involve with a different number of files, to the best of our knowledge,
generic ORAM seems to be the only option for oblivious access on f. In this work, we focus more on
oblivious access techniques on the index (I) that are more bandwidth-efficient than using generic
ORAM (Figure 4.50). Specifically, we propose ODSE, a comprehensive oblivious encrypted index
framework in the multi-server setting with the application to DSSE. The framework contains three
21

We would like to notice an advantage of dictionary over matrix structure. That is, it is not limited by the number of
unique keywords and files, but only the maximum number of keyword-file pairs which might be useful for applications
requiring diverse keyword-file relations.
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wo
wo
ODSE schemes including ODSEwo
xor , ODSEro and ODSEit each offering various performance and
security properties as follows.

• Full obliviousness with information-theoretic security: ODSE seals information leakages when
accessing the encrypted index that might lead into statistical attacks. Our constructions hide
the index-access pattern, and therefore provide forward- and backward-privacy and secrecy
wo
of the query types (search/update). ODSEwo
xor and ODSEro offers computational security for
the encrypted index as well as access operations on it. On the other hand, ODSEwo
it provides
information-theoretic statistical security (see §4.6.2.3).
• Low end-to-end delay: All ODSE schemes offer low end-to-end-delay, which are 3×-57× faster
than using generic ORAM atop the DSSE encrypted index (with optimization [67]) under real
network settings.
• Robustness against malicious adversary: In the present work, we provide secure methods not
only in the honest-but-curious setting but also in the malicious environment. Our ODSE schemes
offer various levels of robustness in the distributed setting. In the semi-honest setting, ODSEwo
ro
and ODSEwo
it are robust against corrupted servers that do not respond due to system/network
failure. All ODSE schemes can be extended to be secure against malicious adversary. Specifically,
the extended ODSEwo
xor scheme can detect if there exists any malicious server in the system (but
wo
without knowing which server it is). The extended ODSEwo
ro and ODSEit schemes can not only
detect which server(s) is malicious, but also be robust against incorrect replies by malicious
servers.
• Full-fledged implementation and open-sourced framework: We fully implemented all the proposed
ODSE schemes, and evaluated their performance on real-cloud infrastructure. To the best of our
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Figure 4.50: ODSE research objective and high-level approach.
knowledge, we are among the first to open-source an oblivious access framework for the encrypted
index in DSSE. The code is available at https://github.com/thanghoang/ODSE.

4.6.2.1

System and Threat Models
Our system model comprises a client and ` servers S = (S1 , . . . , S` ), each storing a version of

the encrypted index. The encrypted files are stored on a separate server different from S (as in [92]),
which can be obliviously accessed via a generic ORAM scheme [150, 169]. We focus only on oblivious
access on distributed encrypted index I on S. We present the definition of ODSE as follows.
Definition 15. An Oblivious Distributed Dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption (ODSE) scheme
is a tuple of one algorithm and two protocols ODSE = (Setup, Search, Update), where the input and
the output for the client and the servers are separated with semicolon such that:
1. (σ, I) ← Setup(f): Given a set of files f as input, the algorithm outputs a distributed encrypted
index I and a client state σ.
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2. (R; ⊥) ← Search(w, σ; I): The client inputs a keyword w to be searched and the state σ; the
servers input the distributed encrypted index I. The protocol outputs to the client a set R
containing file identifiers, in which w appears.
3. (σ 0 ; I 0 ) ← Update(fid , σ; I): The client inputs the updated file fid and a state σ; the servers
input the distributed encrypted index I. The protocol outputs a new state σ 0 and the updated
index I 0 to the client and servers, respectively.
In our system, the client is trusted and the set of servers S are untrusted. We first consider
the servers to be semi-honest, meaning that they follow the protocol faithfully, but can record the
protocol transcripts to learn information regarding the client’s access pattern. Later, we show that
our framework can be extended to be secure against malicious servers that can tamper with the
input data to compromise the correctness and the security of the system (§4.6.2.4). We allow up to
t < ` (privacy parameter) servers among S to be colluding, meaning that they can share their own
recorded protocol transcripts with each other. Formally, the security of ODSE in the semi-honest
setting can be defined as follows.
→
o = (op1 , . . . , opq ) be an operation
Definition 16 (ODSE security w.r.t. semi-honest adversary). Let −
sequence, where opi ∈ {Search(w, σ; I), Update(fid , σ; I)}, w is a keyword to be searched and fid is a
file with identifier id whose relationship with unique keywords in the distributed encrypted index I
→
need to be updated, and σ denotes a client state information. Let ODSEj (−
o ) represent the ODSE
→
client’s sequence of interactions with server Sj , given an operation sequence −
o.
→
An ODSE is correct if for any operation sequence −
o , {ODSE1 , . . . , ODSE` } returns data
→
consistent with −
o , except with negligible probability.
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An ODSE is t-secure if ∀L ⊆ {1, . . . , `} such that |L|≤ t, for any two operation sequences
−
→
→
→
→
→
→
o 1 and −
o 2 where |−
o 1 |= |−
o 2 |, the views {ODSEl∈L (−
o 1 )} and {ODSEl∈L (−
o 2 )} observed by a
coalition of up to t servers are computationally indistinguishable.

By Definition 15, keyword search and file update are the two main operations in searchable
encryption. Given that these operations might incur different procedures, we can trigger both search
and update protocols for any actual action to achieve the operation obliviousness according to
Definition 16. In this case, the server can guess (at best) with a probability of

1
2

what operation the

client is performing “in real” i.e. either search or update.

4.6.2.2

The Proposed Semi-Honest ODSE Schemes
In DSSE, keyword search and file update on I are read-only and write-only operations,

respectively. This property permits us to leverage specific bandwidth-efficient oblivious access
techniques for each operation such as multi-server PIR (for search) and Write-Only ORAM (for
update) rather than using a generic ORAM. The second requirement is to identify a suitable data
structure for I so that these bandwidth-efficient techniques can be adapted. In DSSE, forward
index and inverted index are the ideal choices for the file update and keyword search operations,
respectively as proposed in [82]. However, performing search and update on two isolated indexes will
lead to inconsistency. The server might perform a synchronization to make two indices consistent;
however, this will leak significant information regarding the client query and file content. Therefore,
to avoid this problem, it is mandatory to seek a data structure, where both search index and update
index can be integrated together. Fortunately, this can be achieved by harnessing a two-dimensional
index (i.e., matrix), which allows keyword search and file update to be performed in two separate
dimensions without creating any inconsistency at their intersections. This strategy permits us to
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Table 4.7: ODSE symbols and notation.
Symbol
n, m
I
n0
Tf , Tw
D
S
c

Description
Maximum number of files and keywords in DB.
Incidence Matrix Index
Number of (dlog2 pe − 1)-bit blocks (i.e., n0 = d dlog npe−1 e).
2
Static hash tables for files and keywords.
Set of dummy (empty) columns
Stash to (temporarily) store column data
Column counter vector

perform computation-efficient (multi-server) PIR on one dimension, and communication-efficient
(Write-Only) ORAM on the other dimension to achieve oblivious search and update, respectively.
In the following, we first describe the data structures used in ODSE framework, and then
present semi-honest ODSE schemes in details. We analyze the security of ODSE schemes and present
their extension into malicious setting in §4.6.2.3 and §4.6.2.4, respectively.
Our index to be stored at the server(s) is an incidence matrix (I), where each cell (I[i, j] ∈
{0, 1}) represents the relationship between the keyword indexed at row i and the file indexed at
column j. So, each row of I represents the search result of a keyword and each column represents
the content (i.e., keywords) of a file. Since we use Write-Only ORAM for file update, the number
of columns in I are doubled to the maximum number of files that can be stored in the outsourced
database. In other words, given n distinct files and m unique keywords in the database, our index is
of size m × 2n. At the client side, we leverage two position maps Tw , Tf to keep track of location of
keywords and files in I, respectively. They are of structure T := hkey, valuei, where key is a keyword
or file ID and value ← T [key] is the (row/column) index of key in I. Due to Write-Only ORAM, the
client maintains a stash component S to temporarily store columns that might not be written back
during the update due to the overflow.
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(σ, I) ← ODSEwo
xor .Setup(f):
1: I0 [∗, ∗] ← 0, initialize counter c ← (c1 , . . . , c2n ) where ci ← 1 for each i ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}
2: Let Π and Π0 be a random permutation on {1, . . . , 2n} and {1, . . . , m} respectively
3: k3 ← E.Gen(1λ )
4: Extract keywords (w1 , . . . , wm ) from files f = {fid1 , . . . , fidn }
5: for i = 1, . . . , m do
6:
Tw [wi ] ← Π0 (i)
7:
for j = 1, . . . , n do
8:
Tf [idj ] ← Π(j)
9:
if wi appears in fidj then
10:
I0 [xi , yj ] ← 1, where xi ← Tw [wi ], yj ← Tf [idj ]
11: for i = 1, . . . , m do
12:
τi ← KDF(k3 ||i)
# Compute key for each row
13:
for j = 1, . . . , 2n do
14:
I[i, j] ← E.Encτi (I0 [i, j], j||cj )
# Ciphertext I[i, j] is one-bit long
15: Let I contain ` copies of I and σ ← (k3 , Tw , Tf , c)
16: return (σ, I)

Figure 4.51: ODSEwo
xor setup algorithm.
We introduce ODSEwo
xor , an ODSE scheme that offers a low search delay by using XOR trick.
We present the setup algorithm in ODSE as well as its oblivious search and update protocols as
follows.
Figure 4.51 presents setup algorithm to construct the encrypted index in ODSE. Specifically,
it first initializes an unencrypted incidence matrix (I0 ) of size m × 2n (line 1), and generates a
master key to be used for generating row keys to encrypt each row of I0 (line 3). It extracts unique
keywords from input files (line 4), assigns each keyword and file into a row and column of I0 selected
randomly (lines 6, 9), and then sets the value for each cell of I0 corresponding to the relationship
between keywords and files (line 10). Finally, the algorithm generates a distinct key for each row of
I0 by the master key (line 14), and encrypts each cell of I0 by a distinct pair of row key and column
counter resulting in an encrypted index I (line 14). We encrypt the index bit-by-bit and the resulting
ciphertext of each input bit is also one bit long. This can be implemented by, for example, AES
with CTR mode, where we generate a 128-bit pseudorandom stream key by the master row key (τi )
and the column counter (j||cj ), but only XOR the plaintext bit with the most significant bit of the
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(R; ⊥) ← ODSEwo
xor .Search(w, σ; I):
Client:
1: i ← Tw [w]
2: (ρ1 , . . . , ρ` ) ← PIRxor .CreateQuery(i)
3: Send ρl to Sl for l ∈ {1, . . . , `}
Server: each Sl ∈ {S1 , . . . , S` } receiving ρl do
4: Iˆl ← PIRxor .Retrieve(ρl , Il )
5: Send Iˆl to the client
Client: On receive (Iˆ1 , . . . , Iˆ` ) from ` servers
6: I[i, ∗] ← PIRxor .Reconstruct(Iˆ1 , . . . , Iˆ` )
7: τi ← KDF(k3 ||i)
8: for j = 1, . . . , 2n do
9:
I0 [i, j] ← E.Decτi (I[i, j], j||cj )
10: Let J := {j : (I0 [i, j] = 1) and ((j is not dummy) or (I0 [i, j] ∈ S))}
11: return (R; ⊥), where R contains file IDs at column indexes in J

Figure 4.52: ODSEwo
xor search protocol.
stream key. To this end, the client sends a replica of I to ` servers and keeps some information (i.e.,
k3 , Tw , Tf , c) private.
ODSEwo
xor harnesses XOR-based PIR on the row dimension of I to conduct the oblivious
keyword search as shown in Figure 4.52. The client first looks up the keyword position map to get
the row index of the searched keyword (line 1). The client then creates XOR-PIR queries (line 2)
and sends them to corresponding servers, each answering the client with the output of the PIR
retrieval algorithm (line 4). Notice that the data is IND-CPA encrypted rather than being public as
in the standard PIR model. Therefore, after recovering the row from the PIR retrieval (line 6), the
client generates the row key (line 7) and then decrypts the row to obtain the search result (line 9).
Recall that the content (i.e., keywords) of a file is represented by a column in I. Given a
file fid to be updated, ODSEwo
xor applies Write-Only ORAM mechanism on the column dimension
of I to update keyword-file pairs in fid as shown in Figure 4.53. The client creates a new column
representing the relationship between the updated file and keywords in the database (lines 2-3), and
stores it in the stash (line 4). The client then randomly selects λ column indexes and requests an
arbitrary server to transmit the corresponding columns of I (lines 5-6). The client generates row
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(σ 0 ; I 0 ) ← ODSEwo
xor .Update(fid , σ; I):
Client:
ˆ ← 0 for i ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}
1: Initialize a column I[i]
2: for each keyword wi ∈ fid do
ˆ i ] ← 1, where xi ← Tw [wi ]
3:
I[x
ˆ and Tf [id] ← 0
4: S ← S ∪ {(id, I)}
# Put updated column to stash
5: Let J contain λ random-selected column indexes, send J to an arbitrary server Sl
Server Sl : On receive J do
6: Send {Il [∗, j]}j∈J to the client
Client: On receive {Il [∗, j]}j∈J do
7: for i = 1, . . . , m do
8:
τi ← KDF(k3 ||i)
9:
for each index j ∈ J do
# Decrypt columns
10:
I0 [i, j] ← E.Decτi (Il [i, j], j||cj )
11: for each dummy index ĵ ∈ J do
# Put columns from stash
ˆ is picked from S
12:
I0 [∗, ĵ] ← Iˆ and Tf [id] ← ĵ, where (id, I)
13: for each index j ∈ J do
# Re-encrypt columns
14:
cj ← cj + 1
15:
for i = 1, . . . , m do
16:
Î[i, j] ← E.Encτi (I0 [i, j], j||cj )
17: Send {Î[∗, j]}j∈J to ` servers
Server: each Sl ∈ {S1 , . . . , S` } receiving {Î[∗, j]}j∈J do
18: for each j ∈ J do
19:
Il [∗, j] ← Î[∗, j]
20: return (σ 0 ; I 0 ) where I 0 is Il updated at ` servers, and σ 0 is updated client state

Figure 4.53: ODSEwo
xor update protocol.
(σ, I) ← ODSEwo
ro .Setup(f): Generate encrypted index
1: (σ, I) ← ODSEwo
xor .Setup(f)
2: return (σ, I)

Figure 4.54: ODSEwo
ro setup algorithm.
keys and decrypts λ columns (lines 7-10). The client overwrites dummy columns among λ columns
with columns stored in the stash (lines 11-12). Finally, the client re-encrypts λ columns and sends
them to ` servers (lines 18-20).
The described ODSEwo
xor scheme requires all ` servers in the system to answer the client.
If one server does not reply due to system/network failure, the correctness of ODSEwo
xor will not
hold anymore. We propose ODSEwo
ro , an ODSE scheme that can achieve the robustness against
unresponsive servers. ODSEwo
ro harnesses the t-out-of-` property of SSS, which allows to maintain

187

(R; ⊥) ← ODSEwo
ro .Search(w, σ; I):
Client:
1: i ← Tw [w]
2: (JeK1 , . . . , JeK` ) ← PIRsss .CreateQuery(i)
3: Send JeKl , to Sl for l ∈ {1, . . . , `}
Server: each Sl ∈ {S1 , . . . , S` } receiving JeKl do:
4: for j = 1 . . . , 2n0 do
5:
for k = 1, . . . , m do
(l)
6:
hcjk ibin ← Il [k, (j − 1) · blog2 pc + 1 . . . j · blog2 pc]
7:

(l)
cj

8:

Jbj Kl ← PIR .Retrieve(JeKl , cj )

←

(l)
(l)
(cj1 , . . . , cjm )
sss

# j th batch of kth row

(l)

9: Send (Jb1 Kl , . . . , Jb2n0 Kl ) to the client
0
Client: On receive {Bj = {Jbj K1 , . . . , Jbj K` }}2n
j=1 from ` servers
0
10: for j = 1 . . . , 2n do
11:
bj ← PIRsss .Reconstruct(Bj , t)
12: I[i, ∗] ← hb1 ibin ||. . . ||hb2n0 ibin
13: τi ← KDF(k3 ||i)
14: for j = 1, . . . , 2n do
15:
I0 [i, j] ← Decτi (I[i, j], j||cj )
16: Let J := {j : (I0 [i, j] = 1) and ((j is not dummy) or (I0 [i, j] ∈ S))}
17: return (R; ⊥), where R contains file IDs at column indices in J

Figure 4.55: ODSEwo
ro search protocol.
the correctness given that some servers (i.e., up to ` − t − 1) do not answer. We define the setup
algorithm along with the oblivious search and update protocols in ODSEwo
ro scheme as follows.
ODSEwo
ro works over the index encrypted with IND-CPA encryption. Therefore, the setup
wo
algorithm of ODSEwo
ro is identical to that of ODSExor scheme as shown in Figure 4.54.
ODSEwo
ro harnesses SSS-based PIR protocol on the row dimension of I to conduct keyword
search as shown in Figure 4.55. Specifically, the client first retrieves the row index of the searched
keyword from the keyword position map (line 1). The client then creates SSS-based PIR queries
(line 2) and sends to corresponding servers, each replying with the output of the SSS-based PIR
retrieval algorithm. Notice that the SSS-based PIR retrieval algorithm performs the dot product
between the client query and the database input via scalar multiplication and additive homomorphic
properties of SSS. This requires the database input to be elements in Fp . Since each row in I is a
uniformly random binary string of length 2n due to IND-CPA encryption, the servers split each
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(σ 0 ; I 0 ) ← ODSEwo
ro .Update(fid , σ; I): Update a file
1: (σ 0 ; I 0 ) ← ODSEwo
xor .Update(fid , σ; I)
2: return (σ 0 ; I 0 )

Figure 4.56: ODSEwo
ro update protocol.
row of I into 2n0 chunks (ck ) with the equal size such that |ck |< log2 p (line 6). The dot product is
performed iteratively between the search query and divided chunks from all rows of I (lines 7-8).
After receiving answers from ` servers, the client recovers all chunks of the searched row (lines 10-12)
and finally, decrypts the row to obtain the search result (lines 13-17).
ODSEwo
ro harnesses Write-Only ORAM mechanism on the column dimension of I to perform
wo
wo
file update. Since the index I in ODSEwo
ro is identical to ODSExor , the update protocol of ODSEro
is also identical to that of ODSEwo
xor (Figure 4.56).
ODSEwo
ro scheme relies on IND-CPA encryption for the encrypted index so that it only offers
(at most) computational security. We now introduce ODSEwo
it , an ODSE scheme that can achieve the
highest level of security (i.e., information-theoretic) for the index as well as any operations (search
and update) on it. The main idea is to share the index with SSS, and harness SSS-based PIR to
conduct private search. We describe the algorithms of ODSEwo
it as follows.
Figure 4.57 presents the setup algorithm to construct the distributed index in ODSEwo
it .
Specifically, it first constructs an (unencrypted) index (I0 ) representing keyword-file relationships as
in other ODSE schemes. Instead of encrypting I0 with an IND-CPA encryption scheme, it creates
the shares of I0 with SSS and distributes them to corresponding servers. As discussed above, SSS
operates over elements in Fp . Therefore, it is required to split each row of I0 into blog2 pc-bit chunks
(line 4), and compute SSS share for each chunk (line 5). Therefore, the “encrypted” index in ODSE
contains ` SSS-shares of I0 for ` servers, each being a matrix Il of size m × 2n0 , where Il [i, j] ∈ Fp and
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(σ, I) ← ODSEwo
it .Setup(f):

1: (I0 , Tw , Tf ) ← Execute lines 2–10 in Figure 4.51
2: for i = 1, . . . , m do
3:
for j = 1, . . . , 2n0 do
4:
hbij ibin ← I[i, (j − 1) · blog2 pc + 1 . . . j · blog2 pc] # Pack each row into batches of size blog2 pc
5:
(I1 [i, j], . . . , I` [i, j]) ← SSS.Create(hbij ibin , t)
6: return (σ, I) , where I ← {I1 , . . . , I` } and σ ← (Tw , Tf )

Figure 4.57: ODSEwo
it setup algorithm.
(R; ⊥) ← ODSEwo
it .Search(w, σ; I):
Client:
1: i ← Tw [w]
2: (JeK1 , . . . , JeK` ) ← PIRsss .CreateQuery(i)
3: Send JeKl , to Sl for l ∈ {1, . . . , `}
Server: each Sl ∈ {S1 , . . . , S` } receiving JeKl do
4: for j = 1 . . . , 2n0 do
5:
Jbj Kl ← PIRsss .Retrieve(JeKl , Il [∗, j])
6: Send (Jb1 Kl , . . . , Jb2N 0 Kl ) to the client
0
Client: On receive {Bj = {Jbj K1 , . . . , Jbj K` }}2n
j=1 from ` servers
7: for j = 1 . . . , 2n0 do
8:
bj ← PIRsss .Reconstruct(Bj , 2t)
9: I0 [i, ∗] ← hb1 ibin ||. . . ||hb2n0 ibin
10: Let J := {j : (I0 [i, j] = 1) and ((j is not dummy) or (I0 [i, j] ∈ S))}
11: return (R; ⊥), where R contains file IDs at column indices in J

Figure 4.58: ODSEwo
it search protocol.
n0 = n/blog2 pc. To this end, the client sends Il to server Sl and keep position maps (i.e., Tw , Tf )
private.
wo
Similar to ODSEwo
ro , ODSEit harnesses the SSS-based PIR protocol on the row dimension
of I to conduct the keyword search as presented in Figure 4.58. Generally speaking, the client
gets the row index to be searched from the keyword position map, creates SSS-based PIR queries
and send them to the corresponding servers, each replying with the outputs of the SSS-based PIR
retrieval algorithm (lines 1-6). Notice that since the index stored on Sl is a share matrix, each dot
product computation in the SSS-based PIR retrieval algorithm will result in a share represented by
a 2t-degree polynomial. Therefore, the client needs to call the SSS-based recover algorithm with the
privacy parameter of 2t (vs. t as in ODSEwo
ro ) to obtain the correct search result (line 8).
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(σ 0 ; I 0 ) ← ODSEwo
it .Update(fid , σ; I):
Client:
ˆ ← 0 for i = 1, . . . , 2n
1: Initialize a column I[i]
2: for each keyword wi ∈ fid do
ˆ i ] ← 1, where xi ← Tw [wi ]
3:
I[x
ˆ and Tf [id] ← 0
4: S ← S ∪ {(id, I)}
5: Let J contain λ random-selected column indexes, send J to (t + 1) arbitrary servers Sl1 , . . . , Slt+1
Server: each Sl ∈ {Sl1 , . . . , Slt+1 } receiving J do
6: Send {Il [∗, j]}j∈J to the client
Client: On receive {Bij = {Il1 [i, j], . . . , Ilt+1 [i, j]}}j∈J ,i∈[m] do
7: for i = 1, . . . , m do
8:
for each index j ∈ J do
9:
bij ← SSS.Recover(Bij , t)
10:
I0 [i, j · blog2 pc + 1, ...(j + 1) · blog2 pc] ← hbij ibin
11: for each dummy column I0 [∗, ĵ] do
ˆ is picked from S
12:
I0 [∗, ĵ] ← Iˆ and Tf [id] ← ĵ, where (id, I)
13: for each index j ∈ J do
14:
for i = 1 . . . , m do
15:
hb0ij ibin ← I0 [i, j · blog2 pc + 1, . . . , (j + 1) · blog2 pc]
16:
(Î1 [i, j], . . . , Î` [i, j]) ← SSS.Create(b0ij , t)
17: Send {Îl [∗, j]}j∈J to Sl for l ∈ {1, . . . , `}
Server: each Sl ∈ {S1 , . . . , S` } receiving {Îl [∗, j]}j∈J do
18: for each j ∈ J do
19:
Il [∗, j] ← Îl [∗, j]
20: return (σ 0 ; I 0 ) where I 0 is Il updated at each server Sl and σ 0 is updated client state

Figure 4.59: ODSEwo
it update protocol.
Similar to other ODSE schemes, ODSEwo
it harnesses Write-Only ORAM mechanism on the
column dimension of the index for the oblivious file update as outlined in Figure 4.59. Specifically,
the client creates a column representing the relationship between the updated file and keywords in
the database, and temporarily stores it in the stash (lines 1-4). In ODSEwo
it , each column of the
share index Il on Sl actually contains the share of blog2 pc columns of the unencrypted index I0 .
Therefore, it suffices to read λ0 = d blogλ

2

pc e

random columns of Il from t + 1 arbitrary servers to

reconstruct λ columns of I0 (lines 5-10). The update is similar to other ODSE schemes, in which the
client aggressively over-writes dummy columns of I0 with columns stored in the stash (lines 11- 12).
Finally, the client creates new SSS shares for the retrieved columns (lines 13-16) and writes them
back to ` servers (lines 18-20).
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4.6.2.3

Security Analysis

Remark 5. One might observe that search and update operations in ODSE schemes are performed
on the row dimension and the column dimension of the encrypted index, respectively. This access
structure might enable the adversary to learn whether the operation is search or update, even though
each operation is secure. Therefore, to achieve security as in Definition 16, where the query type
should also be hidden, we can trigger both search and update protocols (one of them is the dummy
operation) regardless of whether the intended action is search or update.

We argue the security of our proposed schemes as follows.
Theorem 7. ODSEwo
xor scheme is computationally (` − 1)-secure by Definition 16.
Proof. (Sketch) (i) Oblivious Search: ODSEwo
xor leverages XOR-based PIR and therefore, achieves
(` − 1)-privacy for keyword search as proven in [45]. (ii) Oblivious Update: ODSEwo
xor employs
Write-Only ORAM which achieves negligible write failure probability and therefore, it offers the
statistical security without counting the encryption. The index in ODSEwo
xor is IND-CPA encrypted,
which offers computational security. Therefore in general, the update access pattern of ODSEwo
xor
scheme is computationally indistinguishable. ODSEwo
xor performs Write-Only ORAM with an identical
procedure on ` servers (e.g., the indexes of accessed columns are the same in ` servers), and therefore,
the server coalition does not affect the update privacy of ODSEwo
xor . (iii) ODSE Security: By
Remark 5, ODSEwo
xor performs both search and update regardless of the actual operation. As
analyzed, search is (` − 1)-private and update pattern is computationally secure. Therefore, ODSEwo
xor
achieves computational (` − 1)-security by Definition 16.
Theorem 8. ODSEwo
ro scheme is computationally t-secure by Definition 16.
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Proof. (Sketch) (i) Oblivious Search: ODSEwo
ro leverages a SSS-based PIR protocol and therefore,
achieves t-privacy for keyword search due to the t-privacy property of SSS as proven in [17, 73].
wo
(ii) Oblivious Update: Similar to ODSEwo
xor , ODSEro leverages Write-Only ORAM over IND-CPA
encrypted database, which offers computational security as shown in [23]. (iii) ODSE Security: By
Remark 5, for each actual operation, the client triggers both search and update protocols. Given that
search is t-private and update pattern is computationally oblivious, the access pattern in ODSEwo
ro is
a computationally indistinguishable in the presence of t colluding servers.
Theorem 9. ODSEwo
it scheme is information-theoretically (statistically) t-secure by Definition 16.
Proof. (Sketch) (i) Oblivious Search: ODSEwo
it leverages an SSS-based PIR protocol and therefore,
achieves t-privacy for keyword search due to the t-privacy property of SSS [73]. (ii) Oblivious Update:
The index in ODSEwo
it is SSS-shared, which is information-theoretically secure in the presence of
t colluding servers. ODSEwo
it also employs Write-Only ORAM, which offers statistical security
due to negligible write failure probability. Therefore in general, the update access pattern of
ODSEwo
it scheme is information-theoretically (statistically) indistinguishable in the coalition of up to
t servers. (iii) ODSE Security: By Remark 5, ODSEwo
it performs both search and update protocols
regardless of the actual operation. As analyzed above, search is t-private and update pattern
is statistically t-indistinguishable. Therefore, ODSEwo
it is information-theoretically (statistically)
t-secure by Definition 16.

4.6.2.4

ODSE with Malicious Security
In previous sections, we have shown that ODSE schemes offer a certain level of collusion-

resiliency and robustness in the semi-honest setting where the servers follow the protocol faithfully.
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In some privacy-critical applications, it is necessary to achieve data integrity and robustness in the
malicious environment, where the adversary can tamper with the query and data to compromise
the correctness and privacy of the protocol. In this section, we show that our proposed semi-honest
ODSE schemes can be extended to be secure and robust against malicious adversaries.
To achieve integrity of the index and the server-computation, our main idea is to harness
computational and information-theoretic message authentication code (MAC) techniques. We first
provide the definition of computational and information-theoretic MAC as follows.
Let Σ = (Gen, Mac, Vrfy) be a secure keyed MAC scheme [110]: θ ← Σ.Gen(1λ ) generating
a MAC key with security parameter λ; µ ← Σ.Macθ (m) generating a tag for message m ∈ {0, 1}∗
with key θ; {0, 1} ← Σ.Vrfyθ (m, µ) verifying if the tag (µ) associated with the message (m) is either
valid (1) or invalid (0).
Let θ ← Fp be a global MAC key, which is known only by the client. The MAC tag (µ) for
each data block (b) is computed as µ = θ · b (over Fp ). Given that the client maintains a consistent
relationship between µ, b and θ while keeping them hidden from the adversary, the adversary cannot
change b without changing µ and/or α. Therefore, µ is secret-shared among servers along with the
shares of b. The verification can be done by reconstructing the block (b) as well as its tag (µ) from
the shares, and comparing if µ = θ · b holds at the end.
wo
In ODSEwo
xor and ODSEro schemes, we leverage the computational MAC scheme to achieve
the integrity of the index encrypted by IND-CPA encryption . On the other hand, the ODSEwo
it
offers information-theoretic security since its index is secret-shared, instead of IND-CPA encrypted.
Therefore, we apply information-theoretic MAC to this scheme to preserve its security level. We
now present the extensions of ODSE schemes into the malicious setting in details as follows.
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(σ, I) ← MD-ODSEwo
xor .Setup(f):
1: (I, Tf , Tw , c, κ) ← Execute lines 1-14 in Figure 4.51
2: θ ← Σ.Gen(1λ )
3: for i = 1, . . . , m do
4:
for j = 1, . . . , 2n/|µ| do
# |µ|:(pre-defined) length of the MAC tag.
5:
T[i, j] ← Σ.Macθ (I[i, (j − 1) · |µ|+1 . . . j · |µ|])
6: Let I contain ` copies of (I, T) and σ ← (θ, k3 , Tw , Tf , c)
7: return (σ, I)

Figure 4.60: MD-ODSEwo
xor setup algorithm.
(R; ⊥) ← MD-ODSEwo
xor .Search(w, σ; I):
Client:
1: (ρ1 , . . . , ρ` ) ← Execute lines 1-2 in Figure 4.52 (to learn that the keyword w corresponds to
ith row and request retrieval of ith row privately)
2: Send ρl to Sl for l ∈ {1, . . . , `}
Server: each Sl ∈ {S1 , . . . , S` } receiving ρl do
3: Iˆl ← Execute line 4 in Figure 4.52
4: T̂l ← PIRxor .Retrieve(ρl , Tl )
5: Send (Iˆl , T̂l ) to the client
Client: On receive (hIˆ1 , . . . , Iˆ` i, hT̂1 , . . . , T̂` i) from ` servers
6: I[i, ∗] ← Execute line 6 in Figure 4.52
7: T[i, ∗] ← PIRxor .Reconstruct(T̂1 , . . . , T̂` )
8: for j = 1 . . . 2n/|µ| do
9:
if Σ.Vrfyθ (I[i, (j − 1) · |µ|+1 . . . j · |µ|], T[i, j]) = 0 then
10:
return abort
11: J ← Execute lines 7-10 in Figure 4.52
12: return (R; ⊥), where R contains file IDs at column indexes in J

Figure 4.61: MD-ODSEwo
xor search protocol.
wo
We present MD-ODSEwo
xor , the extended version of ODSExor , which offers security against
malicious adversary using the computational MAC. The verification allows the client to abort the
protocol if he/she detects any malicious behaviors attempting to tamper with the encrypted index
and/or the search/update query. Our MD-ODSEwo
xor protocols are defined as follows.
Figure 4.60 presents the setup of MD-ODSEwo
xor scheme with the MAC tag generation for the
encrypted index. Generally speaking, it first generates the encrypted index I similar to semi-honest
ODSEwo
xor (line 1), and then generates a MAC key (line 2), followed by computing a matrix T
containing the MAC tag for each |µ|-bit blocks of each row of I (lines 3-5). In this context, each
server in the system stores two matrices including the encrypted index I and the MAC matrix T.
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(σ 0 ; I 0 ) ← MD-ODSEwo
xor .Update(fid , σ; I):
Client:
1: (S, Tf ) ← Execute lines 2-4 in Figure 4.53
2: J 0 ← Select λ random indexes of |µ|-bit columns in I
3: Send J 0 to an arbitrary server Sl
Server Sl : On receive J 0 do
4: Send {Il [∗, (j 0 − 1) · |µ|+1 . . . j 0 · |µ|], Tl [∗, j 0 ] }j 0 ∈J 0 to the client
Client: On receive {Il [∗, (j 0 − 1) · |µ|+1 . . . j 0 · |µ|], Tl [∗, j 0 ]}j 0 ∈J 0 do
5: for each j 0 ∈ J 0 do
6:
for i = 1, . . . , m do
7:
if Σ.Vrfyθ (I[i, (j 0 − 1) · |µ|+1 . . . j 0 · |µ|], Tl [i, j]) = 0 then
8:
return abort
9: (Î, S, Tf , c) ← Execute lines 7-16 in Figure 4.53 with J = {j 0 , . . . , j 0 · |µ|−1}j 0 ∈J 0
10: T̂[i, j 0 ] ← Σ.Macθ (Î[i, (j 0 − 1) · |µ|+1 . . . j 0 · |µ|]) for each j 0 ∈ J 0 and i = 1, . . . , m
11: Send {Î[∗, (j 0 − 1) · |µ|+1 . . . j 0 · |µ|], T̂[∗, j 0 ] }j 0 ∈J 0 to ` servers
Server: each Sl ∈ {S1 , . . . , S` } receiving {Î[∗, (j 0 − 1) · |µ|+1 . . . j 0 · |µ|], T̂[∗, j 0 ]}j 0 ∈J 0 do
12: Il ← Execute lines 18-19 in Figure 4.53
13: Tl [∗, j 0 ] ← T̂[∗, j 0 ] for each j 0 ∈ J 0
14: return (σ 0 ; I 0 ) where I 0 are (I, T) updated at ` servers, and σ 0 is the updated client state

Figure 4.62: MD-ODSEwo
xor update protocol.
Figure 4.61 presents the search protocol of MD-ODSEwo
xor , which is extended from the search
protocol of semi-honest ODSEwo
xor to be secure against malicious adversary. Specifically, the client
generates XOR-PIR queries for ` servers similar to the semi-honest ODSEwo
xor scheme (line 1). Each
server performs the XOR-PIR retrieval on both the encrypted index (line 3) and the MAC components
(line 4) using the same query received, and sends the result to the client. The client recovers the row
of the encrypted index (line 6) as well as its corresponding tag (line 7). The client verifies each |µ|-bit
block with its corresponding tag (lines 8-10). If all the tags are valid, the client continues to decrypt
the row to obtain the search result as in the semi-honest ODSEwo
xor scheme (line 11). Otherwise, the
client aborts and notifies that at least one of the servers is malicious (line 10).
Figure 4.62 presents the update protocol of MD-ODSEwo
xor extended from the semi-honest
ODSEwo
xor for malicious security. Instead of downloading λ random 1-bit columns as in the semi-honest
ODSEwo
xor , the client downloads λ random columns of |t|-bits as well as their corresponding MAC
tag. Before decryption, the client verifies the integrity of the retrieved data by the MAC (lines 5-8).

196

(σ, I) ← ODSEwo
xor .Setup(f):
1: (σ, I) ← MD-ODSEwo
xor .Setup(f)
2: return (σ, I)

Figure 4.63: MR-ODSEwo
ro setup algorithm.
(R; ⊥) ← MR-ODSEwo
ro .Search(w, σ; I):
Client:
1: (i, hJeK1 , . . . , JeK` i) ← Execute lines 1-2 in Figure 4.55
2: Send JeKl to Sl for each l ∈ {1, . . . , `}
Server: each Sl ∈ {S1 , . . . , S` } receiving JeKl do:
3: (Jb1 Kl , . . . , Jb2n0 Kl ) ← Execute lines 4-8 in Figure 4.55
4: Jµj Kl ← PIRsss .Retrieve(JeKl , Tl [∗, j]) for j = 1 . . . , 2n/|µ|
0
2n/|µ|
5: Send ({Jµj Kl }j=1 , {Jbj Kl }2n
j=1 ) to the client
Client: On receive { (Jµ1 Kl , . . . , Jµ2n/|µ| Kl ), (Jb1 Kl , . . . , Jb2n0 Kl )}`l=1 from ` servers
6: X ← Select t + 1 servers among ` servers
7: Bj ← {Jbj Kx }x∈X ,j∈[2n0 ] , Tj ← {Jµj Kx }x∈X ,j∈[ 2n ]
|µ|

8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:

I[i, ∗] ← Execute lines 10-12 in Figure 4.55
for j = 1 . . . , 2n/|µ| do
T[i, j] ← PIRsss .Reconstruct(Tj , t)
if Σ.Vrfyθ (I[i, (j − 1) · |µ|+1 . . . j · |µ|], T[i, j]) = 0 then
if all distinct subset X have been processed then
return abort
X ← Select another set of t + 1 servers and goto line 7
J ← Execute lines 13 -17 in Figure 4.55
return (R; ⊥), where R contains file IDs at column indexes in J

Figure 4.64: MR-ODSEwo
ro search protocol.
If there exists one invalid tag, the client aborts and notifies that at least one server is malicious (line
8). Otherwise, the client performs the update following the same line with the semi-honest ODSEwo
xor
(line 9). Finally, the client creates new MAC tags for re-encrypted columns and send all of them to `
servers to be updated (lines 10-14).
Since ODSEwo
ro relies on SSS for oblivious search, we can extend it in various ways to not
only detect but also be robust against malicious adversary. One straightforward extension is to
consider SSS as a particular instance of Reed Solomon Code, and then implement Reed Solomon
Decoding techniques [81, 185] to handle incorrect server replies. However, this approach can only
handle a small number of the malicious servers in the system (e.g., t < `/3 if using [185]), which
might increase the deployment cost. Another approach is to harness the t-out-of-` threshold property
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(σ 0 ; I 0 ) ← MR-ODSEwo
ro .Update(fid , σ; I):
1: (σ 0 ; I 0 ) ← MD-ODSEwo
xor .Update(fid , σ; I)
2: return (σ 0 ; I 0 )

Figure 4.65: MR-ODSEwo
ro update protocol.
(σ, I) ← MR-ODSEwo
it .Setup(f):
1: (hI1 , . . . , I` i, Tw , Tf , hb11 , . . . , bm2n0 i) ← Execute lines 1-5 in Figure 4.58
$

2: α ← Fp
3: (T1 [i, j], . . . , T` [i, j]) ← SSS.Create(α · bij , t) for i = 1, . . . , m and for j = 1, . . . , 2n0
4: return (σ, I) , where I ← {hI1 , . . . , I` i, hT1 , . . . , T` i} and σ ← (α, Tw , Tf )

Figure 4.66: MR-ODSEwo
it setup algorithm.
of SSS along with the MAC technique presented in the previous section. The main idea is to select
(t + 1) answers among ` answers from the servers to recover the encrypted search result and its MAC
tags. If there exists one invalid MAC, we repeat the recover process by selecting a different set of
(t + 1) answers until we find that all the tags are valid. This strategy offers the detection capability
and robustness against malicious behaviors given that the majority of the servers is honest (i.e.,
t < `/2). Therefore, we opt-to this approach to design MR-ODSEwo
ro , the maliciously-robust version
of ODSEwo
ro as follows.
wo
The index structure of MR-ODSEwo
ro is identical to that of MD-ODSExor . Thus, its setup
algorithm is identical to that of MD-ODSEwo
xor , where the MAC tag is created for each |t|-bit blocks
in each row of the encrypted index (Figure 4.63).
wo
Figure 4.64 outlines the search protocol of MR-ODSEwo
ro extended from that of ODSEro for
malicious security. For each time of oblivious keyword search, the client creates SSS-based PIR
query as in the semi-honest ODSEwo
ro (line 1), and the servers perform the SSS-based PIR retrieval
on both the encrypted index (line 3) and MAC components (line 4). Once receiving answers from
` servers, the client picks t + 1 out of ` replies (lines 6-7), and performs the SSS recover via the
Lagrange interpolation to obtain the encrypted search row (line 8) as well its MAC tag (lines 9-14) .
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(R; ⊥) ← MR-ODSEwo
it .Search(w, σ; I):
Client:
1: (i, hJeK1 , . . . , JeK` i) ← Execute lines 1-2 in Figure 4.58
2: Send JeKl , to Sl for each l ∈ {1, . . . , `}
Server: each Sl ∈ {S1 , . . . , S` } receiving JeKl do
3: (Jb1 Ki , . . . , Jb2N 0 Ki ) ← Execute lines 4 -5 in Figure 4.58
4: Jµj Kl ← PIRsss .Retrieve(JeKl , Tl [∗, j]) for each j ∈ {1 . . . , 2n0 }
5: Send (hJµ1 Kl , . . . , Jµ2n0 Kl i, hJb1 Kl , . . . , Jb2n0 Kl i) to the client
0
Client: On receive {hJµk K1 , . . . , Jµk K` i, hJbk K1 , . . . , Jbk K` i}2n
k=1 from ` servers
6: X ← Select 2t + 1 servers among ` servers
7: Bj ← {Jbj Kx }x∈X ,j∈[2n0 ] , Tj ← {Jµj Kx }x∈X ,j∈[2n0 ]
8: (b1 , . . . , b2n0 ) ← Execute lines 7-8 in Figure 4.58
9: for j = 1 . . . , 2n0 do
10:
µj ← PIRsss .Reconstruct(Tj , 2t)
11:
if (α · βj 6= µj ) then
12:
if (all distinct subset X have been processed) then
13:
return abort
14:
X ← Select another set of 2t + 1 servers and goto line 7
15: J ← Execute lines 9-10 in Figure 4.58
16: return (R; ⊥), where R contains file IDs at column indexes in J

Figure 4.67: MR-ODSEwo
it search protocol.
The client verifies the integrity of the encrypted row and decrypts it if all MAC tags are valid. If
there exists one invalid tag, the client selects another set of t + 1 replies, and repeats the verification
process. If the client tries all possible sets, which incurs (in total)



`
t+1

verification tests, but none

produces all valid tags, the client aborts the protocol and notifies that a majority of servers (t > `/2)
is corrupted (line 13).
wo
The update protocol in MR-ODSEwo
ro is similar to that of MD-ODSExor (Figure 4.65). To
improve the robustness against malicious adversary, the client can request ` servers to transfer λ
|t|-bit columns, and selects one of ` replies to verify the integrity and performs the update.
wo
We present MR-ODSEwo
it , the extended version of ODSEit that inherits all properties of
ODSEwo
it (e.g., information-theoretic security) along with the robustness against malicious adversary.
To preserve the information-theoretic security, we use the information-theoretic MAC as defined
above for each block. The details are as follows.

199

(σ 0 ; I 0 ) ← ODSEwo
it .Update(fid , σ; I):
Client:
1: (J , S, Tf ) ← Execute lines 1-5 in Figure 4.59
2: Send J to ` servers (S1 , . . . , S` )
Server: each Sl ∈ {S1 , . . . , S` } receiving J do
3: Send {Il [∗, j],Tl [∗, j] }j∈J to the client
Client: On receive {hI1 [∗, j], . . . , I` [∗, j]i, hT1 [∗, j], . . . , T` [∗, j]i }j∈J do
4: X ← Select t + 1 servers among ` servers
5: Bij ← {I[i, j]x }x∈X ,j∈J ,i∈[m]
6: {I0 [∗, j], hb1j , . . . , bmj i}j∈J ← Execute lines 7-10 in Figure 4.59
7: for i = 1 . . . m do
8:
for each j ∈ J do
9:
if (α · I0 [i, j] 6= T[i, j]) then
10:
if (all distinct subset X have been processed) then
11:
return abort
12:
X ← Select another set of t + 1 servers and goto line 5
13: {hÎ1 [∗, j], . . . Î` [∗, j]i, hb01j , . . . , b0mj i}j∈J ← Execute lines 11-16 in Figure 4.59
14: (T̂1 [i, j], . . . , T̂` [i, j]) ← SSS.Create(α · b0ij , t) for each j ∈ J and for i = 1 . . . m
15: Send {Îl [∗, j], T̂l [∗, j] }j∈J to Sl for l = 1, . . . , `
Server: each Sl ∈ {S1 , . . . , S` } receiving {Îl [∗, j], Tl [∗, j] }j∈J do
16: {Il [∗, j]}j∈J ← Execute lines 18-19 in Figure 4.59
17: Tl [∗, j] ← T̂l [∗, j] for each j ∈ J
18: return (σ 0 ; I 0 ) where I 0 are (Il , Tl ) updated at ` servers and σ 0 is updated client state

Figure 4.68: MR-ODSEwo
it update protocol.
wo
MR-ODSEwo
it follows the principles in the semi-honest ODSEit scheme to create the share
index (Figure 4.66, line 1). It then creates a global MAC key by selecting a random element in Fp
(line 2). It multiplies the representative element in Fp of each index block with the global MAC key
over Fp yielding the MAC tag, and then creates the SSS shares for each tag (line 3). The SSS shares
of MAC tags are distributed along with the share index across ` servers.
wo
Figure 4.67 presents the search protocol of MR-ODSEwo
it extended from that of ODSEit
for malicious security. The extension follows the line of the MR-ODSEwo
ro scheme. Specifically, the
servers perform SSS-based PIR retrieval on both index and the MAC components (lines 3-4). The
client picks 2t + 1 out of ` replies to recover and verify the integrity of the search result (lines
6-7). If after



`
2t+1

trials with different subsets but none producing the valid tags, the client aborts

the protocol and notifies that more than `/3 servers are malicious (line 7). Otherwise, the client
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continues to process the recovered data as in the semi-honest MR-ODSEwo
it scheme to obtain the
final search result (line 15).
Figure 4.68 presents the update protocol of MR-ODSEwo
it . Basically, the client downloads λ
columns of the share index and their corresponding MAC from ` servers. The client selects t + 1
replies to recover and verify the integrity of downloaded data before performing update. If all tags
are valid, the client performs the write-only ORAM procedure as in ODSEwo
it scheme, re-calculates
the MAC tag for each block, and then creates new SSS shares for each tag. Otherwise, the client
aborts the protocol and notifies that a majority of servers is malicious.

4.6.2.5

Experimental Evaluation
We fully implemented all ODSE schemes in C++. We used Google Sparsehash library [4] to

implement position maps Tf and Tw . We utilized Intel AES-NI library [80] to implement AES-CTR
wo
encryption/decryption in ODSEwo
xor and ODSEro schemes. We leveraged Shoup NTL library [162]
for pseudo-random number generator and arithmetic operations over finite field. We used ZeroMQ
library [3] for client-server communication. We used multi-threading technique to accelerate PIR
computation at the server. The code is available at https://github.com/thanghoang/ODSE.
We used Amazon EC2 with r4.4xlarge instance for server(s), each equipped with 16 vCPUs
Intel Xeon @ 2.3 GHz and 122 GB RAM. We used a laptop with Intel Core i5 @ 2.90 GHz and 16
GB RAM as the client. All machines ran Ubuntu 16.04. The client established a network connection
with the server via WiFi connection. We used a real network setting, in which the download/upload
throughput is 27/5 Mbps, respectively.
We used the subsets of the Enron dataset to build I containing from millions to billions of
keyword-file pairs. The largest dataset contain around 300,000 files with 320,000 unique keywords.
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Our tokenization is identical to [136] so that our keyword distribution and query pattern are similar
to [136].
We compared ODSE with a standard DSSE scheme [35], and the use of generic ORAM atop
the DSSE encrypted index. The performance of all schemes was measured under the same setting
and configuration We configured ODSE schemes and their counterparts as follows.
wo
• ODSE: For the semi-honest setting, we deployed two servers for ODSEwo
xor and ODSEro schemes,
wo
wo
0
and three servers for ODSEwo
it scheme. We selected λ = 4 for ODSExor and ODSEro , and λ = 4
wo
with Fp where p is a 16-bit prime for ODSEwo
ro schemes ODSEit . We note that selecting larger p
(e.g., |p|= 64 bits) can reduce the PIR computation time with the cost of the bandwidth overhead
due to the increase of query size. We chose a 16-bit prime field to achieve a balanced computation
and communication overhead. For the malicious setting, we first fixed the number of servers for
wo
ODSEwo
xor and ODSEro schemes to be two, three and four, respectively to handle one adversary.
We then increased the number of servers to allow more malicious servers.
• Standard DSSE: We selected one of the most efficient DSSE schemes by Cash et al. in [35]
(i.e., Πdyn
2lev variant) to demonstrate the performance gap between ODSE and the standard DSSE.
We estimated the performance of Πdyn
2lev using the same software/hardware environments and
optimizations as ODSE (e.g., parallelization, AES-NI acceleration). Note that we did not use
the Java implementation of this scheme available in Clusion library [1] for comparison due to
its lack of hardware acceleration support (i.e., no AES-NI) and the difference between running
environments (Java VM vs. C). Our estimation is conservative in which, we used numbers that
would be better than the Clusion library.
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Figure 4.69: Latency of semi-honest ODSE schemes and their counterparts.
• Using generic ORAM atop DSSE encrypted index: We selected non-recursive Path-ORAM [169]
and Ring-ORAM [150], as ODSE counterparts since they are the most efficient generic ORAM
schemes for data outsourcing to date. Since we focus on encrypted index rather than encrypted
files in DSSE, we did not explicitly compare our schemes with TWORAM [67] but instead used
one of their techniques to optimize the performance of using generic ORAM on DSSE encrypted
index. Specifically, we applied the selected ORAMs on the dictionary index as in [136] along
with the round-trip optimization as in [67]. Note that these estimates are also conservative,
where memory access delays were excluded, and cryptographic operations were optimized and
parallelized for an objective comparison.

Figure 4.69 presents the end-to-end delays of ODSE schemes and their counterparts, where we
performed both search and update protocols in ODSE schemes to hide the actual type of operation
(see Remark 5). ODSE offers a higher security than standard DSSE at the cost of a longer delay.
Nevertheless, ODSE schemes are 3×-57× faster than the use of generic ORAMs atop DSSE encrypted
index to hide the access patterns. Specifically, with an encrypted index consisting of ten billions
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of keyword-file pairs, Πdyn
2lev cost 36 milliseconds and 600 milliseconds to finish a search and update
wo
operation, respectively. ODSEwo
xor and ODSEit , respectively, took 2.8 seconds and 8.6 seconds to
accomplish both keyword search and file update operations, compared with 160 seconds by using
Path-ORAM with the round-trip optimization [67].
We present the separate delay for the search and update operations in ODSE schemes in
Table 4.8. ODSEwo
xor is the most efficient in terms of search, whose delay was less than 1 second.
This is due to the fact that ODSEwo
xor only triggers XOR operations and the size of the search query
wo
is minimal (i.e., a binary string). ODSEwo
ro and ODSEit are more robust (e.g., malicious tolerant)
and one of which is more secure (e.g., information-theoretic security) than ODSEwo
xor at the cost of
higher search delay (i.e., 4 seconds) due to its larger search query and SSS arithmetic computations.
ODSEwo
it is the slowest among the three ODSE schemes since it requires three servers and, therefore,
the client needs to transmit more data.
wo
For the oblivious file update, ODSEwo
xor and ODSEro achieved a similar delay since they have
the same number of servers and incurred the same amount of data to be transmitted. ODSEwo
it
wo
is slightly slower than ODSEwo
xor and ODSEro because the client transmitted data to three servers,
instead of two. We can see that in many cases, where it is not necessary to hide the operation
types (search/update), using ODSE to conduct individual oblivious operations, especially the
keyword search, is much more efficient than generic ORAMs. We further provide a comparison
of ODSE schemes with their counterparts in Table 4.8. In the following section, we dissect the
end-to-end delay of ODSE schemes to understand which factors contributing the most to their
performance.
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Table 4.8: Comparison of ODSE and its counterparts.
Scheme
Standard DSSE [35]
Path-ORAM[169]
Ring-ORAM [150]
ODSEwo
xor
ODSEwo
ro
ODSEwo
it

Forward
privacy
7
3
3
3
3
3

Security
Backward Hidden access
privacy
pattern‡
7
7
3
Computational
3
Computational
3
Computational
3
Computational
Information
3
theoretic

Delay (second)
Encrypted
index∗
Computational
Computational
Computational
Computational
Computational
Information
theoretic

Search

Update

0.036

0.62
160.6
137.4

0.48
3.45

2.32
1.85

4.54

4.08

Distributed Setting†
Privacy
Improved
level
Robustness
`−1
7
<`
3
< `/2

3

This delay is for semi-honest setting with encrypted index containing 300,000 files and 320,000 keywords under the network and configuration
presented in §4.6.2.5.
∗
The encrypted index in ODSEwo
it is information-theoretically secure because it is SSS. Other schemes employ IND-CPA encryption so that their
index is computationally secure (see §4.6.2.3).
‡
All ODSE schemes perform search and update protocols to hide the actual query type. In ODSEwo
xor , search is IT-secure due to SSS-based PIR and
update is computationally secure due to IND-CPA encryption. Hence, its overall security is computational.
†
` is # servers in the system. We define the robustness in distributed setting as the ability to tolerate unresponsive server(s) in the semi-honest
setting or incorrect replies in the malicious setting. In ODSEwo
it , encrypted index and search query are SSS with the same privacy level. Generic
ORAM solutions have a stronger adversarial model than ours because they are not vulnerable to collusion that arises in the distributed setting.

Figure 4.70 presents the detailed delays of separate keyword search and file update operations
in ODSE schemes. There are three main factors impacting the end-to-end delay of ODSE schemes as
follows.
As shown in Figure 4.70, the client computation contributes the least amount to the overall
search delay (less than 10%) in all ODSE schemes. It comprises the following operations: (i) Generate
wo
wo
search queries with PRF in ODSEwo
xor or SSS in ODSEro and ODSEit schemes; (ii) SSS recovery (in
wo
wo
wo
ODSEwo
ro and ODSEit ) and/or IND-CPA decryption (in ODSExor and ODSEro ); (iii) Filter dummy
columns and collect columns in the stash. Note that the client delay of ODSE schemes can be further
reduced (by at least 50%-60%) via pre-computation of some values such as row keys and PIR queries
(only contain shares of 0 or 1). For the file update, the client performs either decryption followed by
wo
wo
0
re-encryption on λ columns (in ODSEwo
xor and ODSEro ), or SSS over λ blocks (in ODSEit ). Since
we used crypto acceleration (i.e., Intel AES-NI) and highly optimized number theory libraries (i.e.,
NTL), all these computations only contributed to a small fraction of the total delay.
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Figure 4.70: Detailed search (S) and update (U) costs of semi-honest ODSE schemes.
Data transmission is the most dominating factor in the delay of ODSE schemes. The
communication cost of ODSEwo
xor is the smallest among all ODSE schemes since the size of search
wo
query and the data transmitted from servers are only binary strings. In ODSEwo
ro and ODSEit
schemes, the size of components in the search query vector is 16 bits. Their communication overhead
can be reduced by using a smaller finite field at the cost of increased PIR computation on the server
side.
The cost of PIR operations in ODSEwo
xor is negligible as it uses XOR tricks. The PIR
wo
computation overhead in ODSEwo
ro and ODSEit is reasonable because it operates on a considerably
large amount of 16-bit values. For the file update operations, the server-side cost is mainly due
wo
to memory accesses to overwrite some columns of the encrypted index. ODSEwo
ro and ODSEit
schemes are highly memory access-efficient since we store their matrix-based index column-wise in
the memory. This memory layout organization allows the inner product in PIR to access contiguous
memory blocks thereby, minimizing the memory access delay not only in the update but also in the
search. In ODSEwo
xor , we stored the matrix row-wise for row-friendly access to permit efficient XOR
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Figure 4.71: Delay of semi-honest ODSE with different query sizes.
operations during search. However, this requires file update to access non-contiguous memory blocks.
wo
Hence, the file update in ODSEwo
xor incurred a higher memory access delay than that of ODSEro and
ODSEwo
it as shown in Figure 4.70.
The main limitation of ODSE schemes is the size of encrypted index, whose asymptotic cost
is O(n · m), where n and m are the number of files and unique keywords, respectively. Given the
largest database being experimented, the size of our encrypted index is 23 GB. The client storage
includes two position maps of size O(m log m) and O(n log n), the stash of size O(m · log n), a
counter vector of size Ω(n) and a master key (in ODSEwo
xor scheme). Empirically, with the same
database size discussed above, the client requires approximately 22 MB in all ODSE schemes.
We studied the performance of our schemes and their counterparts in the context of various
keyword and file numbers involved in search and update operations that we refer to as “query size".
As shown in Figure 4.71, ODSE schemes are more efficient than using generic ORAMs when more
than 5% of keywords/files in the database are involved in the search/update operations. Since
the complexity of ODSE schemes is linear to the number of keywords and files (i.e., O(m + n)),
their delay is constant and independent from the query size. The complexity of ORAM approaches
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Figure 4.72: Delay of maliciously-secure ODSE schemes with one malicious adversary.
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Figure 4.73: Delay of maliciously-secure ODSE schemes with several malicious servers.
is O(r log2 (n · m)), where r is the query size. Although the bandwidth cost of ODSE schemes is
asymptotically linear, their actual delay is much lower than using generic ORAM, whose cost is
poly-logarithmic to the total number of keywords/files but linear to the query size. This confirms
the results of Naveed et al. in [136] on the performance limitations of generic ORAM and DSSE
composition, wherein we used the same dataset for our experiments.
we present the performance of maliciously-secure ODSE schemes described in §4.6.2.4. Figwo
wo
ure 4.72 presents the search and update delay of MD-ODSEwo
xor , MR-ODSEro and MR-ODSEit
schemes in the presence of one malicious adversary, compared with their corresponding semi-honest
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version. Recall that in this setting, we set the number of servers in the system for MD-ODSEwo
xor ,
wo
MR-ODSEwo
ro and MR-ODSEit schemes to be two, three and four, respectively. We can see that the
search delays of maliciously-secure ODSE schemes are around two times slower than their semi-honest
version. It is mainly due to the additional processing and network transmission overhead for the
MAC components stored at the server-side, which has the same size with the encrypted index. The
wo
update of MR-ODSEwo
ro and MR-ODSEit schemes are around three times slower than that of their
wo
semi-honest version. The main reason is that MR-ODSEwo
ro and MR-ODSEit requires an extra server
in the system to detect one malicious adversary, which leads to the increase of the client bandwidth
overhead.
We also explored the performance of maliciously-secure ODSE schemes when the number of
malicious servers increases. Allowing more servers to be malicious requires to deploy more servers
wo
in the system. Specifically, MR-ODSEwo
ro and MR-ODSEit schemes need 2t + 1 and 3t + 1 servers
in total to be robust against t number of malicious servers, respectively. Figure 4.73 presents the
performance of maliciously-secure ODSE schemes with the varied number of corrupted servers. We
can see that it is expensive to offer the robustness for a number of malicious servers in the system.
This is because it incurs not only the client bandwidth overhead to communicate with more servers,
wo
but also the client computation overhead. In the worst case, MR-ODSEwo
ro and MR-ODSEit requires


`
`
the client to perform t+1
and 2t+1
times of MAC verification, respectively, to find an authentic

|t|-bit data block in the presence of (less than) t malicious servers. Since MD-ODSEwo
xor can only
detect the malicious behavior (without knowing which server it is), its overhead only increases
slightly when allowing more servers to be malicious. This is because it only requires to deploy more
servers in the system, and the client aborts the protocol immediately when he/she finds an invalid
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MAC tag (without trying aggressively to find an alternative authentic block as in MR-ODSEwo
ro and
MR-ODSEwo
it schemes).

4.6.3 OMAT and OTREE: Oblivious Data Structures for Database Services
We propose two efficient oblivious data structures that permit various types of queries on
the encrypted databases: (i) Our first scheme is referred to as Oblivious Matrix Structure (OMAT).
The main idea behind OMAT is to create an oblivious matrix structure that permits efficient queries
over table objects in the database not only for the row but also column dimension. This is achieved
via various strategies that are specifically tailored for the matrix structure with a delicate balance
between the query diversity and the ORAM bandwidth overhead. This allows OMAT to perform
various types of oblivious queries without streaming a large number of ORAM blocks or maintaining
a very large position map at the client. (ii) Our second scheme is referred to as Oblivious Tree
Structure (OTREE), which is designed for oblivious accesses on tree-indexed database instances.
Given a column whose values can be sorted into a tree structure (i.e., numeric values), OTREE
allows efficient oblivious conditional queries (e.g., a range query).
We illustrate desirable properties of our schemes in Figure 4.74-(c,d), and further discuss
them as follows.

• Highly efficient and diverse oblivious queries: OMAT supports a diverse set of queries to be
executed with ORAM. Specifically, OMAT permits oblivious statistical queries over value-based
columns such as SUM, AVG, MAX and MIN. Moreover, oblivious queries on rows (e.g., insert, update)
can be executed on an attribute with a similar cost. As shown in Table 4.9, with the given
parameters and experimental setup, executing a column-related query such as statistical or
conditional query with OMAT is approximately 28× more communication efficient than that
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Research Gap: Limitations of Existing Oblivious Database Access Approaches
Oblivious Access and
Query to Table-A

(a) Limitations of Row-Oriented Packaging in DBaaS
ROW QUERY

Tree-based ORAM Construction of Table A
1. Statistical Queries: û
• Downloading all ORAM
blocks for statistical results
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QUERY

Row_2
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RowID Col1 Col2

Row_3

Row_1
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Tree-based ORAM Construction of Table A
1. Size of Position Map: û
• O(MN)

STATISTICAL
QUERY

Client
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QUERY
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• Downloading all ORAM
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(b) Limitations of Cell-Oriented Packaging in DBaaS
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cells in a row
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3. Column-Related Queries: û
• Round-trip delay to fetch all
cells in a column for queries
such as conditional and
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P
O
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Desirable Properties of Our Proposed Schemes
(c) OMAT (Oblivious Matrix Structure): An oblivious matrix structure and new
ORAM packaging strategies to permit diverse and efficient queries on table instances.

(d) OTREE (Oblivious Tree Structure): An oblivious tree structure and new levelbased ORAM packaging strategies with a heap unification for tree-indexed databases.

• Efficient and Oblivious Statistical Queries on Columns

• Efficient and Oblivious Access to Tree Data Structures

• Efficient and Oblivious Conditional Queries on Columns without Indexing

• Oblivious Access to Index-Tree for Efficient Conditional and Range Queries

• Efficient and Oblivious Row Queries

Experiments and Open-Source
(i)

OMAT and OTREE are fully implemented with Path-ORAM. (any tree-based ORAM scheme can be used)

(ii)

Performance evaluations on LAN server and in-state remote (Amazon EC2) server with MongoDB instances

Figure 4.74: OMAT and OTREE motivation.
of RowPKG and this enables OMAT to perform queries approximately 13× faster than that of
RowPKG. Compared to ODS-2D, although OMAT is only 1.6 × more communication-efficient, it
performs approximately 5× faster in practice due to the large number of additional round-trip
delays. OTREE achieves better performance than ODS for obliviously accessing the database index,
which is constructed from the values of a column as a tree data structure. The communication
cost of OTREE is 1.6× less than that of ODS without caching. This gain can be increased up to
3.2× with the caching strategy.
• Generic instantiations from tree-based ORAM schemes: We notice that any tree-based ORAM
scheme (e.g., [169, 179]) can be used for both OMAT and OTREE instantiations. This provides
a flexibility in selecting a suitable underlying ORAM scheme, which can be adjusted according to
the performance requirements of specific applications. Note that we instantiated our schemes with
Path-ORAM [169] due to its efficiency, simplicity and not requiring any server-side computation.
• Comprehensive experiments and evaluations We implemented OTREE, OMAT, and their counterparts under the same framework. We evaluated their performance with a MongoDB database
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Table 4.9: Transmission cost and client storage for compared schemes.
a

Scheme

RowPKG [42]
ODS-2D [182]
OMAT
RowPKG [42]
ODS-2D [182]
OMAT

Communication Cost

Efficiency

b

c

Client Storage

single column-related query (e.g., statistical, conditional queries)
Z · (_1 · N ) · (2M − 1)
1.00
O(M · N ) · w(1)
(M/4) · [Z · (16 · |b|1 ) · log2 (M · N/16)]
17.04 O(M · log(M · N )) · w(1)
Z 2 · (|b|1 ·M ) · log2 (N )
28.44
O(M · log(N )) · w(1)
single row-related query (e.g., insert/delete/update queries)
Z · (|b|2 ·N ) · log2 (M )
1.00
O(N · log(M )) · w(1)
(N/4) · [Z · (16 · |b|2 ) · log2 (M · N/16)]
0.19
O(N · log(M · N )) · w(1)
Z 2 · (|b|2 ·N ) · log2 (M )
0.25
O(N · log(M )) · w(1)

End-to-End Delayd
Moderate
High
Network
Network
6096 s
1245 s
475 s

776 s
292 s
60 s

567 ms
2380 ms
2032 ms

56 ms
350 ms
128 ms

1318 ms
592 ms

traversal on database tree index (e.g., range queries)
non-caching
ODS-Tree [182]
OTREE
half-top caching
ODS-Tree [182]
OTREE

2 · Z1 · |b|·(H + 1)2
Z2 · |b|·(H + 1) · (H + 2)

1.00
1.60

O(H) · w(1)
O(H) · w(1)

7929 ms
3762 ms



2 · Z1 · |b|· H+1
· (H + 1)
 H+1  2  H+1 

Z2 · |b|· 2
·
+1
2

1.00

√
O( 2H ) + O(H) · w(1)
√
O( 2H ) + O(H) · w(1)

1676 ms

3.20

5979 ms

1008 ms
272 ms

• Table Notations: M and N denote the total number of (real) rows and columns in the matrix data structure, respectively. H is the height of
the tree data structure. Z and |b| denote the bucket size and size of each block (in bytes), respectively.
• Settings: We instantiate our schemes and their counterparts with underlying Path-ORAM for a fair comparison. The bottom half of the table
compares OTREE and ODS-Tree when combined with tree-top caching technique proposed in [127], in which we assume the top half of treebased ORAM is cached on the client during all access requests.
• Server Storage: All of the oblivious matrix structures require O(M N ) server storage, however, the storage of OMAT is a constant (e.g., Z = 4)
factor larger than others. OTREE is twice more storage efficient than ODS.
a Represents the total cost in terms of bytes to be processed (e.g., communication/computation depends on the underlying ORAM scheme)
between the client and the server for each request. For OMAT , ODS-2D and RowPKG, the cost is for one access operation per query. For
OTREE and ODS, the cost is for traversing an arbitrary path in a binary tree.
b Denotes the communication cost efficiency compared to chosen baseline, where Z = 4, |b| = 64, |b| = 128, M = 215 , N = 29 for ODS-2D, Row1
2
PKG and OMAT, and Z1 = 4, Z2 = 5 (for stability), |b|= 4096, H = 20 for ODS-Tree and OTREE.
c Client storage consists of the worst-case stash size to keep fetched data. Additionally, the position map of OMAT and RowPKG are O((M +
N ) log(M + N )) and O(M · log(M )), respectively. For ODS based structures and OTREE, position map requires O(1) storage due to pointers
and half-top cached blocks are also included in client storage.
d The delays were measured with a MongoDB instance running on Amazon EC2 connected with the client on two different network settings.

instance unning on a remote AmazonEC2 server with two different network settings: (1) moderatespeed network and (2) high-speed network. This permits us to observe the impact of real network
and cloud environment.

We now present our proposed oblivious data structures, which are specially designed for
efficient operations in database settings. We propose two schemes including Oblivious Matrix
Structure (OMAT) and Oblivious Tree Structure (OTREE). OMAT supports efficient oblivious
statistical queries on generic table instances, while OTREE supports range and conditional queries
on tree-indexed instances. Figure 4.75 outlines the overview of our proposed techniques. For our
oblivious data structures, we choose Path-ORAM [169] as the underlying ORAM for the following
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conditional queries
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Figure 4.75: Overview of our proposed techniques.
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Figure 4.76: OMAT structure for oblivious access on table.
reasons: (i) It is simple yet achieves asymptotic efficiency. (ii) Unlike some recent ORAMs [54, 150]
that require computations at the server side, it requires only read/write operations. This is useful
since such advanced cryptographic operations might not be readily offered by well-known database
instances (e.g., MongoDB, MySQL). (iii) The availability of Path-ORAM implementations on existing
frameworks (e.g., CURIOUS [20]) enables a fair experimental comparison of the proposed techniques
with the state-of-the-art.

4.6.3.1

OMAT: Oblivious Access on Table Structures
The direct application of tree-based ORAMs to access encrypted tables in general [20] and

database systems in specific [42] have been shown to be inefficient for large datasets. Specifically, if
each row in the table is packaged into an ORAM block as in [42], then performing queries to fetch a
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data ← OMAT.Access(op, dim, id):
1: b ← pmdim [id].pid
2: if dim = col then
$
3:
pmdim [id].pid ← {1, . . . , 2dlog2 (N )e−1 }
4:
H ← dlog2 (N )e
5: else
$
6:
pmdim [id].pid ← {1, . . . , 2dlog2 (M )e−1 }
7:
H ← dlog2 (M )e
. Read all rows/columns on the path P(b)
8: for each ` ∈ {0, . . . , H} do
9:
Sdim ← Sdim ∪ ReadBucket(dim, P(b, `))
10: data ← Read row/column with id from Sdim
11: data ← FilterDummy(data, S¬dim )
12: S¬dim ← Update(S¬dim , pmdim )
13: if op = write then
14:
Sdim ← (Sdim \ {(id, data)}) ∪ {(id, data∗ )}
. Evict blocks from the stash
15: for each ` ∈ {H, . . . , 0} do
16:
S0dim ← {(id0 , data0 ) ∈ Sdim |P(b, `) = P(pmdim [id0 ].pid, `)}
17:
S0dim ← Select min(|S0dim |, Z) blocks from = S0dim
18:
Sdim ← Sdim \ S0dim
19:
o←1
20:
for each (id0 , data0 ) ∈ S0dim do
21:
pm[id0 ].level ← `
22:
pm[id0 ].order ← o , o ← o + 1
23:
WriteBucket(dim, P(b, `), S0dim )
24: return data

Figure 4.77: OMAT access protocol.
column in such a table (e.g., statistics) would require the client to stream all blocks in the ORAM
structure, which might be impractical. On the other hand, packaging each cell in the table into an
ORAM incurs a high network delay and client storage overhead. Thus, we investigate on how to
translate the table into an oblivious data structure so that each row and column of it can be both
accessed efficiently by a given ORAM scheme. Below, we first describe our oblivious data structure
and then present our OMAT access scheme on top of it.
The main data structure that we use for oblivious access on a table is a matrix. Given an
input table T of size M × N , we allocate a matrix M of size Z · 2dlog2 (M )e−1 × Z · 2dlog2 (N )e−1 . We
arrange tree-based ORAM building blocks for oblivious access as follows:
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The layout of OMAT matrix M can be interpreted as two logical tree-based ORAMs defined
as oblivious rows (denoted as OROW) and oblivious columns (denoted as OCOL) as illustrated in
Figure 4.76. That is, the ORAM for row access on OROW is formed by a set of blocks bi := (idi , datai ),
where idi is either a unique identifier if bi contains the content of a row of the table T or null otherwise,
and datai ← M[i, ∗]. We group Z subsequent rows in M to form a bucket (i.e., node) in the OROW
structure. Similarly, the ORAM for column access on OCOL is formed by bj = (idj , dataj ). Each
(bucket) node in OCOL is formed by grouping Z subsequent blocks.
We assign each row T[i0 , ∗] (i0 = 1, . . . , M ) and each column T[∗, j 0 ] (j 0 = 1, . . . , N ) with
a random leaf node IDs ui0 and vj 0 in OROW and OCOL, respectively. That is, the data of T[i, ∗]
and T[∗, j] reside in some rows and columns of M along the assigned paths P(ui ) in OROW and
P(vj ) in OCOL, respectively. In other words, M[i, j] ← T[i0 , j 0 ], where M[i, ∗] ∈ P(ui0 ) in OROW
and M[∗, j] ∈ P(vj 0 ) in OCOL. Our construction requires two position maps (pmrow and pmcol ) to
store the assigned path for each row T[i0 , ∗] and each column T[∗, j 0 ] of table T in OROW and
OCOL, respectively. Our position maps store all necessary information to locate the exact position
of a row/column data in the tree-based ORAM structures as pm := (id, hpid, level, orderi), where
0 ≤ level ≤ log2 (N ) indicates the level of the bucket, in which the row/column with id resides, and
1 ≤ order ≤ Z indicates its order in the bucket.
We present our OMAT scheme, which is instantiated with Path-ORAM, in Figure 4.77.
Specifically, given a column (resp. row ) identifier (id) to be accessed22 , the client retrieves its
location from the column (resp. row ) position map (step 1). The client then assigns the column (resp.
row ) to a new location selected uniformly at random (steps 2–7). The client reads all columns (resp.
rows) residing on the same path according to tree-based ORAM layout (as depicted in Figure 4.76(c)
22

The access can be any types of operation such as read/add/delete/modify.
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to the stash (steps 8–9). In this case, we modify the original ReadBucket subroutine of Path-ORAM,
where it now takes an extra parameter (dim) that indicates the dimension to be read, and outputs
the corresponding Z columns/rows in the bucket. The client retrieves the column (resp. row ) with
id from the stash (step 10). One might observe that according to OMAT structure, the retrieved
column (resp. row ) will contain data from dummy rows (resp. columns) as depicted by empty blue
cells in Figure 4.76(b). Therefore, to obtain only the real data of the requested column (resp. row ),
the client filters all data from dummy rows (resp. columns) (step 11). Moreover, since the position
of the retrieved column (resp. row ) is moved to a new random position (steps 2–7), it is required to
update all rows (resp. columns) that are currently stored in the stash at this column (resp. row )
position to achieve the consistency (step 12). If the access is to update, the client then updates the
column (resp. row ) with new data (steps 13–14) Finally, the client performs eviction as described in
Path-ORAM to flush columns (resp. rows) from the stash back to the OMAT structure in the server
(steps 15–23).
Notice that all columns/rows are IND-CPA decrypted and re-encrypted as they are read and
written to/from the server, respectively. We assume that it is not required to hide the information
whether a column or a row is being accessed. However, this can be achieved with the cost of
performing oblivious accesses on both row and column (one of them is dummy selected randomly)
for each access.
Recall that, in row-oriented packaging, implementing secure statistical queries on a column
requires downloading the entire ORAM blocks from the database. In contrast, OMAT structure
allows queries such as add, delete, update not only on its row but also on its column dimension.
Thus, we can implement statistical queries (e.g., MAX, MIN, AVG, SUM, COUNT, etc.) over a column in an
efficient manner via OMAT. Note that OMAT can also permit conditional query on rows with WHERE
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statement. Similar to statistical queries, the query can be implemented by reading the attribute
column on which the WHERE clause looks up OCOL first to determine appropriate records that satisfy
the condition, and then obliviously fetching such records on OROW structure. For example, assume
that we have the following SQL-like conditional search.

SELECT * FROM A WHERE C > k

It can be implemented by:
1. Read the column C with id0 on OCOL as C[∗, id0 ] ← OMAT.Access(read, col, id0 ).
2. Get IDs of rows whose value larger than k, and such IDs are in pmrow as
I ← {id|id ∈ pmrow .id ∧ C[id, id0 ] > k}
3. Access on OROW to get the desired result as R[id, ∗] ← OMAT.Access(read, row, id), for each
id ∈ I.
The aforementioned approach can work with any unindexed columns. In the next section, we
propose an alternative approach that can offer a better performance if the columns can be indexed
with certain restrictions.

4.6.3.2

OTREE: Oblivious Access on Tree Structures
In the unencrypted database setting, conditional queries can be performed more efficiently, if

column values can be indexed by a search-efficient tree data structure (e.g., Range tree, B+ tree, AVL
tree). Figure 4.82 illustrates an example of a column indexed by a range tree for (non)-equality/range
queries, in which each leaf node points to a node in another linked-list structure that stores the list
of matching IDs. We propose an oblivious tree structure called OTREE, in which indexed data for
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such queries are translated into a balanced tree structure. As in OMAT, OTREE can be instantiated
from any tree-based ORAM scheme. Notice that oblivious access on a tree was previously studied in
[182]. Our method requires less amount of data to be transmitted and processed, since the structure
of indexed values (i.e., the tree data structure) is not required to be hidden, and the client is merely
required to traverse an arbitrary path of the tree. We present the construction of OTREE as follows.
Given a tree-indexed data T of height H as input, we first construct the OTREE structure
of height H with ORAM buckets as illustrated in Figure 4.78. Then, each node of T at level ` is
assigned to a random path and placed into a bucket of OTREE which resides on the assigned path
at level `0 where `0 ≤ `. In other words, any node of T at level 0 ≤ ` ≤ H will reside in a bucket at
level ` or lower in OTREE. If there is no empty slot in the path, the node will be stored in the stash
if OTREE is instantiated with stash-required ORAM schemes (e.g., Path-ORAM).
We assume T is sorted by nodes’ id and the position of nodes at level ` is stored in its parent
node at level ` − 1 using the pointer technique proposed in [182]. Hence, each node of T is considered
as a separate block in OTREE structure as: b := (id, data, childmap), where id is the node identifier
sorted in T (e.g., indexed column value), data indicates the node data, and childmap is of structure
hid, posi that stores the position information of node’s children.
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(data) ← OTREE.Access(op, id, data∗ ):
1: x0 ← RootPos
2: S ← S ∪ ReadBucket(P(x0 , 0), 0)
3: b0 ← Read block with id0 = 0 from S
4: for each ` ∈ {0, . . . , H − 1} do
5:
if compare(id, id` ) = go_right then
6:
(id`+1 , x`+1 ) ← b` .child[1]
$

7:
8:
9:

b` .child[1].pos ← {0, . . . , 2` − 1}
else
(id`+1 , x`+1 ) ← b` .child[0]

10:

b` .child[0].pos ← {0, . . . , 2` }

11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:

$

S ← S ∪ ReadBucket(P`+1 (x`+1 , ` + 1))
b` ← Read block id` from S
if id = id` then
data ← b` .data
if op = write then
S ← (S \ {b` }) ∪ {(id, data∗ , child)}

17:
for each `0 ∈ {`, . . . , 0} do
18:
S0 ← {b0 ∈ S : P` (b0 .pos, `0 ) = P` (b` .pos, `0 ) ∧ b0 .level = `}
19:
S0 ← Select min(|S0 |, z) blocks from S0
20:
S ← S \ S0
21:
WriteBucket(P` (x` , `0 ), S0 )
22: return data

Figure 4.79: OTREE access protocol.
OTREE can be instantiated with any tree-based ORAM schemes (e.g., Ring-ORAM [150],
Circuit-ORAM [179]) , as similar to OMAT in §4.6.3.1, by modifying corresponding retrieval/eviction
procedures while preserving the constraints of OTREE regarding the deepest level of nodes. OTREE
also receives a significant benefit from caching mechanisms like top-tree caching [127], which can
speed up bulk access requests.
We give the proposed OTREE scheme instantiated with Path-ORAM in Figure 4.79. Specifically, given the node identifier id to be accessed in the id-sorted tree structure, the client first reads
the root bucket of Path-ORAM structure to obtain the root node of the tree (steps 1–3). The client
then compares the requested id with the root id to decide which child of the root node should be
accessed in the next step. The client accesses this child by reading its path in the Path-ORAM
structure from level 0 to level 1. We notice that for each node at level l in the tree to be accessed,
219

80
60
40
20
0

100

OTREE
ODS [182]
Level Load (%)

Level Load (%)

100

OTREE
ODS [182]

80
60
40
20

0

2

4

6
8
10
Level Index

12

14

0

0

2

(a) Z = 4

4

6
8
10
Level Index

12

14

(b) Z = 5

Figure 4.80: Average bucket load in OTREE.
the client only accesses the path in the Path-ORAM structure up to level l. The process repeats
until the desired id is found (steps 4–16). Finally, the client performs eviction to flush read nodes
back to the Path-ORAM structure, wherein nodes at level l in the tree must reside somewhere in
the Path-ORAM structure from level 0 to level l (steps 17–21).
The construction and constraints of OTREE require a stability analysis to ensure that treebased ORAM scheme on OTREE behaves similarly to ODS in terms of the stash overflow probability.
We provide an empirical stability analysis of OTREE with Path-ORAM as follows.
We analyze the stability of OTREE in terms of the average bucket load in each level of the
ORAM tree. Intuitively, one would expect an increase in average bucket load near the top of the
ORAM tree, and a possible increase in the average client stash size if a Path-ORAM variant (e.g.,
[127, 150]) is used. We show empirically by our simulations, that OTREE behaves almost similar
to ODS with a bucket size of Z ≥ 4 with Path-ORAM. With Z = 5, bucket usage with OTREE
structure approaches that of the stationary distribution when using an infinitely large bucket size.
Our empirical study considered experiments with an ORAM tree of height H = 14 storing
N = 215 − 1 blocks. We ran the experiments with different bucket sizes to observe its effect on the
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stash size and bucket usage. We treated ORAM blocks as nodes in a full binary tree of H = 14. We
inserted nodes into storage according to the breadth-first order via access functions followed by a
series of (H + 1)-length access requests, each of which consists of accessing a path of nodes from the
root to a random leaf node in the binary tree. A single-round experiment was the execution of 214
random root-to-leaf access sequences as described.
Figure 4.80 and Figure 4.81 show the results of these experiments for ODS and OTREE with
different bucket sizes. The results were generated by first running 1000 warm-up rounds after the
initialization, and then collecting statistics over 1000 test rounds. Figure 4.80 depicts that with a
bucket size Z = 5, buckets near the root of the OTREE structure contain roughly two non-empty
blocks (one more than the average number of blocks assigned to them). Figure 4.81 illustrates that
with Z ≤ 4, the probability of the stash size exceeding O(H) for OTREE diminishes quickly. These
results suggest that using Z = 5 for OTREE in order to make underlying ORAM scheme in OTREE
behaves similarly to that with Z = 4 on ODS.
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Figure 4.82: OTREE example for range queries.
We exemplify an implementation of a database index structured as OTREE for conditional
queries as follows: Consider a column whose values are indexed by a sorted tree T of height h by
putting distinct values as keys on leaf nodes as depicted in Figure 4.82. The leaf nodes of T points to
a node ID in a linked-list structure that contains a list of matching IDs with the key. We translate T
into OTREE, where each node at level ` < H stores the position maps of its children. We store a list
of IDs in each linked-list node using an inverted index with compression. As the data structure for
the linked-list, we employ ODS to store it in another ORAM structure (see [182] for details). Hence,
each leaf node of T stores the position map of a linked-list node in ODS it points to. An example
of a given conditional query is SELECT ∗ FROM A WHERE C = k, where the column C is indexed into
OTREE. It can be executed obliviously as follows.
1. Traverse a path with OTREE to get a leaf node as b ← OTREE.Access(k).
2. Get ID and position map of linked-list node which b points to as (id, pos) ← b.childmap.
3. Access on ODS to get the desired result as R ← ODS.Access(id, pos, ·).
The overall cost for this approach is: O(log2 N + k · O(log(N )), where k is the distance from
the first element of the linked-list. The first part is the overhead of OTREE and the second part is
the overhead of ODS (without padding).
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4.6.3.3

Security Analysis

Corollary 8. Accessing OMAT leaks no information beyond (i) the size of rows and columns, (ii)
whether the row or column dimension being accessed, given that the ORAM scheme being used on
top is secure by Definition 5.

Proof. Let M be an OMAT structure consisting of two logical tree-based ORAM structures OROW
and OCOL with dimensions M and N , respectively. Let the bit |b|= 0 if the query is on OROW and
|b|= 1, otherwise. A construction providing OMAT leaks no information about the location of a
node u being accessed in M beyond the bit |b| and dimensions (M, N ). This is due to the fact that
OMAT uses a secure ORAM that satisfies Definition 5 to access each block of OROW and OCOL in
M. Thus, as long as the node accessed within OROW or OCOL is not distinguishable from any other
node within that OROW and OCOL through the number of access requests, it is indistinguishable
by Definition 5.

Note that the information on whether the row or column was accessed can be hidden by
performing a simultaneous row and column access on both dimensions for each query. This poses a
security-performance trade-off. One can also hide the size of row and column by setting OMAT matrix
with equal dimensions, but this may introduce some cost for certain applications.
Corollary 9. Accessing OTREE leaks no information about the actual path being traversed, given that
the ORAM scheme being used on top is secure by Definition 5.

Proof. Let T be a tree data structure of height H. Let T` be the set of nodes at level 0 ≤ ` ≤ H in
the tree. A construction providing OTREE leaks no information about the location of a node u ∈ T`
being accessed in the tree beyond that it is from T` . This is due to OTREE uses a secure ORAM
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that satisfies Definition 5 to access each level of the tree. Thus, as long as a node accessed within
level ` is not distinguishable from any other node within that level through the number of access
requests, it will be indistinguishable according to Definition 5.

There are several side-channel attacks on Path-ORAM (e.g., [13, 64]) when it is executed
by the secure CPU playing on behalf of the ORAM client. In this context, since the secure CPU
resides in the untrusted party, the adversary has a partial view on it to exploit the timing leakage
(e.g., [13]). In our model, we assume that the client is fully trusted and it is totally apart from the
adversary view (i.e., untrusted database server). Therefore, we do not consider these side-channel
leakages due to the difference between our model and the secure CPU context.

4.6.3.4

Experimental Evaluation
We implemented our schemes and their counterparts on CURIOUS framework [20]. We

integrated additional functionalities into the framework to perform batch read/write operations
to prevent unnecessary round-trip delays, and also to communicate with MongoDB instance via
MongoDB Java Driver. We chose MongoDB as our database and storage engine. We preferred
MongoDB since its Java Driver library is well-documented and easy to use. Moreover, it supports
batch updates without restrictions, which is important for consistent performance analysis.
We created our database table with randomly generated data with a different number of
rows, columns, and field sizes. We then used the table to construct tree-based ORAMs for compared
schemes. For instance, in OMAT, we created OROW and OCOL structures from this table, while an
oblivious tree structure is created for OTREE.
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For our experiments, we used two different client machines on two different network settings:
(i) A desktop computer that runs CentOS 7.2 and is equipped with Intel Xeon CPU E3-1230, 16 GB
RAM; (ii) A laptop computer that runs Ubuntu 16.04 and is equipped with Intel i7-6700HQ, 16 GB
RAM. For our remote server, we used AmazonEC2 with t2.large instance type that runs Ubuntu
Server 16.04. While the connection between the desktop and the server was a high-speed network
with download/upload speeds of 500/400 Mbps and an average latency of 11 ms, the connection
between the laptop and the server was a moderate-speed network with download/upload speeds of
80/6 Mbps and an average latency of 30 ms.
We evaluated the performance of our schemes and their counterparts based on the following
metrics: (i) The Response time (i.e., end-to-end delay) including decryption, re-encryption and
transmission times to perform a query; (ii) Client storage including the size of stash and position
map; (iii) Server storage including the size of OMAT or OTREE. We compared the response times of
OMAT and its counterparts for both row- and column-related queries (e.g., statistical, conditional).
For OTREE and ODS-Tree, we compared the response times of traversing an arbitrary path on the
tree-indexed database. To measure the end-to-end delay, we used the std::chrono C++ library to
get the actual duration at the client side, from the time the client sends the first command until
he receives the last response from the Amazon server. For each experiment, we ran 50 times and
took the average number as the final response time reported in this section. We now describe our
experimental evaluation results and compare our schemes with their counterparts.
We first analyze the response time of column-related queries for OMAT, ODS-2D and
RowPKG. With these queries, the client can fetch a column from the encrypted database for
statistical analysis or a conditional search. Given a column-related query, the total number of bytes
to be transmitted and processed by each scheme are shown in Table 4.9. RowPKG’s transmission
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Figure 4.83: Delay of OMAT and its counterparts with fast network.
cost is the size of all ORAM buckets, where H · (|b|·N ) and (2M − 1) denote the bucket size and
the total number of buckets, respectively. As for OMAT, its oblivious data structure OCOL allows
efficient queries on column dimension with O(log(N )) communication overhead, which outperforms
the linear overhead of O(N ) of RowPKG. While OMAT and RowPKG can fetch the whole column
with one request, it requires M/4 synchronous requests for ODS-2D where each request costs
Z · (16 · |b|1 ) · log2 (M · N/16) bytes due to 4 × 4 clustering of the cells.
We measured the performance of OMAT and its counterparts with arbitrary column queries.
In this experiment, we set parameters as |b|= 64 bytes and Z = 4. The number of columns N varies
from 24 to 29 , where the number of rows is fixed to be M = 215 . Figure 4.83a and Figure 4.84a
illustrate the performance of the schemes on two different network settings with two different client
machines. For a database table with 210 rows and 29 columns, OMAT’s average query times are
60 s and 475 s compared to RowPKG’s 775 s and 6100 s, and ODS-2D’s 292 s and 1245 s on highand moderate-speed networks, respectively. This makes OMAT about 13× faster than RowPKG.
While OMAT performs 2.6× faster than ODS-2D on the moderate-speed network, it becomes 4.9×
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Figure 4.84: Delay of OMAT and its counterparts with moderate network.
on high-speed network since the latency starts to dominate the response time of ODS-2D with M/4
requests due to its construction with pointers.
We now analyze the response time of row-related queries for OMAT and its counterparts.
Given a row-related query, the total number of bytes to be transmitted and processed by OMAT and
its counterparts are summarized in Table 4.9. For OMAT and RowPKG, (|b|·N ) and Z · log2 (M )
denote the total row size and the overhead of Path-ORAM, respectively. Due to OMAT’s OCOL and
OROW structures, OMAT is always a constant factor of Z = 4 more costly than RowPKG. Clustering
strategy of ODS-2D also introduces more cost and makes ODS-2D 4.2× more costly than RowPKG
when N = 32.
We measured the performance of OMAT and its counterparts with arbitrary row queries,
where the number of rows M varies from 210 to 220 . The block size is |b|= 128 bytes and the
number of columns is fixed as N = 32. By this setting, the total row/record size is |b|·N = 4096
KB. Figure 4.83b and Figure 4.84b illustrate the performance of the compared schemes for both
network settings. We can see that OMAT performs slower than RowPKG by a constant factor of
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Figure 4.85: Delay of OTREE and ODS-Tree.
approximately 2.3× and 3.6× on high and moderate-speed network, respectively. As for ODS-2D,
Figure 4.83b explicitly shows the effect of the round-trip delay introduced by network latency on
ODS-2D due to N/4 synchronous requests. Although ODS-2D has similar cost with OMAT, it
performs approximately 220ms and 380ms slower than OMAT.
We analyze the response time of oblivious traversal on database index that is constructed as
a range tree by putting distinct values of a column to the leaf of the tree. Figure 4.82 exemplifies the
constructed range tree, and this structure is used along with its linked list to perform conditional
queries (e.g., equality, range) on an indexed column, and fetch matching IDs. We compare our
proposed OTREE and ODS-Tree with no caching and half-top caching strategies.
Given a database index tree constructed with values of the column, the total number of bytes
to be transmitted and processed by OTREE and ODS-Tree without caching are Z2 ·|b|·(H +1)·(H +2)
and 2 · Z1 · |b|·(H + 1)2 , respectively, where H is the height of tree data structure. While ODS
traverses the tree with O(H), the additional overhead of Path-ORAM makes the total overhead to
be O(H 2 ). As for OTREE, its level restriction on ORAM storage reduces the transmission overhead
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by 1.6×. With half-top caching strategy, overheads of both schemes reduce as shown in Table 4.9,
however, OTREE’s construction benefits more from caching by performing traversal 3.2× less costly
than ODS-Tree.
For this experiment, we set the block size |b|= 4 KB, the number of blocks inside a bucket
for ODS-Tree is Z1 = 4, and the number of blocks inside a bucket for OTREE is Z2 = 5. We
benchmarked OTREE and ODS-Tree with arbitrary equality queries when the number of indexed
values varies from 29 to 219 . The number of indexed values is set to 219 for large database setting.
For both network settings, Figure 4.85 demonstrates the effect of half-top caching strategy and
how the structure of OTREE gives more leverage in response time. While OTREE without caching
performs around 2× faster than its counterpart, caching allows OTREE to perform 3.6× faster than
ODS-Tree with caching for both network settings.
We now analyze the client storage overhead of our schemes and their counterparts. The
position map of OMAT requires O((M + N ) · log(M + N )) storage, while RowPKG requires O(M ·
log(M )), since only the position map of rows are stored. However, the dominating factor is M ,
since large databases have more rows than columns. ODS’s pointer technique allows it to operate
with O(1) storage for position map. Moreover, the worst-case stash size changes with the query
type, because stash is also used to store currently fetched data and the worst-case storage costs
are summarized in Table 4.9. For row-related queries, the worst-case stash storage is the same for
both OMAT and RowPKG but ODS-2D requires more storage due to clustering. For column-related
queries, RowPKG requires storing O(M · N ) that corresponds to all ORAM buckets. Besides the
query performance issues, this also makes RowPKG infeasible for very large databases to perform
column-related queries. In addition, ODS-2D also requires O(log(M )) times more client storage
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compared to OMAT. While RowPKG and ODS-2D have the same server storage size, OMAT requires
constant Z× more storage due to additional dummy blocks.
Since OTREE and ODS do not require the position map to operate, the client storage consists
of the stash and additionally cached block according to the caching strategy used. For the worst-case,
both schemes have the same client storage with the same caching strategy; however, the stash of
OTREE may be more loaded than ODS as shown in Figure 4.81 due to its level restriction. Moreover,
server storage of OTREE is 2× less than ODS, since Path-ORAM of ODS requires one more level
than OTREE.
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Chapter 5: Hardware-Supported Oblivious Storage and Query Platforms23

5.1

Introduction
Search and update are two fundamental functions in any data outsourcing and analytic

platforms. While ORAM can protect the access pattern and confidentiality while conducting
encrypted search and update operations, it incurs high communication/computation, or deployment
costs (i.e., by hiring multiple servers). To address this issue, one line of research harnessed secure
hardware to support ORAM [8, 62, 127, 152, 159]. Initial studies designed a custom hardware (e.g.,
FPGA) to enhance the ORAM performance, and therefore, they might not be easily integrated
into commercial server systems with a legacy architecture [62, 127, 152]. Thanks to the advent of
trusted execution environments recently on commodity hardware such as Intel SGX [46, 100, 101],
the deployment of hardware-supported cryptographic primitives has become more feasible [8, 60, 159].
Several oblivious encrypted search platforms have been proposed [66, 172]; however, they incur a
high delay when dealing with a large amount of outsourced data since its cost grows linearly with
the database size. Moreover, state-of-the-art solutions did not fully investigate the update capability,
which is an essential feature of data-outsourcing applications.
It is also common that the outsourced database can be shared by multiple users, in the sense
that every user may have different permissions to access a specific data item. While ORAM can
be extended to support the multi-user setting, doing so brings up new challenges such as network
bandwidth overhead, complexity of handling concurrent access, asynchronicity, access control, etc.
23
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Although there exist several ORAM schemes, which support either access control [128, 129] or
parallelization [28, 41, 43, 140], they may not fully satisfy all the functionality, performance, and
security requirements. Maffei et al. in [129] showed that there exists a computation lower bound of
Ω(N ) to achieve both the access control and access pattern obliviousness against an active adversary.
A more efficient approach is to use a trusted proxy to handle multi-user concurrent accesses and
enforce access control [20, 158, 166, 167, 186]. However, fully asynchronous proxy designs [20, 167]
were shown insecure against timing attacks [158] exploiting access pattern leakages in processing
concurrent requests. To fix this vulnerability, Sahin et al. proposed TaoStore [158], the most efficient
and secure proxy design to-date, which allows passive ORAM protocols (e.g., Path-ORAM) to be
securely executed in parallel over the network. Despite their merits, all proxy designs execute the
standard ORAM protocols over the network so that their performance is capped by the limitations
of the network bandwidth and latency, and fail to scale beyond that limit. Since all proxy designs
are originally proposed to exploit the maximum network throughput for concurrent accesses, they
do not focus on access control enforcement or handling an active adversary. Maffei et al. in [129]
pointed out that proxy-based designs can offer access control enforcement with the incorporation
of an access control data structure and authentication at the proxy. A detailed exploration of this
enhancement in practical settings is a worthy investigation.
Our objective is to take the ORAM supported by commodity secure hardware to the next
levels, in which we develop privacy-preserving and functional platforms using Intel SGX that can
support (i) practical search/update operations on very large database, (ii) concurrent access from
multiple users (iii) access control enforcement while, at the same time, (iv) concealing the access
pattern and achieving confidentiality and integrity. We implemented our techniques to demonstrate
their efficiency compared with state-of-the-art approaches.
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5.2

Related Work
To enable multi-user concurrent access, several Parallel-ORAM schemes have been introduced

[28, 41, 43, 140]. However, these constructions feature large block size [41], or add poly-logarithmic
communication blowup atop standard ORAM [28, 43, 140]. Maffei et al. proposed several access
control-supported ORAM schemes (e.g., [128, 129]), and provided a computation lower bound of
Ω(N ) for the composition of access control and ORAM against active adversaries.
ObliviStore [168] and its extended multi-server version [166] were among the first to exploit
a trusted proxy for concurrent oblivious access in the multi-user setting. In these systems, the
proxy schedules concurrent user’s requests and then, executes Partition-ORAM [168] with the
storage server [20, 158, 166, 167]. Since ObliviStore only parallelizes requests on different blocks,
but sequentializes same-block requests, it leaks timing information. This allows an adversary to
distinguish access patterns from multi-users. To seal this leakage, CURIOUS framework [20] also
parallelizes same-block requests by invoking one actual ORAM operation along with several dummy
ORAM operations between the proxy and storage server. Although this design enables CURIOUS
to be fully asynchronous (i.e., one request can be processed immediately without waiting for the
previous requests to be finished), Sahin et al. [158] showed that it still leaks timing information.
Specifically, because dummy ORAM operations do not return the actual block being requested to
the proxy, concurrent requests on the same block cannot be answered until the real one is finished.
Given that the adversary can observe all network traffic coming from the proxy, and even reschedule
the network package delivery from the storage server, it can learn the timing difference in replying
same-block requests vs. different-block requests of the proxy. Another limitation is that, they rely on
Partition-ORAM [168], which incurs costly communication overhead due to the background eviction
√
and high proxy storage overhead (i.e., O( N )).
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To seal timing information leakage, Sahin et al. [158] indicated that the proxy must reply
users’ requests sequentially according to their arrival order. The authors proposed TaoStore, which
implements two modules called Processor and Sequencer at the proxy, where the former executes a
standard ORAM (i.e., Path-ORAM [169]) with the storage server in parallel via multiple threads,
while the latter is to reply users’ requests sequentially. Once a thread obtains data from the storage
server due to ORAM operation, Processor will lock the proxy’s local memory and synchronize it
with the fetched data, and then transfers the desired block to the Sequencer for user reply. TaoStore
is also more efficient than previous designs because it employs Path-ORAM [169].
Given that the ORAM communication lower bound has been well-established [74, 119, 179],
recent studies start to look for the support of secure hardware to make ORAM for client-server
applications more practical. The idea of ORAM and secure-hardware composition was first suggested
by concurrent studies in 2013 [62, 125, 127, 152]. However, these these techniques harnessed a custom
hardware such as FPGA, which may not be widely available on commodity cloud platforms. With the
advent of widely available trusted execution environments on commodity hardware (e.g., Intel SGX),
the deployment of hardware-supported cryptographic primitives has become more feasible. For
instance, ZeroTrace [159] and Obliviate [8] leveraged Intel SGX with ORAM to enable oblivious
memory primitives and file access operations, respectively. Intel Intel SGX was also used to design
a functional encryption framework in [60]. These works did not focus on multi-client setting and
access control enforcement. Another relevant work is [55], which harnesses SGX to enforce access
control policy and encryption services. However, it does not provide the access pattern obliviousness.
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5.3

Intel-SGX
Intel Software Guard eXtension (SGX) [100, 101], available from Skylake since 2015, is the

Intel’s commodity implementation of Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) as an extension to
the commodity x86 Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) Its motivation is to have a minimal Trusted
Computing Base (TCB), which is only the program that runs in the TEE, by putting a hardware
trust anchor in the CPU, thus SGX even excluding the operating system from its trust model.
SGX provides an Enclave, which isolates its memory from untrusted system components
other than CPU and also protects the integrity and confidentiality of its memory. Intel SGX isolates
the enclave’s execution by providing a private memory called the enclave page cache (EPC), which
resides in a reserved space in DRAM (the processor reserved memory, PRM) [46]. The EPC is
isolated from the other software security domains by SGX’s hardware mechanism. Thus, SGX blocks
any software attempt to read/write enclave’s memory from user-level as well as privileged-level
(including operating systems and virtual machine monitor) attackers. Moreover, because SGX
encrypts (with integrity check) the data before storing it on to DRAM, EPC stores only encrypted
data on it. Therefore, any hardware attempt to read enclave’s memory will not leak any meaningful
information, and any tampering to enclave’s memory will be detected (and then SGX stops the
enclave’ execution).
SGX supports the remote attestation of the enclave to authenticate whether the configuration
of the enclave is correct and to share a secret key for secure communication [46, 102] only after the
authentication. When a remote attestation request initiated by a client is delivered to the enclave,
the SGX subsystem will run the trusted quoting enclave, which creates a measurement (i.e., hash of
configurations, loaded program with a nonce, and a public key material for key exchange) of the
enclave and signs it (with the quoting enclave’s key). This measurement will be submitted to the
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Intel Attestation Service (IAS) to verify the quoting enclave’s signature; the result will be signed by
IAS and then will be delivered to the client. By verifying IAS’s signature on the result, the client
ensures that a correct enclave is running on the server. The attestation message also includes public
key parameters of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange of the client and the enclave so that a client can
securely communicate with the enclave after this process, by encrypting data using the shared secret.
The root of trust of Intel SGX relies on an infrastructure provided by Intel (e.g., the Intel
Attestation Service and the quoting enclave). Our current implementation uses Intel SGX for its
secure enclave; therefore, its privacy is bound to Intel’s discretion. However, we believe that this is
just an implementation-specific issue and that the use of alternative open-source secure enclaves such
as Sanctum [47] on the RISC-V architecture [183] could relax this restriction, e.g., by distributing
trust over the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), similar to how Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS)
works in practice.
Because an enclave is a part of the user-level process, Intel SGX does not provide any
protection on privileged operations such as system calls, e.g., file and network I/O, etc. Because
such operations have to be performed by the untrusted OS, the enclave must encrypt data before
transferring them to the OS. For example, a network communication between the client and the
enclave should apply encryption to their connection, and a file write operation should store only
encrypted data. For this purpose, Intel provides cryptographic libraries and tools for secure data
migration between the enclave and the OS so the enclave can securely communicate across the
security boundary if it is provisioned with a secret key for the encryption; this can be done securely
via remote attestation.
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5.4

POSUP: Practical Oblivious Search and Update Platform
We design a new hardware-assisted privacy-enhancing platform that we refer to as Prac-

tical Oblivious Search and Update Platform (POSUP). Our proposed POSUP enables oblivious
(single/multi)-keyword search and update operations on very large datasets in a much more efficient
and practical manner compared with existing techniques. Our system design is inspired from
ZeroTrace [159], where we synergize SGX-supported ORAM with Oblivious Data Structure (ODS)
[182] to enable oblivious keyword search and update operations on encrypted data. This synergy
(i) addresses the network bandwidth and communication hurdles of ORAM-SE composition in the
client-server setting; (ii) eliminates the cost of processing the entire database inside Intel SGX as in
[66, 172]; and more importantly, (iii) allows for operation on a large outsourced database without
being restricted by Intel SGX memory as in [8]. This composition also enables efficient oblivious
keyword update capacity. We further outline our contributions as follows:

1. New oblivious search and update platform design with SGX: We construct ODS instantiations
for EIDX and EDB by harnessing Intel SGX with Path-ORAM [169] and Circuit-ORAM [179].
POSUP allows for some query types such as single keyword and multi-keyword queries. Moreover,
POSUP supports an efficient oblivious update via our optimization tricks that exploit some
special characteristics of the underlying oblivious data structures.
2. Full-fledged implementation and evaluation: We implemented POSUP and evaluated its performance on commodity hardware with a large dataset (e.g., a full-size Wikipedia English corpus)
containing hundreds millions of keyword-file pairs and millions of files. Our implementation is
efficient, taking only 1 ms to obliviously access a 3 KB block with SGX hardware. Our experi-
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mental results showed that POSUP incurs much lower end-to-end delay than state-of-the-art
solutions as follows:
• Compared with the ORAM-SE composition in the conventional client-server model (without
a secure hardware), POSUP incurs 100× less network bandwidth overhead and and 1000×
fewer network communication round-trips. As a result, the end-to-end delay of POSUP is two
orders of magnitude lower than that of this approach for both keyword search and update
operations (see §5.4.6 for detailed experiments).
• Compared with processing the entire database in Intel SGX (e.g., [66, 172]), POSUP requires
less data to be processed by the enclave (i.e. O(log N ) vs. O(N ), where N is the size of
outsourced database). This results in POSUP having 10× lower end-to-end delay than the
existing techniques for up to 99.5% of keywords (see §5.4.6). If the number of searched files
is small, POSUP can be 100× faster. Moreover, POSUP allows oblivious updating, which
does not seem to be fully investigated in state-of-the-art SGX-assisted platforms (e.g., [66]).

3. Putting hardware-supported ORAM in real effect: We take the concept of hardware-supported
ORAM primitives to the next level, wherein we develop oblivious data structures and routines
with optimizations to provide practical search and update functionalities on large databases,
which was not investigated by existing hardware-supported memory primitives (e.g., ZeroTrace).
Our implementation will be available at: www.github.com/thanghoang/POSUP.

POSUP’s objective is to utilize a public cloud server, which is equipped with commodity
secure hardware, as secure storage that supports search and dynamic update operations over very
large encrypted datasets. To this end, POSUP aims at deploying a practical oblivious encrypted
search and update platform to guarantee data confidentiality and no access pattern leakage during
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Figure 5.1: An overview of POSUP workflow.
search and update operations, along with a trusted execution. Specifically, to defeat attacks against
data confidentiality and access pattern leakages, POSUP creates a commodity hardware-supported
ORAM and Oblivious Data Structure (ODS) platform, which enables oblivious searches and updates
efficiently, even for very large datasets. To defeat attacks against the server’s execution logic, POSUP
runs its ORAM and ODS controllers in an enclave protected by Intel SGX.

5.4.1 System and Threat Models
5.4.1.1

System Model
We first describe our system composition and then summarize our POSUP workflow.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the components of POSUP and its composition: a client, an untrusted

server, and a trusted enclave on the server. A client (the box on the left side) is a remote entity
that generates and manages recursive ORAM and ODS components on the untrusted server via an
encryption key ko . After initializing the system, the client can send a query to update data on the
server or to search data and then receive the search results from the server.
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The server comprises two parts: an untrusted server and a trusted enclave. (i) The untrusted
server provides storage for recursive ORAM and ODS data structures. (ii) The enclave is a trusted
part of the server and executes ORAM and ODS controller (while protected by Intel SGX). On
behalf of the client, the enclave performs all oblivious search/update operations upon the client’s
request on the encrypted data structures stored on the untrusted server. To do this, the enclave
receives the encryption key ko from the client via a secure channel at the initialization.
Figure 5.1 outlines the overview of oblivious search and update in POSUP.
The client first performs the remote attestation of the enclave (provided by Intel SGX), which
is running on the untrusted server. This attestation step not only verifies that the program running
in the enclave is intact but also exchanges cryptographic keys (a session key Ks ) to establish a secure
(encrypted) channel between the client and the enclave. After establishing the secure channel, the
client also sends a key ko to the enclave, which will be used for ORAM operations.
Upon receiving the key, the enclave on the server will initialize encrypted data structures.
Our POSUP is composed of two main encrypted data structures: ODS-IDX, which is an encrypted
index that represents keyword-file relations, and ODS-DB, which stores encrypted files. Both data
structures are stored in the server’s untrusted memory. We employ the ODS techniques proposed in
[182] to instantiate ODS-IDX and ODS-DB. This data structure initialization step happens only at
the first connection. In other words, to perform search and update operations, the client requires
only that a session key (Ks ) be exchanged with the enclave.
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1 The client encrypts the search (resp. update) query with the session key Ks , and sends it

to the enclave (through the untrusted server). 2 Upon receiving the encrypted query, the enclave
decrypts it with Ks . 3 The enclave scans the entire keyword hash table24
All these strategies enable us to achieve oblivious keyword search/update operations more
efficiently than processing the entire ODS-DB and ODS-IDX in the enclave [66, 172]. Our system
is also more efficient than the direct application of existing SGX-ORAM memory primitives [159]
because we harness the ODS technique for both ODS-DB and ODS-IDX, which reduces the number
of recursive calls when executing an oblivious keyword search/update query.

5.4.1.2

Threat Model
We build POSUP based on the following assumptions as its threat model. The client is fully

trusted and transfers only the ORAM encryption key ko to the enclave after establishing a secure
channel with the enclave (Therefore, untrusted parts of server cannot obtain this key). To establish
this secure channel, we rely on the remote attestation protocol provided by Intel SGX. Thus, we
need a trusted authority (right now, it is Intel) for this remote attestation protocol; however, this
does not have to be Intel if we utilize a different kind of secure enclave (e.g., Sanctum [47]). We
assume the server is untrusted except for the enclave. Specifically, we do not trust any of the server’s
logic that includes a virtual machine monitor, operating system and drivers, software that manages
24

Since keyword universe is arbitrarily large, it is mandatory to maintain a hash table that uniquely matches each
keyword to a block ID in the encrypted index for a given dataset (see §5.4.3.1 for more details). to retrieve block IDs
and their location (path) in ODS-IDX that correspond to the query. 4 If the query is to search, the enclave performs
ODS accesses on ODS-IDX using the ORAM key ko to get matching file IDs. 5 The enclave determines the location
of file IDs in ODS-DB by executing recursive ORAM accesses with ORAM key ko on the file position map structure.
6 The enclave performs ODS accesses on ODS-DB with ko to retrieve file(s) associated with the query. 7 The
enclave encrypts retrieved files with Ks and sends them to the client. 8 The client recovers encrypted files with Ks .
The enclave performs the same procedure as search for handling the update query, where it first performs a keyword
hash table scan and ODS accesses on ODS-IDX to update blocks in the encrypted index, followed by a recursive
ORAM access on the file position map and an ODS access on ODS-DB to update file blocks in the encrypted files.
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storage, etc. This is a general assumption for a system that utilizes an enclave because Intel SGX
isolates and applies encryption to the enclave’s memory space using hardware mechanisms.
Intel SGX does not come without limitations; it suffers from various side-channel attacks in
cache access [30, 78, 83, 122], memory access [31, 187], registers [121], etc [106, 184]. Unfortunately,
preventing side-channel attacks against Intel SGX entirely is a very challenging task. Instead
of making POSUP side-channel free, we aim only to make POSUP secure against several known
side-channel attacks on Intel SGX, which are mentioned above. For simplicity, we do not focus
on securing POSUP against size and timing information leakage, which can be easily achieved via
padding. We refer the reader to §5.4.5 for a more detailed discussion.

5.4.2 POSUP Building Blocks
We use Intel SGX as a trusted execution environment to protect the execution of the ORAM
controller on the untrusted server. We run the logic in an SGX enclave, which guarantees the
isolation and confidentiality of its execution, to protect the ORAM controller logic from attacks.
We utilize the remote attestation protocol of Intel SGX to check the integrity of our logic and
securely exchange/provision secret keys for storing ORAM data structures, as well as to protect
communication channels between the enclave and the client. We also implement our logic in the
enclave using oblivious primitives in the Intel processor such as CMOV and SETE instructions to prevent
potential access pattern leakage.
We implement oblivious assignment (oupt) and oblivious equality comparison (ocmp) functions based on CMOV and SETE instructions proposed in prior works [142, 149], which do not leak
access patterns via control-flow side-channel attacks when POSUP executes the ORAM controller
inside the enclave as follows.
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• pred ← ocmp(x, y): It takes as input two values x, y, and outputs pred = 1 if x = y or pred = 0
otherwise.
• z ← oupt(pred, x, y): It takes as input two values x, y and a boolean pred. It assigns z ← y if
pred = 1, and z ← x otherwise.
We refer interested readers to prior works [142, 149] for a detailed description of these
functions. Note that our ocmp function slightly differs from what was originally proposed in [142],
where we employ SETE instead of SETG instruction for equality checking.
ZeroTrace [159] proposed OReadPath and OEvict, which are secure versions of ReadPath and
Evict tree-based ORAM functions, respectively, both of which are executed by the enclave without
leaking side-channel access patterns. We implemented our version of OReadPath and OEvict and
refer readers to ZeroTrace [159] for a detailed description. In OReadPath and OEvict, we scan the
entire stash and path and then use ocmp and oupt to put real blocks from the path to the stash,
or vice versa. This results in Path-ORAM being more computation-expensive than Circuit-ORAM
as follows. Since Path-ORAM pushes all real blocks from the path to the stash or vice-versa, its
OReadPath and OEvict incur two nested loops, where we must scan the entire stash for each path slot
access to hide the access pattern. Circuit-ORAM processes only one targeted block at a time and
only incurs two separate loops that scan the entire path once to get target blocks and the entire stash.
As a result, Circuit-ORAM is more computation-efficient than Path-ORAM when dealing with a
B ← OGet(S, id):
1: B ←⊥
2: for i = 1, . . . , |S| do
3:
v ← ocmp(S[i].id, id)
4:
B ← oupt(v, S[i], B)
5: return B

Figure 5.2: OGet function in POSUP.
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large dataset and large block size (see §5.4.6). We then implement the OGet function (Figure 5.2),
which reads a block ID from the stash S into the enclave without leaking access patterns via ocmp
and oupt.

5.4.3 The Proposed POSUP Platform
We first describe the oblivious data structures in POSUP. We then present the oblivious
search and update protocol in detail.

5.4.3.1

Oblivious Data Structures
Figure 5.3 presents the overview of ODS-IDX and ODS-DB in POSUP. ODS-IDX and ODS-DB

follow the tree ORAM paradigm in [161] because POSUP harnesses Path-ORAM and Circuit-ORAM
as oblivious access cryptographic primitives. We create a search index (IDX) from a set of plaintext
files (DB) and then package IDX and DB into ODS-IDX, ODS-DB, respectively, as follows.
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We construct IDX as an inverted index, in which given DB as the input, we extract unique
keywords and associate each keyword wi with the list of corresponding file IDs idij that wi appears
in as wi := (idi1 . . . , idin ). We divide the list of each keyword in IDX into multiple chunks of the
same size and package them into separate tree ORAM blocks. We use the pointer trick (i.e., linked
list in [182]) to connect these blocks with each other, where the information of successive blocks is
stored in their predecessors. Thus, each block is in the form of B := (id, DATA, NextID, NextPath),
where id is the block ID; DATA := (hfid1 , σ1 i, . . . , hfidn0 , σn0 i) is the block data, which contains a
partial list of file IDs (fid) as well as their state (σ ∈ {0, 1}) indicating whether they are added or
deleted; NextID and NextPath are the ID and the path of the next block, respectively. Finally, we
create ODS-IDX by putting all constructed blocks into a tree ORAM structure.
Since keywords are arbitrary and can be of any length, POSUP maintains a hash table data
structure (TW) to map each arbitrary keyword to an ORAM block ID (id) as well as its path (pid)
in ODS-IDX. Additionally, POSUP stores a counter (ci ) for each keyword in TW to indicate the
actual number of hfid, ci pairs that are stored in the head block of the list. So, TW is of the form
hkey, valuei, where key is the hash of the keyword and value contains a triplet (id, pid, c). We denote
the access operation to the value component in TW as (id, pid, c) ← TW[wi ].
In POSUP, we maintain TW under the encrypted form in the storage server. This allows
the client to be stateless and easily extensible to the multi-client setting (see §5.4.4 for further
discussion). Since, to the best of our knowledge, there is no oblivious hash table mechanism, the
enclave performs a linear scan on TW for reading/writing component(s) in TW to hide the access
pattern. Notice that recursive-ORAM might not be applied on TW because it requires deterministic
indexes to operate, while keywords to be accessed are arbitrary.
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ODS.Setup(DB):
1: B ← ∅; B 0 ← ∅
2: W := (w1 . . . , wM ) ← Extract all unique
keywords in DB

−
→ M 
−
→
3: Construct inverted index IDX ← hwi , fidi ii=1 , where fidi := (hfidi1 , 1i . . . , hfidin , 1i) are file IDs
containing wi
4: for each file fi ∈ F do
5:
Split fi into mi chunks of size |B|
6:
7:
8:
9:

10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:

$

Bij .DATA ← j-th chunk; Bij .pid ← [2H ] ∀j ∈ [m]
for j = 1, . . . , mi − 1 do
Bij .NextID ← Bij+1 .id
Bij .NextPath ← Bij+1 .pid
pmf [Bi1 .id] ← Bi1 .pid
B ← B ∪ {Bi1 , . . . , Bimi }
ODS-DB ← BuildORAMTreeko (B)
BuildRecursiveORAM(pmf )
for each keyword wi ∈ W do
−
→
fidi ← IDX[wi ]
−
→
Split fidi to m0i chunks (ci1 , . . . , cim0i ) each of size |B 0 |
$

0

0
0
Bij
.DATA ← cij ; Bij
.pid ← [2H ] ∀j ∈ [m0 ]
for j = 1, . . . , m0i − 1 do
0
0
Bij
.NextID ← Bij+1
.id
0
0
Bj .NextPath ← Bij+1
.pid
0
0
B 0 ← B 0 ∪ {Bi1
, . . . , Bim
0}
i

22: ODS-IDX ← BuildORAMTreeko (B 0 )
23: TW[wi ] ← (Bi1 .id, Bi1 .pid, |ci1 |) for each wi ∈ W

Figure 5.4: Setup algorithm to construct oblivious data structures in POSUP.
We apply the same principle as in the encrypted index construction to build ODS-DB from
DB. Since each file is organized into a linked list, we set B.id = id, where B is the first block in the
list and id is the ID of the file that B represents. Given that the size of IDX is generally smaller
than that of DB, we build ODS-IDX and ODS-DB as two separate oblivious data structures, where
the block size of ODS-IDX is smaller than that of ODS-DB.
POSUP maintains the file position map to keep track of the path of the head block in each
ODS linked list. Note that we can index file IDs with an integer from 1 to N , where N is the
total number of files in DB since POSUP focuses on search and update functionalities on keywords
appearing in DB. This allows us to maintain the file position map via a recursive ORAM in the
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server side. Our design needs to perform only recursive ORAM access to get the path of the starting
block, while the path of other blocks in the linked list is obtained from their predecessor due to
the ODS technique. This reduces the number of recursive calls on the file position map compared
with the direct application of oblivious memory primitives (e.g., [8, 62]) for enabling oblivious query
functionality.
We present the detailed algorithm to construct ODS-IDX and ODS-DB in Figure 5.4. We
encrypt ODS-IDX and ODS-DB with ORAM key ko and store both ODS-IDX and ODS-DB on the
server’s untrusted memory. The stash components required by underlying ORAM schemes are also
encrypted with ko and stored in the server’s untrusted memory. They are loaded and decrypted in
the enclave when needed.
Since search operations require us to clear stale data that might arise due to previous update
operations, we first introduce the oblivious update protocol in POSUP and then describe the oblivious
search.

5.4.3.2

POSUP Oblivious Update Protocol
For simplicity, we assume that the file to be updated (fid ) is already present at the client side.

The update operation incurs fid to be added/deleted/modified from EDB, and some keyword-file
pairs to be added/deleted from EIDX. Intuitively, for each keyword (wi ) to be updated in fid , the
client requests the enclave to add id along with the update state (add/delete) to an empty data slot
in the head block of the linked list, which represents the search result of wi in EDB. If there is no
available slot, the enclave picks an empty block25 in EDB, adds update information into it and then
links it with the current head block of the linked list by updating its NextID and NextPath values.
25

ID of empty blocks can be stored in a separate data structure (e.g., list).
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This strategy results in blocks close to the head of the list containing the latest updated file IDs.
Figure 5.5 outlines the oblivious update protocol with the following details.
The client updates the file content, and forms a list of keywords (w) to be added or deleted
in the updated file (fid ) ( 1 ). The client encrypts the update query (q) containing id and w with
Ks and sends it to the enclave. The enclave decrypts q with Ks ( 2 ) and then accesses the entire
keyword position map (TW) to retrieve the block ID (id), path (pid), and current counter (c) of
updated keywords ( 3 ). For each updated keyword (wi ), the enclave checks whether there is an
empty slot in the head block of wi in ODS-IDX ( 3 ). If this does not hold, the enclave gets the ID
and the path of an empty block in ODS-IDX ( 5 ) and updates this block as the new head of the
linked list of wi in TW ( 6 ). Notice that POSUP performs all comparison and update operations
in the oblivious manner using ocmp and oupt functions described in §5.4.2 to prevent instructional
leakage. Once the target block is determined, the enclave performs an ORAM access on ODS-IDX to
add fid and the update state (σ) into it ( 7 –11). Specifically, for each updated keyword (wi ), the
enclave first executes OReadPath with path pidi ( 7 ) to fetch the block (Bi ) of ID idi from ODS-IDX
into the stash (S). Second, it reads Bi from S via OGet ( 8 ) and then adds hfid, σi to the block
data (Bi .DATA) ( 9 ). If Bi was previously empty, it updates the pointer of Bi to link it with the
current block head of wi (10). Finally, the enclave performs OEvict to write the updated Bi back to
ODS-IDX (11).
Given the ID (fid) of the updated file (13), the enclave executes recursive ORAM accesses on
the file position map to retrieve the location of fid in ODS-DB (14). The enclave splits the updated
file ffid into several chunks and then executes ODS access on ODS-DB to update the ORAM data
blocks in the linked list of ffid with these chunks (15–17).
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Figure 5.5: POSUP oblivious update protocol.
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We can see that the deletion in POSUP does not actually delete some real data in ODS-IDX
but instead performs addition with the state bit (σ = 0). This lazy deletion enables the efficient
update, which only requires O(1) access on the encrypted index compared with O(r) in the actual
deletion due to the search, where r is the number of files in which the updated keyword appears.
The price to pay for this efficiency is the cost of increasing the actual size of the search index and the
search complexity. To mitigate this impact, after k (system parameter) successive updates, POSUP
performs a dummy search on the most frequently updated keyword to do garbage collection, since
the search operation in POSUP will clear stale data appearing in blocks toward the tail of the linked
list, as described in the next section.

5.4.3.3

POSUP Oblivious Search Protocol
Figure 5.6 presents the oblivious search protocol in POSUP. First, the client executes the

remote attestation protocol with the enclave to establish a secure communication channel with a
session key (Ks ). The client then encrypts the search query of the form q = w1 ?1 . . . ?m−1 wm with
Ks , where ?i ∈ {∨, ∧} ( 1 ) and sends it to the enclave. The enclave decrypts q with Ks to obtain
the list of searched keywords (wi ) and performs the following operations.
The enclave scans TW entirely to get the block ID (idi ) and its path (pidi ) in the index
(ODS-IDX) of each wi ( 2 ).
For each hidi , pidi i pair, the enclave performs an ODS access on ODS-IDX (containing multiple
ORAM accesses) to retrieve all blocks in the linked list, all of which form the entire list of file IDs
(Ri ) matching wi ( 3 –11). According to our update strategy (see §5.4.3.2), blocks toward the head
of the oblivious linked list will contain file IDs with the most up-to-date update state. Hence, during
the block update operation ( 5 ), the enclave will clear stale file IDs in the accessed block if they are
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Figure 5.6: POSUP search protocol.
already present in Ri , or their most recent update status is “delete.” Once the block becomes empty
(meaning it does not contain any file IDs left), the enclave will store its ID in the empty list in TWso
that it can be re-used later in the update operation. After the block is accessed with ORAM, the
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enclave determines if it links with another block via ocmp ( 8 ). If this holds, the enclave gets the
next block information ( 9 ) and continues the oblivious access as above. Otherwise, it processes the
next searched keyword (10).
Note that we perform all these conditional checks and processing in an oblivious manner
via ocmp and oupt functions. This prevents POSUP from leaking the information regarding size of
individual searched keywords (11) but only the total amount of data that are processed due to the
search query.
After the file IDs (stored in Ri ) of each keyword wi are retrieved, the enclave performs
union/intersection on Ri according to ?i to get the final list of file IDs matching q (12)26 . For each
block id0i in the joint list, the enclave performs recursive ORAM access (13) on the file position map
structure to retrieve the corresponding path pid0i of id0 in ODS-DB (14).
The enclave performs a sequence of ODS accesses on ODS-DB with the same logic as ODS-IDX
accesses to retrieve the file content of each id0i (15–16). Finally, the enclave encrypts all the retrieved
files with the session key Ks (17), and sends them to the client for decryption (18).

5.4.4 Extension to Multi-User Setting
In POSUP, the client is stateless. Thus, it is easy to extend POSUP into the multi-user
setting including a data owner (who owns n outsourced files), a storage server, and k users (who
want to search/update on n files) as follows. The data owner creates an access control data structure
(ACDS) to grant permission (e.g., search/update) for k users on n files. The data owner encrypts and
sends ACDS to the enclave, along with the encrypted index (ODS-DB) and encrypted files (ODS-DB)
26

Since the file ID (fid) is assigned to the ID (id) of the head block in the linked list, we use fid and id interchangeably.
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that are constructed, as described in §5.4.3.1, all of which are stored in the server’s untrusted memory
(e.g., SSD).
Given that a user wants to search for a keyword, he/she will authenticate with the enclave
using, for example, the user identifier and password. If authenticated, the enclave performs oblivious
access on ODS-IDX (as described in §5.4.3.3) to obtain file IDs matching the query. For each file ID,
the enclave accesses ACDS with ORAM to check whether the user has the read permission on the
file. If so, the enclave performs oblivious access on ODS-DB to retrieve the file and sends it to the
user. The same principle applies to the file update procedure. Roughly speaking, the enclave first
authenticates the user and then obliviously accesses ACDS to check whether the user has the update
permission on the file. If permitted, the enclave executes the oblivious update protocol as presented
in §5.4.3.2.

5.4.5 Security Analysis
We design and build POSUP by using ODS and ORAM, and therefore, its security is inherited
from the security of these tools. Specifically, these tools guarantee that POSUP hides all access
patterns on ODS-IDX and ODS-DB, given that they have the same length as in Definition 5.
In POSUP, we can observe from Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 that search and update operations
incur the same oblivious access procedures on encrypted data structures. In particular, given a
search/update query, the enclave first performs (i) access on the entire keyword hash table and then,
(ii) ODS access(es) on ODS-IDX, followed by (iii) recursive ORAM access(es) on the file position
map, and finally (iv) ODS access(es) on ODS-DB. In the update protocol, add and delete operations
also invoke the same oblivious access procedure, where they differ from each other only in terms
of the state bit value (σ), which is encrypted in the view of the attacker. Hence, in general, any
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search/update queries that are of the same size and incur the same number of (recursive) ORAM
and ODS accesses are indistinguishable.
Since ORAM and our linked list ODS do not hide the number of oblivious accesses,
POSUP might leak the size of the query, which can allow the attacker to distinguish access patterns,
thereby learning information about the query. The size information can be inferred in several points
when the enclave performs oblivious operations as follows. In the search protocol (Figure 5.6), the
size can be learned by an attacker from (i) the search query ( 1 ); (ii) the number of accesses on
the keyword hash table ( 2 ) and the encrypted index (11,12); (iii) the number of recursive ORAM
accesses on the file position map (13,14) and encrypted files (16); (iv) and the result returned to the
client (17). Similarly, in the update protocol (Figure 5.5), the size can be leaked from the update
query ( 1 , 2 ), or the number of accesses on encrypted data structures (12,17).
To mitigate the impact of size leakage, we can apply padding to all aforementioned positions.
For instance, for the query that requires less than n0 total ORAM accesses, one can add dummy
ORAM accesses on both ODS-IDX and ODS-DB, and dummy recursive ORAM accesses on the file
position map to quantize the total number to be n0 , thus making the query size indistinguishable
by the attacker. We can further apply padding to obfuscate the actual size of the search/update
query as well as the size of (search) results being sent from the enclave to the client at the end of
the protocol. However, we notice that such padding strategies are generally application-specific,
which fully depends on the characteristics of a particular dataset and user preferences, and also
might incur heavy bandwidth and processing overhead as the trade-off. This is because padding will
increase the cost of oblivious operations less than n0 (suppose the number of required operations is
n) to be equal to that of n0 actual operations (where n0 > n ). We refer the reader to Ryoan [98] for
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its parts of data-oblivious communication as well as quantizing processing time to learn more on
how the size quantization by padding can thwart such a side channel attack.
Although the enclave of Intel SGX provides security guarantees such as data confidentiality
and integrity against direct memory access attacks, it is not free from side-channel attacks. POSUP
does not aim to defeat all sorts of side-channel attacks, which seems to be a very difficult task; instead,
we try to build POSUP as a best-effort approach to make it secure against known side-channel
attacks. The use of recursive ORAM and ODS in POSUP naturally defeats side-channel attacks
on data access patterns such as cache side-channel attacks [30, 78, 83]. Employing oblivious data
comparison (ocmp) and oblivious data assignment (oupt) in POSUP (see §5.4.2) defeats attacks on
the control-flow side channel [31, 122, 187] because these primitives eliminate conditional branches
on processing secrets. Therefore, such attacks cannot measure a difference in control-flow for different
secrets.

5.4.6 Experimental Evaluation
5.4.6.1

Implementation
We implemented POSUP with C/C++ using the Intel SGX SDK v1.7. Our implementation

contains a total of around 4.9K lines of code for trusted and untrusted modules. For cryptographic operations inside the enclave, we leveraged Intel SGX SDK library functions including
sgx_aes_ctr_encrypt for encrypting ORAM with AES-CTR mode and sgx_read_rand for pseudo-

random number generation. We implemented Path-ORAM and Circuit-ORAM controllers in an
enclave to execute ODS access on ODS-DB and ODS-IDX. As mentioned in §5.4.3, our platform
stores ORAM stashes encrypted in the untrusted memory (RAM/SSD), and they are loaded into
the enclave when needed.
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We describe our configuration and evaluation methodology, followed by the main experimental
results.

5.4.6.2

Configuration and Methodology
We evaluated the performance of our system on a commodity HP Desktop, which supports

Intel SGX and is equipped with Intel E3-1230 v5 @ 3.4 GHz CPU, 16 GB RAM and 512 GB SSD.
Our dataset is the full Wikipedia English corpus enwiki v.20180120. To extract text data
from the corpus, we used WikiExtractor [11] Python script and extracted 5,554,594 distinct text-only
articles (i.e., files in our term) from enwiki. To collect the keywords for the search, we implemented
a standard tokenization method to extract unique alphabetical and non-alphabetical keywords from
the dataset. The total number of unique keywords in the dataset is 7,075,917 and the total number
of keyword-file pairs is 863,782,383. The total size of the database (DB) is 27 GB (on the disk), and
the total size of the search index (IDX) is 6.9 GB. Figure 5.7 presents the size distribution of text
articles in the enwiki dataset.
To assume a general use case of a mobile client and a cloud server, we use Wi-Fi as the
communication channel between the client and the server and then mimic the bandwidth and latency
of using Amazon EC2 from our lab. The average network latency and transmission throughput are
18 ms and 150 Mbps, respectively.
We compare POSUP with the implementation of existing designs, namely ORAM-SE and
EntireSGX. The following represents the configuration of each implementation and how we compare
each with POSUP.
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Figure 5.7: File size distribution in enwiki dataset in CDF.
• POSUP: We constructed ODS-IDX and ODS-DB with ORAM tree structures with 24 and 23
levels, respectively, to store the entire files (7,075,917 ≤ 223 ). Because more than 50% of files in
our dataset are smaller than 3 KB (shown in Figure 5.7), we selected the block size of ODS-DB
to be 3 KB to balance the efficiency and storage overhead. Likewise, we selected the block size of
ODS-IDX to be 512 B, because the majority of search keywords appears in less than 512 files (see
Figure 5.8c). We represent a file identifier with a 4-byte integer. This results in ODS-IDX being
obliviously accessed up to four times for most search cases. We set the stash size of both ORAM
schemes as 80 to achieve negligible overflow probability [169, 179].
• ORAM-ODS-SE – Direct ORAM-SE composition in a traditional client-server model (without
secure hardware): In this setting, we used the same configuration as in POSUP, where we integrate
ODS into the ORAM-SE composition for fair comparison with POSUP. We also set the size
of ODS-IDX and ODS-DB to be identical to POSUP. ORAM-ODS-SE differs from POSUP in
terms of the ORAM communication channel (over network vs. local bus) and the keyword
position map location (client vs. server). For the ORAM scheme, we employed Path-ORAM for
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ORAM-ODS-SE because it requires less access to ORAM, so it is more efficient than Circuit-ORAM
in the conventional client-server network setting. For the evaluation, we measured all delays
when a client is accessing ODS and recursive ORAM on ODS-IDX and ODS-DB stored on the
Amazon EC2 with the above network throughput and latency (18 ms and 150 Mbps). Note that
our analysis is conservative, because we tend not to take into account the impact of side factors
(e.g., disk I/O).
• EntireSGX – Processing the entire outsourced data in Intel SGX: We measured the search delay
by decrypting the entire EIDX and EDB inside the enclave. We used the maximum heap size
(i.e., 95 MB) allowed to the enclave to subsequently decrypt EIDX and EDB to maximize its
performance. In other words, EIDX and EDB are loaded and processed (decrypt/encrypt) in
95 MB chunks sequentially inside the enclave. For the update cost, we measured the delay of
decryption and re-encryption of the entire EIDX and EDB inside the enclave. Notice that in
POSUP, we selected the size of ODS-IDX and ODS-DB that have sufficient empty spaces for later
addition of the same amount of dataset size in the setup phase (i.e., 27 GB file with 6.9 GB index).
Hence, we double the size of EIDX and EDB in EntireSGX to assume it can also support addition,
similar to POSUP, for fair comparison between two techniques.

5.4.6.3

Micro Benchmark
We first conducted a micro benchmark of POSUP to investigate the delay of performing a

single recursive ORAM and ODS access. Three factors cause delay in each operation: (i) the time to
read/write ORAM data from the hard disk to the memory and vice versa (i.e., I/O access); (ii) the
time for an enclave to secure ORAM operations, such as applying encryption and decryption on the
data (i.e., encryption overhead); (iii) the amount of data to be processed in each ODS operation on
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Table 5.1: Micro-benchmark of POSUP.
Execution Time (µs)
Path-ORAM Circuit-ORAM

Operation

ODS access on ODS-IDX
I/O Access
134
Enclave Process
2,362
Total
2,496

144
686
830

ODS access on ODS-DB
I/O Access
156
Enclave Process
3,909
Total
4,065

285
746
1,031

Recursive ORAM on file position map
I/O Access
34
41
Enclave Process
13,246
4,631
Total
13,280
4,672

ODS-IDX and ODS-DB, expressed as

DODS = H · |B|·Z · k,

(5.1)

where H and |B| are the height and block size of ODS-IDX (or ODS-DB), respectively; and (Z, k) =
(4, 2) are the bucket size and the number of read/write operations in Path-ORAM, respectively.
When Circuit-ORAM is used, (Z, k) = (2, 5). The amount of data (in bytes) to be processed for
each recursive ORAM on the file position map pmf is:
l 

N 

X
Dpmf =
|B|·Z · k · log2
+
1
,
Ri

(5.2)

i=1

where N is the total number of files, R = |B|/4 is the compression ratio (assume that a path ID is
represented by 4 bytes) and l = blogR N c.
Table 5.1 presents the execution time of each ODS access on ODS-IDX and ODS-DB and
recursive ORAM on pmf in our current configuration. Note that the performance changes for the
different parameter configurations (e.g., for a different H, |B|, Z, or k) according to Equation 5.1
and Equation 5.2.
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The I/O access in POSUP is efficient because we implemented the caching technique proposed
in [127], where we cache the first K levels of the ORAM tree structures on the RAM. In this experiment, we used 4 GB of memory to cache 2/3 levels of both ODS-IDX and ODS-DB, which significantly
reduced I/O delay from 520-767µs to ≤285µs. Compared to Path-ORAM, Circuit-ORAM incurs
1.25× more I/O access, and therefore, its I/O latency is slightly higher than that of Path-ORAM.
Because the recursive ORAM structure of the file position map is small (i.e., ≈0.2 GB), we store the
entire map directly on the RAM. This results in its I/O access delay being negligible (i.e., ≤41 µs).
Processing data in the enclave has more effect on the access delay than I/O access because it
handles encryption and decryption when reading data from ORAM. Another point that we observed
from Table 5.1 is that the cost of executing the Path-ORAM controller in the enclave is much higher
than that of Circuit-ORAM because its read/eviction is more aggressive. Specifically, when using
Path-ORAM controller, the enclave must perform O(log N ) · |S| number of encryptions/decryptions,
where |S|= 80 is the stash size. In contrast, using the Circuit-ORAM controller requires O(log N )+|S|
number of encryptions/decryptions. Therefore, our benchmarked result has shown that integrating
Path-ORAM with secure hardware is much less efficient than Circuit-ORAM due to the multiplied
factor |S|, which is 80. The processing delay of recursive ORAM is high because this requires the
enclave to perform additional ORAM encryptions and decryptions on O(log N ) recursion levels.
Table 5.1 also illustrates that it takes 830 µs to obliviously access a 512 B block in ODS-IDX
with Circuit-ORAM. That is, the latencies of performing single-keyword searches on ODS-IDX in
many cases are likely similar to each other, and they are mostly dominated by the number of files
to be returned. We now illustrate the formula for calculating the number of ODS and recursive
ORAM accesses incurred in each search and update query. Given a search query q with n keywords
wi , let mi and m0 be the number of files matching wi and the final q, respectively. The search q on
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POSUP incurs
Pm0

|fi |
i=1 d |B 0 | e

Pn

mi
i=1 d |B| e

accesses on ODS-IDX plus m0 recursive ORAM accesses on pmf and plus

accesses on ODS-DB, where B, B 0 are block sizes of ODS-IDX and ODS-DB, respectively,

and |fi | is the size of file fi in m0 files. Given an updated file f with m updated keywords in it,
|f |
the cost is m accesses on ODS-IDX plus one recursive ORAM access on pmf plus d |B|
e accesses on

ODS-DB.
Because the delay in I/O access and encryption in an enclave is stable (i.e., does not change
between accesses), our measurement of the actual search and update delay in POSUP respected the
above formulas and the micro benchmark in Table 5.1. Moreover, as explained in §5.4.3.1, each
search/update operation in POSUP additionally incurs one-time decryption and re-encryption of the
entire keyword hash table (TW), which costs 210 ms for 188 MB-sized TW constructed from the
enwiki dataset.

In the following, we present actual benchmarked delay for search and update operations to
showcase the efficiency of our system compared with other techniques.

5.4.6.4

Search Delay
Figure 5.8a presents the end-to-end delay of processing a keyword search query in POSUP,

compared with ORAM-ODS-SE and EntireSGX techniques. POSUP (the blue line) is hundreds of
times faster than ORAM-ODS-SE (the purple line) for any search query being performed. This
is mainly because POSUP performs ORAM-controlling operations in an enclave, so it does not
incur significant network communication overhead like ORAM-ODS-SE, as shown in Figure 5.8b;
instead, the enclave reads a large amount of data from the memory, which is faster and cheaper than
accessing over the network. ORAM-ODS-SE incurs overhead not only in bandwidth (i.e., 100× more
than POSUP) but also in generating a large number of network round-trips (i.e., 1000× more than
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Figure 5.8: Detailed search delay of POSUP and its counterparts.
POSUP) due to multiple rounds incurred in the recursive ORAM and ODS operations. This is the
main bottleneck of ORAM-ODS-SE, given that the network latency is hard to improve in practice.
When compared with EntireSGX, POSUP is one to two orders of magnitude faster than
EntireSGX for more than 99.5% of keywords that can be searched. In Figure 5.8a, when searching
keywords that returns ≤ 212 files, POSUP is more efficient than EntireSGX. Figure 5.8c presents
the (accumulative) keyword distribution on enwiki. The Zipf’s law distribution [141] shown in
Figure 5.8c indicates that the cases returning ≤ 212 files are the majority (99.5%), and this indicates
that POSUP is more efficient than EntireSGX for a large fraction of keywords in practice. This is
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because the enclave in POSUP only works with a small amount of data per ORAM access, while
EntireSGX works with the entire index and dataset as its working set, as presented in Figure 5.8d.
For a small fraction of keywords (< 0.5%), the end-to-end delay of POSUP is slower than that of
EntireSGX.This is because a large number of ORAM and ODS accesses on ODS-IDX and ODS-DB
require data processing in enclave more than processing the entire dataset. The cost of executing
Path-ORAM and Circuit-ORAM in POSUP is C · r · 8 log2 (N ) and C · r · 10 log2 N , respectively,
where r is the number of file blocks matched with the search query, N = 223 is the total number of
file blocks in ODS-DB, and C is a constant factor. This formula implies that if r ≥

N
C·k·log2 N ,

where

k ∈ {8, 10}, then processing the entire database in the enclave is better than performing ORAM.
Our benchmark result in Figure 5.8a respects this formula. Theoretically, POSUP should incur more
memory accesses than accessing the entire memory when it processes more than 215 files. The graph
shows that overhead start to become significant when 213 files are returned, we can assume the
constant C as 4, and then POSUP processes more than

N
4·k·log2 N

file blocks in the enclave.

Padding so that a search query has the same size as another query will result in a total
delay of two queries becoming similar. For example, padding on one-file-involved queries to make
their size the same to four-file-involved queries incurs 46% extra delay (239ms) compared with the
non-padding case.

5.4.6.5

Update Delay
We selected the file with the largest size (i.e., 290 KB) in enwiki and performed the update

benchmark on that file for a different number of unique keywords that can be updated (add/delete)
in it. Figure 5.9 presents the end-to-end update delay of POSUP and its counterparts. POSUP is
one order of magnitude faster (40×) than ORAM-ODS-SE because it does not increase bandwidth
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Figure 5.9: End-to-end update delay of POSUP with a 290 KB file size.
and round-trip overhead, as analyzed above. POSUP with Circuit-ORAM produces the highest
throughput so that it achieves the lowest update delay among its counterparts. POSUP is up to
3, 300× faster than EntireSGX due to the inevitable overhead in I/O writing required by the design
of EntireSGX. An update in EntireSGX requires re-encrypting the entire data and write them back to
the disk. Therefore, the update delay of POSUP is three orders of magnitude faster than EntireSGX.

5.4.6.6

Storage Overhead
The server storage of EntireSGX is more efficient than POSUP and ORAM-ODS-SE. This

is because, in POSUP and ORAM-ODS-SE, IDX and EDB are arranged as tree-ORAM structures,
which incur a constant (e.g., 1.5×-2×) size blowup. Specifically, the total server storage of POSUP is
|TW|+|ODS-IDX|+|ODS-DB|+|pmf |= 0.19 + 34 + 97 + 0.19 ≈ 131 GB if POSUP uses Circuit-ORAM.
The corresponding overhead is 0.19+68+194+0.38 ≈ 262 GB if POSUP uses Path-ORAM. Note that
some capacity of the ORAM structure is reserved to enable oblivious update (e.g., addition/deletion).
Therefore, our server storage overhead presented above can allow the further addition of 3× more
IDX and DB to what being used in this experiment.
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5.5

MOSE: Multi-User Oblivious Storage Platform
We design a multi-user oblivious storage system called MOSE, which employs secure enclave

to drastically reduce network overhead, support security functionalities against active adversaries,
and exploit parallelism in the server at once. In particular, we first develop the trusted logics (similar
to the trusted proxy) on an untrusted server (i.e., not on the network) by adopting a commodity
secure enclave (SGX) as a secure isolation mechanism. This design is inspired by recent systems and
frameworks assisted by SGX (e.g., [8, 55, 60, 66, 91, 142, 159]), which employ a commodity secure
hardware to enhance the efficiency of the underlying cryptographic operations. We are motivated by
these approaches to overcome network bandwidth limitations of the previous proxy-assisted ORAM
systems.
MOSE offers the following desirable properties.

• Minimal network bandwidth overhead: MOSE removes network-related problems in existing proxyassisted oblivious storage systems by putting the trusted logic on an enclave. In this setting, the
enclave communicates with the storage server via a local memory bus, which is several orders
of magnitude faster than the network communication in terms of both bandwidth and latency.
This design does not incur network bandwidth overhead because MOSE will transfer only the
encrypted, bulk data over the network.
• Access control enforcement against active adversary: MOSE, running in a secure enclave, securely
enforces access control policies and hides the access patterns against an active adversary corrupting
the users and/or all components of the server except for the CPU. To this end, we define a
security notion for enclave-assisted multi-user ORAM with access control in the presence of an
active adversary. We show that MOSE achieves the security according to this model (see §5.5.4).
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• Scalable to multi-user concurrent access: MOSE achieves a scalable performance by utilizing a
parallel optimization, which achieves maximum concurrency at the server while preserving the
ORAM security. In particular, MOSE is scalable proportional to the available system resources,
e.g., the number of CPU cores in the server. These properties allow MOSE to achieve a high
throughput in serving a large number of concurrent requests from multiple users.
• Implementation and experimental evaluations: We implemented MOSE and evaluated its performance on a commodity desktop that supports SGX, and the experimental result indicated that
our system is efficient and practical (see §5.5.5). For example, with 96 GB database, MOSE can
process 374 concurrent requests while achieving less than one second delay to all requests, and it
can process 788 concurrent requests while achieving, on average, one second delay per request.
MOSE is two orders of magnitudes faster than the state-of-the-art [158] and thus more suitable in
serving multi-users requests. Specifically, MOSE can support more than 300 concurrent users with
a reasonable delay for accessing 96 GB database, compared with 10 users on 13 GB database in
TaoStore with 1 Gbps network bandwidth. To achieve these, MOSE incurs 10 GB of additional
memory usage and doubles the storage overhead.

Based on these results, we believe that MOSE fills an important practical gap between
security and performance, and facilitates secure data outsourcing in practice.

5.5.1 High-Level Architecture
At a high level, MOSE is an outsourced oblivious storage in an untrusted cloud server with a
trusted proxy that handles user’s requests. MOSE runs its trusted logic such as user authentication,
en/decryption, and the ORAM controller logic in the enclave Unlike previous approaches that put
the trusted proxy in a physically separated server on the network, MOSE utilizes hardware-based
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isolation provided by SGX and can guarantee a comparable grade of security to such approaches. To
make an access request to MOSE, a user must be authenticated by the enclave logic and also pass
the access control checking. After that, the enclave will perform oblivious access to the encrypted
database stored in untrusted storage. The trusted logic will decrypt the content, and finally, the
result will be returned to the user. Note that the communication between the user and the enclave
is encrypted by the secret key shared by the remote attestation protocol provided by SGX.
On the other hand, the storage is untrusted, thereby the database and the access control
structure must be encrypted. This proxy construction ensures three security requirements for
data outsourcing. First, the ORAM access from trusted proxy can guarantee the access pattern
obliviousness if our secure enclave does not leak any critical data via side-channel analysis. Second,
to guarantee security, MOSE blocks control-flow side channel via secure (non-branch) comparison
and assignment logic and blocks cache side-channel by accessing the entire data for critical ORAM
components such as requested paths and the stash. Third, for access control and resiliency, MOSE
implements access control logic in the trusted enclave and uses ORAM to obliviously check the
permission, so even when a malicious user colludes with the server, they cannot infer any information
about the honest user(s).
Regarding the performance, MOSE achieves the two following design requirements. First, by
having a trusted proxy in a secure enclave, MOSE eliminates efficiency issues related to network
bandwidth/latency applied between the proxy and the storage server. Instead of communicating
via a network link, the trusted proxy of MOSE uses memory bus, which is two orders of magnitude
faster (273 Gbps vs. 1 Gbps) in bandwidth and much faster (350 ns vs. ≈ 50 ms) in latency. This
design unleashes the bottleneck in serving concurrent requests as in TaoStore [158], which can only
support ten users for achieving their optimal performance.
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Second, MOSE offers scalable performance for supporting multi-user access by speeding up a
single ORAM access via parallelization while processing the entire user access requests sequentially.
Unlike previous works aiming at parallelizing multiple ORAM access in a concurrent manner,
this construction makes MOSE free from the asynchronicity attack. In particular, MOSE applies
parallelization to a single ORAM access request regarding encryption and decryption computations,
and I/O access. MOSE splits each block in ORAM structures into m chunks, where m is the number
of parallel threads. When processing an access request, each thread processes the reading of each
chunk from the storage as well as cryptographic computation in parallel. Thanks to this parallel
construction, MOSE’s performance increases in proportion to the number of parallel threads, and
therefore, it is scalable.

5.5.2 System and Threat Models
5.5.2.1

System Model
Our system is comprised of a data owner, k users, and an untrusted storage server S equipped

with SGX. The data owner owns a database (DB) containing N blocks and grants permissions such
as read (R), read&write (RW) for k users to access N blocks via an access control data structure
(ACDS). Only the data owner can update ACDS entries. The data owner encrypts DB and ACDS
forming EDB and EAC, respectively, both of which are stored in the untrusted memory region of
S such as solid-state drive (SSD). To access an entry in DB/ACDS, the users/data owner interacts
with an enclave created by SGX, which acts as a trusted proxy to execute ORAM operations with S.
For the sake of simplicity, we say accessing S to imply accessing the untrusted memory region
in S. We consider the enclave as the ORAM client (OClient) in our models because it is the only
entity that executes the ORAM protocol with S.
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Inspired by [129, 158], we present the definition of multi-user ORAM with trusted proxy
in Definition 17. Our model differs from the ones in [129] and [158] in the sense that the former
does not use proxy while the latter does not consider the access control enforcement. We denote
−
→ −
→
→
→
the execution of protocol A by OClient with the server S as (−
o C; −
o S ) ← A( i C ; i S ), where the
input/output vectors of two parties are separated by a semicolon (;).
Definition 17 (Enclave-assisted multi-user ORAM with access control). A multi-user ORAM with
access control is comprised of the following (interactive) PPT algorithms:
• (ko , EDB, EAC) ← Gen(1λ , DB, k, N ): It takes as input a security parameter λ, and a database DB
containing N data blocks. It initializes a data structure ACDS managing the access policy of k
users for N blocks. It returns EDB and EAC as the encrypted form of DB and ACDS, respectively.
• (p; ⊥) ← ReadAC(uid, id; EAC): It takes a user ID uid and a block ID id from OClient and EAC
from S as input. It reads the permission on EAC for entries idand uidas p ← EAC(uid, id). It
outputs a permission p ∈ {R, RW, ⊥} to OClient and ⊥ to S.
• (p; EAC0 ) ← WriteAC(uid, id, p; EAC): It takes (uid, id, p) from OClient, where p ∈ {R, W, RW, ⊥}
and EAC from S as input. It updates as EAC(uid, id) ← p. It outputs p to OClient, and the
updated EAC0 to S.
• (data; ⊥) ← ReadDB(uid, id; EAC, EDB): It takes (uid, id) from OClient and (EAC, EDB) from S as
input. It executes (p; ⊥) ← ReadAC(uid, id; EAC). If p ∈
/ {R, RW}, it gets data ← EDB[i], where i
is a dummy block ID. Otherwise, it gets data ← EDB[id]. Finally, it returns data to OClient and
⊥ to S.
• (data; EDB0 ) ← WriteDB(uid, id, data∗ ; EAC, EDB): It takes (uid, id, data∗ ) from OClient, where
data∗ is the new data to be written, and (EDB, EAC) from S as input. It executes (p, ⊥) ←
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ReadAC(uid, id; EAC). If p 6= RW, it gets data ← EDB[i], where i is an dummy block ID. Otherwise,
it gets data ← EDB[id], and updates EDB[id] ← data∗ . It returns data to OClient, and EDB0 to S
indicating EDB is (possibly) updated.
• data0 ← Response(Ks , data): It encrypts data with key Ks .

5.5.2.2

Threat Model
We build MOSE based on following assumptions as its threat model.
We trust the data owner, OClient and the ORAM controller logic, both of which run by the

enclave. We trust the remote attestation protocol by SGX, on which we rely on for verifying the
integrity of the enclave and establishing a secure communication channel between the user and the
enclave. We also trust the hardware key generated by the enclave that seals the ORAM key.
We assume that the server S is completely untrusted except the enclave. We assume attackers
on the server can freely monitor access patterns of the users and the enclave such as network access,
storage and memory access; however, they cannot compromise data confidentiality for such accesses.
We do not trust any of server’s logic that includes virtual machine monitor, operating system and
drivers, software that manages storage, etc. This is a general assumption for a system that utilizes
secure enclaves because SGX isolates and applies encryption to the enclave’s memory space via
hardware mechanisms. Additionally, data users and the server can also be active adversaries, meaning
that they may attempt to inject/tamper their input or even collude with each other to break the
security of other honest users.
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5.5.3 Design of MOSE
5.5.3.1

System Initialization
Figure 5.10 presents the initialization workflow of MOSE. Given a database DB containing

(upto) N block entries being shared among (upto) k users (uid1 , . . . , uidk ), the data owner executes
the Gen algorithm to construct mandatory data structures outsourced to the cloud (Step 1 ). The
algorithms first generates an ORAM symmetric key ko and initializes an access control matrix
ACDS (see §5.5.3.3 for our argument on why matrix structure is preferred) for each user uidi with
each database entry idj . For simplicity, we consider basic permission attributes including read and
write. DB and ACDS are then packaged and encrypted into two separate recursive Circuit-ORAM
structures called EDB and EAC, respectively. Figure 5.11 presents the Gen algorithm, which executes
Circuit-ORAM setup algorithm to construct recursive Circuit-ORAM structures for the database
and the access control structure. After the algorithm is executed, the data owner sends EAC and
EDB as well as their encrypted position map (all in the form of Circuit-ORAM trees) to the server,
all of which are stored in the untrusted memory region (e.g., SSD, at Step 2 ). The data owner
performs a remote attestation of an enclave (provided by SGX) running on the server to ensure if
the enclave is intact and to exchange cryptographic key for establishing an encrypted communication
channel between the data owner and the enclave. To this end, the data owner sends ko to the enclave
via the established channel (Step 3 ). To ensure security, the enclave always keeps ko in the trusted
memory, and stores it to the disk only after encrypting it with the enclave’s hardware key (i.e., data
sealing feature provided by SGX).
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Figure 5.10: MOSE initialization.
MOSE.Gen(λ, DB, k, N ):
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:

ko ← E.Gen(1λ ) and initialize k × N matrix ACDS
EDB ← Circuit-ORAM.Setup(ko , DB)
ACDS[uid, id] ← {R, RW, ⊥} for 1 ≤ id ≤ N and 1 ≤ uid ≤ k
ACDS0 ← Split ACDS into N 0 blocks each of size |B 0 | bits
EAC ← Circuit-ORAM.Setup(ko , ACDS0 )
return (ko , EDB, EAC)

Figure 5.11: Setting up EAC and EDB components in MOSE.
In MOSE, we employ authenticated encryption technique (i.e., AES-CTR for encryption and
HMAC with SHA-256 for authentication) to achieve the integrity for each node in the Circuit-ORAM
structures against a malicious adversary.

5.5.3.2

Handling User Request with Access Control
Figure 5.12 illustrates the workflow of MOSE in processing the user request with the access

control check. Let id be the ID of the block in EDB the user uid wants to access. The user will first
establish a secure channel (via a shared key Ks ) with the enclave via remote attestation. The user
encrypts the 4-tuple (uid, pwd, id, op) with the shared key Ks where pwd is user’s authentication
password and op denotes the access type (e.g., op ∈ {read/write}), and then sends the encrypted
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Figure 5.12: Oblivious access workflow in MOSE.
MOSE.AccessDB(uid, id, op, b∗ ):
0
1: id0 ← (2N · uid + id)/|b0 | # N
 : # DB blocks,
 |B |:
2: b0 ← Circuit-ORAM.Access read, id0 , ⊥; EAC

AC block size

3: perm ← Get the permission of user uid on id from b0
4: v ← ocmp(op, perm) # Check if op = perm
$

5: did ← {1, . . . , N }
∗
6: id ← oupt(v, id, did); b∗ ← oupt(v,
b∗ , {0}|b| )

7: b ← Circuit-ORAM.Access op, id, b∗ ; EDB
8: b ← oupt(v, b, {0}|B| )
9: b0 ← E.EncKs (b)
10: return b0 # Send b0 to uid

Figure 5.13: Processing user request in MOSE.
request to the storage server, which passes it into the enclave (Step 1 ). The enclave decrypts
the tuple (uid, pwd, id,op) using Ks , and authenticates the user with the uid and password pwd.
If authenticated, it derives the ID id0 of a block in EAC containing the permission of uid with id.
The enclave performs recursive Circuit-ORAM accesses on the position map component of EAC
to retrieve the path location (pid0 ) of id0 in EAC (Step 2 ). After that, the enclave performs a
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Circuit-ORAM access on EAC to retrieve the block id0 from the path pid0 (Step 3 ), and checks
whether op is permitted (i.e., op ∈ id0 ) or not (Step 4 ). If op ∈ id0 , the enclave performs recursive
Circuit-ORAM accesses on the position map component of EDB to retrieve the path location of
id (Step 5 ), and then executes a Circuit-ORAM access on EDB to retrieve the requested block id
from the path (Step 6 ). Otherwise, if op ∈
/ id0 , the enclave performs dummy (recursive) accesses
on both EDB’s position map and EDB. Such dummy accesses are necessary in order to prevent the
server from learning whether the user request is permitted or not. Finally, the enclave encrypts the
accessed block (or dummy data if uid is not permitted) with Ks , and then sends the encrypted data
to the user (Step 7 ).
Figure 5.13 presents how our enclave processes the access request algorithmically after the
user is authenticated. The algorithm invokes the recursive Circuit-ORAM protocol (steps 2, 7 ).
Generally speaking, the enclave needs to perform a conditional check to verify whether the user
has permission or not (step step 4) and also require a check when the enclave obliviously accesses
the database block from the path of the Circuit-ORAM tree. To prevent information leakage from
diverging execution on a conditional branch, we implemented the oblivious comparison and oblivious
update functions using CMOV and SETE instructions proposed in [142, 149] defined as follows.

• b ← ocmp(x, y): It takes as input two values x, y and outputs b ← 0 if x = y or b ← 1 otherwise.
• z ← oupt(b, x, y): It takes as input two values x, y and a boolean b, and assigns z ← x if b = 1 or
z ← y otherwise.
Notice that read and write operations (i.e., ReadDB and WriteDB algorithms in Definition 17)
must incur the same procedure presented in Figure 5.13 to achieve security. To be complete,
Figure 5.14 presents the detailed WriteAC algorithm defined in Definition 17. Notice that this process
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MOSE.WriteAC(uid, id, p):
1: id0 ← (2N · uid + id)/|b0 | # N : # DB blocks, |B 0 |:
2: b0 ← Circuit-ORAM.Access(write, id0 , p; EAC)

AC block size

Figure 5.14: User permission update in MOSE.
can only be triggered by the data owner, and the enclave executes this algorithm only after the data
owner is authenticated.

5.5.3.3

Towards Scalable Oblivious Access
To achieve a scalable performance, we optimize each Circuit-ORAM access on encrypted data

components stored in the untrusted memory via secure enclaves and parallelization of computation
and I/O accesses. As briefly discussed in §5.5.1, the state-of-the-art proxy-based oblivious storage
design (TaoStore [158]) pointed out the concurrency limitation of ORAM. That is, any optimization
that parallelizes multiple ORAM access must reply such requests sequentially in their arrival order
to prevent information leakages via their timings. Although multiple user’s requests can arrive and
be processed at the proxy simultaneously, the total response time for a user is equal to the total
processing time of its prior requests plus the processing time for the target request, which includes
local proxy computation and ORAM network communication delay.
Holding the restriction that all requests have to be replied in a sequential order to ensure
security, the only solution to optimize MOSE’s performance is to employ parallelization tricks, not
for the concurrent ORAM access, but for minimizing the processing time of a single request. With
this approach, we can minimize the delay of processing one user request at a time and also make
MOSE scalable by increasing its concurrent request processing performance in proportional to the
number of available CPU cores.
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Another bottleneck that limits the support of concurrent requests is the network bandwidth
overhead. The 1 Gbps link between the proxy and the storage server only allows ten concurrent
access requests in a second, and this number cannot reflect concurrency needs in real-world scenarios.
Thanks to MOSE’s design that utilizes secure enclaves, the network overhead does not exist in
MOSE because the enclave communicate with the storage via a high-speed memory bus, which is a
273 Gbps link for a regular dual-channel DDR4-2133 memory.
MOSE parallelizes computations as well as I/O accesses in each Circuit-ORAM access by
utilizing a multi-core CPU as follows. We split each (real/dummy) block of Circuit-ORAM into
multiple chunks, preferably as the number of parallelized threads, and encrypt each chunk separately
and independently from one another using parallelizable encryption techniques such as AES-CTR.
On performing a Circuit-ORAM access, the enclave spawns multiple threads to access such chunks
in parallel. Each thread is responsible to read/write its assigned chunks from/to the server’s storage
device and also perform encryption/decryption. This parallelization is simple, but more efficient
than [43], in which each CPU is assigned to an independent subtree in the ORAM tree structure,
which might incur a costly synchronization and unbalanced CPU workloads. Moreover, because
it only parallelizes a single ORAM access request, this parallelization is not vulnerable to the
asynchronousity attack [158].
A caveat on applying this parallelization is that meta-data components in the Circuit-ORAM
tree is very small in practice (less than 16 B), the parallelization for meta-data computation is not
beneficial because initializing threads costs some delay. Therefore in MOSE, we use only one thread
to load the encrypted meta-data from the storage disk into the enclave memory space first, and then
creating multiple threads to process block data by chunks.
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In this study, we instantiate ACDS with matrix, which is the basic structure for access control
management. This design decision follows the same scalability principle: optimizing a single request.
Although matrix is storage-costly (sized as # of user × # of database files) than more compact
alternatives such as linked-list, it allows to get the user permission on a specific database block
directly when packaged into the ORAM blocks. Specifically, the cell ACDS[uid, id] can be packaged
into an ORAM block with ID id0 = (2 · uid · N + id)/|B 0 |, where N is the number of database blocks,
and |B 0 | is the selected AC block size (in bits). On the contrary, with a linked-list structure, each
entry for uid stores an array of block IDs that uid can access to (or in reverse). Because the list is
different from each user, one might have to scan at least logarithmic number of entries in the list with
multiple ORAM executions (e.g., [182]), which will incur a high latency. Moreover, such structure
might be vulnerable to information leakage via list size and access timing, which cannot be prevented
by ORAM. Padding can mitigate this leakage, but it incurs more delay and is application-specific.
Note that the entire operation of MOSE is orthogonal to the selection of AC structure, so
any structure can be utilized. However, for the given scalability goal and security requirements, we
decide to sacrifice the storage for the other properties.

5.5.4 Security Analysis
We present the security notion for an enclave-assisted multi-user ORAM with access control,
and show how MOSE achieves them. Our model is inspired from [128, 129, 158] with the following
differences. In [128, 129], the security model captures multi-user ORAM and access control without a
trusted proxy (modeled as a secure enclave in MOSE). In [158], it captures a multi-user ORAM with
a trusted proxy over the asynchronous network setting but does not offer access control measures.
In MOSE, the enclave resides on an untrusted server and therefore, the network setting does not
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apply. We consider two main adversary properties including maliciousness, where they can actively
inject/tamper with the input and collusion, where both the user and server can collude with each
other.
Intuitively, an enclave-assisted multi-user ORAM with access control security is secure if the
server and an arbitrary subset of users, aside from what is trivially leaked by corrupted users, cannot
learn any information regarding the access patterns of honest users. We define this notion as follows.
Definition 18 (Enclave-assisted multi-user ORAM with access control security). Consider the following
experiment between an adversary A, which contains a set of malicious and colluding entities (e.g.,
users and server) and a challenger C (which works as OClient).
• Setup: C generates a database DB with N blocks for k users and initializes two empty lists UL
and QL. It executes (ko , EAC, EDB) ← Gen(1λ , DB, k, N ), and returns EAC and EDB to A.
• Learning phase:
– OaddU(uid): This oracle adds a user and its secret key to the list of colluding users as
UL ← UL ∪ {uid, kS }.
– OAccess(op, uid, id, data): If op = read, it executes ReadDB(uid, id; EAC, EDB). Otherwise, it
executes WriteDB(uid, id, data; EAC, EDB) (i.e., when op = write). It then executes data0 ←
Response(Ks , data) and add oi = hop, uid, id, datai, AP(oi ) to QL, where AP(o)i is the access
pattern when executing WriteDB, ReadDB and Response protocols.
• Distinguish phase: A prepares two access requests o1 = hop1 , uid1 ,
id1 , data1 i and o2 = hop2 , uid2 , id2 , data2 i.
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– Challenge(o1 , o2 ): A queries the challenge oracle with two access requests o1 and o2 defined
above. If uid1 ∈ UL or uid2 ∈ UL, C aborts. Otherwise, C flips a random coin b ← {0, 1}
and executes ReadDB or WriteDB depending on opb and returns AP(ob ) to the adversary.
The adversary can continue the learning phase with the exception of calling OaddU(uid1 ) or
OaddU(uid2 ). A eventually outputs a bit b0 to indicate if AP(ob ) corresponds to o1 or o2 .
At the end of the game, the adversary wins if b0 = b.

We also require that only the authorized users can learn about the database contents.
Moreover, the adversary can not violate data integrity.
Theorem 10. MOSE is secure by Definition 18 if the underlying ORAM and IND-CPA encryption
scheme are secure.

Proof. The game starts by running the Gen algorithm to initialize EDB, EAC and the ORAM key ko .
During the learning phase, the adversary can corrupt any user of its choice by simply querying its
key. A can adaptively query the OAccess oracle on access requests of its choice. At some point,
A decides to query the Challenge oracle. A prepares two access requests o1 = hop1 , uid1 , id1 , data1 i
and o2 = hop2 , uid2 , id2 , data2 i. Note that to rule out the trivial cases, we require that uid1 ∈
/ U L or
uid2 ∈
/ UL.
Upon initiating the Challenge oracle, C commits to a random coin b ← {0, 1}. For a
ob = hopb , uidb , idb , data0 , data∗ i submitted to the Challenge oracle, whether opb is a read or a
write operation, two ORAM accesses take place. The first ORAM access is to EAC to determine
the permission of uidb on idb . When (pb , EAC0 ) ← hReadACA(EAC) (uidb , idb )i is called, EAC is
accessed by the underlying ORAM and the output (e.g., pb ) is returned to C. After determining
279

uidb ’s permission on idb , C performs either a real or dummy ORAM access for data request ob on
EDB. This leads to memory access pattern AP(ob ) on EDB where the output is returned through
data ← hResponse(Ks , data)i to uidb .
We now analyze the view of A for the access patterns and transcripts generated through
the above accesses. First, both EAC and EDB are encrypted via an IND-CPA encryption scheme
at all times. Second, when (pb , EAC0 ) ← hReadACA(EAC) (uidb , idb )i is called, A does not have any
view on outputs to C, therefore, it cannot infer any information about pb . Moreover, since MOSE
leverages a secure ORAM, to access EAC, any memory access pattern generated by ORAM is
(computationally) indistinguishable by Definition 5 [41]. Third, based on the permission pb , whether
A has to perform a real or dummy access for request ob on EDB, due to the security of the underlying
ORAM, the generated access patterns AP(ob ) for b ∈ {0, 1} is (computationally) indistinguishable
by Definition 5. Lastly, the output of Challenge to A is encrypted with an IND-CPA encryption and
therefore, indistinguishable for A. In all the above cases, for A to distinguish between AP(ob ) based
on o1 and o2 , it has to break the underlying ORAM or IND-CPA encryption.
Corollary 10. MOSE offers data secrecy and tamper resistance against malicious adversary.

Proof. Data secrecy in MOSE is based to the IND-CPA property of the underlying encryption scheme.
As pointed out in the above proof, EDB and EAC remain encrypted at all the times via an IND-CPA
encryption. Moreover, the returned values are also encrypted in the Response algorithm via the
underlying IND-CPA encryption. The tamper resistance of MOSE is based on the underling keyed
hash function (e.g., SHA-256) which is used to provide HMAC for each database block. Finally, the
integrity of the enforced access control mechanism ensures users cannot access (read/write) that
they do not have permission on.
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Although the enclave’s data is isolated and encrypted, attackers could indirectly learn about
the data via cache [78, 122, 134] or page-fault [31, 83, 187] side-channel attacks. Specifically, the
execution that retrieves a block from a read path of ORAM tree or accesses stash could leak
information related to data to such side channels. In this regard, MOSE provide defenses against
such attacks. On one hand, we access all blocks in a single path and the stash per each ORAM
access to prevent cache side-channel attacks. On the other hand, we implement our logic in the
enclave using CMOV instructions to remove conditional branches that potentially leaks via page-fault
side-channel when the enclave verifies the user permission.

5.5.5 Experimental Evaluation
5.5.5.1

Implementation
We implemented MOSE in C/C++ using the SGX SDK v1.7. Our implementation contains

approximately 2,982 lines of code for the untrusted modules and 780 lines of code for trusted modules.
We leveraged sgx_aes_ctr_encrypt() and sgx_read_rand() functions in the SGX SDK library, for
encrypting ORAM with AES-CTR mode and random number generation (via the RDRAND instruction),
respectively. We used pthread for spawning multiple threads to support parallelism in secure enclave.
Remark that we stored the position map components on the untrusted memory in the form of
recursive Circuit-ORAM structures. We also stored the stash components on the untrusted memory,
which are encrypted and loaded as plaintext only to the enclave memory space chunk-by-chunk (an
ECALL function handles this). In the following, we outline the configurations and methodology of

our evaluation (in §5.5.5.2), and then we evaluate the effectiveness of MOSE in terms of the delay
when handling single/multiple client request(s) with/without optimization and the storage overhead.
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5.5.5.2

Configurations and Methodology
We used a commodity desktop supporting SGX, which is equipped with a six-core Intel Core

i7-8700K CPU @ 3.70 GHz, 32 GB of dual-channel DDR4-2133 memory, and 4 TB NVMe SSD
drive.
We constructed a database DB containing 225 (33,554,432) random database blocks of size
24 KB (4 KB × six threads). We assumed basic 2-bit access policies (read and/or write) for 214
(16,384) users on such 225 blocks.
We evaluated the performance of MOSE in terms of latency, throughput, and memory usage,
by varying the database size, number of cores and ORAM cache level (see §5.5.5.3). Afterwards, we
applied various optimizations such as position map caching and k-top level caching (see §5.5.5.5).
We then analyze the effectiveness of MOSE in the multi-user environment, compare its performance
with TaoStore [158] under various database sizes. (see §5.5.5.6). We did not compare with other
proxy-based techniques [20, 158, 167] because their design is insecure against asynchronous timing
attack (see §5.2). We also did not compare MOSE with non-proxy ORAM primitives [22, 41] because
they incur high communication/computation overhead due to some cryptographic operations. For
scalability testing, we created a number of virtual users that send concurrent access requests to
MOSE with 50 ms network latency. We setup the following system parameters.

• MOSE: We selected standard parameters for Circuit-ORAM: bucket size Z = 2 with deterministic
eviction and stash size |S|= 80. To exploit parallelism on accessing the ORAM structure from
the NVMe disk drive, we divided each block of EDB into nt 4 KB chunks, where nt = 6 being
the number of threads for parallelism. We instantiated ACDS with a matrix for access control
management of 214 users on 225 data blocks. We divided ACDS into 12- KB blocks, and built
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recursive Circuit-ORAM trees for such blocks and their position map. Similar to EDB, we divided
each EAC block into nt chunks, and each chunk is of size 2 KB. For the recursion, we selected
the compression ratio r = 256.
• TaoStore [158]: We launched a simulation experiment for TaoStore with a conservative approach.
Our virtual TaoStore used Path-ORAM because it was used by default in [158] and is the most
efficient ORAM for (networked) client-server applications. We used the Path-ORAM standard
parameters: Z = 4, |S|= 80 [169]. We selected 1 Gbps of network throughputs with 10 ms
latency for simulating the execution of the Path-ORAM on the proxy. We excluded all execution
delays at the storage server and the proxy such as I/O access, decryption/encryption, thread
synchronization, etc. and only simulated the network delay of transmitting Path-ORAM paths
caused by executing Path-ORAM protocols (in parallel) over the network between the proxy and
the server. Our logic behind this experiment is that the network delay is inherent so it must be
included, and adding any of implementation to the server and proxy will incur more delay on
the execution side. Any actual implementation of TaoStore will involve more delay than this
simulation.

5.5.5.3

Single Request Processing Time
We first present MOSE’s response time in handling a single user request for various database

sizes from 6 GB to 768 GB, while not applying any optimizations such as k-level cache, etc. (see
Table 5.2). The size of database will affect the path length, so our enclave will read more data from
the ORAM, and therefore will result in more delay. In the base-case design, the average total delay of
MOSE is from 9.21 ms to 28.05 ms. In MOSE, the accesses on EAC and EDB can be slightly pipelined.
That is, right after finishing the access on EAC from one request, MOSE can issue the access on EAC
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Table 5.2: Delay of base-case MOSE in processing one user request.
DB
Size
6 GB
12 GB
24 GB
48 GB
96 GB
192 GB
384 GB
768 GB

Acc. Control (ms)
pmEAC
EAC
1.46
2.77
1.64
2.78
2.36
3.49
2.51
3.79
2.56
3.92
2.78
4.13
3.52
4.84
3.67
5.14

pmEAC

pmEDB

EAC

Total
(ms)
9.21
9.62
13.03
16.05
18.95
21.66
25.03
28.05

EDB
Comp.

I/O

768

Comp.

I/O

384
DB Size (GB)

Database (ms)
pmEDB
EDB
1.43
3.55
1.54
3.72
2.55
4.63
3.46
6.29
4.94
7.53
6.05
8.7
7.06
9.61
7.97
11.27

Comp.

I/O

192

Comp.

I/O

96

Comp.

I/O
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Comp.
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Figure 5.15: Delay breakdown of MOSE on a single user request.
of the next request while processing EDB access of the previous request. This pipelining strategy
allows MOSE to achieve the throughputs ranging from 200 ops to 53 ops for database sizes from
6 GB to 768 GB, respectively.
Note that these numbers do not reflect the optimized performance. Next, we will further
analyze factors that affect the total delay in MOSE, and then optimize them.

284

5.5.5.4

Delay Breakdown
We dissect the cost of a single request to understand the factors that affect MOSE’s perfor-

mance. As illustrated in Figure 5.15, MOSE has two major sources of delay: (i) the I/O accesses
between enclave and disk incurred by Circuit-ORAM via encrypted read/write operations; (ii) the
secure computation (e.g., decryption/re-encryption/oblivious update operations) in the enclave. In
the breakdown, we can observe that most delays in MOSE are caused by four different I/O accesses:
The position map for the access control, the access control data, the position map for the database,
and the database block. For the database accesses, the delay is caused by their tree ORAM structure,
where each read/eviction operation requires accessing O(log N ) blocks located in random positions
on the disk. For the position map accesses, 92% of its delay is caused by I/O access (uses only 8% of
time for computation) because it is stored in the recursive ORAM structures, which require multiple
access rounds. In the next section, we will evaluate optimization techniques applied to MOSE to
reduce this I/O delay.

5.5.5.5

Optimized MOSE
To reduce the single-request delay, we implemented various optimization techniques including

caching and parallelization to minimize the I/O access and computation delays.
We first cache the entire position map, stash, and metadata, all of which are required
to make an ORAM access, in the main memory. For instance, the size of position map is only
5.6 MB for a 12 GB DB and 47.8 MB for a 96 GB DB, while the size of stash and metadata are
approximately 400 MB. Due to their relatively small sizes, maintaining them in the main memory
incurs a low overhead. The second and third bars in Figure 5.16 illustrate the outcome of this
optimization. Caching the entire position map reduces the I/O delay from 14.93 ms to 8.03 ms
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Figure 5.16: Impact of caching on the I/O delay and memory usage of MOSE scheme.
(46.21% reduction). Moreover, caching the stash and meta-data components reduces I/O delay from
8.03 ms to 3.01 ms (62.51% reduction) on top of the position map caching. In summary, applying
the caching mechanisms reduces MOSE’s I/O delay from 14.93 ms to 3.01 ms, which is 79.83% delay
reduction (see the third bar of Figure 5.16), while incurring ≈ 500 MB of additional memory usage.
We also implemented the k-top caching strategy proposed in [127], which caches the first k
levels of the EDB and EAC structures, to reduce I/O delay in ORAM access. The latter bars (4th +)
of Figure 5.16 illustrates the outcome of the caching. Increasing the number of cached levels reduces
the I/O delay with the cost of a higher memory usage, however, note that performance gain increases
in linear (by reading H − k blocks where H is the tree height), and memory overhead increases
exponentially (caching 2(k+1) blocks for k-top caching). In this regard, we should set a practical limit
of cached level by which the server can accommodate its memory overhead. Overall, we can reduce
the I/O delay of MOSE from 14.93 ms to 0.68 ms by using around 10 GB of additional memory. As
shown in Figure 5.16, caching around 50-70% levels of EDB and EAC provides a reasonable memory
and I/O delay trade-off (e.g., 11–13 levels with 1 GB RAM usage for 96 GB DB).
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Figure 5.17: Impact of CPU cores on the efficiency and scalability of MOSE.
MOSE also leverages the parallelism in a multi-core CPU to speed up encryption/decryption
operations in the enclave, and this optimization makes MOSE scalable. The purple line in Figure 5.17
illustrates the impact of utilizing multiple CPU cores in MOSE’s computation logic. The performance
of MOSE increases in proportion to the number of CPU cores that MOSE uses. The actual gain
by a multi-core CPU is slightly lower than linear increment, e.g., using 6 physical cores improved
around 4× of the performance. This is because creating and assigning multiple threads into the
corresponding physical CPU core costs a fixed and remarkable overhead.
When all optimization techniques above are applied, MOSE will take 3.74 ms in total to
process an access request on a 24 KB block in a 96 GB DB, which consists of 0.56 ms I/O delay and
3.18 ms computation delay. This allows MOSE to process around 394 op/s with pipelining strategy.
MOSE’s performance is scalable, i.e., MOSE performs better with a more number of CPU
cores on the server. The blue line in Figure 5.17 illustrates how the number of concurrent users for
supporting less than one second delay increases as the number of cores that MOSE used for the
experiment increases.
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Figure 5.18: Performance of MOSE vs. TaoStore under 1 Gbps network.
5.5.5.6

Multi-User Concurrent Access Performance
We ran an experiment on a virtual network that assumes 50 ms for the user network latency,

and it showed that on a 96 GB DB, MOSE can serve 374 concurrent requests, each accessing a
24 KB block without incurring more than a second delay for 374 users. In case if the server’s
service-level agreement (SLA) is to ensure average expected delay for each user to be one second,
MOSE can serve around 788 concurrent requests.
We compare the performance of MOSE with TaoStore [158] with varied database sizes.
We considered ten concurrent requests27 as originally presented in [158] for a fair performance
comparison. For the experiment, we simulated the performance of TaoStore according to 24 KB
block size and varied database sizes ranging from 1 GB to 1 TB. Figure 5.18 presents the delay of
MOSE and TaoStore. Note that since our database and block size are larger than that of [158], the
reported delay of TaoStore in Figure 5.18 is higher than what is originally presented in [158]. Given
TaoStore is equipped with a highly dedicated network (i.e., 1 Gbps throughput), MOSE is still
27

The notion of concurrency in TaoStore is limited by the communication bandwidth between the server and the
trusted proxy. The reason for having maximum ten concurrent users in their evaluation is mainly because ten
concurrent requests will max-out the bandwidth. Having more request than ten at the same time will drastically
degrade its performance, as stated in their paper.
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around 34.80–37.8× faster than TaoStore where MOSE (with optimization) achieved (on average)
13–21 ms delay for each request, compared with 525–731ms (on average) in TaoStore.

5.5.5.7

Storage Overhead
MOSE stores four encrypted components in the server’s untrusted storage device: EAC and

EDB, and their position maps. All of them are in the form of Circuit-ORAM tree structures, which
incur a constant (≈ 2×) storage blowup. Specifically, for the 96 GB DB with 214 users, EDB and
EAC cost approximately 206.8 GB and 103.7 GB, respectively. The position map components cost
approximately 48.8 MB (1/2000 of DB size).
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Chapter 6: Conclusion

In this dissertation, we developed a series of privacy-enhancing technologies featuring a high
level of privacy and security while offering mandatory functionalities for critical cyberinfrastructures.
We summarize our contributions as follows.

• Efficient searchable encryption techniques for critical cloud storage services: We introduced
IM-DSSE frameworks and FS-DSSE scheme, both of which offer mandatory security and privacy

features (e.g., forward privacy, backward privacy and size obliviousness) against statistical analysis
attacks, while achieving a high level of efficiency (i.e., low end-to-end delay, low computation
overhead).
• Efficient distributed ORAM schemes for data outsourcing applications: We proposed novel distributed ORAM schemes for data outsourcing applications including S3 ORAM and MACAO.
Both S3 ORAM and MACAO harness secret sharing techniques, which offer efficient homomorphic
properties to achieve desirable performance and security such as low delay, low storage, low communication and computation overhead, and security against active adversaries. The experiments
on commodity cloud platform confirmed the efficiency of S3 ORAM and MACAO compared with
the state-of-the-art.
• Efficient oblivious data structures for secure searchable encryption and database services: We
proposed DOD-DSSE and ODSE as oblivious data structures to mitigate/seal the search and
update pattern leakage on the encrypted index in searchable encryption. These techniques offer
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higher efficiency than the composition of generic ORAM and searchable encryption. We proposed
OMAT and OTREE as oblivious data structures that can be integrated with tree-based ORAM
scheme to enable oblivious queries on legacy database management systems (e.g., MongoDB,
SQL). The experiments on real commodity cloud platform confirmed the efficiency of the proposed
techniques.
• Efficient hardware-supported data storage and query platforms: We designed POSUP, an efficient
oblivious search and update platform for personal data outsourcing. By using Intel SGX to
implement ORAM controller directly on the untrusted server, POSUP mitigates the network
impact of ORAM, thereby featuring very low latency when tested on very large dataset with
commodity hardware. We further designed MOSE, an oblivious storage platform for multi-user
setting sharing the same database. By implementing proxy logics with Intel SGX, MOSE supports
oblivious access, access control and concurrent access in a much more efficient manner than the
state-the-art solutions.

6.1

Future Work
We briefly outline some of our potential research directions as follows.
We first focus on building practical oblivious distributed access systems. Distributed File

System (DFS) allows multiple clients to efficiently store and access the files remotely on the server(s)
anytime anywhere. It is critical to enable essential security services on DFS such as oblivious
access, access control, confidentiality and integrity. Although ORAM can offer ideal breach-resiliency
properties (e.g., oblivious access, confidentiality, integrity) for DFS, there is still a critical research
gap toward the integration of ORAM with DFS architecture. For instance, ORAM is mostly designed
in the single-client setting, and therefore it may not be directly compatible with the multi-client
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setting in DFS, which requires access control and parallel access features. Some client-efficient
ORAMs only offer security against semi-honest adversaries [89]. In practice, an active adversary
(e.g., malware) will likely be present in the DFS execution environment, who may inject malicious
inputs to compromise the system security and integrity. Meanwhile, the extension of such ORAMs
into the malicious setting may completely invalidate all client-efficiency gains [44, 54].
Toward filling this gap, we consider two research tasks as follows. First, we will propose
several new ORAM schemes for the DFS setting. Specifically, we will create new multi-client ORAM
schemes, which offer critical DFS features such as parallel access, access control enforcement and
authorization. We will seek possible solutions that rely only on cryptographic primitives. Our
second research task will focus on the creation of a full-fledged Oblivious DFS (ODFS) platform by
integrating modern DFS techniques with the new ORAM schemes. We will seek the most efficient
DFS and then analyze its unique characteristics and system requirements for the integration. This
research is expected to enable breach-resilient oblivious file systems that can serve as the core
building block to construct trustworthy and privacy-preserving data storage and analytics platforms
with a high level of security and efficiency.
Our second research direction focuses on efficient privacy-preserving machine learning. Machine Learning (ML) serves as the backbone of numerous intelligent applications such as virtual
assistant platforms, intrusion detection, automation and sophisticated surveillance. Since the data
to be processed by ML algorithms may be sensitive (e.g., personal data, location, biometrics), it is
critical to ensure their security and privacy during the processing. However, there is a substantial
research gap toward the creation of such secure, privacy-preserving yet practical ML techniques.
Existing Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning (PPML) methods generally rely on MPC and Fully
HE (FHE) techniques. Simply using these functional encryptions in the context of big data processing
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may suffer from not only high computation/communication overhead but also accuracy degradation.
For example, FHE and MPC offer limited arithmetic operations (e.g., addition, multiplication),
which may not be sufficient to realize complex yet critical ML subroutines (e.g., non-linear activation
layer, max-pooling functions). As a result, existing PPMLs [72, 133, 157] generally simplified ML
algorithms (e.g., limited non-linear layer, no convolution, limited number of instances) to fit with
these techniques, and therefore, the accuracy is decreased. The extension of FHE and MPC protocols
to the malicious setting incurs high communication and computation overhead.
Given that MPC, HE and TEE are three major tools to enable encrypted computation, we
will investigate the synergies between them to achieve the optimal trade-offs in terms of security,
performance and efficiency for specific application requirements. For instance, we will address the
security limitations of MPC-based approaches (e.g., collusion, active security) by bootstrapping them
with TEE. We will develop secure fundamental arithmetic operations (e.g., addition, multiplication,
division, factorization, floating-point operations) under the MPC and TEE composition models,
which will be then used as the core building blocks to develop kernel PPML algorithms. The strategic
use of secure hardware to complement algorithmic limitations of MPC will enable a breach-, collisionand failure-resilient execution of ML techniques in the untrusted environments. We will propose new
PPML schemes based on the hybrid composition between FHE and MPC techniques, in such a way
that the computation and communication burdens are balanced, to achieve an optimal performance
regarding specific application/system constraints. As polynomial approximations in the activation
functions may impact both the complexity and accuracy of ML algorithms, we will also seek a
correct approximation method for each privacy-preserving scenario to achieve a good efficiency and
performance trade-off. Finally, instead of simplifying ML algorithms to fit with the underlying
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cryptographic primitives, we will realize their native form by synergizing efficient MPC, HE and
TEEs altogether to preserve their original accuracy.
We will also focus on designing efficient privacy-preserving data (pre)processing and feature
extraction schemes. Although these processing phases may greatly impact the overall efficiency of
the system, they are less likely to be investigated in the privacy-preserving context. We will then
build full-fledged PPML platforms for some critical applications (e.g., anomaly detection, biometric
identification/authentication) by harnessing all the developed techniques along with optimizations.
To this end, we will seek the possible integration between these new PPML platforms with the
oblivious access systems proposed above. This integration is expected to enable breach-resilient
multi-functional cloud platforms that can offer privacy-preserving data storage and ML services
simultaneously.
Finally, although PPMLs based on functional encryption offer a very high level of privacy,
they are not flexible due to their strict bond to a certain ML algorithm. Because many new ML
techniques are being proposed and renovated regularly, such cryptographic-based PPMLs must be
re-customized frequently to cope with these changes. Therefore, We will also investigate alternative
approaches such as federated learning or differential privacy, which focus more on preserving the
privacy of the input/output data rather than the entire ML computation. Although these approaches
may not offer the same level of security as cryptography-based PPMLs, they are more flexible and
efficient to be adopted with rapid changes in ML technologies while offering an adequate level of
privacy.
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